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DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE POST-COMMUNIST MILITARIES:
U.S. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE
CZECH AND RUSSIAN MILITARIES

BY

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THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
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U.S. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE CZECH AND RUSSIAN MILITARIES


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


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


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To Mark

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	Antiballistic Missile
ACR	Army of the Czech Republic
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AP	Associated Press
BALTOPS	Baltic Operations
CBM	Confidence Building Measure
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJCS	Commander Joint Chiefs of Staff
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSA	Czechoslovak Army
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSPA	Czechoslovak People's Army
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction
CZ	Czech Republic
DAO	Defense Attaché Office
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DISAM	Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DOD	Department of Defense
DCS	Direct Commercial Sales
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
EIMET	Expanded International Military Education and Training
EEU	European Economic Union
EU	European Union
EUCOM	European Command
FAO	Foreign Area Officer
FAM	Familiarization Tour
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FSU	Former Soviet Union
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accounting Office
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
G-7	Group of Seven
HQ	Headquarters
ID	Infantry division

INSS	Institute of National Strategic Studies
IWG	Interagency Working Group
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
J-5	Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCTP	Joint Contact Team Program
JPRS	Joint Publication Research Service
KSC	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
MAG	Military Assistance Group
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN	Most Favored Nation
MLT	Military Liaison Team
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MP	Member of Parliament
MPA	Main Political Administration
MWR	Morale Welfare and Recreation
NA	Not applicable
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDU	National Defense University
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NIS	New Independent States
O-6	Colonel
OAS	Organization of American States
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSIA	On-Site Inspection Agency
PACOM	Pacific Command
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PME	Professional Military Education
POC	Point of Contact
POW	Prisoner of War
PPBS	Planned Programmed and Budgeting System
RAF	Royal Air Force
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SEED	Support for East European Democracy
SPACECOM	Space Command

SRF	Strategic Rocket Forces
STRATCOM	Strategic Command
TCT	Traveling Contact Team
TDY	Temporary Duty
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
UCMJ	Unified Code of Military Justice
UMA	Military Affairs
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UPI	United Press International
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFA	United States Air Force Academy
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USAFNG	United States Air Force National Guard
USAREUR	United States Armies in Europe
USARNG	United States Army National Guard
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USEUCOM	United State European Command
USIA	United States Information Agency
USN	United States Navy
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War world has witnessed a virtual explosion of efforts at democratization within the former Soviet bloc. The proliferation of post-communist states has challenged the advanced democracies to contribute in appropriate ways to the task of democratic consolidation across all aspects of these transitioning states. The United States' historic commitment to the promotion of democracy abroad, coupled with the increasing acceptance of the idea that the expansion of democracies in the international system increases the likelihood of global peace, has made democratization a top priority of US post-Cold War foreign policy.

Most scholars have focused on the role of civilian institutions in their analyses of the democratic transitions of the post-communist states, but the democratization of the military institutions of these states should not be ignored. Post-communist militaries are key actors in the process of democratic consolidation. The successful democratic transition of post-communist military institutions is essential to protecting the democratic gains achieved by society overall, and for ensuring that coercive force is not used to reverse them.

The existing civil-military relations literature contributes little to understanding the problem of the democratic transition of post-communist militaries. The classic argument of civil-military relations theorists has been that military professionalism is easily transferable across political systems. Since a hallmark of military professionalism is allegiance to civilian governments which come to power through legitimate means, civil-

military relations theorists assume that transitioning political regimes pose no particular problems for military professionals. The general characterization of civil-military relations proposed by Huntington and seconded by the field is that the focus of civil-military relations is “governmental control” of the military.¹ Neither the type of political system exerting governmental control nor the special problem of transitioning between political systems is taken into account.

However, field research across many of the post-communist states between June 1994 and April 1995 revealed that the assumptions prominent in the existing civil-military relations literature about the static nature of civilian supremacy and military professionalism do not fit the realities of the transitioning states. When states transition to democratic political control, consideration must be given to *how* officers come to accept this new form of civilian supremacy. Similarly, when states adopt democratic values, consideration must be given to *how* professionalism adapts so that the state’s democratic values are manifested in democratic military professionalism.

The main thesis of this study is that political systems matter and are, indeed, determinants of patterns of civil-military relations. Authoritarian and democratic political systems produce different forms of civilian control and military professionalism.

Consequently, shifts in political systems necessarily result in changed patterns of civilian

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, “Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical Statement,” in *Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research*, eds. Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), p. 380. Among those in agreement with Huntington are S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962); Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); Claude E. Welch Jr., *Civilian Control of the Military* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976); Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) and in *The Political Influence of the Military*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

control and military professionalism. A new form of military professionalism is needed to ensure that the militaries in the post-communist states become democratically accountable and reflect democratic principles while also functioning as effective instruments of national security. Militaries in transitioning states must set their sights on achieving these goals although they are burdened with the weight of institutional norms formed while in service to authoritarian states.

I will argue that concentrating on two critical dimensions of the military democratization problem -- democratic political control and democratic military professionalism -- will address the democratization needs which transitioning militaries face. This study explores the dimensions of democratic political control and military professionalism in-depth and identifies specific issue areas on which both internal and external policymakers can focus to further the democratization of post-communist militaries. Distinct patterns of *democratic* political control and *democratic* military professionalism must be built in transitioning states. Building these patterns should be the aim of all involved in the military democratization process in the post-communist states.

I have developed a general framework that links professional norms with the infusion of democratic values and which recognizes the need for democratic socialization in transitioning states. While drawn primarily from American practice, it has potentially great applicability to the transitioning states, when adapted to their historical experiences, habits, and current needs. The model attempts to delineate the norms and habits that must be developed within transitioning militaries as they progress toward the goal of democratic consolidation.

I suggest that the goal of achieving democratic political control of the military in transitioning states can be advanced by focusing on specific aspects of the civil-military relationship. First, what constitutional provisions are in place to ensure that the mechanisms for civilian control are sufficient and clear codified? Second, do democratically accountable civilian leaders control the budgetary authorizations of the military, and is sufficient authority and expertise vested in both executive and parliamentary bodies, as applicable, to adequately exercise democratic oversight of the military? Is there a group of civilian experts in military affairs to advise civilian democratic decision makers and balance the opinions of the military chiefs? Are the operations of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) transparent and is the MOD accountable to civilian authorities with legitimate authority to oversee its work? Finally, how is the military responsive to the democratic expectations of society at large? Does the military have the trust of society to be its guardians of societal freedoms?

The second part of the model focuses on achieving the goal of democratic military professionalism. I enumerate specific criteria that ensure the presence of democratic norms and practices in the development of transitioning military institutions. This framework weighs heavily the transitioning military's objective of defending the democratic state while remaining true to democratic societal values, such as the observance of basic civil rights and the just treatment of military personnel.

Specifically, I look at patterns of recruitment and retention, promotion and advancement, officership and leadership, education and training, norms of political influence, prestige and public relations, and the compatibility of military and societal

values. I stress how concentrating on the development of democratic norms in each of these elements of military professionalism can enhance both the democratic accountability and competence of the armed forces of transitioning states.

Building these patterns of *democratic* political control and *democratic* military professionalism should be the aim of all involved in the military democratization process in post-communist states. An examination of the US military's democratization programs in place in the former Soviet bloc, however, clearly shows that no such understanding of the scope of the military democratization problem exists among US policymakers.

The case study method is used to explore the specific problems of military democratization and democratization assistance in Russia and the Czech Republic. I chose these cases for both theoretical and practical reasons. First, I thought it was important to include Russia because of its enormous geo-political influence in the region and because there are many similarities between its model of civil-military relations in the Soviet era and the pattern of civil-military relations that existed in the Eastern European states at the beginning of their democratic transitions. The Czech Republic was chosen as an example of a case that has made great overall strides in the process of democratic transition. I wanted to see what difference significant overall progress in the process of democratization makes in the democratic transition of the military and what particular military democratization problems persist in even the most advanced cases.

The dimensions of the military democratization problem are applied to these post-communist military institutions with the goal of assessing progress made and democratization needs that remain as the transitions progress. An analysis of the program

activity of the US military democratization programs shows negligible progress toward achieving their goal of facilitating the democratic transition of post-communist militaries. The prescription of inappropriate solutions and the overall lack of effectiveness of the US endeavor stems from the failure of policymakers to understand the scope of the military democratization problem.

This dissertation is an attempt to contribute both a diagnosis and a prescription for the problem of military democratization in post-communist states so that it can be addressed effectively. First, I have identified specific theoretical shortcomings in the classical civil-military relations literature and adapted some of these classical assumptions to the problems of transitioning states. Much work remains, however, for theorists to build the theoretical concepts needed to guide the successful democratic transitions of authoritarian military institutions. Second, the identification of particular issue areas and desired behaviors across the dimensions of democratic political control and democratic military professionalism offers policymakers specific suggestions for making their democratization programs in the region more effective. The hope is that this study will assist both theorists and policymakers better understand the problem of military democratization. The models developed and the conclusions drawn in this endeavor may be imperfect, but its undertaking is a beginning toward solving the problem of military democratization in transitioning states, and, consequently, may make some contribution toward their democratic consolidation.

CHAPTER 1

A Survey of the Promotion of Democratic Values in American Foreign Policy

Introduction

American foreign policy has been characterized as a successful blend of democratic idealism and realistic concern for American national interests.¹ “Americanism” has been defined as an approach to the world characterized by the key components of morality and principle. An accent on principles and moral norms has been a continuing feature of US behavior, ebbing and flowing throughout American diplomacy depending on circumstance.² Since World War II, especially, Americans have become accustomed to seeing a connection between the preservation and extension of democratic values and government and their long-term national security.³

But the struggle for the control of foreign policy throughout the life of the American republic has centered on the competition for preeminence between two opposing schools of thought. The analytic or realist school compels national leaders to distinguish between essential national security interests of the state and other demands of secondary importance. Realists assume that the forces of human nature inevitably result in a world of opposing interests and conflict. Moral principles can never be fully realized; therefore, states should seek to balance interests rather than rely on adherence to universal

¹ Jerald A. Combs, *The History of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), p. vii.

² Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.), pp. 285-286.

³ Cathal J. Nolan, *Principled Diplomacy: Security and Rights in US Foreign Policy* (London: Greenwood Press, 1993), p. 7.

moral principles.⁴ The primary task of policymakers executing this approach to foreign policy is to engage perpetually in the process of determining the nation's hierarchy of interests. Once determined, these interests are protected against the traditional interests of other states whose own competition for power has implications for the pursuit of US interests.⁵

Alternatively, idealists approach foreign policy with a hierarchy of interests, but moral claims prevail. Idealists measure foreign policies positively not to the extent that a nation's power position is improved, but according to the degree that such values as the rule of law, self-determination, honoring contracts, respecting international law, human rights and civil liberties, and democratic processes and institutions are represented. Idealists assume the essential goodness of human nature and believe that a social order can be built on the acceptance of universal moral principles.⁶ Idealists focus on eliminating power from world affairs in order to pursue the common interests of mankind, or on using power only in pursuit of moral aims. The realist aim is the accumulation of power for maximum influence in the international system.⁷

On the whole, American foreign policy has been characterized by the conflicting desires to foster idealist aims without forfeiting the realist benefits of advancing US global power and influence. The US commitment to such principles as support for open societies, popularly elected governments, and the construction of a morally based international system has at times been compromised in order to achieve realist ends. But

⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 3.

⁵ Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 351-356.

⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 3-4, 10.

⁷ Norman A. Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. viii.

the perceived obligation to promote democracy abroad has been a constant, if not always realized, value in American foreign policy. What has varied, however, is the means and substance by which this national mission has been carried out.

The distinction between idealist and realist forces has become blurred in recent years, however, because of the ascendance of the idea of the “democratic peace.” Those who support this concept contend that the promotion of democracy is not strictly an idealist preference because empirical research has established that democracies are less likely to go to war with other democracies.⁸ Therefore, promoting democracy abroad is actually in the narrow selfish interests of democratic states. The pursuit of idealist or realist ends in foreign policy is not an “either-or” proposition. However, such a scientific understanding of the “democratic peace” was not grasped by the earliest executors of US foreign policy. There was some comprehension that democratic outcomes across the globe were positive occurrences for the security of the US. But doing little to facilitate them was more often considered the cautious and prudent path of foreign policy -- especially when US power was weak *vis-à-vis* other states. Woodrow Wilson’s vision of creating a new world order founded on moral principles stood apart from those who

⁸ See Dean Babst, “A Force for Peace,” *Industrial Research* (April 1972); Peter Wallensteen, *Structure and War: On International Relations, 1820-1968* (Stockholm: Raben & Sjogren, 1973); Melvin Small and J. David Singer, “The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes,” *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 50-69; Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (December 1986), p. 1151-69; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, “Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33, no. 1 (March 1989), pp. 3-35; Bruce Russett and William Antholis, “Do Democracies Fight Each Other?” *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 4 (1992), pp. 415-434; and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). More recent research, however, warns about the dangers states undergoing the process of democratization pose to the stability of the international system. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” *Foreign Affairs*, 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 79-97.

preceded him in the conduct of US foreign policy. His successors increasingly blended principle with realist power aspirations to achieve their ends. A central principle among these idealist aims has been the advancement of democratic values in the international system.

This chapter will survey the evolution of the promotion of democracy as a pillar of the diplomacy of the United States. The survey will conclude with a discussion of the US's democratization strategy in the post-Cold War world. The aim is to place current policy orientations within the context of America's diplomatic tradition. What emerges is an account of a perpetual struggle to balance national interests and the promotion of democracy in its affairs abroad.

The thesis that stands out is that the promotion of democratic values and human rights has been an endemic aspect of US policy. While the specific details of diplomatic challenges fade into history, "the concepts and assumptions underlying policy decisions live on as the country's true diplomatic tradition, remaining to serve and guide future generations as they attempt to dispose of new challenges which confront them."⁹

Ultimately this dissertation will focus on a specific period of time, the post-Cold War era, and the ability of a specific institution of American government, the US military, to promote democracy in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But first, it is necessary to frame the current effort within the context of the US national struggle to balance its national security with its national mission. This survey of the promotion of democracy in US foreign policy will show that as America grew in power and international

⁹ Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy*, p. vii.

stature, its foreign policy goals and grand strategy became increasingly tied to the idea of pursuing the “democratic peace.” The emphasis on democratization in the post-Cold War era is not a new phenomenon. Rather, it is the natural result of the gradual evolution of a distinctively American approach to world affairs which presumes that a more democratic world is an essential condition for America’s national security and its continued pursuit of liberty at home.¹⁰

The Emergence of the US Approach: The Founding Fathers’ Approach to the Promotion of Democratic Values Abroad

The Founding Fathers were heavily influenced by the predominant approach to international relations universally espoused by eighteenth century European statesmen -- balance of power politics. The eighteenth century balance of power system was characterized by diplomatic flexibility. Realignment of the alliances within the system occurred if the accumulation of one or more participants’ power posed a threat to the system’s survival or to the independence of any one state. States were free to pursue their own national interests as long as such policies did not threaten to eliminate the power of any other state within the system and the monarchies were preserved.¹¹ The diplomats charged with managing the system ensured that the moderate pursuit of national interests prevailed and the power of overly ambitious states was contained.

¹⁰ Smith, *America’s Mission*, p. 327.

¹¹ For an explanation of the rules governing the eighteenth century balance of power system see Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 6-10. For an explanation of the breakdown of the balance of power system also see Schroeder, pp. 517-582. This whole volume deals with the emergence of a “balance of equilibrium” as the replacement for the balance of power system. For a classical account of balance of power theory see Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 185-205.

Although the Founding Fathers understood the imperatives of the balance of power system, they were determined to establish diplomatic independence from Europe at the onset of the creation of their experiment in self-government. John Jay's and Alexander Hamilton's main argument in the *Federalist* for the formation of a federal government to coordinate the foreign affairs of the United States was fundamentally isolationist. The Union was needed not to foster participation in Europe's affairs or wars, but as the united country's best protection against European attacks and from the external interventions that internal divisions within the confederation might invite.¹²

Yet even as the Founding Fathers were eagerly accepting the aid of the French during the Revolution, the dominant priority of those contemplating the future foreign policy of the independent nation was to withdraw from Europe. John Adams noted in his autobiography that, although French interests clearly favored helping the American cause, in soliciting help, the rebels should be careful to avoid involvement in entangling alliances, "we ought to lay it down as a first principle and maxim never to be forgotten, to maintain an entire neutrality in all future European wars; that it never could be our interest to unite with France in the destruction of England."¹³ Louis Hartz argued that the American sense of mission at this time was characterized not by universalism of the American experiment, but by a sort of separatism committed to sparing the new nation from the "contamination" that plagued Europe.¹⁴

¹² John Jay and Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist, nos. 1-8," in *The Enduring Federalist*, ed. Charles A. Beard (New York: Ungar Publishing Co., 1959), pp. 31-64.

¹³ John Adams, *Diary and Autobiography*, ed. L.H. Butterfield (New York: Atheneum, 1964).

¹⁴ Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America*, p. 37.

The first major opportunity for the young republic to promote the democratic aims of revolutionaries abroad came in the aftermath of the French Revolution. The United States was confronted with choosing between England and France when France declared war on England after the execution of Louis XVI in 1793. Some Americans were torn between their sympathy for their kindred revolutionaries in France and their reliance on England for commercial trade.¹⁵ Obligations which were incurred in the 1778 treaty, because of the acceptance of French aid in the American Revolution, dictated that France be afforded some type of preference. The overwhelming sentiment of the nation, however, was to retain its political isolation from Europe.

In their respective positions as Secretaries of State and Treasury, Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton clashed over remaining neutral in the war. The realist Hamilton lobbied George Washington to put the national interest above treaty obligations.¹⁶ But the idealist Jefferson, who sympathized with the revolutionaries, argued that the treaty obligations should be honored.¹⁷ President Washington sided with Hamilton and issued the Proclamation of Neutrality in April of 1793. In it Washington sought to pacify the expectations of France, England, and his constituency. No matter how carefully phrased, however, the declaration of neutrality effectively amounted to a renunciation of the 1778 alliance.

¹⁵ Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History to 1920*, 4th ed. (Lexington, MA: DC Heath and Co.), p. 46.

¹⁶ For a thorough explanation of Hamilton's position see Henry Cabot Lodge, *Alexander Hamilton* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co, 1885), pp. 154-166.

¹⁷ Leonard D. White, *The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History* (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 212-218.

Alexander Hamilton defended the proclamation, which he composed for Washington,¹⁸ a few months later by arguing that the first obligation of the new nation was to itself. Hamilton argued that unlike individuals a nation has no right to “indulge in emotions of generosity and benevolence at the expense of its own interests.”¹⁹ In his view, the new nation could not risk its existence in honoring a treaty whose validity depended on the nation’s existence. Survival of the nation must be its primary interest. Hamilton reasoned that the recent internal turmoil regarding American intervention in Europe

Ought to teach us not to overrate foreign friendships, and to be on our guard against foreign attachments. The former will generally be found hollow and delusive; the latter will have a natural tendency to lead us aside from our own true interest, and to make us dupes of foreign influence.... Foreign influence is truly the Grecian horse to a republic. We cannot be too careful to exclude its entrance.²⁰

Thus with the successful navigation of America’s first foreign policy crisis, the stage was set for the realist based isolationism that would characterize the United States’ first act in the ongoing drama of more than two centuries of foreign relations. Isolation from Europe’s wars was thought to be an essential condition in maintaining the unity and survival of the young nation. Jay argued in *Federalist No. 4* that divided allegiances to various European powers among Americans could lead to the downfall of the republic.²¹ In addition, European powers still maintained parts of their empire on the American continent.²² American unity was essential to prevent clashes with these powers and to

¹⁸ Lodge, *Alexander Hamilton*, p. 162.

¹⁹ Hamilton, in *The Works of Alexander Hamilton*, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge (New York: 1885), p. 175.

²⁰ *ibid.*, p. 183.

²¹ Jay, “Federalist No. 4,” in Beard, pp. 48-49. See also A.H. Bowman, *The Struggle for Neutrality* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1974), pp. 268-269.

²² Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), p. 12.

wage a cohesive defense against the Indians. Washington drove the principles of diplomatic independence home in his valedictory address to the nation. In his final speech as President he advised his successors to avoid all concepts of moral and ideological preference which might endanger the nation's freedom of action by universalizing its interests under a blanket of abstract ideals.²³

What responsibility, if any, then, did the first executors of US foreign policy feel for the propagation of the great democratic experiment abroad? America's first diplomats limited the promotion of democratic values to holding up the American democratic republic as an example for all would-be democrats to emulate. They simply did not trust the European powers who were perceived to be committed only to their own interests.²⁴ Washington hoped that America's contribution would be in its progress as a free nation, "It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period a great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence."²⁵ The construction of this noble example required US separation from European politics.

Jefferson's election to the Presidency and the succession of the Federalists by the Republicans marked a shift in the approach to foreign policy. Jefferson tempered his predecessors' realist approach to foreign policy with a sense of morality:

²³ Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy*, p. 73.

²⁴ Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History to 1920*, p. 54.

²⁵ George Washington, "Farewell Address, 17 Sep 1796," in *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, ed. James D. Richardson (Washington, 1896), pp. 221-223.

We are firmly convinced, and we act on that conviction, that with nations, as with individuals, our interests soundly calculated, will ever be found inseparable from our moral duties; and history bears witness to the fact, that a just nation is taken on its word, when recourse is had to armaments and wars to bridle others.²⁶

Hamilton and the Federalists accepted the existing system of international relations and made decisions based on the sober calculation of power, but Jefferson and Madison believed that just actions were determined by standards derived from the ideal of upholding the natural rights of man -- not by following the standards of the existing balance of power system.²⁷ Within a decade of Washington's valedictory, the tendency to blend interests with moral duties had crept into the foreign policy rhetoric of the new state.

Jefferson did not intend for the manifestation of the nation's moral duties to extend beyond serving humanity as an example and place of refuge for the oppressed. But there existed the constant temptation for editors and political leaders to exploit the emotional appeal of a limited moral mission in order to transform its fundamental conservatism into the transcendent purpose of underwriting the cause of liberty abroad.²⁸ The struggle between the shapers of public opinion and the executors of foreign policy would become an ever present characteristic of the American foreign policy making process. The balance between these forces would determine the conditions of American intervention abroad for the promotion of its democratic ideals.

²⁶ Thomas Jefferson, "Second Inaugural Address," in *Thomas Jefferson: Writings* (New York: Library of America, 1984), p. 518.

²⁷ Paul A. Varg, "The Virtues of Hamiltonian Realism over Jeffersonian Idealism," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol., I, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1978), pp. 67-68.

²⁸ Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy*, p. 86.

The Prominence of Democratic Values in Foreign Policy Over the Next Hundred Years

The internal domestic pressures that Washington presaged in his farewell address came to pass in the Monroe Administration. A segment of the population clamored to convince Congress and Monroe that the US must take a stand in the Latin American revolutions against Spanish rule which swept the South American continent beginning in 1817. The superficial resemblance to their own rebellion in 1776 made many Americans sympathetic to the struggle for independence.²⁹ Americans favored this support despite the nondemocratic nature of the Latin American revolutions which were devoid of fundamental civil rights reforms. These idealist stimuli for action coincided with geopolitical considerations concerning European intervention in the region and US commercial and expansionist designs. Most scholars agree that the major justification for the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine in December of 1823 laid in these realist aims.³⁰

In the same period the Greeks, who were fighting for independence from the Ottoman Empire, were receiving a lot of support among the American public for their cause. Even members of Congress whose districts benefited from Turkish trade, such as Boston's Daniel Webster, outspokenly advocated assistance to the Greeks.³¹ Appeals to aid the Greeks' quest for liberty pervaded the press and many Americans were moved as individuals to support the Greek cause, but the conservative mind of the nation prevailed. No instruments of national power were employed to assist the Greeks.

²⁹ Dexter Perkins, "The Defense of Commerce and Ideals," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol., I, p. 173.

³⁰ William Appleman Williams, "Manifesto of the American Empire," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol., I, pp. 177-179.

³¹ Daniel Webster, "19 January 1824 Speech in the House of Representatives," *Abridgement of the Debates of Congress* vol. VII (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1860), pp. 641-649.

President Monroe responded to public sentiment with a profession of support for the Greeks as the heirs to the cradle of civilization, but his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, resisted even the appearance of lending support when concrete action would not be forthcoming. For Adams the critical US national interest was the maintenance of neutrality in Europe.³² He ridiculed those in the Cabinet advocating action without regard to means or consequences:

Their enthusiasm for the Greeks is all sentiment, and the standard of this is the prevailing popular feeling. As for action, they are seldom agreed; and after two hours of discussion this day the subject was dismissed.... I have not much esteem for the enthusiasm which evaporates in words; and I told the President I thought not quite so lightly of a war with Turkey.³³

In the end, the empty rhetoric that so frustrated John Quincy Adams would be all that Monroe would offer to the Greek cause.

The Monroe Doctrine featured three main principles: non-colonization in the Western hemisphere, the separation of two distinct spheres of influence between Europe and the United States, and non-intervention in the independence aims of the Americas.³⁴ Monroe was originally predisposed to including idealist overtones such as a declaration for the support of the Greeks or some other declarations implying that America was committed to liberal causes everywhere. However, Monroe succumbed to Adams's advice to strip the address of any such rhetoric. Though relatively ambitious in terms of its claim of the American sphere of influence in the Western hemisphere, the Monroe

³² LaFeber, *The American Age*, p. 84.

³³ John Quincy Adams, "15 Aug 1823," in *The Diary of John Quincy Adams*, ed. Allan Nevins (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), pp. 172-173.

³⁴ Paterson, *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol. I, p. 163.

Doctrine was a document with limited objectives. It recognized the limits of US power and relied on an unacknowledged alliance with England to enforce its provisions.

Monroe's famous declaration climaxed a quarter century of Jeffersonian rule. American diplomacy from 1789 to 1823 focused on the central problem of limiting the nation's interests to its power. "[US policymakers] avoided sentimentality and abstraction, and they condemned the intrusion of domestic politics into matters of diplomacy."³⁵ In this era ambitions to export the American experiment were limited to the development of the new nation's continued expansion and prosperity which the balance of power on the European continent made possible.

In the following decades preceding the Civil War, Americans grew more confident of their messianic mission to spread their democratic political system. This righteous vision of democratic idealism helped to propel Americans across the continent in order to achieve the "manifest destiny" of the American people. Andrew Jackson, in his 1837 farewell address, reflected the growing sentiment of the American people that Providence had chosen them "to be the guardians of freedom to preserve it for the benefit of the human race."³⁶

The darker side to Manifest Destiny, however, was the recognition that the doubling of the population from generation to generation mandated Western expansion.³⁷ As far back as 1751 Benjamin Franklin predicted that additional land would be needed to accommodate the growing colonies.³⁸ James Madison also advocated the necessity of

³⁵ Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy*, p. 142.

³⁶ Andrew Jackson, "Farewell Address," in Robert V. Remini, *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Democracy: 1833-1845*, vol. III (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 418.

³⁷ LaFeber, *The American Age*, p. 95.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p. 14.

eventual expansion to mitigate the economic conflicts that were sure to develop in a confined state.³⁹ Others accused expansionists of having the ultimate aim of extending slavery beyond the South.⁴⁰ In reality, both idealist and opportunist forces were at work. Idealist rhetoric may have been used to justify territorial gains, but those who moved westward also carried with them and were motivated by the ideal of democracy.⁴¹

Meanwhile, in the 1840s, conservative monarchical governments in Europe were pursuing reactionary policies in order to crush democratically oriented resistance to the status quo. Then, beginning in France in February of 1848, a series of revolutions swept across the European continent.⁴² Again the press and Congress stirred up public opinion to support the democratic revolutions abroad. President James K. Polk issued a congratulatory message to the provisional French government and dispatched a special envoy to provide encouragement to the Hungarians in their uprising against Austria, but concrete action remained restrained. In a statement to Congress, Polk reminded the nation that the policy of the US has always been and will continue to be a policy of nonintervention in European affairs, but “all our sympathies are naturally enlisted on the side of a great people, who, imitating our example, have resolved to be free.”⁴³

Meanwhile, as Polk offered up democratic rhetoric to boost the spirits of the liberal forces in Europe, he plotted a war of conquest on his own continent with the

³⁹ William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1959), pp. 25-26.

⁴⁰ Paterson, *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol., I, p. 184.

⁴¹ Ephraim D. Adams, “Manifest Destiny -- An Emotion,” in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol., I, p. 194.

⁴² For a complete account of this period of European history see J.A.S. Grenville, *Europe Reshaped: 1848-1878* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), pp. 19-101.

⁴³ James K. Polk, “3 April 1848 Address to Congress.” quoted in Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy*, p. 264.

ultimate aim of gaining the prizes of California and Texas. The arrogant justifications for the war against Mexico and for other expansionist activities, such as the liquidation and removal of the Indians from their lands, tainted the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny which envisioned a peaceful extension of American institutions across the continent.⁴⁴

When Louis Kossuth, the leader of the Hungarian revolution, came to the US in 1851 after the crushing of his movement by Russian troops in 1850, he was received as a hero. However, Kossuth became quickly disillusioned when it became clear that beyond the hype and rhetoric no concrete aid would be forthcoming. Even the premiere advocate of Hungarian liberation, Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, tempered his passionate speeches with assurances to the Austrian chargé d'affaires that he intended no action that would give weight to his words.⁴⁵

Such was the state of the promotion of democratic values in the United States and abroad in the era immediately preceding the Civil War. Expansion westward was accompanied by the extension of slavery into the territories, and of course, its continuation in the South, and the displacement of the Native Americans. A pattern had emerged. Events related to the evolution of democratic forces were closely monitored abroad. Then national leaders gifted in the skill of rhetoric would raise false hopes both at home and abroad, and, finally, the conservative implementers of national policy would resist them. In practice, realists carefully assessing national interests drove United States' foreign policy, while idealists ensured that the realist edge of self-interest was misled by democratic rhetoric.

⁴⁴ Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History to 1920*, pp. 122-126.

⁴⁵ Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy*, pp. 283-285.

The Quest for Empire

The promotion of democratic values abroad in the post-Civil War period was limited to the protection of American citizens involved in trade and missionary activity. Americans were generally averse to imperialist expansion abroad, because such action would mean incorporating and suppressing peoples of diverse racial and cultural backgrounds in areas far-flung from the American continent. But the US did not refrain from using its power to expand across the continent without regard for the rights of the Native Americans in its path. By the 1890s, however, the preference for expansion abroad changed. Accompanying this shift in priorities would be a major break with the conservative policies of nonintervention that had characterized American foreign policy throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

By the 1890s the means to expand the United States' diplomatic role from a regional to a global power were at hand. The industrial revolution had enabled tremendous growth in manufacturing capacity and immigration had increased the population of the US from thirty-nine million in 1870 to sixty-three million in 1890. The US was second only to Great Britain in export capacity and had proven its capacity to wage a major military operation through the conduct of the Civil War.⁴⁶

Imperialism had become the order of the day among the European powers who were engaged in the race for colonies in Africa and spheres of influence in Asia. Underlying this movement was a general sense of cultural superiority rooted in Social Darwinism which had taken hold among intellectual circles. Americans, too, were swept

⁴⁶ Combs, *The History of American Foreign Policy*, p. 130.

up in the imperialist fervor. They reasoned that, since the American way of life was superior to all others, the US was compelled to participate in the effort to rule “the backward, less fit peoples of the world.”⁴⁷ The expansionist outlook also came to dominate American thinking on foreign affairs for economic reasons. Many American leaders saw economic expansion as the solution to social and economic problems.⁴⁸ In Hawaii American business interests usurped the power of the legitimate government there through a virtual coup backed by the US Navy in January of 1893. By sanctioning the events that led to Hawaii’s eventual annexation in 1898, the US government wielded its power to annex territory without regard to the rights of the native people for self-determination.⁴⁹

Amidst this swelling of expansionist fervor the Cuban rebellion against Spanish rule re-erupted in 1895. Liberal arguments that had in previous generations fought for intervention in France, Greece, and Hungary were renewed. In this view it was the moral responsibility of the US as a great democratic power to aid oppressed revolutionaries seeking freedom from the unenlightened rule of a reactionary power. The yellow press documented Spanish atrocities, and, Cuban interest groups energized public opinion to take the side of the rebels. In addition, both parties in Congress attempted to outdo each fighting for resolutions in support of the rebellion.⁵⁰

By 1898 the overwhelming tide of public opinion to go to war with Spain was becoming increasingly difficult for the McKinley Administration to resist. In 1898 idealist

⁴⁷ Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy*, p. 336.

⁴⁸ Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, pp. 30-34.

⁴⁹ Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History to 1920*, pp. 190-191.

⁵⁰ Combs, *The History of American Foreign Policy*, p. 142.

rhetoric mattered, though it often masked expansionist desires, because the oppression was occurring only ninety miles off the American shore. The US allegedly held the strategic advantage over Europe within the Western hemisphere. Even though Spain was moving as quickly as its own domestic forces would permit toward resolving the situation in Cuba according to the US's demands, and President William McKinley and his advisors were assured that Cuban independence was at hand, public pressure propelled the nation into war.

With the Spanish-American War moral abstraction and mass phenomenon was substituted for the political realism which had circumscribed previous American diplomacy. This was a people's war, forced on a reluctant administration. It was not the result of any deliberate weighing of interests and responsibilities.⁵¹

George Kennan agreed that the decision to go to war was not marked by a careful analysis of the national interest or by any great awareness of a global security framework. Instead, public opinion, election year politics, and warmongering within the press and other political quarters swayed McKinley.⁵²

Although war with Spain was clearly avoidable, its occurrence supported US imperialist ambitions with the acquisition of the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, influenced by the expansionist writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, had argued for the annexation of the Philippines as a means of offsetting Japanese supremacy in Asia and as serving as an open door to China. Although scholars debate whether or not such a reasoned appraisal of US interests was undertaken

⁵¹ Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy*, p. 339.

⁵² George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 3-21. William Appleman Williams disagrees with these traditional interpretations and presents his argument for the economic stimuli for the war in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, pp. 31-34.

by McKinley before the declaration of war, there is agreement that he liked the results that only war could bring.⁵³

For the first time Americans engaged in war overseas despite the fact that their territorial boundaries were not threatened. While national interests rooted in expansionist motivations played some role in this outcome, so too did self-assertive egoism and altruistic idealism to an extent previously unprecedented in US foreign policy.⁵⁴ The cautious conservatism that had carefully guarded neutrality in global conflict had finally yielded to a combination of mostly idealist and partially realist forces.

Concurrent with the Cuban revolt was the growing concern over the protection of US commercial interests in Asia. The United States had a long standing trading relationship with China dating from the American Revolution and dreamed of the benefits of sustained and open trade with China. American liberals harbored hope that China might one day become the democratic anchor in Asia. The European powers, on the other hand, were determined to partition China into distinct spheres of influence in order to maximize their own trading stakes in the region. The United States countered the movement to carve up China with the issuance of a series of “Open Door” notes beginning in 1899. These declared that each imperial power should keep its sphere of influence in China open to trade from foreign nations. Although the policy was justified as protecting China against the designs of the European powers, US economic interests were at the heart of the Open Door policy. It was a classic program of imperial expansion. Its aim was to

⁵³ LaFeber, *The American Age*, pp. 200-202.

⁵⁴ Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 27.

make the US the preponderant economic power in China without the traditional trappings of colonialism.⁵⁵

Ironically, as the US pressed for greater rights in China and many Americans were engaged in winning over the souls of the Chinese to Christianity, the US was closing off Chinese rights of immigration and blatantly discriminating against Chinese already residing in the US. Additionally, American troops were undergoing courts martial for the commission of heinous atrocities while “democratizing” the Philippines.

The collective effect of the US’s Asian ventures was the acquisition of territory and the proclamation of vital interests well beyond the strategic capacity of the US to defend. In the end, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 would drive home the fact that such policies, when challenged by ambitious powers with deeper vital interests and greater power in a region, cannot be sustained at least in the short term. The United States, at the turn of the century, was beginning to learn the lesson that having the ambition of a power politics foreign policy without the military might to support it is not sustainable.

Theodore Roosevelt, who had long advocated the need for expanding US naval power, induced a great dose of realism into American foreign policy. He was a great proponent of expansion while a member of the McKinley Administration and was a key advocate of going to war with Spain to acquire additional territories. As President he recognized the importance of closing the gap between means and ends in the defense of America’s far-flung empire. Despite his Darwinian views, in some ways Roosevelt was

⁵⁵ Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, p. 37.

also an idealist because he believed that all nations should work to observe moral principles in their international relations. However, contrary to the beliefs of many of his contemporaries, he did not believe that war would ever become obsolete and that all states should maintain arms sufficient to protect their interests.⁵⁶

His promulgation of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine embodied his belief that the “civilized” nations had certain obligations to assist those nations who did not yet have the benefits of Anglo-Saxon values. The application of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Caribbean and South America relied on US interpretations of what was “right” for these states. Right action in this sense included the discouragement of revolutions, improving internal economic conditions, and promoting trade.⁵⁷ The US feared that Latin American states’ renegeing on foreign debts might invite European intervention and invoked the Monroe Doctrine through Roosevelt’s corollary to allow for US intervention instead.

However, the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary had some significant differences. The Monroe Doctrine supported revolutions while the Roosevelt Corollary only supported those that were favorable to US interests. Additionally, the Monroe Doctrine insisted on non-intervention by all actors, but the Roosevelt Corollary reserved to the US the exclusive right and responsibility to intervene and depended on US force.⁵⁸ The promotion of democratic values in the Western hemisphere motivated each president

⁵⁶ Osgood, *Ideals and Self Interest*, pp. 88-95.

⁵⁷ Dana G. Munro, “In Search of Security,” in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol., I, p. 351.

⁵⁸ LaFeber, *The American Age*, pp. 245-250. .

to some extent, but the conceptualization of their policies and the methods employed to implement them were also certainly fraught with undemocratic elements.

Woodrow Wilson extended the Roosevelt Corollary's goal of fostering stability in the region to the creation of democratic institutions and values. His favored method to achieve this end was the promotion and installation of constitutional governments. His efforts to influence the internal politics of Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala were largely ineffective in achieving the end of stable democratic governments, but his focus on the importance of democratic structures marked a previously unmatched dedication to the promotion of democracy abroad.⁵⁹ His administration was the first to articulate a comprehensive agenda for American democratic internationalism and the first to clearly advance the promotion of democracy as a guiding principle of US foreign policy.⁶⁰

As Wilson applied his principled foreign policy toward Latin America, the balance of power in Europe began to crumble. Wilson would soon have the opportunity to expand his framework for world order beyond a specific region. Herbert Croly predicted in 1909 in his prophetic book, *The Promise of American Life*, that the next opportunity to defend democratic values might well involve American intervention in a conflict in Europe in order to guarantee the continued sovereignty of the United States.

In what may at first appear to be a purely European complication ... [may] result in the general obligation of a democratic nation to make its foreign policy serve the cause of international peace. Hitherto, the American preference and desire for peace has constituted the chief justification for its isolation. At some future time the same purpose ... may demand intervention.... If it wants peace, it must be spiritually and physically prepared to fight for it.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Smith, *America's Mission*, pp. 60-83.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

⁶¹ Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (New York: Macmillan, 1911), pp. 310-311.

Croly's argument was essentially a realist one. However, a sense that it was America's moral mission to help create an order of democracies would also characterize the great crusade upon which the American people were about to embark.

The Great Crusade: Making the World Safe for Democracy

When the rise of German power and ambition on the European continent culminated in the outbreak of war in 1914, President Wilson was slow to recognize the threat to American security that might accompany a British defeat. Indeed, he informed the American people in his annual message given December 8, 1914 that military preparations were not necessary since the integrity of American territory was not threatened. He described the conflict as "a war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us."⁶²

Wilson's attempt to keep the US out of war was doomed on several counts. First, the credibility of the United States as a neutral state was suspect because of the prevalence of pro-British sentiment among both the American people and Wilson himself. Second, the interests of the bankers and munitions makers leaned heavily toward the allied side. US exports of war materials and the extension of loans clearly favored Allied over German interests.⁶³ In short, the continued prosperity of the bankers and munitions makers depended on the Allies winning the war.⁶⁴ Finally, the Germans ignored the importance of the American psyche which is averse to cold and calculated realism in foreign affairs. The expedient invasion of Belgium and the continuation of unrestricted submarine warfare

⁶² Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 31 (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 414-424.

⁶³ Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History to 1920*, p. 296.

⁶⁴ Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, p. 58.

resulted in the stirring of indignation in the country and a bias toward the Allies. The combined effect of geo-political, economic, and idealist interests was pushing the US toward war.

Fresh from his 1916 re-election victory, waged on the slogan, "He kept us out of war," Wilson learned of the infamous Zimmerman note. The note proposed a military alliance between Germany and Mexico against the US with the potential for Mexico to reconquer territory lost in 1848. This strategic interest combined with the US economic interest of unrestricted free trade and with Wilson's moral interest to protect democratic principles and create a new world order spurred Wilson to declare war on Germany in April 1917.

The victory of autocratic Germany over England and France would threaten the twin aims of American foreign policy that were focused on working toward a prosperous and more democratic world. In this sense, balance of power politics played some role in Wilsonianism. Wilson's liberal democratic internationalism consisted of two main pillars -- a liberal economic regime and democratic political systems -- all bound together through an international superstructure of interdependence, collective security, and international law. The dominance of autocratic and mercantilist Germany combined with the extension of autocracy and mercantilism to the defeated powers of France, Britain, and Russia would threaten this vision.

In its time Wilsonianism was doomed to failure for several reasons. First, it confused the concept of self-determination with the adoption of American political and economic norms. This limited the construction of other patterns of development that did

not mirror American democracy. In this sense Wilsonianism was essentially non-democratic. Second, multiple interpretations of democracy existed which did not incorporate an unrestrained market economy -- not to mention the existence of Communist ideology which rejected the concept outright.⁶⁵ Third, none of the actors who fought in the war, including American servicemen, necessarily shared Wilson's agenda of war aims. Wilson had prepared Americans to win the war. He had not prepared the country to win the peace.

Wilson's war message to Congress was virtually devoid of any explanation of compelling national interests, such as respect for neutrality and international law, that may have served as war aims for the American people. Yet the realist aims were largely responsible for the US's entry into the war.

Let us be very clear, and make clear to all the world what our motives and objects are.... Our object ... is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of these principles.... We are glad ... to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples.... The world must be made safe for democracy.⁶⁶

Unlike the US, the Allies had specific war aims that they sought to achieve through a harsh settlement with Germany. In contrast, Wilson touted his Fourteen Points with its call to end secret diplomacy and arms races, focus on self-determination, and plan to inaugurate collective security as the enlightened means of guarding against aggression among members of Wilson's most prized point of all -- the proposed League of Nations. Georges Clemenceau typified the Allies' reaction to Wilson's New Diplomacy, "God gave

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 45-76.

⁶⁶ Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. I (New York: 1927), pp. 6-16.

us the Ten Commandments, and we broke them. Wilson gives us the Fourteen Points. We shall see.”⁶⁷

Wilson’s leadership of the United States through the “war to end all wars” and the imperfect peace that followed stands out as the most single-minded attempt to promote American democratic and economic values in the history of US diplomacy. Wilson’s critics have condemned his deference to the principles of democratic internationalism as idealist, vain, and unrealistic. But his defenders point to the social and political realities of his day which constrained the implementation of his vision. The desire of the Allies to punish Germany, the rise of Bolshevism in Russia, the inability of democracy to take root in Germany, and the existence of agrarian social structures and ethnic tensions in Eastern Europe all contributed to the mismatch between Wilson’s vision and the conditions in the region on which he would see it imposed.⁶⁸ Since World War II, however, there has been a much better fit between Wilsonianism and international politics. Acceptance of the value of democratization and free trade has come to characterize the foreign policy of not only the US, but of most members of the community of states. Wilson’s contention that the expansion of liberal democratic institutions and free markets are the best protection against war and suffering sounds resonantly in the present generation of American and other like-minded policymakers striving to forge the “newest world order.”

Overcoming the Trauma of Saving the World: The Emergence of a Balanced Approach to American Foreign Policy

Robert Osgood characterized the foreign relations of the United States, in the era from the turn of the century to the eve of World War II, as a period of impulsiveness,

⁶⁷ Combs, *The History of American Foreign Policy*, p. 226.

⁶⁸ Smith, *America’s Mission*, pp. 97-102.

instability, and ineffectiveness. He attributed the phenomenon of enthusiastically undertaking extravagant commitments, only to repudiate them later, to a basic maladjustment to the international environment. Americans simply held unrealistic views of how they might reconcile their ideals with their self-interest in their foreign relations.⁶⁹

He further argued that Americans were generally embarrassed by their moral fervor displayed in World War I. "It was as though they had made a hasty and unseemly show of emotion on a false assumption and discovered the facts of international life too late to retract the mistake. The response to this experience was a well-nigh unanimous 'Never again!'"⁷⁰ This disillusionment was translated into a series of initiatives aimed at ensuring that Americans would never again have to participate in the phenomenon known as war.

In the 1920s American diplomats went to work on securing sweeping disarmament and anti-war treaties. At the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 the great naval powers of the world agreed to limit the growth of their navies according to an agreed upon ratio. Additionally, Americans seemed to have won their quest to get Japan to uphold the principle of the Open Door. However, despite their jubilation at having facilitated the agreement of so many "concessions," the reality of the agreement was that Japan became the premiere naval power in the Far East. Although the US and Britain retained their overall naval supremacy, Japan remained superior in the region of greatest interest to her. Consequently, the Western powers were ultimately at the mercy of Japan to voluntarily limit her goals in the Far Eastern theater in order to avoid infringing on

⁶⁹ Osgood, *Ideals and Self Interest*, p. 18.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p. 332.

Western interests there. Such an assumption of self-restraint could only work in the case of a satiated power.

A similar seemingly triumphant diplomatic coup that would eventually prove hollow was the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war. This agreement epitomized the utopian mood of the American people who took solace in the formalization of their isolationist preferences in this much heralded pact. While the other treaty signatories ratified the treaty with an eye on monitoring its usefulness through the retention of their realist world views, the US retreated into a false sense of security for the next decade. President Hoover assured his constituents in 1929 that the key to world peace lay not in preparedness or diplomacy, but in building up good will between nations. "To build the spirit of good will and friendliness, to create respect and confidence, to stimulate esteem between peoples -- this is the far greatest guaranty of peace."⁷¹

Meanwhile, as the United States reverted to isolationism in Europe, it continued its interventionist policy in Latin America and Central America. The US occupations of the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua begun before the war continued in these states until 1924 and 1933 respectively. Because of increasing negative nationalist sentiment and erosion of support within the US for the use of military methods of domination, the US turned to non-military means to maintain its hegemony in the region. This new approach, the "Good Neighbor Policy," continued to pursue the imperialist goals of economic

⁷¹ Hoover, Herbert. "1929 Armistice Day Address," in *The State Papers and Other Public Writings of Herbert Hoover*, ed. William Starr Myers (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Doan and Co., 1934) vol. I, pp. 125-32.

penetration and dependency. However, Americans deceived themselves about the democratic nature of their behavior toward their neighbors to the south.⁷²

The United States conducted its affairs for the bulk of the inter-war years with a dual-pronged approach to the conduct of foreign policy. It rejected the possibility of ever going to war purely for the satisfaction of idealist principles, while ensuring that idealist principles were codified in international law. This course illustrated the US's preference that international standards rather than national power govern the behavior of nations. Although political isolationism carried the day among most Americans, economic expansion was high on the list of some inter-war policymakers.⁷³ The US tried to wield its influence in the world through its power over loans and war debts in Europe.⁷⁴ But the reluctance to acknowledge the role that US military force plays in its own defense, the refusal to allow for the institutionalization of pooled force through the League of Nations, and its reticence to project its power outside the Western hemisphere failed to prepare the US for its inevitable participation in another world war.

When the illusion of the eternal peace began to unravel in 1931 with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, neither Secretary of State Henry Stimson nor the toothless League of Nations, which was weakened by the US refusal to join, could muster a response greater than condemnation of the outlawed aggression. The era of appeasement had begun. The American retreat into post-war isolationism would continue until its own self-

⁷² Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895*, 4th ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1995), pp. 181-193; Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, p. 114.

⁷³ *ibid.*, pp. 92-93; LaFeber, *United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad*, pp. 336-337.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p. 342.

preservation was threatened by the success of the expansionist gains of Germany in Europe and of Japan in the Far East.

Roosevelt's famous Quarantine Speech delivered at Chicago in October of 1937 was an important first step in his campaign to prepare a reluctant America again for war. However, in his desire to play to the isolationist mood, FDR couched his reasoning in Wilsonian idealism. He assured Americans, first, that they would be protected from the horrors of direct involvement of war, and, second, that America's willingness to help the struggling democracies of Europe was rooted in its sense of moral obligation to support international principles.⁷⁵

This appeal to American idealism over realism allowed for the continued blurring of distinctions between the national interests at stake in World War I and the threat which the antagonists in World War II posed to democratic regimes. The emphasis on the promotion of democratic values at this stage of the public's preparation for war gradually led to a realist conception of the national interest as the conflict unfolded. Americans understood the difference between the contrived atrocities of World War I and the systematic persecution and aggression of World War II. Finally, the advances in technology made retreat into the American continent a poor substitute for preparedness.

But as American involvement deepened, the rhetoric used to justify the US's role still promised that the US was determined to keep its own forces out of the conflict. The Roosevelt Administration insisted in its campaign to win over the remaining isolationists in Congress to such initiatives as the repeal of the Neutrality Acts and Lend-Lease that such

⁷⁵ Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy*, pp. 586-590.

measures were part of a plan to keep the US out of the war. If the US could serve as the world's "arsenal of democracy" then the struggling democracies would have the wherewithal to fend off Hitler's aggression without the addition of US troops. In this respect, Roosevelt was deliberately misleading the American people.⁷⁶

FDR's actions were in accordance with a shrewd interpretation of American public opinion. He knew that the American electorate would not tolerate an active foreign policy in the midst of the depression.⁷⁷ FDR continued his thinly veiled pledge to keep American troops out of war until the election of 1940 had passed and he was safely secured in his third term. Just months later Lend-Lease initiated the flood of war supplies to Britain as British and US military officials began their preparations to wage war jointly.

With the unstoppable drift toward war well underway, Roosevelt and Winston Churchill secretly met on the USS *Augusta* at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, in August of 1941 to negotiate their war aims. The resultant Atlantic Charter announced that the signatories sought no additional national territory and recognized the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government and to approve any territorial changes that might affect them. It also called for the establishment of a postwar international security system which would later be codified in the United Nations Charter.⁷⁸

The Allies' realist aims were partially reflected in the Charter's provisions prohibiting any alteration of the pre-war territorial status of Eastern Europe. This denied the Soviet Union its greatest interest of securing a sphere of influence on its Western

⁷⁶ Robert A. Divine, "Roosevelt the Isolationist," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol. II, p. 145; Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895*, p. 210.

⁷⁷ Divine, "Roosevelt the Isolationist," pp. 137-138.

⁷⁸ Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, eds. *The Reader's Companion to American History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1991), p. 62.

borders. However, the rest of the allies' separate realist war aims were not accurately reflected in the Atlantic Charter. England and France wanted to preserve their own countries and stabilize Europe. Roosevelt's stated aim was to destroy Nazism and establish democracy throughout Europe.⁷⁹ But, as he navigated the US toward war, often secretly when public opinion was still opposed to it,⁸⁰ he revealed that he was fundamentally a pragmatist who understood the realist argument for checking German and Japanese power abroad and the American interest in the survival of the allied states.

The allied victory in World War II resulted in a new balance of power in Europe. A devastated Germany, and a weakened France and Britain could not be expected to balance the power of the Soviet Union. The democratic values enshrined in the Yalta agreement "to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems" and which acknowledged "the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live" could not be upheld in light of the power and ambition of the Soviet Union to pursue its own aims in postwar Europe.⁸¹ Churchill's and Roosevelt's expediency in dealing with the Soviet Union stemmed from their recognition that appeals to the self-preservation of their states would be more effective tools of gaining public support than offering exclusively idealist arguments.⁸² Yet at the same time these astute political leaders understood Walter Lippmann's assertion that, "The people of the liberal democracies could not be aroused to the exertions and sacrifices of the struggle until they had been frightened by the opening disasters, had been incited to passionate hatred, and

⁷⁹ *ibid.*, p. 1178.

⁸⁰ Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, p. 141.

⁸¹ "The Yalta Protocol of Proceedings, 1945," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol. II, pp. 200-201.

⁸² Chester Wilmot, "A Stalinist Victory," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol. II, p. 234.

had become intoxicated with unlimited hope.”⁸³ Lippmann’s argument implies that leaders of democratic states carry the additional burden of invoking idealist justifications for realist ends.

Democratizing Japan and Germany

The most ambitious program of American liberal democratic internationalism was the demilitarization, democratization, and economic liberalization of Germany and Japan after World War II.⁸⁴ These initiatives were carried out in order to achieve the principal postwar allied objective of preventing Germany and Japan from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world. Although there was significant support for the dismemberment and deindustrialization of the Axis powers, eventually a realist consensus was reached that revitalization of these states would be the best means of countering Soviet global power. Accordingly, a program of demilitarization, democratization, decartelization, and psychological deprogramming was implemented by the allied occupying forces of both states.⁸⁵ Although the overall democratization effort in Japan and in the non-Soviet sectors of Germany has been criticized as not sufficiently respecting the history and political traditions of the subject states, the long-term success of these initiatives is indisputable. West Germany and Japan emerged as economic dynamos committed to democratic political systems and fully integrated within international structures. This outcome can be directly attributed to the application of the Wilsonian

⁸³ Walter Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy*, quoted in Chester Wilmot, “A Stalinist Victory.” p. 235.

⁸⁴ Smith, *America’s Mission*, p. 147.

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 146-176.

interpretation that national security is enhanced by promoting democracy and economic liberalism abroad.⁸⁶

The Aftermath of Victory: The Cold War and the Constrained Context of the Promotion of Democratic Values

As efforts to revitalize and democratize the defeated Axis powers were undertaken, the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West deepened and became an ideological struggle. Soviet war aims came to fruition as the Red Army transformed the liberation of Eastern Europe into a zone of occupation in which the Soviets controlled the satellite Communist regimes. Beginning with the installation of the Lublin puppet committee in Poland in July of 1944, the Soviets began the process of installing sympathetic governments throughout the Eastern bloc using the tools of economic and political disarray, an army of occupation, intimidation, and general manipulation. Coalition governments of Communist and non-Communists gradually evolved into governments under full Communist control in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. It became clear that the hope of democratic governments taking root in the Soviet occupied territories was untenable. Self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe was incompatible with Soviet control over what would come to be known as the Eastern bloc.

Stalin, himself, signaled the complete abandonment of wartime allied unity in a radio address in February of 1946. He declared that the capitalist state system was inherently inferior to the Soviet multi-national state system, implying that the world was divided into two irreconcilable camps.⁸⁷ Winston Churchill was the first Western leader to

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, p. 171.

⁸⁷ Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy*, p. 713.

proclaim publicly, just one month later, that the Soviet Union posed a military threat to the West and suggested that the presence of an “Iron Curtain” in Europe required the massing of countervailing military force in the West.⁸⁸

By 1947 the Truman Administration was convinced of the need to proclaim a viable containment policy *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. Between February and March of 1947 the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were developed at the State Department. The Marshall Plan sent \$13 billion to seventeen western European nations from 1948-1952. US policymakers understood that the economic revitalization of war-torn Europe was essential to the stabilization of democratic governments and to the economic well-being of the US. The result of this unprecedented transfer of economic resources was the creation of an integrated European market capable of absorbing German power, raising living standards, and creating the necessary conditions for the economic and political security of Western Europe, and, consequently, also for the US.⁸⁹

The Truman Doctrine was the result of a specific desire to help the Greek and Turkish governments defeat Communist rebels fighting against the Greek government in the Greek Civil War, but its identification of Communist regimes as international security threats would form the basis of postwar US foreign policy. The granting of \$400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey combined with the \$13 billion dispersed under the Marshall Plan indicated the growing acceptance among realists that economic stability is a precondition to the rejection of authoritarian regimes and the security of democratic

⁸⁸ Winston Churchill, “Speech at Fulton, MO, 5 Mar 46,” in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, vol. XII, 15 March 1946, pp. 329-32.

⁸⁹ LaFeber, *The American Age*, pp. 479-482.

regimes.⁹⁰ Distinctions between idealist and realist justifications for the promotion of democracy throughout the international system had become even more blurred. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and US sponsorship of the United Nations were regarded as being consistent both with American idealism and self-interest.⁹¹

The policy of containment, however, was not without its critics. Chief among them was Walter Lippmann, a respected American journalist who argued in a series of articles against the theory of containment. The US, Lippmann argued, was unsuited to pursue the policy for several reasons. First, unlimited resources were not available for its application; second, the checks and balances inherent in the Constitution would necessarily slow US response to Soviet initiatives; third, the market economy of the US could not be controlled to counter Soviet policy.⁹² Finally, the UN would be co-opted to contain the Soviets,⁹³ and US foreign policy would be hopelessly militarized.⁹⁴ In addition, Lippmann argued that the US public lacked the patience to support such a long-term policy with no end in sight and that shackling the US with weak allies would be more of a liability than a benefit in both power and moral terms.

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 is regarded by some analysts as the militarization of the Truman Doctrine. Its most important element, Article 5, obligated each of the twelve signatories to come to the collective defense of an attack

⁹⁰ James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, *United States Foreign Policy and World Order*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1985), pp. 61-67.

⁹¹ Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy From Truman to Reagan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 15.

⁹² Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 15-17.

⁹³ *ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

⁹⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 60-62.

on any member of the alliance. This institutionalized isolationism as a non-option in the event of future aggression in Europe. As Lippmann had predicted, it also locked the East and the West into the pursuit of zero-sum games of bi-polar politics in order to protect the frontiers of the non-Soviet world. The Korean Peninsula would provide the first forum for the zero-sum game of ideological conflict in the postwar world.

The Korean War as Containment's First Battleground

The issuance of NSC-68 in April 1950 advised increases in defense spending to complement the previously economically based policy of containment. The explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949, the victory of Mao's Communist revolutionaries in October 1949, followed by the North Korean attack on South Korea on 25 June 1950 convinced Western policymakers that the Communist states would use force to achieve their aims. The authors of NSC-68 recommended the build-up of the political, economic, and military capability of the free world to deter the advance of Communism.⁹⁵ But the invasion of Korea was the main impetus to the militarization of NATO. The \$15 billion ceiling on US defense spending was abandoned and military spending between FY 1952 and FY 1960 averaged \$39.3 billion.⁹⁶

The "loss" of China was particularly disheartening for American foreign policymakers who had long regarded the Chinese-American relationship as special. The United States had held out hope that China would be the democratic anchor of Asia and had played the additional roles of protector, missionary, and philanthropist, while other imperialist powers directed their efforts more exclusively to securing favorable spheres of

⁹⁵ Nathan and Oliver, *United States Foreign Policy and World Order*, p. 102.

⁹⁶ Edward A. Kolodziej, *The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963* (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 126.

economic influence. The US also gave economic and military aid to China in World War II with the hope that postwar China would prove to be a progressive American partner.⁹⁷ Overall, however, US support for China throughout this century has been weak and has been mainly characterized by rhetoric.

The lack of a clear-cut policy within the Truman Administration, the adoption of a policy of limited assistance, and a partisan stalemate in Congress all contributed to the “loss” of China.⁹⁸ In addition, US reluctance to accept the popularity of Mao’s movement in light of the corruption and incompetence that marred the Nationalist regime proved to be the first in a series of black and white characterizations that would haunt American foreign policymakers for the duration of the Cold War. The preference for non-Communist movements and regimes -- no matter how corrupt, undemocratic, unpopular, or ineffective -- to Communist regimes became a hallmark of US postwar foreign policy.

In the case of China, the US appropriated only \$400 million in the April 1948 China Aid Act. This step was widely perceived as a half-measure undertaken to appease the Republicans in Congress who demanded a more forceful policy.⁹⁹ Although key policy makers understood that Chiang’s regime was incorrigible and that external aid was disproportionate to the prevailing internal forces favoring Mao over Chiang, US domestic political forces compelled the continued futile support of the Nationalist forces. Thus, the half-hearted extension of the Truman Doctrine to the periphery of the “basin of world power” was done to demonstrate the US’s commitment to the idealist elements of

⁹⁷ Peter G. Boyle, *American-Soviet Relations: From the Russian Revolution to the Fall of Communism* (London: Rutledge, 1993), p. 72.

⁹⁸ Tang Tsou, *America’s Failure in China, 1941-1950* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 446.

⁹⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 470-477.

containment, but the US's preoccupation with affairs in Europe limited the effectiveness of its efforts to influence events in China.

The attack of North Korea on the South was interpreted within the Truman Administration as a Soviet probe to test the resoluteness of the American and general Western responses to Communist expansion. Policymakers assumed that the invasion was part of a larger Communist design to distract the US from its commitment to Europe¹⁰⁰ and to test the viability of the new Atlantic alliance.¹⁰¹ Truman portrayed the invasion of South Korea as the first step in a conspiracy to stamp out the free world:

It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot -- and will not -- sit idly by and await foreign conquest...If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression anywhere is a threat to peace everywhere in the world. When that aggression is supported by the cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful nation who are bent on conquest, it becomes a clear and present danger to the security and independence of every free nation.¹⁰²

Such was the context of the decision to repel the North Korean aggressors with military force. The Korean War marked the globalization of the policy of containment and its extension to secondary theaters. It was a turning point in postwar foreign policy because it demonstrated the role that the US would play outside of Europe in responding to Communist expansion.¹⁰³ Although the Korean War achieved its limited objective of containing Communism in Asia, its ending in stalemate exasperated the American public

¹⁰⁰ Brown, *The Faces of Power*, p. 55.

¹⁰¹ A.W. DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 156-157.

¹⁰² Harry S. Truman, "11 April 1951 Address to the Nation Defending Korean War Policy," *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. XXIV, 16 April 1951, pp. 603-5.

¹⁰³ David F. Trask, "The Korean War and the Cold War," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol. II, p. 344.

and touched off a debate on whether or not the US had overcommitted itself around the globe.¹⁰⁴

In the 1952 presidential campaign, General Eisenhower and the Republican party campaigned on a platform that promised to end the war in Korea and to liberate Eastern Europe. The key proponent of the “beyond containment” approach to free the oppressed peoples behind the Iron Curtain was the aspiring Secretary of State to be, John Foster Dulles. In the heat of the presidential campaign, Dulles published an article in *Life* which challenged the Truman Administration’s containment policy as being morally devoid, too costly, and, ultimately, ineffective. He proposed that the peoples of Eastern Europe were being condemned to perpetual co-existence with the West. What was needed, instead, was a dynamic policy which relied on *ideas* as its weapons. This approach would better conform to the moral principles that have been traditionally projected abroad and better fit the sense of destiny and mission of a great nation.¹⁰⁵

In practice, though, the realization of the formidable force of Soviet and Chinese power resulted in a restrained “liberation policy.” The Eisenhower Administration understood the limits of American power and had no illusions about liberating the satellite countries by force. Instead, the administration worked to encourage splits in the Soviet empire along the lines of Tito’s nationalist defection from the bloc.¹⁰⁶ In addition, the instruments of containment created under Truman, NATO and economic revitalization, would continue to be used. Eisenhower would also turn increasingly to military assistance to pursue the goals of containment in the periphery.

¹⁰⁴ Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan. *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895*, p. 326.

¹⁰⁵ John F. Dulles, “A Policy of Boldness.” *Life*, 19 May 1952, pp. 146-157.

¹⁰⁶ Smith, *America's Mission*, pp. 188-191.

The American response to the East German uprising in 1953 and the Hungarian revolt in 1956 bore out the caution with which the United States approached the prospect of forcing change within the Eastern bloc. Eisenhower rejected Dulles's policy of liberation early on in favor of a policy of deterrence and defense. The Soviet Union was becoming too strong militarily for the US to pursue a course set on "rolling back" the Soviet empire.¹⁰⁷

The promotion of democratic values took on a distorted appearance with the Eisenhower Administration's reliance on the New Look as its foreign policy mantra. The New Look depended on the concept of massive retaliation through the application of coercive military force. The Eisenhower Administration also favored using foreign alliances, indigenous troops, and political pressure to maintain its commitments abroad, in order to reduce defense spending and the need for conventional forces. In addition, it assigned a key role to covert operations.¹⁰⁸ Fear that Communist governments or governments sympathetic to left leaning policies might come to power led to the approval of the overthrow of legitimate governments in Iran and Guatemala, the planning of unsuccessful coups in Indonesia and Cuba, and plots to assassinate Chou En-Lai, Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.¹⁰⁹

The US faced a dilemma rooted in its perception of power politics in the world. Containing Communism was the undisputed first priority of foreign policy, but the foreign opponents to encroaching Communism were often not democratic. Consequently, the US chose the support of non-democratic regimes as the lesser evil than the coming to power

¹⁰⁷ Nathan and Oliver, *United States Foreign Policy and World Order*, pp. 165-166.

¹⁰⁸ Combs, *The History of American Foreign Policy*, p. 352.

¹⁰⁹ *ibid.*, p. 353.

of Communist ones. The provision of economic assistance to support Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam in 1954, the support of Abdel Nasser's nationalist regime in Egypt in the 1956 Suez crisis,¹¹⁰ and the sending of US troops to Lebanon in 1958 indicated a tendency to frame all occurrences of instability in peripheral areas in terms of the East-West balance of power.¹¹¹ By the late 1950s it was clear that the US was in the habit of supporting regimes that lacked internal legitimacy, but which were engaged with struggles for survival with opposition groups that were linked to Communism.

The New Frontier: Youthful Idealism Reborn

President John F. Kennedy's inauguration brought with it a pledge to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."¹¹² Kennedy viewed the overt and aggressive promotion of democratic values in the Third World as the key to breaking the Cold War stalemate.¹¹³ His administration created a multi-faceted internationalist approach as part of an overall global strategy to defeat Communism.

The Alliance for Progress, which was directed at preventing the spread of Communism in Latin America, represented the most ambitious and comprehensive democratization program of the 1960s. It was rooted in the belief that the promotion of socioeconomic reform and a just social order could prevent the maturation of internal Communist movements.¹¹⁴ In this respect it was a direct response to the 1959 Cuban

¹¹⁰ LaFeber, *The American Age*, pp. 556-560.

¹¹¹ Brown, *The Faces of Power*, pp. 102-103.

¹¹² John F. Kennedy, "Inaugural Address," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 6 February 1961, pp. 175-176.

¹¹³ Nolan, *Principled Diplomacy*, p. 110.

¹¹⁴ Tony Smith, "The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s," in *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 74.

Revolution. The Alliance for Progress was regarded as even more ambitious than the Marshall Plan, because it sought to transform structural as well as economic, social, and political features of Latin America.

The Alliance for Progress continued the search for a stable political order in Latin America which had been initiated with the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. However, the disbursement of \$22.3 billion dollars¹¹⁵ over its decade of existence is widely thought to have been ineffective, or, according to some estimations, even counterproductive, because right wing forces were emboldened due to the pressures that the Alliance tried to impose on them.

The failure of the program is attributed to an inability to convince elites to pursue the land reform that was essential to the depolarization of wealth in the region. Another key factor was the United States' willingness to tolerate military coups and the subsequent proliferation of military governments as temporary diversions enroute to the consolidation of democracy in the region. Tony Smith argues further that the program was doomed at its inception because its founders' conceptions of how social reform was related to democracy were so abstract and vague that the actual implementation of the program lacked an adequate theoretical framework from which to proceed.¹¹⁶ The same defects plague US democratization efforts today in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

As a result of the deliberate policy of being non-specific about the criteria of a democratic system of government that the Alliance was trying to build, it was difficult to evaluate progress and to ensure that the specific initiatives were contributing to an agreed

¹¹⁵ Smith, *America's Mission*, p. 214.

¹¹⁶ Smith, "The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s." p. 78.

upon desired outcome.¹¹⁷ Additionally, policymakers failed to appreciate the depth of the internal opposition to the program's initiatives.¹¹⁸ In sum, the Alliance for Progress was a serious and well-intentioned policy which attempted to blend the deep-set moralism of American foreign policy with the overlapping national interest of containing Communism.

Valuable lessons, however, can be learned from the Alliance's ill-fated course. First, the process of democratization requires a conversion of old power structures that is difficult to mandate from the outside. Legitimate governments must be established through the support of internal forces. Second, undemocratic means rarely result in democratic ends. Finally, opposition to democratization will be encountered by the inevitably of winners and losers in the reform process.¹¹⁹ In general, would-be democratizers should be aware of the limits of external influence.

Vietnam: Containment's Second Battleground

Any survey of the promotion of democratic values in foreign affairs across the brief history of the American Republic would be remiss if it did not include some discussion of the most divisive intervention in its history -- Vietnam. Although the US's Vietnam policy was focused on preventing the extension of Communist control in Southeast Asia,¹²⁰ the ideological basis of the American anti-Communist obsession stems from the perceived threat to democracy that Communism posed. In this sense, the policy of containment embodied US concerns that the preservation and extension of democratic regimes depends first on limiting the expansion of Communist ones. A non-democratic,

¹¹⁷ This is also a common complaint of the US's democratization programs in the post-Cold War world.

¹¹⁸ Smith, "The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s," p. 75. 81.

¹¹⁹ Smith, *America's Mission*, pp. 234-235.

¹²⁰ Neil Sheehan, *The Pentagon Papers* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. xix.

non-Communist regime was thought to be closer to democracy than a Communist one.

American involvement in Vietnam began in World War II with US support for the Viet Minh who were fighting Japan's effort to take over Indochina.¹²¹ Then, in 1949, the US economically supported the struggle of the French to hold on to their colonial possession in Indochina. Within the context of Mao Zedong's victory in China, Vietnam became a critical chip in the global high stakes game of containment.¹²² Fear that a Communist victory in Vietnam would result in the installation of Communist regimes throughout all of Southeast Asia, drove administration and congressional officials to doggedly support increasing levels of US involvement until American public opinion and Congress turned decidedly against the war in the late 1960s.

In the end the United States invested more than \$150 billion in treasure and nearly 60,000 lives in this crusade for the containment of Communism in a geographical area of secondary interest. The US military emerged from the conflict as a bruised force with low morale and a tarnished public image. US air and sea power came out of the war almost intact, but the Army had become a "hollow" combat force scarred by drug abuse, insubordination, and poor morale.

Although the US was engrossed in a war against peasant communist guerrillas in a peripheral area that had been deemed a vital national interest, it had concluded that no changes to the status quo in Europe were worth the risk of war with the Soviet Union.¹²³ Consequently, the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was ordered to reverse the significant liberalizations gained in the "Prague Spring," was dismissed as a

¹²¹ Nathan and Oliver, *United States Foreign Policy and World Order*, p. 169.

¹²² Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Viking Press, 1983), p. 169.

¹²³ DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers*, p. 169.

mere “setback” to US-Soviet relations. Cathal Nolan argues that “never was the disjunction greater between real national interests and a misplaced national commitment and crusading zeal.”¹²⁴ In reality, however, these decisions were consistent with a clear trend in US foreign policy to balance the threat to democratic values with the realities of the global balance of power. If action could be taken without directly confronting Soviet power, then great resources would be expended to achieve the moral aims of US foreign policy.¹²⁵

Henry Kissinger has observed, “Vietnam is still with us. It has created doubts about American judgment, about American credibility, about American power -- not only at home, but throughout the world. It has poisoned our domestic debate. So we paid an exorbitant price for the decisions that were made in good faith and for good purpose.”¹²⁶ But the endurance of the national trauma known as Vietnam, and its accompanying disillusionment, were not the only shocks to the traditional dual pursuit of national interests and moral principles that Americans had come to expect of their foreign policymakers. America was also destined to endure an overlapping decade of Kissinger’s brand of *realpolitik* which would make its own contributions toward distorting the balance between idealism and realism in American foreign policy.

The Nixon and Kissinger Era of Realpolitik

Richard Nixon and his like-minded National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, brought a revived sense of realism and balance of power politics to the conduct of

¹²⁴ Nolan, *Principled Diplomacy*, p. 120.

¹²⁵ Brown, *Faces of Power*, pp. 15-18.

¹²⁶ Henry Kissinger, quoted in *Vietnam: A History*. Stanley Karnow (New York: Viking Press, 1983), p. 9.

American foreign policy. *Rapprochement* and *détente* became prominent aims in American strategy as the Nixon-Kissinger team set out to decouple principled diplomacy and the idea of monolithic communism through the creation of their own style of containment. This approach featured downplaying the traditional moral component of US foreign policy in favor of enhancing America's power position in the world *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union.

The US emerged from the protracted Vietnam conflict as a wearied power disillusioned at the long-term prospect of framing its foreign policy in terms of containing Communism throughout the world. As a result, the American foreign policy community was receptive to policies that would allow the United States to continue to exercise influence in the world without undertaking any further grand commitments. Additionally, the Soviet achievement of nuclear strategic parity in 1970, the relative decline of US economic dominance, divisions in the Communist bloc caused by the Sino-Soviet split, and the rise of Eurocommunism contributed to the receptivity of a new approach. Kissinger's successful navigation of American foreign policy away from idealpolitik-blended-with-realism to pure realpolitik can be attributed to the presence of these constraining factors.

Kissinger's much heralded adeptness in crafting foreign policy aims and seeing them to fruition was essential to the achievement of such successes as the opening of China and the pursuit of *détente* with the Soviet Union. In addition, Nixon exploited the powers of the Presidency in order to achieve such fundamental shifts in these policy directions. In his memoirs Kissinger argued that Nixon's political strength was the result

of his political base on the right, bureaucratic clout, and an administrative style that was conducive to the conduct of secret diplomacy. These factors combined with Nixon's intellectual grasp of politics and power balances led to their joint success.¹²⁷

Kissinger's philosophy rejected the notion that international politics was characterized by competition between the forces of good and evil. Instead, he pragmatically refrained from assessing the moral validity of states in order to deal with them and their pursuit of interests in the international system. Gains could be made on all sides if cooperation in areas of mutual interest was encouraged. Meanwhile, deeply held conflicting interests, such as opposing philosophies toward the conduct of internal affairs, were not highlighted as areas of contention. Diplomacy should focus on maintaining the balance of power by accommodating the interests of those powers in the greatest position to disturb the balance. The result, then, would be an international system in which all major powers were relatively satisfied.¹²⁸

The first grand application of the Nixon Administration's *realpolitik* came with the surprise rapprochement with China. Nixon's triumphant state visit there in February of 1972 was followed by steady progress toward formal recognition. Overtures to China began as the Cultural Revolution was still underway in 1969. The fact that such a diplomatic initiative could occur in the midst of such a repressive domestic campaign highlighted the shift away from moralism in American foreign policy.

The goal was to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet rift which was rooted in the conflicting nationalist and personal aspirations of the Chinese and Soviet leaders as well as

¹²⁷ Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 163-4.

¹²⁸ John F. Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 12th ed. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991), pp. 187-188.

in ideological differences over how to advance Communism in the world. Kissinger explained that his approach to China and the Soviet Union reflected his general philosophy of conducting foreign policy, "Our relations to possible opponents should be such ... that our options toward both of them were always greater than their options toward each other."¹²⁹ The imperatives of geopolitics prevailed over the short-term pursuit of democratic aims in this era. China and the US turned to each other as a means of achieving their mutual goal of containing Soviet power.

The diplomacy of Kissinger and Nixon was framed in the concepts of diplomatic equilibrium and classic balance of power politics. The aim was to create a balance between the main powers of the world: the US, the Soviet Union, China, Europe, and Japan. The problem with this vision was that neither Japan nor Europe enjoyed the great power benefits of strategic autonomy. The Europeans depended on the US politically, militarily, and economically. Japan did for its security needs. The 1973 Arab oil embargo illustrated how vulnerable she was to the realities of global economic interdependence.¹³⁰ In general, the European allies resented the unilateralist and condescending character of Kissinger's approach to foreign policy. Major differences also existed over how to deal with Israel and the Arab states. Their refusal to line up in a unified fashion behind Kissinger's diplomacy during the 1973 oil embargo can also be attributed to their displeasure with Kissinger's indifferent treatment of them.¹³¹

Kissinger and Nixon laid out three specific operational principles to govern the US's relationship with the Soviet Union which reflected the overall demoralization of their

¹²⁹ Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 165.

¹³⁰ Nathan and Oliver, *United States Foreign Policy and World Order*, pp. 362-364.

¹³¹ Brown, *Faces of Power*, pp. 421-425.

approach and their willingness to bargain in order to achieve mutual interests. The first of these was the *principle of concreteness*. This principle sought to deal with specific causes of tension rather than dwelling on irreconcilable differences in ideology. Second, was the *principle of restraint*, or the expectation that the Soviets would not exploit crises for unilateral gain. Finally, the Kissinger-Nixon formula was also based on the *principle of linkage*, which meant that strategic and political environments would be considered together. Progress on arms control would depend on cooperation in regional and political problems. However, linkage would not extend to a preoccupation with internal issues such as human rights. Linkage was essentially an attempt to ground the foreign policy of the Nixon Administration in a “firm conception of the national interest”¹³² -- no more, no less.

The result of such an approach led to great breakthroughs in the areas of arms control, to include the negotiation of the SALT and ABM treaties, as well as economic agreements that included wheat sales, the extension of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, and a settlement of World War II lend-lease debts. In addition, linkage yielded positive results in the settlement of the status of Berlin, cooperation in scientific endeavors to include a joint mission in space, and Soviet restraint *vis-à-vis* its client states -- particularly, in Indochina and the Middle East.¹³³

However, a constraining factor on the success of Kissinger’s realpolitik strategy was his failure to reconcile his effectiveness abroad with the need to develop public and congressional support at home. Kissinger’s view of the world was too coldly geopolitical

¹³² Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 129-130.

¹³³ Nolan, *Principled Diplomacy*, p. 129.

to sit comfortably with influential segments of the American polity.¹³⁴ Eventually, détente would be undermined through the combined effects of countervailing congressional power and Soviet “misbehavior” in the developing world. The 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which tied trade to the Soviet Union with its policy on Jewish emigration, angered the Soviets and led to decreased Soviet cooperation. Meanwhile, Soviet insistence on continuing its penetration of the developing world in the Middle East and Africa, despite the incentives of détente to curb such behavior, also led to public erosion for the support of détente.¹³⁵

The demise of détente demonstrated the limits US policymakers approach when they exclude democratic values from the conduct of foreign affairs. On this account Kissinger failed his own “acid test” of statecraft: the necessity to create public support for policies so that they might survive the political trials of any given moment.¹³⁶ Robert Beisner argues further that the fatal flaw of Kissinger’s realpolitik was that [he] “confused a fear of ideology’s excesses with its condemnation.”¹³⁷ Stripping US foreign policy of idealist aims resulted in diminished public support for pure realpolitik.

The New Moralism: Carter and Human Rights

Presidential candidates from both sides campaigned on platforms distancing themselves from Kissinger’s and Nixon’s realpolitik in the 1976 election. Jimmy Carter argued on the campaign trail, “We’ve lost in our foreign policy the character of the

¹³⁴ Brown, *Faces of Power*, pp. 443-445.

¹³⁵ Leslie H. Gelb, “Kissinger as Flawed Strategist, Brilliant Tactician.” in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol. II, p. 519.

¹³⁶ Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 325-326.

¹³⁷ Robert Beisner, “History and Henry Kissinger.” *Diplomatic History* (Fall 1990), pp. 520-521.

American people.”¹³⁸ When reviewing the inaugural addresses of his predecessors, Carter noted that he was “touched most of all by Woodrow Wilson’s. Like him, I felt I was taking office at a time when Americans desired a return to first principles of their government.”¹³⁹ In his own inaugural address Carter declared, “Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere.... Our commitment to human rights must be absolute.”¹⁴⁰

A few months later in a speech at Notre Dame, Carter outlined his approach:

I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence, which we have, for humane purposes. We can also have a foreign policy that the American people support, and, for a change, know and understand.... We are confident that the democratic methods are most effective, and so we are not tempted to employ improper tactics at home or abroad.... We are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.... Through failure we have found our way back to our own principles and values.... We can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights.¹⁴¹

Thus a new era of American foreign policy began in which linkage continued, but the primary point of leverage would be steadfastness in human rights. Foreign aid became linked to states’ records on human rights.¹⁴² A priority was placed on pushing repressive regimes toward democracy and in some cases, such as Brazil and Argentina, much

¹³⁸ Jimmy Carter, “Jimmy Carter on the Failures of Nixon-Ford-Kissinger Foreign Policy, 1976.” transcript of 7 October 1976 presidential debate found in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol. II, p. 498.

¹³⁹ Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam, 1982), p. 19.

¹⁴⁰ Jimmy Carter, “Speech of 20 January 1977,” *Public Papers of the President of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 1.

¹⁴¹ Jimmy Carter, “Address of Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame: 22 May 1977,” *Public Papers of the President of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 955-956.

¹⁴² Smith, *America’s Mission*, pp. 241-242. Smith details the criteria by which states’ human rights records were evaluated and argues that the consideration of sociopolitical conditions and civil liberties extended the policy to the promotion of democracy; Brown, *Faces of Power*, pp. 470-471.

progress was made to this end.¹⁴³ Carter can also be credited with encouraging democratization in Ghana, Nigeria, and Thailand and for stimulating the release of many political prisoners across the globe.¹⁴⁴

However, strategic considerations limited the consistent linkage of human rights to US policy. The Carter Administration continued to support authoritarian regimes in Iran, Nicaragua, South Korea, and China which had great strategic value to the US. However, Carter's critics contend that insistence on some internal reform in the Shah's Iran and Somoza's Nicaragua contributed to their fall and replacement with Islamic fundamentalism in one case and a leftist regime aligned with the Soviet Union in the other.¹⁴⁵ The US also looked away from the persistence of human rights violations in Egypt, the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia, and trained foreign officers in US military schools who served repressive regimes.¹⁴⁶ Meanwhile, the administration took a more hard line stance toward weaker states of little strategic value such as Haiti, Paraguay, Cambodia, and Uganda.¹⁴⁷

The inconsistency of Carter's foreign policy stemmed from the conflicting approaches of his top advisers and his inability to forge his own consistent framework of analysis. Andrew Young, ambassador to the United Nations, championed the idealist aspects of Carter's world view. Meanwhile, the national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was careful not to abandon geopolitical realities in the actual conduct of policy, but he welcomed the opportunity to apply human rights standards to the Soviets.

¹⁴³ LaFeber, *The American Age*, p. 686.

¹⁴⁴ Brown, *Faces of Power*, p. 472.

¹⁴⁵ Smith, *America's Mission*, pp. 248-260; Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895*, p. 507.

¹⁴⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 506-507.

¹⁴⁷ Brown, *Faces of Power*, p. 469.

Finally, Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, represented a sort of middle way which favored considering each international situation on a case-by-case basis in search of a “higher realism” that balanced idealist goals with the limits of US power and consideration of vital US interests.¹⁴⁸

Carter favored each of these approaches at times which resulted in a multi-directional approach to US diplomacy.¹⁴⁹ His greatest foreign policy successes, however, can be attributed to the pursuit of a balance between realist and idealist goals.¹⁵⁰ The negotiation and ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty, the Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt, the normalization of relations with China, conflict mediations in the Third World, the emphasis on North-South relations, the installation of a black majority regime in Zimbabwe, improvements on human rights, and the eleventh hour deal with Iran to free the embassy hostages were the result of pursuing a middle ground between the competing forces of cold realpolitik and unrestrained idealism.

Eventually, the realities of geopolitics -- especially those embodied in the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan -- tempered much of the idealism of Carter’s foreign policy. Afghanistan effectively reordered the priorities of Carter’s foreign policy. Human rights, global economic development, and arms control were all subordinated to checking Soviet power.¹⁵¹

Although Carter is almost universally criticized for his excesses of moralism in the conduct of foreign policy, he should be credited with attempting to restore the principle

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 452-454, 465-466; Nathan and Oliver, *United States Foreign Policy and World Order*, pp. 390-395.

¹⁴⁹ LaFeber, *The American Age*, p. 683.

¹⁵⁰ Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895*, pp. 488-489.

¹⁵¹ Brown, *Faces of Power*, p. 562.

that power and principle can serve one another in American foreign policy. His failure to appreciate the limits of idealism can account for many of his missteps, but his recognition that the promotion of democratic values is an enduring component of US foreign policy revived a US diplomatic tradition that had been discarded by his realpolitik predecessors.

Reagan-Bush: Befriending the “Evil Empire”

Although many observers expected the incoming Reagan Administration to de-emphasize Carter’s focus on human rights and democracy in favor of a security centered realpolitik based approach, the goal of promoting democracy, especially in Latin America, became the stated theme of US policy.¹⁵² However, the means employed to achieve this end, “constructive engagement,” drew great fire from Ronald Reagan’s critics. This approach favored working with authoritarian governments by engaging them in areas of common interests and then using this influence as a stimulus to internal reforms. Critics of the constructive engagement contend that it was little more than a smoke screen aimed at protecting the status quo and propping up anti-Communist dictators.¹⁵³ However, to openly admit that a resumption of the Cold War and the containment of the global expansion of Communism were the real goals of the administration, would be politically unacceptable to the post-Vietnam populace which had become used to the idea that human rights and democratic values matter.

The Reagan Administration blended the human rights rhetoric still resonant from the Carter era with a national mood re-energized toward considering Moscow as “the focus of evil in the modern world” into its own version of democratic internationalism. Its

¹⁵² Thomas Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy: US Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 6-7.

¹⁵³ Smith, *America’s Mission*, p. 286.

goals were fundamentally Wilsonian, but its method of supporting less than democratic means as worthy, because they led to the achievement of democratic ends separated this approach from Wilson's. Rather than focusing on individual violators' transgressions, Reagan's team believed that the best human rights policy was to pursue the fundamentals of containment. "In short, *containment itself was to be understood as the administration's main human rights policy.*"¹⁵⁴

Policymakers devised an all-encompassing vision of promoting democracy centered on extensive military aid and intervention aimed at ensuring that leftist governments did not come to power. This policy to support "freedom fighters" opposing Communist regimes across the globe became known as the Reagan Doctrine, which was used to justify military aid to guerrillas in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. Although Reagan had taken to describing "freedom fighters" as the "moral equal of our Founding Fathers,"¹⁵⁵ the administration was under no illusion that these forces were democratic. Certainly neither Jonas Savimbi's forces in Angola nor the mujaheddin guerrillas in Afghanistan could qualify as democrats.¹⁵⁶

The Reagan Administration also instituted development programs aimed at promoting democracy. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created in 1982 and is credited with supporting the Solidarity movement in Poland, democratic forces in Chile and South Korea, and helping to ensure the conduct of free elections in the Philippines.¹⁵⁷ Other development efforts, particularly those aimed at Central and Latin

¹⁵⁴ Nolan, *Principled Diplomacy*, p. 157.

¹⁵⁵ Current Documents, 1985, March 1, 1985, p. 973.

¹⁵⁶ Smith, *America's Mission*, pp. 298-299.

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 286-287.

America were criticized for focusing almost exclusively on the maintenance of order through the provision of aid to the law enforcement sector of society.¹⁵⁸ Such an approach did little to empower opposition groups which were more likely to embody the ideals of increased mass participation in governmental affairs.

The main focus of the Reagan Administration's approach to promoting democracy worldwide was the Soviet Union and its capacity to expand its political system. Eliot Abrams articulated this view in 1983 when he said, "Many regimes violate human rights, but Communist regimes tend to *export* their human rights violations."¹⁵⁹ Therefore, putting pressure on the Soviet Union through a massive arms build-up and aggressively supporting the opponents of its clients in the periphery, while all along maintaining the offensive volley of moralist rhetoric, were all elements of Reagan's "democratic revolution."

This approach relied on American military power to back it up and capitalized on its application to support the underlying principles of the policy when "easy" opportunities, such as the intervention in Grenada and the bombing of Libya, came into view. The policy bogged down, however, when the American public and Congress were not as committed to the "means" argument in more problematic situations such as the support of the Contras in Nicaragua.

Although Reagan and his foreign policy team credit their methods of promoting democracy for the collapse of the Communist bloc, the democratization of Central America and eventually South Africa, their critics argue that they should not be heralded

¹⁵⁸ Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, p. 224.

¹⁵⁹ Eliot Abrams, *Current Policy #112* (Washington DC: Department of State, 1983).

as champions of liberal democratic internationalism. According to this argument, the means do not justify the ends. Financing secret wars and implicitly endorsing the brutal tactics of authoritarian, though non-totalitarian, governments does not fit the Wilsonian tradition of exporting American democratic values. Indeed, the circumventing of Congress and deception of the American people demonstrated in the Iran-Contra scandal, in the name of bringing democracy to others, actually undermined its existence at home.

The Bush Administration inherited the basic foreign policy outlook, and, indeed, many of the same players, of the Reagan Administration. The great differences, though, laid in the ever increasing pace of the unraveling of the order of the Cold War and a hesitancy in assertively applying a consistent agenda for American foreign policy. The opportunities were historic and without precedent in terms of the possibilities for the advance of democracy, particularly in the former Soviet Empire. The vacuum left by the dismantling of the Eastern bloc and of the Soviet Union, itself, meant that the US had been dealt a rare window of opportunity to shape events.

However, the Bush Administration seemed to be a passive spectator to the drama unfolding before it. Bush and his foreign policy team have been criticized for preferring the status quo to the uncertainty of departing on fresh policies courses. Though able executors of policy, none of Bush's foreign policy advisers could muster the insights needed to provide their rudderless chief with the "vision" that was needed to construct a foreign policy suited to the ever changing world before them. Bush wanted to be viewed as a decisive leader, but he feared making mistakes.

With respect to his commitment to promote democracy in the world, he lacked the ideological zeal to be single-minded, assertive, and proactive in response to the opportunities at hand. Although idealist rhetoric was a frequent feature of Bush foreign policy statements, an analysis of actions reveals a pattern of passivity interrupted by spurts of activity.

Action in response to the repression of the Chinese student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in June of 1989 was reticent and again reflected a preference for order and economic interests over the promotion of democracy. The students' prodemocracy rallies had widespread support in the US and even some Chinese party officials were willing to hold talks with the movement's leaders,¹⁶⁰ but the octogenarian hardliners moved to crush the movement resulting in the deaths of hundreds of demonstrators. The Bush Administration rejected stiff sanctions and resisted condemning the Chinese leadership for fear that China would become isolated. Most Favored Nation status was renewed and Bush vetoed legislation that would have extended safe refuge in the US to the 40,000 Chinese students studying in the US who were fearful to return home.

The desire to bring democracy to Panama was one of the reasons cited for its invasion in December of 1989. Other reasons included protecting US military personnel stationed there, the security of the Panama Canal, and General Manuel Noriega's role in trafficking drugs to the US.¹⁶¹ However, most analysts agree that Bush's main impetus was his eagerness to look decisive and shed his "wimp" label after months of trying lesser measures to oust Noriega. Noriega had long been on the CIA's payroll as a source of

¹⁶⁰ Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan. *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895*. p. 587.

¹⁶¹ LaFeber, *The American Age*, p. 751.

intelligence in the area and had cooperated with the US in the training of the Contras. His involvement in the drug trade was also well-known to the US for many years.¹⁶² The Bush Administration relied heavily on the democracy argument in justifying its invasion course to the American people, but accounts of the operation's planning reveal that little preparation went into achieving this end.¹⁶³ In addition, the means employed violated the UN and Organization of American States (OAS) charters' nonintervention provisions. Both organizations moved to condemn the US action. The invasion also sent a poor signal to the Soviets that the use of enemy troops to change an enemy government was an acceptable course for democratic America.

Without question, the Gulf War marked the high water mark of the Bush Administration. The decisive victory of the allies was trumpeted as the foundation from which a new world order could be launched based on the principles outlined in the UN Charter. The overriding motivation for military action was to prevent Saddam Hussein from controlling up to 40 percent of the world's oil reserves in the event that he also conquered Saudi Arabia. Other reasons cited were the threat that Iraqi nuclear and chemical weapons could pose and the need to respond to aggression through the "liberation" of Kuwait.¹⁶⁴ But consensus over the defense of Kuwaiti sovereignty, which was built on the realist foundation of overlapping security interests, did not translate into a unified response to similar violations of sovereignty later when they occurred in less strategically sensitive areas of the world such as the former Yugoslavia. However, the US

¹⁶² Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895*, p. 573.

¹⁶³ See Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), pp. 161-174.

¹⁶⁴ LaFeber, *The American Age*, p. 761.

did take a principled stance when it stood by the fragile democratic regime of Corazon Aquino when it was threatened in December of 1990.

The events in China and Panama preceded the Gulf War, while the support of the Aquino regime was concurrent with Desert Shield. One may argue, then, that the Bush Administration was merely finding its way prior to its triumph in the Gulf and that inconsistency is often the mark of lack of sureness. But just months after victory in the Gulf, the Bush Administration stood passively by as Haiti's first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown in September of 1991. The US watched as the coup plotters dealt severely with his supporters.

Worst of all, many argue, in terms of the hope of sustaining a new world order, no effective policy was advanced in the early stages of the war in Yugoslavia to attenuate the conflict, nor was the application of coercive force as a means of deterring further aggression seriously considered or promoted among the US's European allies. Bush deferred to the European Community to solve the crisis. But critics attribute to Germany some responsibility for the widening of the war, because of its eagerness to recognize Croatia and Slovenia virtually at the onset of the conflict. Finally, in his final weeks in office, Bush took some limited action by supporting the no-fly zone over Bosnia. By then 150,000 people, mostly civilians, had already died in the conflict.

The greatest opportunity for decisive action in advancing the cause of democracy was in the Soviet bloc. In the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration neglected alternative democratic forces in favor of a policy supporting Mikhail Gorbachev to the bitter end. This course illustrated the administration's preference for the continuation of order and

stability. Bush failed to recognize that Gorbachev was losing his grip on power while Boris Yeltsin was building a strong democratic base. Again, working with a known, though failing approach, was preferable to admitting that adaptation to revolutionary change was needed -- even change that held more promise for the advancement of democracy.

Another indicator of a missed opportunity to shape events in the Soviet Union was that no significant aid was sent in the name of democratization there while Gorbachev was still in power. Much of Gorbachev's shrinking support stemmed from the poor economic conditions that resulted from the implementation of economic reforms. The Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act appropriated \$900 million in aid to Central and Eastern Europe beginning in 1990, but US aid to Gorbachev's government was only considered seriously for the first time six months before its collapse.¹⁶⁵ In addition, a \$24 billion aid package promised by the Western democracies failed to materialize in time. Nor was a significant amount of aid from the West forthcoming after the break-up of the Soviet Union¹⁶⁶ -- certainly nothing along the lines of the Marshall Plan or even commensurate with the billions given to El Salvador in the 1980s. Indeed, in March 1992 President Nixon embarrassed the Bush Administration with his remarks contending that the aid to the former Soviet Union was "pathetically inadequate" and that consequently pundits may soon be asking "who lost Russia?"

In general, the Bush Administration continued the rhetoric of the Reagan Administration regarding the centrality of the promotion of democracy in its foreign

¹⁶⁵ See chapter four.

¹⁶⁶ Chapter four details the US and Western aid effort in the post-communist states.

policy, but it never constructed a foreign policy framework to guide its actions to achieve these ends. Bush's actions in the Gulf War and in Panama proved that he could be decisive, but missed opportunities elsewhere, particularly his failure to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq and to proactively address opportunities in the former Soviet bloc, revealed an underlying discomfort with confronting changed realities and exercising US influence to shape events. Bush's record on promoting democracy was inconsistent. The absence of decisive action in this realm of foreign policy indicates that the opportunity to spread democratic values in an increasingly receptive world was neither a priority nor an overriding goal of the Bush Administration.

The Current State of the Promotion of Democracy in US Foreign Policy

The Clinton Administration, which campaigned on the theme "It's the economy, stupid," was neither inclined, equipped, nor sufficiently motivated to markedly improve upon the foreign policy crises inherited from the Bush Administration. On the contrary, drift continued as the aversion to constructing a foreign policy framework that had begun on Bush's watch extended into the next. The common ground, which had sustained bipartisan support among realists and idealists alike for a fundamental framework for foreign policy in the Cold War era, had eroded and no administration since has been able to put forth a new vision underlying a unifying principle or grand strategy to replace containment.

The Clinton Administration took power with the hope that economic policy extended abroad could serve as a substitute for foreign policy. Indeed, Clinton's "foreign

policy has often seemed an economic policy barely disguised.”¹⁶⁷ In laying out the strategic priorities one year into the new administration, Secretary of State Warren Christopher listed economic security as the number one priority of US security strategy, “This administration understands that America’s strength at home and its strength abroad are interlocking and mutually reinforcing. That is why President Clinton and I have placed economic policy at the heart of our foreign policy.” This pronouncement was followed by a list of regional situations deserving of US attention.¹⁶⁸

Meanwhile, as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) marched toward passage, the US became increasingly embroiled in Somalia, Haiti, and North Korea. The imbroglio in the former Yugoslavia waged on, while the international community failed through its various different institutions: the UN, NATO, and the EU, to make any substantial difference in shaping events there. In addition, events in the post-communist states continued to develop. The Central and East European states looked to the West for their security and economic needs, seeking membership in Western institutions in the long-term and economic support in the short-term. Russia, meanwhile, became increasingly intransigent as it tested the waters as a revived great power with its own distinct national interests. Chief among these interests is the wielding of influence within its sphere, the “near abroad,” followed by being a force in the international community at large.

¹⁶⁷ Harvey Sicherman, “Winning the Peace.” *Orbis* (Fall 1994) 38, no. 4, p. 541.

¹⁶⁸ Warren Christopher, “American Foreign Policy: The Strategic Priorities,” speech delivered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4 November 1993. *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 1 January 1994, LX, no. 6, p. 163.

The Clinton Administration was berated from all sides in its first eighteen months for its inability to articulate a foreign policy framework capable of guiding its actions in the post-Cold War world. Finally, in July of 1994, the administration published its foreign policy “vision” which it claimed had guided its policy all along. In *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* the administration attests to being concerned with more than just economic policy. Indeed, the goal of bolstering the US economy descended one notch in importance from previous administration foreign policy pronouncements.¹⁶⁹ “Enlargement” was put forth as the new guiding concept of the post-containment era:

Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.¹⁷⁰

This policy pronouncement indicated the Clinton Administration’s acceptance of the idea of the “democratic peace.”¹⁷¹ In addition, the strategy of enlargement assumes the interconnectedness of three goals: the maintenance of a strong defense rooted in cooperative security arrangements, the opening of foreign markets, and the promotion of democracy.¹⁷² Yet even the very general goal of “enlargement” through the promotion of democracy has conditions:

¹⁶⁹ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, (Washington DC: GPO, July 1994), p. i.

¹⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁷¹ The theory of the democratic peace was outlined at the onset of the chapter. See footnote 9.

¹⁷² *ibid.*, p. 2.

This is not a democratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that will help us most.... We must focus our efforts where we have the most leverage. And our efforts must be demand-driven -- they must focus on nations whose people are pushing for reform or have already secured it.¹⁷³

Most observers of the evolution of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy, who eagerly awaited the pronouncement of some visionary strategy that might more ably guide its actions abroad, were disappointed with the document. In this view, national interests had yet to be defined; and, the administration still seemed averse to the concept of assuming a leadership role amongst its allies. "An administration that moved from assertive multilateralism to deliberative multilateralism was moving from slow to stop."¹⁷⁴

On the positive side, Clinton's emphasis on promoting democracy has resulted in a renewed emphasis on political development in the name of democratization on a scale unseen since Kennedy's Alliance for Progress initiative. Although the Clinton Administration has its sights on applying the policy throughout its realm of influence: the Western hemisphere, Asia, and Africa, its particular target has been the post-communist states of the former Eastern bloc.¹⁷⁵ The largest part of the State Department's FY 1995 assistance budget request, which was earmarked specifically at promoting democracy, \$1.3 billion, went to support democracy building programs in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union.¹⁷⁶ This priority reflects a broadened concept of national security. The promotion of democracy within the post-communist states is considered to be a cost-

¹⁷³ *ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁷⁴ Sicherman, "Winning the Peace," p. 529.

¹⁷⁵ See chapter four for a detailed analysis of this assistance.

¹⁷⁶ Warren Christopher, "Advancing the Strategic Priorities of US Foreign Policy and the FY 1995 Budget," *Dispatch*, (7 March 1994) 5, no. 10, p. 118.

effective alternative to paying the cost of increased defense expenditures should the transition to democracy fail within these states -- especially Russia.¹⁷⁷

The promotion of democracy may have reached new heights as the centerpiece of American foreign policy with the Clinton Administration's emphasis on "enlargement," but relying on this principle alone has not been a sufficient remedy to all the challenges confronting the Clinton foreign policy team. It is significant to note, too, how this approach varies from Reagan's. The Clinton Administration believes that security interests are enhanced with such a policy because democracies tend to be more peaceful than non-democracies, while Reagan's team used its campaign to promote democracy as a pleasing cover for less publicly presentable security goals.¹⁷⁸ In this sense the Clinton approach is more in line with Wilsonian principles.

The approaches differ, too, on the willingness to use force to achieve their ends. Reagan tied the application of force to his perception the arming of anti-democratic groups contributes to the promotion of democracy. Clinton's strategy is less risky because it does not see a connection between "enlargement" and the potential to apply force, or to even sacrifice in a significant way. For instance, the opportunity to protect democracy and human rights in China through the denial of Most Favored Nation status was bypassed primarily because of the cost to the US economy of such an action. The Clinton Administration seems willing to apply its policy of enlargement to situations of mutual benefit to the US and the recipient state. The Clinton Administration should be

¹⁷⁷ Warren Christopher, "International Affairs Budget: An Investment in Peace and Prosperity." *Dispatch*, (14 February 1994) 5, no. 7, p. 79.

¹⁷⁸ Thomas Carothers. "Enlarging Democracy: Democracy and Human Rights." *Current* (November 1994), no. 367, p. 22.

lauded for recognizing the strategic value of expanding the community of democracies in the world. However, it should be noted that in cases where the costs are too high or where strategic considerations are paramount, opportunities to implement the vision are missed.

The Promotion of Democracy in US Foreign Policy: Some Conclusions and Lessons

This chapter has analyzed the struggle between America's sense of mission and its quest for power among nations. The goal has been to use history as a lens through which current policy can be understood. The thesis that stands out is that the promotion of democratic values and human rights has been an endemic aspect of US policy. The quest for democratization continues to play an important role in defining US aims and grand strategy in the post-Cold War world.

International contexts, interpretations of national mission, administrations, and the ability to use US national power have varied over time, but the sense that democratic values matter has been an enduring theme of US foreign policy. Indeed, since World War I, the most consistent tradition in American foreign policy has been the belief that the nation's security is best protected by the expansion of democracy worldwide.¹⁷⁹ It makes sense, that with the fading of the US's main adversary, the Soviet Union, policymakers in search of a replacement to containment would rely on the themes that have long been a part of America's approach to the world.

Realist and idealist forces have competed for ascendance in American foreign policy, but over time, policymakers have come to appreciate that fostering

¹⁷⁹ Smith, *America's Mission*, p. 9.

democratization throughout the world serves both idealist and realist interests. The success of the current effort to “win the peace” depends on how well post-Cold War administrations can learn from the lessons of the past -- especially from specific efforts to facilitate democratization abroad through deliberate programs of democratic assistance. Policymakers should understand that the track record for previous attempts has been less than completely successful.

Previous attempts assumed that success would result even if theoretical frameworks to guide the implementation of programs were not present. Additionally, many of these attempts that involved the implementation of specific democracy programs, such as the Alliance for Progress, did not emphasize the importance of outlining specific methods and means for achieving democratization goals. There has also been a tendency to ignore cultural and political differences that might limit approaches that are biased with a US view of democracy. Henry Kissinger remarked in July of 1994 when commenting on the gulf between ideas behind policies and the ideas themselves, “It is one thing to talk about the enlargement of democracy, but in foreign policy the problem is what are you going to do about it, how much are you willing to pay for it and what is the operational method for carrying it out.”¹⁸⁰ Attention should also be given to how resources are distributed in particular initiatives.

The rest of this dissertation will take an in-depth look at one ongoing attempt to facilitate the promotion of democratic values abroad as part of the Clinton Administration’s overall program of enlargement. My specific focus will be the US

¹⁸⁰ Henry Kissinger quoted in Robert Shogun. “GOP’s Big Guns Rake Clinton’s Handling of Foreign Policy.” *Los Angeles Times*, 28 July 1994, Part A, p. 20, col., 1.

military's handling of one of its ascendant post-Cold War missions -- the promotion of democracy among its counterpart military institutions in the post-communist states. This effort is representative of the broad array of attempts currently underway to expand the community of democratic states in the international system. One would hope that the lessons of the past would inform this effort. Another expectation is that the inadequacies discovered in current initiatives will inform future attempts by US policymakers to employ American resources to achieve the desired end of spreading democracy throughout the international system.

The case has been made that democratization is a worthy and expected aim of US foreign policy. Now attention will turn to what means are most effective in achieving this desired end in the military institutions of transitioning states. Chapter two will begin the evaluation of the success of US military democratization initiatives in the post-communist states with the presentation of a model for military institutions in democracies. The aim is to lay out the dimensions of the military democratization problem so that policymakers can effectively address them.

CHAPTER 2

The Military Institution in a Democracy: The Imperatives of Democratic Political Control and Democratic Military Professionalism

Introduction

This chapter will focus on the imperatives of democratic political control and democratic military professionalism as essential elements of military institutions in democratic states. The goal is the creation of a model of how militaries can be democratically accountable and reflect democratic principles while also functioning as effective instruments of national security. My model is a composite, drawn from the civil-military literature and informed by my experience as a professional military officer in the service of a democratic society and state. The model responds to the special circumstances and needs of post-communist states.

Emphasis will be placed on the impact that the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic political system has on the achievement of civilian control. The process of democratization has raised the expectations of civilian leaders of these democratizing societies to demand greater accountability from the military in defending the state and in executing its political will, defined by civilian public officials who are responsible ultimately to a democratic electorate. Professional competence and a commitment to democratic values and practices by a reconstituted military in these states are critical touchstones to assess the successful transition of these functioning democracies.

The experience of the transitional states in Eastern Europe mandates a different theory of civil-military relations than has previously been pursued by states, whether

authoritarian or democratic. For states undergoing a democratic transition the relationship between civilian and military authorities is evolving as the institutions in the democratizing society take shape. Resistance within one democratizing institution must be met with the enforcement of standards of democratic accountability in others. States striving to become consolidated democracies must ensure that their militaries comply with democratic controls, while simultaneously developing the professional competence essential to the defense of the democratic state.

The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the elements of *democratic* political control and *democratic* military professionalism which characterize the military institutions of the developed democracies. My goal is to contribute to the delineation of a coherent set of civil-military relations that are responsive to the needs of these newly democratizing states and that can also guide policy advisers in reforming these systems. The model presented below can also be used to inform the efforts of developed democracies to assist these transitioning states.

The Imperative of Democratic Political Control

Samuel Huntington, arguably the leading theorist of civil-military relations today, has argued that the interaction of the twin imperatives of security and accountability is at the root of the problem of civil-military relations. “The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society.”¹ A state’s civil-military relations, then, depend

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 3.

on forces which compel the military institution to strive to become a competent military force and the competing forces demanding that the military be accountable and responsive to societal needs. The central problem of civil-military relations is resolving the tensions which inevitably arise from these competing imperatives. The classical focus has been on civilian control of the military defined as “governmental control of the military.”² This general characterization of the problem of civil-military relations has been traditionally accepted by theorists in the field.³

In the case of a democratic state, or of a state engaged in the process of democratic transition, there exists the additional and more demanding challenge of ensuring that military security is achieved at the least sacrifice of democratic practices, norms, and values. With regard to military institutions within democratic societies, the most important of these values is that civilian authorities, elected and appointed, direct the military institution. The military must serve the democratic state and remain under its control. Although civilian control of the military is a goal for all states, its achievement in democratic states depends on the interaction between democratic institutions and military institutions charged with defending both the state and its democratic values.

Alfred Stepan has argued that considering the total context of the military institution’s political environment is the most analytically powerful approach to take when

² Samuel P. Huntington, “Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical Statement,” in Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz, eds. *Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), p. 380.

³ Among those in agreement with Huntington are S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962); Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); Claude E. Welch Jr., *Civilian Control of the Military* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976); Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) and in *The Political Influence of the Military* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

studying its behavior. This is because the political role that the military institution can play within a state is derived from the position of the military subsystem within the overall political system.⁴ Stepan's insight implies that the type of political system that a military institution serves matters. Consequently, variances between political systems or transitions to new political systems must necessarily affect the behavior of the military. Analyzing the military institution in isolation of its social and political setting is consequently a limited and insufficient approach.

A superior approach recognizes that civilian control is best understood by considering a set of relationships rather than an individual event or series of events. "The nature and extent of civilian control reflect shifting balances between the strengths of civilian political institutions on one side, and the political strengths of military institutions on the other."⁵ It is appropriate, then, to attempt to illuminate which relationships are relevant and how they can best be structured to enhance civilian control in general, and democratic political control, in particular, especially as these relations apply to East European reform efforts.

Huntington has developed two competing concepts of civilian control. These reflect different relational patterns between the military and civilian authority -- objective and subjective civilian control. These ideas will be explored and adapted to the case of transitioning states. I will argue that the conditions of the post-communist states engaged in democratic transition are distinct from the conditions which characterized the military institutions in stable political systems which served as the subjects of Huntington's

⁴ Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 7-8, 54.

⁵ Welch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, p. 1.

analysis. Democratic states insist on military subordination to its civilian leadership and, by extension, to democratic processes of authority and control, resting ultimately on the freely expressed opinion of unfettered electorates in choosing officeholders. Therefore, many of the widely held assumptions underlying traditional approaches to civil-military relations need to be reexamined in light of the experience of the post-communist states in transition from authoritarian rule.

Huntington's Concepts of Subjective and Objective Civilian Control

According to Huntington subjective civilian control seeks to exert civilian authority over the military by “maximizing civilian power”⁶ primarily through ideological controls. Loyalty of the military to the political regime is the main aim of the civilian government. Consequently, the executors of subjective civilian control deny the military a separate sphere of activity to manage autonomously the military security of the state. Indeed, civilians exercising subjective civilian control may consciously trade the value of military preparedness and effectiveness for civilian control. They fear that unrestrained professionalism that results in maximizing military security will also undermine civilian control.

Under subjective civilian control civilian authorities fear their own military institution more than outside forces that may threaten the state and their authority. Consequently, civilians attempt to civilianize the military institutions as much as possible so that the values of the military institution are congruent with those of the state. Subjective civilian control may also rely on constitutional constraints that ensure that the

⁶ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 80-83.

powers among the institutions of the state are distributed in such a way that civilian control of the military is assured.

Objective civilian control, on the other hand, depends on maximizing military professionalism. “More precisely, it is that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps.”⁷ Huntington goes on to argue that objective control recognizes the necessity of an independent military sphere in order to encourage the development of the professional norms and expertise necessary to maximize military security.

Additionally, objective civilian control assumes complete apolitical behavior from military professionals. Indeed, Huntington contends that, since one of the basic foundations of military professionalism is obedience to any civilian group which secures legitimate authority in the state, professional officers would have no desire to interfere with questions of policy. Instead, their full attention would be devoted to carrying out the state’s political aims with maximum effectiveness and efficiency once these have been determined.⁸ In contrast, subjective civilian control assumes the military’s participation in politics and encourages the politicization of the military so that its values mirror those of the state.⁹

In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington’s concept of the military professionalism, characteristic of objective civilian control, mandates that no political role, no matter how responsible, can be allowed for the military. Such a perspective does not sufficiently

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 83.

⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 83-85.

⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 80-83.

reflect the dynamics that operate within a democratic state. In the politics of democratic states all institutions compete for resources and attempt to influence policymakers who make decisions affecting their organization. Military institutions must cooperate with their oversight bodies to pass on professional expertise and lobby for the support of their professional recommendations regarding national security.

Huntington acknowledges this reality in a later work in which he chronicles the increased political behavior of the US military services, due primarily to each service's desire to prevail in the inter-service rivalry for prestige, military roles, and resources.¹⁰ The services also discovered that the cultivation of political skills in the professional officer corps was essential to advancing their preferences in the development and procurement of weapons systems and in increasing their budgets.¹¹ Amos Perlmutter agrees that the military's role in the formation and implementation of national security policy forces it to assume some political role, at least in the pursuit of their organizational and professional interests.¹² Although Huntington accepts this qualification to his apolitical theory of military professionalism, his overall argument that professionalism and political intervention are antithetical remains essentially intact.¹³

Objective civilian control remains Huntington's clear preference for modern states. "Subjective civilian control is fundamentally out of place in any society in which the division of labor has been carried to the point where there emerges a distinct class of

¹⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 369-391.

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, p. 8.

¹³ Samuel P. Huntington, "Foreword," in *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, p. x.

specialists in the management of violence.”¹⁴ In Huntington’s view, objective civilian control is the only option that contains the power of the military *vis-à-vis* civilian groups while also maximizing the likelihood of achieving military security.¹⁵

The problem with Huntington’s analysis is that it assumes a brand of military professionalism so unquestionably loyal to whatever government has legitimately come to power that he ignores the ideological adjustments that necessarily accompany shifts in political systems.¹⁶ As citizens of the states they serve, military personnel inevitably undergo some form of socialization which transmits the values of the state. Servicemembers develop a set of beliefs which forms the basis of their motivation for their service to the state. When society embraces a new set of values, as in the process of transition from authoritarian rule, some adjustments must also be made to reorient the motivation for service of military members.

Moreover, to assume that the military as a sub-unit of society, albeit a group isolated to some degree, is totally impervious to monumental political and economic changes that may sweep a state ignores the fact that military personnel, like all participants in the life of the state, are affected by significant changes within it. A liberalization of the political system or the transformation of economic patterns will inevitably affect the military whose members share many of the same expectations and values as their civilian counterparts. This is particularly true when political changes result in negative outcomes

¹⁴ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 85.

¹⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶ W.H. Morris Jones pointed out the unlikelihood of the military officer cohort always acting as perfectly obedient neutral instruments in the hands of policy makers in his essay, “Armed Forces and the State,” *Public Administration* 35 (Winter 1957), pp. 411-16. Also found in Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett, *The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 51-55.

for the military which may undermine, threaten, or perhaps even destroy previous levels of status and material well being. Such is the case in many of the transitioning post-communist states. While the military increasingly comes to share the values of society, it also resists change and the values underlying them if their status and well-being is threatened.

Huntington's analysis also imposes rigid constraints on his concept of objective civilian control which imply that the military will not be an effective tool of the state if its values resemble too closely those of the state's, particularly with respect to liberal regimes. Huntington has great difficulty accepting the possibility of a professional military institution that is also socialized ideologically to defend a particular political system. Yet, he assumes that soldiers born in democratic states will naturally act as democrats without any particular effort in the military socialization process to ensure that such behavior occurs.

Perlmutter, who was a protégé of Huntington, uses Huntington's concept of military professionalism to develop his own theory of civil-military relations. Perlmutter expands on Huntington's characterization of the modern military professional to portray the modern soldier as corporate, bureaucratic, and professional. He challenges Huntington's equating of professionalism with non-intervention. He argues instead that modern military professionalism leads to corporatism which can ultimately serve as the justification for intervention. Perlmutter's professional soldiers' main values seem to be the preservation of the military's corporate aspirations and a stable political order. Allegiance to civilian authority can shift depending on the military's interpretation of the

state's interests.¹⁷ The legitimacy of the regime is important to Perlmutter, but only in the sense that civilians define the values of the civic order which can be either authoritarian or democratic.¹⁸ His officers' motivation to serve lies in loyalty to political order -- not in any particular preference for what ideology underlies the regime. Like his contemporaries, Perlmutter, too, ignores the specific requirements of military professionalism in democratic states.

Military professionals in modern democratic states, however, are socialized to defend a particular form of government. Morris Janowitz recognizes this constraint, although he never fully develops its implications in his work. He posits that civil-military relations in a democratic model are differentiated from those in non-democratic models due to the fact that military leaders in democracies "obey the government because they accept the basic national and political goals of democracy, and because it is their duty and their profession to fight."¹⁹ An extension of this argument is that military professionals in democracies believe that the protection of democratic institutions and of the individual freedoms of their countrymen depends on their service. In consolidated democracies, there exist expectations within society at large and within the military that democratic values matter and that all organs of the government, including the military, should reflect and uphold them. The military not only defends the political order advanced by the democratic regime, it must allow itself to be shaped by them. As such, human rights abuses within the military are not normally tolerated nor are strategies of organization and

¹⁷ Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, pp. 1-17.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁹ Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 3.

leadership endorsed that conflict with standards prevalent throughout the rest of the democratic society. This emphasis on democratic values is carried out as long as military effectiveness is not sacrificed. Certainly, in combat scenarios, military personnel enjoy limited freedom. Overall, though, military professionalism in a democracy is monitored by the civilian overseers to ensure that the norms, practices, and values of the democratic state are replicated in the behavior of its military arm to the greatest extent possible.

Janowitz's recognition of the need to develop both subjective and objective forms of civilian control is closer to the mark for democratic and democratizing states than the views of Huntington and Perlmutter. Janowitz argues that objective control implies legislative and administrative institutions and a political base for ensuring their effectiveness. Meanwhile, subjective control implies the existence of professional norms and values that are a result of contact with and responsiveness to the demands of civilian society. "Civilian control must operate to develop subjective control, namely, a set of values and norms which are compatible with the social and political decision-making process of the larger society. Professionalism is not merely concerned with procedures but with societal goals and priorities."²⁰

Janowitz's interpretation, as that of Stepan, makes intuitive sense. It acknowledges the importance of considering the context of the total political system in which the military institution is operating. This view also allows for particular emphasis to be placed on the relationship that a military institution has with its society. This relationship is particularly important for states in transition struggling with adapting

²⁰ Morris Janowitz, "Preface," *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972), p. 10.

societal goals to reflect the expectations of citizens struggling to create viable democratic systems.

In reality, then, a blend of subjective and objective control is found in advanced democratic states and in transitioning states aspiring to become consolidated democracies. An overreliance on professionalism alone to ensure democratic political control ignores the ideological transition to democracy that transitioning militaries must make and takes for granted the ideological socialization of militaries that occurs in advanced democracies. Non-intervention in the professional military sphere also assumes that, left to its own devices, militaries in democracies will develop a set of norms and practices that reflect the values of the democratic state. Or, that if a set of norms and practices reflective of the state's values does not develop, then such a result is of no real consequence for the preservation of a democratic regime.

Janowitz's blending of subjective and objective forms of civilian control addresses more effectively the problem which the post-communist militaries and their civilian overseers face as they undertake the process of democratic transition. This study adapts his general assumptions in this regard and applies them to the specific problems of democratizing states. Transitioning states confront unique problems of security and adaptation to democratic political systems that did not face the military institutions which were the objects of Huntington's and Perlmutter's studies.

In post-communist states democratic institutions are weak and the locus of power and authority either uncertain or not yet clearly established by consensus within the society at large or within the military institution in particular. Similarly, democratic values cannot

be assumed to be firmly entrenched or to form the basis of the military institution's motivation for service. To achieve democratic consolidation in the realm of civil-military relations, civilian leaders must meet real external, and in some cases, internal security problems, while also overseeing reforms that lead to the military's support of democratic values and of the democratic state. Failure to achieve success in both dimensions of the problem may result in the inability of civilian authority to check the military's seizure of power, due to its rejection of democratic values, and the collapse of the democratic state due to the military's indifference in defending it, or both. The overall goal of civilian policymakers, then, is to build post-communist military institutions that ultimately come to be a positive support for the overall process of democratic transition and eventual democratic consolidation. These institutions must not only accept democratic values and develop norms and practices reflective of their ideological conversion; they must also accept the military's proper role in the struggle for power and influence in a democracy.

The models that follow in this chapter were developed with an understanding of how advanced democratic states, and specifically the United States, have tried to resolve the issue of balancing the imperatives of democratic political control and military professionalism with the overall goal of all leaders of democratic states -- the protection of the democratic political system and way of life. Both policymakers within states and those trying to strengthen democratic processes from the outside must understand the patterns of behavior that characterize militaries in democratic societies and seek to foster appropriate relations between civilian authorities and military institutions in transitioning states. Policymakers must also understand the pattern of civil-military relations that is the

starting point of the military's democratic transition. These patterns will be presented in separate models in the following chapter.

Table 2.1 lays out the characteristics of democratic political control and contrasts these features with non-democratic features. The elements of civilian control in democratic states that are considered are the importance of constitutional provisions which enumerate responsibility for democratic political control, the quality of control exercised through the executive, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the parliament, and, finally, the relationship of the military to the society at large. The models presented in this chapter offer a general framework which links professional norms with infused democratic values and socialization. While drawn from American practice, it has potentially greater and more universal applicability, subject to qualifications and adaptations that are sensitive to the historical experience, habits, and current needs of transitioning states. Additionally, the non-democratic features outlined in the models are not meant to reflect the starting point of post-communist states' transitions. These will be outlined in separate models in chapter three.

Table 2.1: Characteristics of Democratic Political Control of Military Institutions in Democracies

Elements of Civilian Control in a Democracy	Democratic Features	Non-democratic Features
<i>Constitutional Provisions</i>	Mechanisms for civilian control sufficient and clearly codified.	Mechanisms for civilian control insufficient and not clearly codified.
<i>Executive Oversight and Control</i>	Clear chain of command from military leaders to the executive. Presence of expert civilian national security staff. Effective civilian oversight within the MOD. Transparent and responsive MOD and military. Expert advice of military leaders one input to national security decisions. Mutual confidence between civilian and military leaders. Corruption not tolerated. Executive actively educates public on national security policies and priorities.	Ambiguous or multiple chains of command from military leaders to the executive. No source of national security expertise outside of the military. Ineffective or non-existent civilian oversight within the MOD. Military makes national security decisions. Lack of confidence between military and civilian leaders. Public uninformed on national security policies and priorities.
<i>Legislative Oversight and Control</i>	Sufficient expertise to oversee budgetary and other oversight issues. Broad control over policy issues and ability to conduct hearings. Transparent MOD and military that allow unrestricted access to information to legislatures. Military responsive to legislative inquiries. Legislators motivated to ensure accountability of the military institution.	No real budgetary control. No meaningful control over military policy. Lack of military expertise within the legislature for effective oversight. No restraints on executive power. Military non-responsive to legislative inquiries. MOD and military not transparent. Legislators disinterested in the oversight role.
<i>Relationship Between Military Institution and Society</i>	No serious tensions between military institution and society. Respect for the military as the guardians of societal freedoms. Limits on the military's access to influence and public participation.	Serious tensions exist. May fear the military for its internal repression role. Special military access to civilian authority.

The Importance of Constitutional Provisions for Ensuring Civilian Control

One of the first tasks that a society seeking to become a democracy sets out to complete is the composition of a constitution that codifies its societal goals and values. A

constitution is vital for the success of a democratizing society. It ensures democratic political control of the military. It defines the powers of governing institutions and their oversight authority over the military. Such constitutional constraints on the military routinely include vesting command of the armed forces in the civilian head of state or government and ascribing to the legislature the power to approve appropriations and to declare war. Power to act in emergency situations without the specific consent of the legislature may be reserved to the executive.²¹ Constitutional provisions may also ascribe to legislatures broad oversight capabilities over the military. These normally include the approval of major appointments, the organizational structure of the defense establishment, the powers of civilian and military officials within it, and special investigatory powers to ensure democratic accountability.²² While the legislature has broad constitutional powers “to make rules for the government and regulation of land and naval forces,” the executive also has broad powers of internal management that allow him to issue orders that may affect internal procedures, responsibilities, and the distribution of authority in the armed forces.²³

While such provisions are important to include in a written constitution, one must be careful not to confuse “shadow with substance” when evaluating the effectiveness of civilian control within a democratic state. Theorists agree that formal prescriptions alone are not sufficient for civilian control. Huntington even argues that civilian control is achieved in the US model *despite* rather than because of constitutional provisions.²⁴ The

²¹ Elmer J. Mahoney, “The Constitutional Framework of Civil-Military Relations,” in *Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Charles L. Cochran (New York: The Free Press, 1974), p. 35, 45.

²² Welch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, pp. 6-8.

²³ Mahoney, “The Constitutional Framework of Civil-Military Relations,” p. 49.

²⁴ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 163.

constitutions of most states contain such formulae as popular sovereignty, policy supervision, and budgetary control.²⁵ The essential point of evaluation is the reality of the enumerated relationships. Are the formal prescriptions lived out in the life of the state? Is the influence of the military balanced *vis-à-vis* the influence of civilian institutions? When valid constitutional designs do not work well in practice, citizens and civilians in positions of political authority must recognize their legitimate power to correct abuses. Action should be taken to right the balance of coordinated authority and control of the armed forces among constitutional bodies that is essential to the maintenance of democratic political control.

Constitutional constraints enhance the legitimacy of civilian authorities. If democracy can be crystallized in its most simplistic sense to mean that “the power resides in the active people,”²⁶ then the elected representatives of the people serving in the various organs of the government must set the policy for a democratic state. Legal prescriptions legitimize the ultimate authority of the people through their representatives, and this legitimization may give pause to potential coup makers when they consider the possibility of intervention.²⁷

Constitutional constraints are essential in that they contribute to a sense of which authorities legitimately should govern in a democratic state and how their powers are diffused and specified. But the nature of the relationship between the military institution and the executive and legislative organs of state power, as well as the relationship of the

²⁵ Welch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, p. 8.

²⁶ Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), p. 90.

²⁷ Welch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, p. 8.

military institution with the society at large, go further in explaining the extent to which military institutions are democratically accountable.

Democratic Political Control of the Military

The form of democratic political control of the military will vary in the transitioning states depending on whether they have selected presidential or parliamentary political systems. For instance, in Russia, democratic institutions are dominated by a strong executive and most of the responsibility for democratic political control is lodged in the executive by design. In contrast, the Czech Republic has chosen a system with a strong parliament and a weak president. Control in this case is largely administered through the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister who are accountable to Parliament. The model presented below constructs a general framework of civil-military relations in transitioning states. It must be adapted to the specific historical circumstances, current needs, and future imperatives of democratizing states. Some states may choose to have greater reliance on executive controls, others on parliamentary, and still others on a separation of powers between institutions. The important benchmark for success is the proper implementation of whatever system of control is chosen.

The Quality of Executive/Ministry of Defense (MOD) Control

The exercise of democratic political control through the executive is reflected first and foremost through the military's responsiveness to the executive's constitutional powers. Day-to-day executive control, however, is administered through a ministry of defense accountable to the executive and/or to parliament, as applicable, through the legislature's oversight powers. Militaries in democracies are further characterized by

civilian defense ministers whose departments have authority for the organizational and administrative control of the armed forces. Furthermore, sufficient civilian expertise must exist in military matters so that civilian overseers in the MOD can effectively execute their oversight functions.

Executive control also depends on the transparency of the defense ministry and the military services. Defense officials and military officers must be responsive to outside inquiries. Violations of democratic norms and practices or of military procedures and regulations should be swiftly investigated and resolved. Additionally, corruption in any form that may jeopardize the public trust must not be tolerated. Civilian defense officials must also have the capability of accurately assessing the readiness of the nation's military forces and have access to military bases and the appropriate information to make this assessment.

One of the factors that can limit democratic political control is the monopolization of national security information by the military. It is difficult for civilian authorities to maintain control of the military institution if they feel incompetent in matters of national security. Civil-military relations theorists recommend the establishment of a national security council comprised of civilian expert advisers on military affairs to counsel the executive or the prime minister, as applicable, on national security issues.²⁸ A staff of civilian experts can serve as a filter between the military chiefs and civilian officials while also formulating its advice based on an understanding of the broadest aspects of domestic and international affairs.

²⁸ See Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 428; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 348.

The authority of the executive is also vested in the civilian chiefs of the military services and their staffs. The presence of competent civilian bureaucrats capable of overseeing the military organization because of their technical expertise, while also remaining accountable to elected officials, is essential to democratic political control as well. In addition, such officials are an important source of institutional continuity and memory. Under the guidance of a national security council, these civilians are responsible for preparing the budget, allocating missions and responsibilities between the services, and advising the prime minister or president, and the foreign ministry on military aspects of foreign policy.²⁹ Their presence ensures that matters of state policy are initiated by civilian authorities who are accountable to elected members of the government.

While matters of policy may be initiated by civilian authorities, civilian supremacy in any political system depends on a sense of mutual confidence between military and civilian leaders. Military leaders must perceive that their expertise matters and their advice is weighed with great care by competent civilian authorities. Military leaders at least want to be assured that they have access to civilian policy makers and that any strategic decision of the executive is made after considering their expert advice.³⁰

Finally, the head of government can play a role in strengthening the relationship between the society at large and the military institution by helping to educate the public on the nation's security policies.³¹ The national security policies of a democratic state should be well known and understood by its citizens. The public should understand the efforts of

²⁹ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, pp. 363-366.

³⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 367-369.

³¹ Harold D. Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1950), pp. 80-81.

military professionals charged with carrying out the policies, as well as the national sacrifice of treasure and some individual freedoms that may be necessary to achieve the nation's security ends.

The Quality of Parliamentary Control

One of the chief means for democratic political control in states with parliamentary systems or with a separation of powers between institutions is legislative oversight of military affairs. This supervision may be carried out by specialized defense committees, as is the case in the US, through broad oversight powers exercised by the entire legislative body, or through a combination of the two. The primary means of parliamentary or alternative forms of control is budgetary.³² Effective budgetary control depends on access to accurate and specific information regarding proposed programs and expenditures. Control of the budget, like all other aspects of legislative control, also depends on sufficient parliamentary expertise in defense matters to make appropriate judgments.

Legislative oversight of the military also typically includes control over broad matters of military policy, such as the size and organization of the military and the defense ministry, and the confirmation of key military promotions and civilian appointments. Legislative authority may extend, too, to the regulation of recruitment and training practices, approval of salaries, monitoring of housing conditions, and the deployment of troops abroad. Legislative control may rival that of the executive due to specific powers reserved for the legislature which may limit the authority of the executive such as the confirmation of appointments and control of the purse. However, some constitutions may

³² Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, p. 161.

reserve these powers for the executive or for the prime minister. The multi-party makeup of most legislatures limits somewhat their effectiveness because they lack the focus and unity of the executive.

The quality of legislative oversight varies, as with the executive oversight discussed above, with the competence and interest of the overseers. Do the legislators have the technical expertise, through their own training or by access to expert staffs, to consider carefully different aspects of the budget and relate them to the long term strategic needs of the state? Are they willing to appear to be unpatriotic if they question the needs of the military? Are the supervisors too close to those that they supervise to rein them in when appropriate? Is the military responsive to legislative inquiries? Finally, are the civilian overseers sufficiently motivated to invest a lot of energy and resources into overseeing an area of national policy in which their electorate is typically disinterested?

One way to enhance the defense expertise of parliamentarians is through the participation of staffs made up of functional experts to assist in the decision making process. Unrestricted access to defense ministry, outside civilian, and uniformed military experts through the conduct of hearings on military policy can also improve the defense oversight process. In this respect, the executive and legislature have similar interests in access to the expertise of the military leaders. Just as the executive can call on military leaders directly for their input into national security issues, legislators must also be able to hear directly from military experts when they so desire. In return, military leaders expect that civilian authorities will respect the autonomy of the military institution to the greatest degree commensurate with a democratic society.

Legislative oversight, as executive oversight, varies according to an array of factors. The most important of these is the relative responsibility for control granted to the parliament by the constitution. Although the powers of budgetary oversight, investigation, and general legislative authority on matters of military organization and policy may reside within civilian bodies, their effective control may be low either by design or because the legislature is not fully implementing its designated authority. Civilian oversight must be evaluated according to the competence and motivation of the civilians filling the relevant positions as well as the resources available to assist them in their supervisory task. The existence of oversight positions alone does not guarantee democratic political control of the armed forces.

The Relationship Between the Military Institution and Society

Alfred Stepan has argued that civilian attitudes toward the behavior of the military institution, to include a range of activity up to and including a coup, are directly related to the perceived appropriateness of military action at any given time.³³ In democratic states the appropriateness of military behavior is determined by the degree to which the military complies with controls of democratic institutions and how well the military upholds the democratic principles of the state. The attitude of the society at large is shaped by such factors as the congruence of military and societal values, the historical role of the military in the society, and the prevalence of outside threats to the society.

In a democratic state it is essential that tensions between society and the military remain low. The gap between society and the military institution can be bridged to some

³³ Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, p. 4.

extent through the mutual exchange of societal and military expectations about the role of each in a democratic society.

For instance, the society at large may have the expectation that the military institution places a great value on remaining an instrument of state policy, that it places a premium on military members upholding military virtues, and that democratic principles are reflected in the procedures and practices of the military institution to the greatest extent possible without forfeiting a degree of military security. In order to ensure that these societal expectations are met, citizens may demand that local military commanders and defense and military officials at the national level respond to the military's breaches of democratic norms as perceived by the public. The press can also play a key role in forcing the military and its civilian overseers to remain democratically accountable through its investigative reporting and demands for access to information that should rightly fall in the public domain.

The military institution, on the other hand, may have the expectation that its professionalism is respected and encouraged, that its service is rewarded with an appropriate level of compensation while on active duty and with the possibility of civilian employment upon discharge or retirement, and that the society at large entrusts it with the responsibility for protecting its physical security and way of life. The military can advance the fulfillment of its expectations *vis-à-vis* society at large by cultivating its relationship with the civilian community, being responsive to demands for democratic accountability, and upholding democratic values, such as the protection of civil rights, in its institutional practices.

The military institution must realize, though, that it is responsible to a great extent for shaping its image within society. The armed forces must, first of all, be aware of what their image in society is and what the sources and substance of the societal perceptions are. In areas where societal perceptions do not match reality, the military may have to actively seek ways to correct the misperception. Where negative perceptions are valid, then the military should work to reform these practices inducing popular skepticism.

In the late 1970s the French military realized that thorough reform was necessary to restore its prestige and societal regard which had eroded in the late 1960s-early 1970s. The military institution in France took responsibility for restoring its own legitimacy by focusing on changing leadership styles, liberalizing service norms, raising compensation, and striking a general balance between the duties of a soldier and the rights of a citizen in a democratic state.³⁴ Similarly, a public relations campaign was at the heart of the US military's rebuilding of its image after the Vietnam War in the development of incentives to attract enough quality personnel to serve in the new all-volunteer force.

The Imperative of Democratic Military Professionalism

At the onset of the chapter I proposed that there are two imperatives that drive the process of ensuring civilian supremacy and democratic accountability of the military institution. These imperatives are democratic political control, viewed through the analytic lens of the interplay between democratic civilian and military institutions, and democratic military professionalism.

³⁴ Bernard Boene, "Nonmilitary Functions of the Military in a Democratic State: The French Case." in *The Military in the Service of Society and Democracy*, ed. Daniella Ashkenazy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 113.

The development of the model of military institutions in democracies in terms of democratic military professionalism will necessarily take more of a subsystem approach. As such, the military institution will be studied as a separate entity charged with the function of managing violence for the state. However, in the end, the two imperatives of the model must be brought together to reflect the dynamic interdependence of the military subsystem with the other components of the comprehensive political system that is the modern democratic state.

Professionalism Defined

Civil-military relations theorists agree that the advent of modern technology spurred the growth of specialization which in turned produced the phenomenon of professionalization. Huntington's widely accepted model of professionalism distinguishes between a profession and other occupations by the presence of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness within a profession.³⁵ The continued utility of Huntington's conceptualization is borne out by its prominence in course materials used by United States commissioning sources when introducing officer candidates to the military profession.³⁶

According to Huntington's model, the expertise of a professional stems from a period of prolonged education and experience during which the professional must demonstrate competence in the objective standards of the profession. Professional

³⁵ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 8.

³⁶ Robert K. Angwin, Capt., "Professionalism: A Model," *An Introduction to the Military Profession* (West Point, NY: U.S. Military Academy, 1984). This article has also been excerpted for use in *Foundations of the Military Profession*, a course book used in Military Arts and Science 220, a core course for all cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy.

education consists of two phases: in the first, a broad, liberal, cultural background is imparted; and, in the second, the specialized skills of the profession are learned.³⁷

Since the professional is a specially trained expert who performs a service essential to society, a professional has a responsibility to perform his service when required by society and can be stripped of his right to practice his profession if this responsibility is not discharged.³⁸ Additionally, since the expertise of the professional is so complex, peer review is essential in assessing professional competence. As a result of this “monopoly of expertise” there is a special “professional-client” relationship between the professional and lay members of society. Society expects that the professional is motivated by the client’s best interests and that absolute integrity will characterize the relationship.³⁹ In a democratic society, there is the additional expectation that a parallel group of civilian experts will serve the interests of society in a military oversight role.

Members of a profession share a sense of corporateness that stems from sharing a unique social responsibility and the experience of common training in order to qualify for its assumption.⁴⁰ Members of a profession also share the common bond of work, the desire for autonomy, and membership in special organizations that help to service and foster professional interests. Corporateness encourages the development of social bonds and contributes to the sense that members of a profession are a distinct group within society. However, corporateness can also potentially lead to the isolation of the

³⁷ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 8.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p. 9.

³⁹ Alan W. Burke, Capt. and Robert D. Critchlow, Capt., eds. *Foundations of the Military Profession* (Dubuque: Kendall Hunt, 1994), pp. 2-3.

⁴⁰ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 10.

profession within society and to the development of practices and norms of behavior separate from those that are prevalent in society at large.

Military professionals are distinguished from other professionals by the nature of their expertise as managers of violence. The military profession is unique because of the distinct function that society has entrusted to it. The singular responsibility of the military professional is to direct, operate, and control an organization whose primary function is the threat or use of deadly military might against enemy forces and targets designated by the political leadership. Professionals in democratic and non-democratic militaries share a mandate to be as competent as possible in their military expertise in order to defend the political ends of their respective states.

Additionally, Huntington's conceptualization of military professionalism assumes that the execution of these functions is bereft of political content.⁴¹ Finer argues, though, that the armed forces' unique function gives it a political advantage over all other civilian organizations within a society because of their superiority in organization, highly emotionalized symbolic status, and monopoly of arms.⁴² It is this distinct blend of mission and potential for political power that is at the heart of the problem of civilian control.

Military Professionalism and Politics

Rooted in efforts to improve the competence and battlefield performance of the Prussian military in the 19th century, a separate merit-based caste of military professionals was developed to conduct the increasingly complex art of war. There is no debate that focusing on organizational, military strategic, and tactical issues significantly enhances the

⁴¹ *ibid.*, chapter 1.

⁴² Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, p. 5.

capability of armed forces to wage war. There is a lot of debate among civil-military relations theorists, however, over the relationship between professionalism and political control of the military.

Huntington leads the school of thought that argues that professionalism makes civilian control of the military possible through objective civilian control. In this view maximizing military professionalism results in the development of an autonomous military sector dedicated to the military ethic that “war is the instrument of politics, that the military are servants of the statesmen, and that civilian control is essential to military professionalism.”⁴³ Furthermore, Huntington argues in a later work that the level of modernization of a society is the factor that distinguishes politically active militaries from apolitical ones because he assumes that advanced societies will inevitably have professional militaries.⁴⁴ The only variable that matters in this analysis is the level of modernization -- not variations in political systems that could characterize equally modern societies.

Abrahamsson argues that Huntington’s definition of professionalism is flawed because it defines objective civilian control by professionalism and visa versa. A professional, according to Huntington, will not participate in politics because he is a professional. Although Abrahamsson does not go much beyond stating his displeasure with its circular reasoning, I contend that there is an inherent, and potentially perilous, assumption underlying Huntington’s view that an officer’s internalization of professionalism necessarily includes a slavish sense of obedience to civilian authorities.

⁴³ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 79.

⁴⁴ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 194-197.

This position ignores the type of political system that exerts control over the military and presupposes that military professionals will remain loyal to any legitimate government regardless of the potential ideological variations that may characterize different governments. This view also ignores the effect that ideological orientation may have on *how* military professionals come to accept the principle of civilian control within a particular political system. As chapters five and six suggest, such an assumption is particularly dangerous in states undergoing a democratic transition where societal and military values are in a state of flux. Military professionals in democratizing states are faced with the unique problem of remaining loyal to the political leadership when civilian authority itself is in question or seriously divided between competing democratizing institutions.

Abrahamsson also disagrees with Huntington's contention that increased military professionalism leads directly to civilian supremacy through objective control. Abrahamsson proposes that increased professionalism actually contributes to the political power of the military because it contributes to the military's ability to mobilize the resources of the state potentially to gain control of it.⁴⁵ Finer also warned of the double-edged sword of military professionalism.⁴⁶ Welch contends, on the other hand, that professionalism characterized by functional specialization contributes to civilian control since such organizational complexity makes it more difficult to form a coup coalition.⁴⁷ Stepan, too, discounts the argument that one should assume apolitical behavior from

⁴⁵ Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, p. 145.

⁴⁶ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, pp. 20-26.

⁴⁷ Welch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, p. 320.

“ideal” military institutions.⁴⁸ However, his work does not specifically address the issue of achieving democratic political control. Finally, Janowitz joins the argument by pointing out the necessity of emphasizing the development of societal values within the military profession while simultaneously allowing the military to autonomously develop procedures and methods that will make it more effective in carrying out its unique function.⁴⁹

Again, Janowitz comes closer to offering a concept of civil-military relations that grapples with the dilemma of developing military institutions that are both effective in the discharge of their professional competence and which are also loyal to the principles inherent in democratic political control. However, none of these theorists quite grasps the idea of *democratic* military professionalism. Abrahamsson, Perlmutter, and Welch are correct to see the deficiency of the argument that assumes the apolitical nature of professionalism, but they do not translate their criticism into a prescription for the proper presence of democratic values within the norms and practices of military institutions in democracies. This is what I attempt to do in the model of democratic military professionalism that follows.

A Model for Professionalism in Democratic States

States seeking to maximize their military security, while also ensuring that democratic values characterize the national security effort, need to pursue a form of professionalism that incorporates Huntington’s principles of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness while also fostering the penetration of democratic values within the military institution. Both efforts must be deliberately thought out, planned, and executed. In

⁴⁸ Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, p. 7.

⁴⁹ Janowitz, “Preface,” in *Military Professionalism and Political Power*, p. 10.

addition, civilian and military participants in the process should be aware of the need to monitor the growth in functional professionalism so that it does not outstrip the concurrent need to insure that societal values are also internalized. The goal is to ensure the development of both professionals and democrats.

My model for fostering professionalism in democratic and democratizing states reflects classical elements of military professionalism combined with features traditionally excluded or not specifically enumerated as essential to the development of democratic military professionalism. Although my model's division of features stresses democratic and non-democratic elements, it is important to note that there is some overlap in the model's features that could be appropriate for any political regime. These overlapping features are indicated by an asterisk. Criteria that ensure the presence of democratic norms and practices are essential to ensure the development of democratically accountable military institutions. The goal is to offer a framework for institutional development that weighs heavily both the objective of defending the democratic state and remaining true to the societal values of the democracy it defends.

Both objectives can be achieved if the insertion of democratic norms in the following aspects of the military institution's professional development are deliberately pursued: recruitment and retention, promotion and advancement, officership and leadership, education and training, norms of political influence, prestige and public relations, and, compatibility of military and societal values. Each of these elements will be discussed in turn and related to how its particular emphasis can enhance the democratic accountability and competence of the armed forces in a democratic state.

Table 2.2: Characteristics of Military Professionalism in Democratic and Non-democratic States

Elements of Military Professionalism in a Democracy	Democratic Features	Non-democratic Features
<i>Recruitment and Retention</i>	Cross-societal, variety of sources. Entry based on merit. Prestige of commissioning sources high. Democratic values reflected in treatment of personnel.	Not representative of society at large. Entry related to factors other than merit. Standards of treatment may be poor – no mandate to respect democratic values.
<i>Promotion and Advancement</i>	* Merit-based promotion system. Affirmative action based advancement may be used to fulfill democratic norms of inclusion. Performance and seniority balanced. Officers promoted who support democratic principles	Political influence interferes with merit-based system. Loyalty to regime valued over competence. Officers promoted who oppose democratic values.
<i>Officership and Leadership</i>	Styles of officership and leadership reflect democratic principles and respect for individual human rights. Preference for non-authoritarian style of leadership.	Individual rights sacrificed beyond the constraints necessary for military competence. Preference for authoritarian style of leadership. Abuse of soldiers common.
<i>Education and Training</i>	Principles of democracy and the role of military professionals in the state taught throughout the military system. Allegiance to democratic institutions taught. Qualified civilian and military instructors with some civilian participation as students at some levels. * Professional ethics emphasized along with military competence.	Insufficient opportunity to internalize democratic principles of military service. No appreciation of civilian expertise gained in training. Resistant to political training or trained in authoritarian ideology. Professional ethics may not be emphasized. Professional military competence may also be a priority.
<i>Norms of Political Influence</i>	* Military fully accepts role in the political order. No involvement of military in political feuds. Recognition that some limited degree of political interaction with oversight institutions is necessary. Direct participation in politics is not accepted. Attempts to influence the political process are non-partisan.	Completely apolitical or so political that exceed limits of functional responsibility. Unable to compete for resources within the “rules of the game”. Inadequate institutional safeguards against direct participation in politics or the use of coercive force to take power.
<i>Prestige and Public Relations</i>	Public accountability high. Full disclosure of information. Responsive to outside inquiries. Media has full access. Military actively manages relationship with the public.	Low public accountability. Limited or no transparency. Controls release of information to outside inquiries. Limited media access. Doesn't actively foster relationship with society.
<i>Compatibility of Military and Societal Values</i>	Accepts legitimacy of democratic institutions. Conceptualization of democracy is similar to society's. Adapts internal operations to reflect democratic societal values.	Questions legitimacy of democratic institutions. Conceptualization of democracy diverges from societies. Internal operations resistant to changes in societal values.

Recruitment and Retention

Standards of selection into the ranks of military professionals are an essential part of civilian control. Various objectives can be achieved by manipulating the requirements for acceptance into the various commissioning sources and the enlisted ranks as a whole. For instance, the prestige of the profession can be boosted by increasing the prerequisites and criteria of admission in order to attract superior candidates. Of course, prestige also depends on the quality of the education and training offered as well as the overall status of the profession within society. De Tocqueville argued that the prestige of the military is essential to the recruitment of quality officers, particularly within democracies, “The best part of the nation shuns the military profession because that profession is not honored, and the profession is not honored because the best part of the nation ceased to follow it.”⁵⁰

It is essential that a political democracy have a civil and military service whose social origins and attitudes are broadly representative of society at large.⁵¹ Emphasis on national service academies which draw candidates from across the nation helps to weaken regional ties and develop a broader sense of national identity. Additionally, the existence of scholarships to pay for the education received at the various commissioning sources ensures that officer candidates will be drawn from all economic sectors of the society. Control over the selection and subsequent socialization of its members contributes to the ability of the profession to successfully institutionalize societal and institutional values deemed necessary for democratic accountability and professional competence.

⁵⁰ Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Langley, 1840), vol. II, book III, pp. 266-267.

⁵¹ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, p .8, 253.

Retention issues focus on offering incentives of adequate pay, quality of life, and opportunities for advancement within the military profession for officers and professional non-commissioned officers (NCOs). These factors enhance the retention of military professionals across all political systems. Military professionals in service to democratic political systems have the additional expectation that standards of treatment in military service will be commensurate with the values of democratic societal values. Additionally, procedures for the redress of grievances through oversight authorities exist when civil liberties, human rights, or other standards of democratic accountability are violated.

Promotion and Advancement

A merit-based, objective system of promotion is one of the fundamental elements of a professional military.⁵² Militaries in democracies may also implement affirmative action based programs of monitoring professional advancement to ensure that democratic values of inclusion are reflected in promotion patterns. Harmonizing societal aims with institutional preferences without sacrificing military effectiveness, however, is a complex task. Incorporating various ethnic and demographic groups within the military is important because such action helps to ensure that the military's institutional values remain in step with those of society. A comprehensive system of evaluations, periodic testing on essential professional skills, especially those related to technical competence, and the balancing of performance criteria with seniority contribute to professional competence.

⁵² Perlmutter and Bennett, eds. *The Political Influence of the Military*, p. 205.

The prevalence of bureaucratic norms eliminates advancement due to the political criteria of military or political leaders.⁵³ Non-democratic regimes that value loyalty to the regime over competence sacrifice military effectiveness. Democratic governments must balance fostering loyalty to democratic institutions with professional competence. Merit-based promotion systems are based on the existence of a widely known career pattern that standardizes requirements for career progression throughout the military. These requirements for advancement are reinforced and taught in the professional military education (PME) system and recognized by promotion boards which are usually centralized to reduce or eliminate cronyism that may exist at local levels of command. In transitioning states in the process of reform, promotions can also be used to promote supporters of democratic military professionalism.

Officership and Leadership

The core issues of professional officership: *who*, *why*, and *how* an officer serves differ markedly in authoritarian and democratic states. Soldiers in democratic states are conditioned to believe that standards of treatment central to life within their democracy are expected within all societal institutions. Additionally, in democracies, laws come from those elected to create them and all citizens are subject to them. A commander's individual order cannot supersede the law of the land. Democratic control of the military is partially dependent on the shared democratic socialization of all citizens about democratic principles and the requirements of democratic accountability.

⁵³ Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, p. 55.

Military leadership in a democracy places a high premium on paying attention to the individual needs of the soldier. General Edward C. Meyer, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), wrote in an essay excerpted for use at the service academies, that “the kind of leadership we need is founded upon consideration and respect for the soldier.”⁵⁴ He went on to stress that “each soldier meaningfully assisted toward development as a whole man, a whole person, is more likely to respond with his or her full commitment.”⁵⁵

One of the hallmark experiences of a cadet’s first year at the US Air Force Academy is the memorization of the contents of a small, but packed, book entitled *Contrails*. Among the treasure-trove of professional knowledge contained in *Contrails* is a series of quotes which stress integrity, leading by example, and putting oneself before one’s subordinates. All must be memorized and recited whenever requested by the cadet’s superiors. However, the one quote that is most revered is an almost one page long excerpt from a speech delivered by Major General John M. Schofield to the graduating cadets at West Point in 1879 -- a time when military professionalism in America was taking off. An excerpt from it illustrates the unique view that military officers in a democracy are trained to take:

⁵⁴ Edward C. Meyer, General, “Leadership: A Return to Basics,” *The Military Review* (July 1980) as excerpted in Burke and Critchlow, *Foundations of Military Professionalism*, p. 59.

⁵⁵ Meyer, “Leadership: A Return to Basics,” pp. 60-61.

The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army...The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them respect for himself, while he who feels and hence manifests, disrespect for others, especially his subordinates, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.⁵⁶

The emphasis on “leading by example”, “taking care of the troops”, and “respect for the soldier” are traits that can be found across political systems, because, over time, these leadership methods have been proven to produce more competent and motivated military forces. For instance, German NCOs in World War I were particularly adept at these methods. However, these traits are especially appropriate in democratic, open societies due to the expectations of their citizens that human rights will not be unduly sacrificed and the existence of oversight procedures capable of monitoring violations of democratic norms and practices. Consequently, such characteristics are required elements of democratic military professionalism and are often found lacking in authoritarian systems where similar expectations and oversight capabilities do not occur.

Additionally, the transparency of military institutions and the intolerance for a lack of democratic accountability also make the existence of institutional corruption less likely and contributes to the institutional emphasis on professional ethics.⁵⁷ Officer evaluations assess leadership qualities that contribute to the achievement of democratic military professionalism and steady progression in the development of these attributes enhances an officer’s potential to achieve command positions and advanced rank. Likewise, the

⁵⁶ John M. Schofield, Major General, in address to the graduating class of West Point in 1879. Excerpted from *Contrails: The Air Force Cadet Handbook*, vol. 26, 1980-81, pp. 116-117.

⁵⁷ The general emphasis that all professions place on professional ethics is described in Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, p. 63.

presence of an NCO corps with standards of democratic military professionalism similar to the officer corps leads to the enhanced technical competence of military forces in all political systems and to the infusion of principles of democratic military professionalism throughout the entire chain of command in democracies.

Officership necessarily undergoes changes when the expectations of the society that it serves changes. Transitioning states must incorporate the lessons of democratic military professionalism practiced in consolidated democracies. In democratic systems, styles of officership and leadership are characterized by accountability to democratic values, respect for civil liberties and human rights, stewardship of the public trust, and ethical behavior manifested in the honor code of the profession. The motivation to institute these changes depends on military leaders' own dedication to democratic principles as well as the realization that such changes will result in a more motivated and competent professional military institution.

Educational and Training

Experts have estimated that modern officers spend approximately one third of their professional careers in formal schooling.⁵⁸ In these courses officers acquire their knowledge of subjects ranging from the liberal arts and engineering while studying at a service academy, to technical aspects of their craft while training at an artillery officer school or flight training base, to the complexities of joint operations and international relations while studying at the senior service schools. Such comprehensive training is characteristic of professional militaries across political systems. However, some systems

⁵⁸ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 13.

place different emphases on the value of a broad, general versus a narrow, technical military education.

The military is unique as a profession because there are multiple points throughout the career of an officer when he or she can be influenced by an educational experience. Such courses should be monitored to ensure that their curricula reflect changing priorities in the profession and within society at large. Concepts or values that may have changed since an officer underwent training at his commissioning source can be readdressed at later points in his career. In the case of transitioning states striving to incorporate the traits of democratic military professionalism, use of the military education system to reorient officers schooled in authoritarian values is an excellent means of achieving democratic military reform.

Janowitz contends that particular care should be given to the curriculum of the service academies. Although attendance at them is not universal, the academies set the standards of behavior for the whole military profession.⁵⁹ In the US, an almost continuous debate has raged throughout the life of the service academies regarding the preference for academy graduates over those who attended civilian institutions. The debate has also included the proper balance between the commissioning sources for the accession of cadets into the officer ranks.

Those who favor a system in which officers would be drawn only from specialized military schools believe that the singular emphasis placed on the development of professional officer skills at the academies produces superior officer specialists dedicated

⁵⁹ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, p. 127.

to be career officers. On the other hand, critics of an academy based officer corps contend that such a system removes officer candidates from the educational experience of civilian life. This results in the creation of a separate caste of officers, who are reared in a specialized educational system, and who are more isolated from the democratic expectations of society at large.

A combination of the two sources of accession ensures that some percentage of the officer corps has been socialized at the undergraduate level according to the norms of the democratic society at large. This exposure infuses a portion of the officer corps with the values and expectations of civilian society toward the military. Of course, similar ends can be achieved in the course of instruction at specialized military schools if democratic values are deliberately inculcated into the officer corps. Such instruction is characteristic of US service academies. However, the separation from civilian society at this phase of training in military academies cannot be completely overcome. The post-communist states are not yet engaged in this debate since all of them inherited commissioning systems that rely on specialized military schools for career officers. No movement away from this preferred source of most officers has yet occurred.

An officer's commissioning source is his first exposure to the principles of the military profession. Abrahamsson calls this period of indoctrination "professional socialization" and describes it as "the process by which individuals are being transformed from a state of relative unawareness of the theoretical and practical problems of the profession's issue area, to the state of acute awareness of such problems."⁶⁰ In these

⁶⁰ Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, p.16.

critical formative years officer candidates are taught what their role in a democratic society is as a military professional. Cadets are taught *who*, *why*, and *how* they serve. Obedience to the orders of legitimate authority is the first principle of civilian control. Therefore, the question to whom a military professional's obedience is owed cannot be left to ambiguity.⁶¹ In a democratic state, commissioning sources emphasize the requirements of democratic military professionalism.

In all states, cadets are exposed to the heritage of their service and state and imbued with a sense of purpose to serve a society that appreciates its role. In addition to a comprehensive curriculum that includes the development of critical thinking skills and a general education, the future officer-democrat should receive deliberate training on the imperatives of democratic political control and the responsibilities inherent in serving a democratic system of government.

For example, the US Air Force Academy ensures that its cadets understand the impact of military action on domestic political affairs and the international system by mandating that cadets take courses on American government and international relations. Such courses are meant to lay the foundation for the cadet's understanding of domestic and international affairs, in general, and to introduce him or her to the idea that as military professionals they may one day play a role in influencing these political processes. They also stress that military officers serve a democratic government and society rather than a "nation," "motherland," or "fatherland." As such, they learn that their role is to develop

⁶¹ Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin. "Civilian Supremacy Over the Military: Its Nature and Limits," *Armed Forces and Society* 19, no. 1. (Fall 1992), p. 9.

their military expertise with the understanding that its employment is subordinate to the directives of political authorities.

Furthermore, they are taught that their conduct as officers is subject to standards of democratic accountability which are regulated by military and civilian overseers. It is especially critical that the curriculum include heavy doses of ethics and professionalism because political democracies assume an overwhelming role for the priority of professional ethics in the motivation of officers.⁶² Not only is a firm grounding in professional ethics essential to non-intervention in politics, it is a crucial ingredient in assuring that professional soldiers have a sufficient ideological base to behave in appropriate ways when serving both at home and abroad. Such training goals are achieved through the institution of honor codes at service academies. Additionally, democratic accountability is emphasized across commissioning sources in military regulations on the stewardship of resources allocated the military by the democratic government.

In all areas of professional military education, instructors should be chosen with extreme care to ensure that they embody and are able to relay the professional traits that the system is trying to foster, such as integrity and honor. Additionally, instructors (especially those teaching in this area) should be well versed in democratic processes. The presence of some civilians as instructors and the training of military instructors at civilian universities can enhance the cross flow of ideas and methods from society. Finally, senior service schools should be open to civilians charged with participating in the national

⁶² Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, p. 440.

security process as a means of improving their expertise on military affairs and developing a cadre of civilian experts for both mature and transitioning democratic states.

De Tocqueville recognized the need to make sure that all those involved in the processes of democratic government have a common understanding of what democracy means in order to work toward common societal goals. “It is our way of using the words ‘democracy’ and ‘democratic government’ that brings about the greatest confusion. Unless these words are clearly defined and their definition agreed upon, people will live in an inextricable confusion of ideas, much to the advantage of demagogues and despots.”⁶³ It is essential, then, that a clear definition of these terms be part of an officer’s education so that there is neither confusion over the principles his institution is charged to defend nor uncertainty over the proper role the military institution plays in a democratic society. Stepan’s work demonstrates that ideological unity is an important political variable. He found that there is a greater tendency for political intervention within military institutions that were not ideologically unified.⁶⁴

Though collaboration with the enemy is a problem that militaries across political systems have endured, citizens in democracies are more shocked by the betrayal of their political system -- particularly when engaged in conflict with an authoritarian political system. The incidents of collaboration of US POWs in the Korean War taught the leaders of the US military the lesson that it had to be more deliberate in teaching them democratic ideas and the values and meaning of a democratic system to its recruits and officers. It cannot be assumed that a military member who is a product of a democratic society

⁶³ Alexis De Tocqueville, in *Democratic Theory*, opening page.

⁶⁴ Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, p. 56.

necessarily holds strongly the principles on which that society is based. Finer warned in his analysis of military intervention in governments that expediency can easily be advanced over principle if the principle is not held strongly enough.⁶⁵

A comprehensive understanding of the democratic form of government by military members also entails the acceptance of political conflict as characteristic of the political system. The military must also become comfortable with the uncertainty and problematic nature of political authority in an open society and resist the temptation to intervene in political processes for the sake of its own interests and those of the officer corps.⁶⁶ Officers in transitioning political systems will find it particularly difficult to adjust to the multiple axes of democratic oversight and accountability that characterize democracies.

Norms of Political Influence

Another essential component of democratic military professionalism is the degree to which the military institution can participate in the politics of its society without sacrificing its professionalism. Huntington allowed for only an extremely limited role for the military professional in politics. The reality, though, is that armed forces are inherently political institutions. They must compete for resources within democratic states, and their sense of professional responsibility motivates them to seek to influence the conduct of national security by offering their professional expertise to civilian policy makers. Military leaders in a democracy can, accordingly, be expected to lobby legislators and executive department officials on matters related to enhancing the professionalism and competence of the armed forces and the assessment of the security implications of national policy.

⁶⁵ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, p. 106.

⁶⁶ Idea offered by Professor Edward A. Kolodziej, Research Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois.

Democratic military professionals, however, fully accept their role in the political order and do not offer their services to civilian leaders involved in political feuds. Institutional safeguards exist to ensure that allegiance to democratic institutions supersedes allegiance to particular political figures or policy agendas. Democratic officer corps respect as a priority of professionalism the importance of remaining nonpartisan in political battles -- even those which directly impact the future of the military. Their efforts should be focused on the military security of the state and the maintenance of a professional military institution in service to a democratic state.

Indeed, in the US, military regulations are quite specific in their prohibition and permission of particular forms of political activity. Active duty military members may register and vote in elections, express personal opinions as individual citizens on candidates and issues, make financial contributions to political parties and organizations, attend political gatherings as spectators if not in uniform, and display political stickers or badges when not in uniform and not on duty. Active duty military members may not campaign for or hold elective office, make financial contributions to individual candidates, directly participate in political campaigns, speak before partisan political groups, or march or ride in partisan political parades. Additionally, candidates for public office cannot make political speeches or distribute campaign materials at military installations.⁶⁷

Such a nonpartisan orientation supports not only a democratic military institution's emphasis on defending a system of government, but also enhances the influence that the military institution can have on matters of primary importance to it. Military leaders have

⁶⁷ Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-902. This is the US Air Force regulation that details permissible and prohibited political activities of USAF personnel.

learned that continued success over time in gaining resources for their services and in influencing strategic national defense policies depends on the careful preservation of a nonpartisan stance.⁶⁸ However, military professionals in democracies also understand the importance of balancing this constraint with their advisory role as functional experts on matters of national security which may result in promoting certain matters of military policy to civilian authorities.

Direct participation in politics, on the other hand, undermines professionalism by extending the officer beyond his scope of competence while also involving the officer in political trade-offs that might damage the military institution and its ability to achieve its primary function of ensuring the state's military security.⁶⁹ A balance must be struck between being competent in matters of domestic and international politics, in order to effectively realize the constraints on resources and to offer expert military advice based on an understanding of the comprehensive context of an issue, and actively participating in political affairs. The military officer in a democracy must prize his advisory role and consequently remain personally above politics. Officers in democratic and democratizing states must be aware of the established norms of influencing the political process while remaining focused on respecting the constraints of democratic accountability.

Prestige and Public Relations

Finer argues that, while centralization of command, the hierarchical arrangement of authority, and the rule of obedience are all necessary and contribute to the *mechanical* solidarity of an army, *esprit de corps* gives an army its life.⁷⁰ *Esprit de corps* is grounded

⁶⁸ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, p. 234.

⁶⁹ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 71.

⁷⁰ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, pp. 6-7.

in service to a cause and depends greatly on the general sense of prestige that society attributes to the military. Adequate pay, good living conditions, and respect within society for the skills learned by military specialists enhance the prestige of the armed forces.

The degree of prestige that the military institution can earn within society also depends on how well the military meets the expectations of society in practicing military virtues. The military gains a certain amount of respect and political power in society to the extent that society finds the military to be an institution which places a high premium on the military virtues of service, bravery, discipline, obedience, self-denial, poverty, and patriotism.⁷¹ In democratic states, militaries must meet the additional expectation of upholding and practicing democratic norms and practices in the fulfillment of their specialized tasks.

Although his military service predated the professionalism of the US military by one hundred years, George Washington understood and instructed his troops to avoid even the hint of corruption, and to subject themselves to the discipline of legitimately constituted civilian authority should they falter. "Every officer and soldier will constantly bear in mind that he comes to support the laws and that it would be peculiarly unbecoming in him to be in any way the infractor of them ... The dispensation of this justice belongs to the civil Magistrate and let it ever be our pride and our glory to leave the sacred deposit there unviolated."⁷² Washington did not follow this advice himself since he opted to disavow his oath as a British officer in order to serve as the military commander of revolutionary forces. He justified his actions by arguing that British law was illegitimate,

⁷¹ *ibid.*, p. 9.

⁷² George Washington, General, *The Writings of George Washington*, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington DC: GPO, 1940), 27 March 1795, XXXIV, pp. 159-160.

but his remarks reveal an appreciation for the need to be accountable to civilian authorities.

Prestige and competence are mutually dependent concepts. Prestige falters when the military institution fails in its function to protect the national security interests, while competence is enhanced when prestige of the military is high. Both society, to include the activity of civilian institutions, and the military need to appreciate this relationship and work to improve prestige and professional competence through all means available. This chapter has posited that one means of improving the competence of armed forces in democracies is to foster the traits developed in the model of democratic military professionalism.

Prestige rooted in democratic accountability to civilian society is a trait of democratic military professionalism. Military institutions in democracies work to gain the support of the societies they serve by charging military professionals specifically with the task of managing the military's relationship with the public. In the United States, in all services, the public affairs field is a separate specialty requiring specific training and expertise like any other career field in order to be effective. These specialists focus on shaping a positive image for the armed forces while also fielding investigatory requests from the press, civilian authorities, and the public.

In this way the military institution fulfills the expectation that it will operate according to democratic principles when interacting with the rest of society. The press expects and is normally granted access to military leaders and authorities. The value of disclosure to the public is respected -- even if such revelations have a negative impact on

the armed forces' reputation in society. However, claims that full disclosure may compromise national security limit the transparency of military institutions in all states. In democratic states, however, transparency of budgets, management planning, strategy, and doctrine are all essential elements of democratic oversight and civilian control.

Democratic militaries must have routines of communicating this information to the public and civilian authorities through public affairs specialists and accessibility of military officials before authoritative civilian panels. In general, democracy and secrecy are thought to be incompatible unless measures of the utmost national security are at stake.⁷³ Even then, appropriate civilian authorities in oversight roles will have access to otherwise restricted information.

. The self-image of the military professional is also important and it is essential that this self-image closely parallels the image of the military professional in society. For instance, professional military officers, and even enlisted troops, place a value on the self-image of service to country versus the image of working as a mercenary. There is also a prevalent self-image that mastery of their jobs requires quite a bit of expertise -- an expertise that should be recognized within society at large and rewarded by a society that recognizes the transferability of military skills to the civilian sector.

As discussed earlier when analyzing the importance of the mutual cultivation of the prestige of the military institution by itself and society, such attention will help to attract quality recruits and enhance the professional competence of the military institution. The maintenance of a high level of prestige for the military institution is a critical factor in

⁷³ Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom*, p. 65.

successfully achieving the dual roles of military professionalism and professional competence. It's important to keep in mind the responsibility of all pillars of a democratic society to foster it.

Compatibility of Military and Societal Values

The most fundamental value that must be mutually held by the military institution and the society it serves is what constitutes the legitimate authority of the state. Huntington argues that a professional officer must be loyal to a single institution that embodies the authority of the state. He warns, "Where there are competing authorities, or competing ideas as to what ought to be the authority, professionalism becomes difficult if not impossible to achieve."⁷⁴

Yet a democratic political system assumes that its military officers are positively committed to the principles of civilian supremacy and civilian leadership.⁷⁵ In mature democracies, democratic institutions are strong and military professionals are accustomed to the political conflict that takes place between them and to the need for mutual accommodation consistent with democratic strictures. There are multiple axes of democratic oversight making demands on the military, and ensuring that oversight authority between institutions remains in balance according to the design of society outlined in either constitutional provisions or other accepted norms is essential. In transitioning states, however, the legitimate authority of state institutions may not be widely agreed upon. When the political system of a state is changing, it is important to

⁷⁴ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 35.

⁷⁵ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, p. 253.

assess the degree to which military and societal values are diverging and aggressively employ the levers of civilian oversight and control to bring them back together.

Janowitz outlines in his classic work, *The Professional Soldier*, the historical parallels between revolutions in the relationships of governments to their people and subsequent changes within their respective military institutions. When authoritarian methods dissipated within the state, then the organizational revolution that pervaded contemporary society with its emphasis on relating to the people by means of persuasion, explanation, and expertise also began to permeate and to be expected within the military.⁷⁶

Organizational procedures and methods appropriate under one ideological system may seem to undermine, rather than support societal values, in another. When a society shifts from holding subordination to the state as the highest ideal to promoting the rights of individual, its institutional practices should also change. Military professionalism does not exist within a vacuum that is completely unaffected by changes within the society it serves -- especially revolutionary changes. States in transition face the problem of an increasing level of disparity between societal and military values. Military institutions, which tend to be led by conservative leaders resistant to change,⁷⁷ may reject the notion that the brand of military professionalism developed within an authoritarian political system is inappropriate within a democratic political system. The democratization of society at large may result in less tolerance for such practices as the abuse of conscripts or other harsh practices that exceed the limits of discipline required for the maintenance of a professional military force. The public and civilian authorities will increase outside efforts

⁷⁶ *ibid.*, p. 8.

⁷⁷ Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, p. 8.

to humanize and increase the transparency of the military and force the accountability of military officials who resist. An analysis of the cases in chapters five and six will illustrate the differences between transitioning states where societal consensus on democratic consolidation exists and where some democratization has occurred but there is not an overall consensus on its consolidation across all aspects of society.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the imperatives of democratic political control and democratic military professionalism as essential elements of military institutions in democratic states. The goal has been to create a model demonstrating how militaries can be democratically accountable and reflect democratic principles while also functioning as effective instruments of national security. The application of the classical assumptions of civil-military relations theorists to the circumstances of the post-communist states currently in transition from authoritarian to democratic rule has revealed a gap in the literature that does not address the specific needs of states in transition. These theorists either fail to recognize the interrelatedness of political systems and control of military forces or neglect the specific application of societal values to the requirements of democratic accountability.

The task of achieving civilian control and military professionalism in states undergoing democratic transitions is complicated by the shift in the political system from authoritarianism to democracy. In transitioning states, the requirements of *democratic* political control must replace the previous understanding of civilian control. Similarly, the

criteria of *democratic* military professionalism must replace earlier concepts of military professionalism practiced under authoritarian political systems.

The work of building a military institution that best serves the needs of a democratic state is a continuous and ongoing process. Even the most mature democracies engage perpetually in debates concerning a myriad of issues to include the national security strategy, appropriate force structure, military budget, and conditions of service.⁷⁸ It is important to note, too, that the “demonstration effect” of one particularly effective professional military has historically been the impetus for observing militaries to institute the requisite reforms to elevate the competence of its military institution to match that of its professional adversaries.

Additionally, it should be encouraging for states undergoing a transition to democracy that significant reforms to the military institution can be instituted at little cost and without assistance from external institutions. Many of the reforms suggested in this chapter are attitudinal in nature and require only a shift in values toward democratic norms. The US military underwent its period of professionalization in the latter quarter of the 19th century during a period of civilian indifference and slow promotions.⁷⁹ Many of the changes were the result of studying foreign military establishments,⁸⁰ and most of the impetus for reform came from within the US military establishment. But, the US military in its period of nineteenth century reform was also a small force easily controlled by the

⁷⁸ Brenda Vallance, Lt. Colonel, *The Military in a Strong Democracy: A Comparative Approach*, an unpublished research paper prepared for the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) located at the USAFA.

⁷⁹ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Policy and Strategy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 171.

⁸⁰ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 235.

political leadership. In the post-communist states, societal relations with the military are also poor, status and resources low, and the presence of external threats uncertain.

However, an analysis of the cases will show a reluctance on the part of military leaders to drive reform processes. Another great difference between the transitioning states and developed democracies that engage in reform of military forces is the absence of strong democratic institutions in the former through which civilian authorities could direct the desired changes.

These states are confronted with the dual challenge of instituting democratic political control through still evolving democratic institutions while simultaneously inculcating their armed forces with the values of democratic military professionalism. Specific steps must be taken to ensure the political loyalty of the transitioning states' military managers of violence while also focusing on improving the effectiveness of the armed forces. The approach to reform must recognize the interdependent nature of civilian and military institutions, and also demand that the military conduct internal institutional reforms.

Most importantly, though, transitioning military institutions, and mature democracies that recognize the need to assist them, need to be well-versed in the theoretical principles of civil-military relations in a democracy. The imperatives of civilian control in a democratic society and professionalism should guide all efforts to adapt to the ideological sea changes that continue to challenge transitioning states. The prescription is complex, and necessarily incomplete, but ignorance of its contents will lead to something less than the emergence of mature democratic societies with competent and respected

military institutions that maximize military security at the least sacrifice of democratic values. The second part of the solution requires recognizing and reorienting the patterns of civilian control and military professionalism that characterized the transitioning states in the Soviet era. This is the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3

The Military Institution in the Soviet Bloc: Soviet Patterns of Political Control and Military Professionalism

Introduction

The soldier in the Soviet Union and his comrades in the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) experienced a completely different set of dynamics in relating to their states than did their counterparts in democratic states. The greatest difference was that Soviet era militaries did not serve governments brought about by democratic political processes. Rather, these military institutions served the Communist Party, whose will and plan for society was imposed forcefully and brutally upon the citizens of the Soviet state and its satellites. Because of the political leaderships' need to perpetuate and extend their illegitimate rule over their populaces, these authorities had an immense attachment to the military.¹ The military in Communist societies consequently assumed both internal and external roles of managing the instruments of force of the state.²

The Party relied on the military as an instrument of enforcing and imposing authoritarian rule, yet these political authorities also feared the military as the only institution capable of employing its resources against the state in order to overthrow it. Although Party leaders maintained a monopoly of power within the political system, they did not have a similar monopoly of force. The possession of the instruments of coercive

¹ Timothy J. Colton, "Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union," in *Soldiers and the Soviet State*, eds., Timothy J. Colton and Thane Gustafson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990) p. 3.

² Zolton D. Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1990* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) p. 6.

power by states' militaries mandates that all states cultivate stable relations between the military and the civilian leadership so that militaries do not stray from their designated role in the political system. The imperative of Party control in Communist systems was compounded by the fact that no process of orderly transfer of power was present.³ Potential rivals, then, could always seek to manipulate the military institution for its own purposes, while the opportunity also existed for the military to take sides in political fights as the primary managers of violence in the state. Continued party control, then, depended on complete control of the military institution.⁴

The need for such comprehensive political control had a profound impact on the development of military professionalism and the possibility of increased autonomy for the military as an institution within the Soviet Union and the East European states . This chapter will examine the legacy of the Soviet system of political control, its consequent effects on military professionalism in the Soviet bloc, and the implications of this model for the eventual transition of the military institutions of post-communist Russia and its former satellites to democratic systems of government. I will restrict my analysis to the Soviet era up to the period of democratization ushered in by Gorbachev's reforms. Chapters five and six will consider the evolution of the Soviet system of political control and military professionalism in the transitional period which is still ongoing today.

³ Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe*, p. 11.

⁴ Roman Kolkowicz, "Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist (Hegemonial) Systems." in *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats*, eds. Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 233.

Prevailing Models of Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Era

There are three predominant models of Soviet era civil-military relations prevalent in the Western literature. Each revolves around the degree to which the relationship between the military institution and the Party can be characterized by conflict, harmony, or political participation.

The first of these models has been advanced by Roman Kolkowicz, who contends that pervasive enmity between civilian and military leaders continually clouded their relationship because each had different values and interests.⁵ He argues that “the history of party-military relations in the Soviet Union is a study in distrust and occasional conflict rooted in a certain incompatibility between the hegemonial holder of power in the state and one of its main instruments of power.”⁶ This constant and pervasive conflict resulted in a reliance on subjective civilian control, through the intrusion of the Party in military affairs, to ensure the loyalty of the military. The military, in turn, Kolkowicz explains, responded with attempts to exercise greater professionalism.⁷

The second model of civil-military relations in the Soviet era is put forth by William Odom. Odom argues that convergence of values and interests, rather than conflict, characterized the party-military relationship. His perception of military professionalism in the Soviet model is one that is not concerned with political influence. The military, in Odom’s view, did not focus as much on defending their interests as on carrying out the wishes of the political leadership. Odom admits that disputes over military policy were normal but described them as cutting “across the military-civilian

⁵ Colton, “Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union,” p. 12-13.

⁶ Kolkowicz, “Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist (Hegemonial) Systems.” p. 233.

⁷ Colton, “Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union.” p. 13.

boundary to become intra-party disputes.” In this analysis, marshals and generals are party executants.⁸

The third model of Soviet civil-military relations is offered by Timothy Colton as an attempt to reconcile the previous two. Colton asserts that an analysis of the relationship throughout the Soviet era reveals both degrees of conflict and congruence between the Party and the military. Central to Colton’s view is his understanding of Soviet military professionalism which recognized limited political participation for the military within constrained issue areas.

Colton contends that the military made its greatest attempts to influence the Party’s policymakers in areas which directly affected its ideological self-image, material well-being, status, and professional well-being.⁹ The reality of the relationship was interaction between elite groups with the acceptance that the Party was the sovereign authority. Colton’s contribution to the debate is his legitimization of military influence within the realm of military professionalism. Kolkowicz does not sufficiently recognize military influence in specific areas and Odom’s model assumes so much agreement that bargaining is not necessary.¹⁰

The debate over which of these models best explained the reality of the military-party relationship in the Soviet Union will likely continue and sides will be taken depending on which deviations from congruence or conflict one chooses to highlight. Kolkowicz, himself, after vehemently defending his position from the dissenting view of

⁸ William E. Odom, “The Soviet Military in Transition,” *Problems of Communism* 39, (May/June 1990) p. 69.

⁹ Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 63-69.

¹⁰ Colton, “Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union,” p. 14.

Odom, posited that perhaps the lines on which the disagreements are drawn are not that distinct and that there may be more harmony between the theorists than one might realize at first glance. He argued that the unique political context of the Soviet Union, in which the Party's unconditional insistence on hegemony and its exaggerated distrust of all institutions drove the political process, was simply less tolerant of the display of even the limited institutional interests and objectives of the military. Consequently, any sign of disharmony took on disproportionate importance.¹¹

It must be emphasized that none of these models can absorb the different dynamic between the military and the civilian leadership that characterized the East European states. These militaries never acquired the interest group status ascribed to the Soviet military. With the exception of the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981¹², the reduced domestic legitimacy of the East European armed forces and the threat of external intervention resulted in a more limited and peripheral role for the armies of Eastern Europe.¹³

The impact of the legacy of the Soviet era must be considered as the foundation on which adjustments to a democratic system of government will be made. The side one chooses to take in the debate over which model more accurately portrays party-military relations is not as critical as understanding the overwhelming differences between the civil-military relations of the Soviet and democratic models. In comparison to militaries

¹¹ Kolkowicz, "Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist (Hegemonial) Systems," p. 234.

¹² For thorough coverage of this event see Andrew A. Michta, *Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990).

¹³ Jonathan R. Adelman, "Toward a Typology of Communist Civil-Military Relations," in *Communist Parties in Politics*, ed. Jonathan R. Adelman (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), p. 8.

functioning in democratic societies, professional autonomy was radically less and the characteristics of military professionalism were markedly affected by the military institutions' service to a Communist state which emphasized subordination to an authoritarian ideology and state rather than upholding the primacy of the individual and the protection of his rights as the central focus of state institutions.

Table 3.1 lays out the characteristics of democratic political control and contrasts them with the features of political control which were prevalent across the Soviet bloc. The same features considered in the previous chapter will be revisited here in the context of the Soviet model of political control.

Table 3.1: Comparison of Political Control in Democratic and Soviet Models

Elements of Political Control	Democratic Features	Soviet Era Features
<i>Constitutional Provisions</i>	Mechanisms for civilian control sufficient and clearly codified.	Communist Party vested with supreme authority.
<i>Executive Oversight and Control</i>	Clear chain of command from military leaders to the executive. Presence of expert civilian national security staff. Effective civilian oversight within the MOD. Transparent and responsive MOD and military. Expert advice of military leaders one input to national security decisions. Mutual confidence between civilian and military leaders. Corruption not tolerated. Executive actively educates public on national security policies and priorities.	General Secretary is Communist Party leader and directs party apparatus that carries out party policies. Military exerted influence over military policy and issues of professionalism but accepted the Party as the sovereign authority.
<i>Legislative Oversight and Control</i>	Sufficient expertise to oversee budgetary and other oversight issues. Broad control over policy issues and ability to conduct hearings. Transparent MOD and military that allow unrestricted access to information to legislatures. Military responsive to legislative inquiries. Legislators motivated to ensure accountability of the military institution.	Legislature is no counterweight to the party leadership. No real oversight role. Loyal ratifiers of party policy.
<i>Relationship Between Military and Society</i>	No serious tensions between military institution and society. Respect for the military as the guardians of societal freedoms.	Party was source of military's prestige and status and bestowed upon the military a privileged place in society in exchange for defending the regime. Party controlled all levels of socialization and instilled militarism and respect for the military as hallmark of Soviet political culture.

Political Control in the Soviet Era

The mechanisms that drove the formulation and conduct of military policy in the Soviet era were inextricably linked to the overall Soviet policy process. The Soviet political system was characterized by different degrees of centralization at different levels of administration enabling the political leadership, embodied in the upper echelons of the

Communist Party, to prioritize and concentrate its resources and attention on areas in which it had the greatest interest.¹⁴ Party control extended over every aspect of Soviet society's life.¹⁵ While an elaborate bureaucratic structure developed over time separating every conceivable functional area of the Soviet state, only the party leadership had the authority to formulate policy and to oversee its execution. The role of the rest of the institutions of government was to ratify party policy and to implement it.¹⁶

The military institution, in this respect, was not unlike other Soviet institutions. However, its unique function as one of the managers of violence in the Soviet state meant that the party-military relationship would be characterized by a high degree of mutual dependence. The professional officer in the Soviet state resented the constraints on professionalism that service to an authoritarian state entailed, yet he also remained indebted to the state for the opportunity to serve it and to maintain a privileged position within it.

The Soviet political system featured a dual party-government structure of two parallel hierarchies consisting of the party apparatus and the bureaucratic network of the government. While some institutions were formally party organs and others government organs, in reality, there were substantial links between the two structures with all key government officials belonging to the Party and with policy making committees in either structure comprised of membership from both government and party organs. The dual

¹⁴ Ellen Jones, *Red Army and Society* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 23.

¹⁵ Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 15-18.

¹⁶ Jones, *Red Army and Society*, p. 2.

party-state structure can be characterized as a partnership in which the Party was the undisputed senior partner.¹⁷

The key bodies concerned with the formulation and implementation of defense policy in the Soviet system were the Defense Council and the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The Defense Council was the highest government body specializing in national security issues. It was a joint political-military committee formed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet with the General Secretary serving in the role of Chairman. Its membership consisted of the Minister of Defense, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Chief of the General Staff, the Foreign Minister, and other Central Committee secretaries with military duties. The Defense Council's role was to provide top-level coordination of defense-related activities of government bodies while also reviewing the development of the armed forces.¹⁸

The MOD in the Soviet era had responsibility for the direct management of the armed forces. It served as an executive agency for policies that were formed elsewhere and was not an autonomous actor in the Soviet policy process. However, the MOD was able to influence the policy making process because it was the repository of expertise and data which were the basis of the decisions made by external party-government organs.¹⁹

The presence of civilians within the defense ministry was unlike the experience of the democratic model which mandates the presence of civilian staffers in the upper echelons of the body, while ensuring that the head of the ministry is also a civilian. In the Soviet model, the MOD was essentially militarized and when an occasional civilian was

¹⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 6-9.

¹⁹ Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority*, p. 244.

given a top position, such as the installation of Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, such individuals were given a military rank and wore a military uniform.²⁰

The dominance of full-time party apparatchiks at the highest levels of the decision-making process ensured that all policies would serve the Party's interests. Chief among these interests was controlling the military institution. To achieve this end, the Party created military party organs to carry out party work within the military. Its latter day version was embodied in the structure of the Main Political Administration (MPA). Colton described three definite roles of these organs throughout the Soviet era: prevention of political insurrection, political control, and military administration.²¹

In the early days of the revolution the position of political commissar was created to ensure that Tsarist officers remained loyal to the Bolshevik government and did not incite or participate in a counterrevolution. The commissar's power came in his authority to cosign all military orders of the commander, and, ultimately, came to control him. But by the 1920s with the accession of Red Army trained officers to command positions, the role of the commissar began to evolve from party monitor to collaborator of a trusted commander with political-military administrative duties. With the development of rigid political standards for professional officers, eventually the two cadres -- military and political -- developed similar interests. The political officer, subsequently acquired more military related missions and became the chief political socialization agent of the conscript,

²⁰ Bruce Parrott, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations." in *Soldiers and the Soviet State*, eds. Timothy J. Colton and Thane Gustafson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 59-60; Jones, *Red Army and Society*, p. 105.

²¹ Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority*, p. 35.

responsible for the political climate and morale of the unit as well as the overall maintenance of discipline within it.²²

Colton argues that with the exception of the period of 1937-1942, when direct intervention in military activities was restored to party organs, party leaders became less concerned about political instability resulting from unreliable commanders.²³

Consequently, the political officer became more of an assistant to the commander responsible for implementing the military's political socialization role and monitoring the ideological purity of the unit's members.

Some analysts argue that the KGB had the primary responsibility of enforcing political control in the military. KGB officers serving in "special departments" limited the potential for dissent within a military unit and acted as the most important source of political surveillance -- not the MPA.²⁴ Though there is disagreement on whether the Party or state security services exercised more control over the Soviet military and the militaries of the East European regimes, the state security services at least complemented the more formal and open activities of the Party carried out by the political officer.²⁵

The patterns of Party control in the East European states modeled those relied upon in the Soviet Union. Governmental structures paralleled those found in the Soviet Union. With regard to control of the military, local versions of the MPA ensured the

²² Jones, *Red Army and Society*, pp. 128-130.

²³ Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority*, pp. 42-45.

²⁴ Jones, *Red Army and Society*, p. 123.

²⁵ Bradley R. Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 54. For more information on the role of KGB and state security services see Jonathan Adelman, ed., *Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983) and Amy W. Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments in the Soviet Armed Forces," *Orbis* 28, (Summer 1984), pp. 257-280.

political reliability of the armed forces and carried out their programs through political officers and basic party organizations.²⁶ However, in the East European states, control was exercised at multiple levels: at the domestic level by the Communist Party, on a bilateral level with the Soviet Union, and at the multinational level through the mechanisms of the WTO.²⁷

Political control in the Soviet military depended greatly on the symbiotic nature of the relationship between the Party and the military. The Party needed the military to defend the regime from external and internal enemies, to serve as the guardians of the revolution, and to socialize society through military service. The Party, on the other hand, was the source of the military's prestige, material status, and insurer of the continuation of a stable system of government.²⁸

In Eastern Europe, however, the legitimacy of ruling Communist parties was weak because they had not come to power either through a revolution or by popular demand. Power was handed to the local Communists through the coercive means of Red Army occupation. Consequently, the legitimacy of the armed forces committed to defend the Communist regimes was also weak.²⁹ This complicated the problem of achieving political control. East European Communists were wary of the loyalty of their armed forces and considered the Soviet military, whose troops were present within the WTO states along side the national militaries, as their ultimate line of defense.³⁰ The Soviet Union's permitting of the conditions that would enhance the political legitimacy of the local

²⁶ Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, p. 52.

²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 51.

²⁸ Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe*, pp. 9-10.

²⁹ Adelman, "Toward a Typology of Communist Civil-Military Relations." pp. 6-8.

³⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

Communist regimes would necessarily mean the loosening of Moscow's control over them. Similarly, allowing the development of greater military professionalism within the East European militaries may have led to greater competence, and contributed to the enhanced legitimacy of the armed forces, but the price would have been some loss of Soviet control.³¹

A necessary condition of service for the military in both the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states was the forfeiture of much of its professional autonomy throughout the Soviet era. Ensuring the military's continued reliability within political systems suffering from legitimacy problems of varying degrees required a conscious decision on the part of the political leadership to trade-off maximum military efficiency and competence for the objective of political reliability. Political control was maintained through a network of non-autonomous political-governmental bodies which were responsible to the centralized authority embodied in the Politburo and the General Secretary of the Communist Party. In the Eastern European states, these local party mechanisms were additionally accountable to party mechanisms within the Soviet Union.

The gradual advent of democratization across the Soviet bloc has resulted in the simultaneous decentralization of this system of control and the rising influence of other legitimate centers of power characteristic of democratic political systems. These changes have inevitably had a seismic effect on civil-military relations in the post-communist states. The armed forces of the former Soviet bloc have been forced to adapt to their new

³¹ John F. Brown, "Détente and Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe," *Survey* 20, (Spring/Summer 1974), pp. 46-58; Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, p. 28.

environments characterized by a new political ideology requiring a conversion of loyalties and patterns of thinking.

Relationship of the Military to the Organs of Government

The most obvious difference between discussions of civil-military relations in the Soviet era and the model of civil-military relations presented in the previous chapter is that there are not as many axes of the relationship to explore. The only relationship that really mattered was that between the Party and the military. Neither the legislature, the executive, nor the judiciary had separate autonomous realms of authority *vis-à-vis* the military. Each was present in the Soviet system, but only the authority of the Party, which controlled all institutions of government, mattered. Even the enumeration of powers and rights in the Soviet and East European constitutions mattered little in comparison to the will of the Party.

Political control of Eastern European armed forces, however, depended on both the nature of the Soviet-East European relationship at the interstate level and the relationship between the military and the Party within each individual Communist state.³² A variety of coercive and socialization mechanisms were employed to ensure loyalty to both the Soviet Union and the national regime.³³ These included control through the party apparatus and the establishment of Soviet Army norms and practices throughout the Warsaw Pact.

Military and political actors with only the democratic model of civil-military relations as a point of reference are consequently struck by the uni-dimensionality of the

³² *ibid.*, p. 3.

³³ *ibid.*, pp. 6-10.

Soviet model. Limited experience with only one primary source of authority over Communist militaries in the Soviet era severely constrains post-communist actors attempting to transition to a political system in which a more comprehensive set of democratic institutions has legitimate political influence over the military.

Relationship Between the Military Institution and Society

Since the Party controlled all levers of socialization -- the work place, the schools, the media, and to some extent the home -- militarism and respect for the military institution were deliberately fostered until they became hallmarks of Soviet political culture. The authoritarian nature of the Soviet state enabled the political leadership to manipulate the terms of the military's relationship with society. High levels of respect were encouraged within the school system; and, from the earliest age, Soviet youths were taught to look forward to their time of compulsory military service.

The use of the military as the primary agent of political socialization among conscript age youths highlighted the compatibility of military and societal values in the Soviet system. The ideal soldier was, conveniently, also the ideal New Socialist Man -- patriotic, hard working, Communist, morally upright, and respectful of his Commander and comrades in arms.³⁴ The system of universal conscription which required virtually every Soviet man to perform military service at the age of 18 gave Soviet males first hand experience with military values and with the institution in general. Many continued their military service in the reserves thus carrying on a life-long affiliation with the military.

³⁴ Jones. *Red Army and Society*, p. 150.

The deliberate presentation of military values through all vehicles of Soviet socialization reduced the gap between military values and those desired by the Party in society at large. The result was an overall controlled, but positive relationship between the military institution and society. The constant influx of conscripts and their subsequent return to civilian life also contributed to a greater sense of the permeability of the military and civilian worlds.

In the East European states the socialization process was complicated by the anti-Russian and anti-Communist sentiment that pervaded the Eastern bloc to varying degrees throughout the Soviet era. First, some basic level of tolerance for Soviet values had to be established. Accomplishment of the political socialization task in the East European militaries drew heavily on the Soviet model which was aimed at developing officers who were both “red” and “expert”. Moreover, the ideological message transmitted in the East European states was necessarily two-dimensional. Emphasis had to be placed on both socialist patriotism, or nationalism, and socialist internationalism, or obedience to Moscow.³⁵

In contrast to democratic societies, whose professional military enlistees and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) voluntarily serve for relatively long periods of time, the militaries of the Soviet bloc were less isolated societal institutions inevitably affected by the social forces influencing its conscript pool. Any significant change in the compatibility of societal and military values has deep consequences for the military institution which must adapt itself to the changing society that it serves. Certainly, shifting from the

³⁵ Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, pp. 89-94.

homogeneous militaristic values of the Soviet era to the pluralist values of a transitioning democratic society will challenge the conservative nature of the post-Soviet militaries in the former Soviet Union and across the former Soviet bloc.

Military Professionalism in the Soviet Bloc

The unique features of the Soviet political system fostered a distinct form of military professionalism resulting from its tsarist legacy, the socialization processes of the Soviet era, and the constraints of Party control. Authoritarian models of officership and leadership, the harsh discipline of military life, an intense aversion to revealing its internal operations to the public, and the corruption of bureaucratic and personal ethics all came to characterize Soviet military professionalism.

The Evolution of Soviet Military Professionalism

The priority of political reliability in the officer corps led to a reliance in the early years of the Soviet Union on poorly educated, but loyal “red” cadres. The Frunze reforms begun in the mid-1920s initiated the process of building a professional cadre by regularizing the education, staffing, and logistics requirements of the Red Army while also downplaying the role of the commissar.³⁶ But the Great Purge of 1937-1938 illustrated that Stalin was willing to place the goal of political hegemony within the state above all other objectives -- including the national security of the Soviet Union at the very moment that the danger of war was rising in Europe.³⁷ The purges virtually eliminated the professional officer corps at the highest and middle levels and sacrificed nearly half of the

³⁶ Colton, “Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union,” p. 18.

³⁷ Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, pp. 56-57; Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority*, pp. 136-152.

lower ranking command personnel.³⁸ Most of the gains toward professionalism initiated by Frunze that would have held the Soviet Union in great stead on the eve of World War II were wiped out. However, many officers who were spared were products of the professional military education system put in place by the Frunze reforms. Although they necessarily served side by side with the new influx of inexperienced and poorly trained officers recruited after the purge, the professional officers served ably in the war and continued the process of professionalization after it.

Marshal Zhukov's elevation to Defense Minister in 1955 ushered in a brief period of continually increasing demands for greater professional autonomy for the military. Zhukov's brand of professionalism emphasized firm discipline, the sharp separation of ranks, and a preference to strictly limit the indoctrinational and political activities of the MPA within the military. Zhukov also tried to rid the military of the Bolshevik practice of *kritika/samokritika* that subjected commanders to open criticism from their subordinates.³⁹

Zhukov's push for the expansion of Soviet military professionalism beyond its previous bounds would prove to be in excess of the inherent constraints of a political system dependent on maintaining absolute political control. Enabling the military institution to become an independent, autonomous actor in the Soviet political system would jeopardize the continued existence of the illegitimate system itself. Zhukov's ouster suggested a natural reflex on the part of the Party leadership to check any institutional

³⁸ Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, p. 59.

³⁹ Kolkowicz, "Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist (Hegemonial) Systems," pp. 122-124.

challenge to its authority⁴⁰ -- even measures undertaken with the intent of enhancing the ability of the military to defend the interests of the regime through improved professional competence.

Although the following period of civil-military relations has been dubbed the “golden age” because of the unusual compatibility of military and Party interests,⁴¹ the leadership of the military by men who had to pay disproportionate attention to Party over military interests compromised the military’s professionalism. The Party’s insulation of the military from the negative effects of economic stagnation of the Brezhnev era dulled the military to the upcoming external scrutiny and criticism that would befall it under Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost. The Soviet military would enter an era of great social upheaval and reprioritization of governmental goals unprepared to recognize the incompatibility of many of its “professional” habits with the demands of a democratizing populace.

Characteristics of Military Professionalism in the Soviet Bloc

Chapter two explored the concept of military professionalism in-depth in order to highlight the specific needs of democratic military professionalism. In the process, some common ground of military professionalism was uncovered that transcends political systems. Developed states strive to achieve the dual goals of professional competence and loyalty to the political regime. The task for consolidated democracies is the development of an officer corps of expert soldiers who are also democrats, while the task for the communist states of the Soviet bloc was to develop soldiers who were both “red” and

⁴⁰ Colton, “Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union.” p. 24.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, pp. 26-27

“expert”. The obvious task for post-communist states in transition, then, is the conversion of the “red experts” into “expert democrats”. This chapter attempts to show how such a shift in military professionalism is difficult to make because of the inherited patterns of control and behavior from the Soviet era.

The Soviet army reflected the values of its authoritarian state in that the relationship between officers and soldiers was like that of a serf to a landowner. Some landowners were concerned about their serfs’ welfare, while others did not even think of them as real people. Consequently, the Soviet Army and its successor, the Russian Army, practiced the traits of slaves: forbearance, suffering, and pretending to get along.⁴² Consequently, a form of military professionalism developed in which officership was characterized by uneven standards of responsibility for subordinates, coercive, rather than motivational forms of leadership, and protecting oneself from the potentially cruel disciplinary arm of the state.

In the previous chapter, I laid out the characteristics of a model for military professionalism in democratic states. In this chapter I will overlay that model on the experience of Soviet military professionalism in order to begin the process of assessing the disadvantageous starting position of post-communist states transitioning to democratic systems of government. I will return to the characteristics of military professionalism explored in chapter two: recruitment and retention, promotion and advancement, officership and leadership, education and training, norms of political influence, prestige and public relations, and compatibility of military and societal values. My goal is to

⁴² Gregory Govan, Brigadier General, Commander, On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) and former Defense Attaché in Moscow, 1987-1991, interview by author, Washington DC, May 1995.

highlight elements of Soviet era military professionalism that are incompatible with military professionalism in a democracy, so that internal and external efforts to overcome the Soviet legacy can be appropriately focused. The specific aspects of the model are laid out on the following page. Each of these elements will be discussed in turn as a means of understanding the starting point of the militaries' democratic transitions in the former Eastern bloc.

Table 3.2: Characteristics of Military Professionalism in a Democracy vs. Soviet Era Characteristics

Elements of Military Professionalism in a Democracy	Democratic Features	Features of the Soviet Model
<i>Recruitment and Retention</i>	Cross-societal, variety of sources. Entry based on merit. Prestige of commissioning sources high. Democratic values reflected in treatment of personnel.	Conscript system led to universal service. Entry into the officer corps related to merit and factors other than merit.
<i>Promotion and Advancement</i>	Merit-based promotion system. Affirmative action based advancement may be used to fulfill democratic norms of inclusion. Performance and seniority balanced. Officers promoted who support democratic principles	Political influence interferes with merit-based system. Patronage networks compromise bureaucratic norms for promotion.
<i>Officership and Leadership</i>	Styles of officership and leadership reflect democratic principles and respect for individual human rights. Preference for non-authoritarian style of leadership.	Individual rights sacrificed beyond the constraints necessary for military competence. Preference for authoritarian style of leadership. Abuse of soldiers common.
<i>Education and Training</i>	Principles of democracy and the role of military professionals in the state taught throughout the military system. Allegiance to democratic institutions taught. Qualified civilian and military instructors with some civilian participation as students at some levels. Professional ethics emphasized along with military competence.	Extensive and in-depth education and training network. Professional knowledge stressed. Marxist-Leninist ideological training emphasized. Limited appreciation of civilian expertise gained in training. Professional military competence also emphasized.
<i>Norms of Political Influence</i>	Military fully accepts role in the political order. No involvement of military in political feuds. Recognition that some limited degree of political interaction with oversight institutions is necessary. Direct participation in politics is not accepted. Attempts to influence the political process are non-partisan.	Accepted junior partner role to sovereign Communist Party. Limited political influence in some areas of military affairs. Favored role in society and centralized economy reduced need to lobby for resources.
<i>Prestige and Public Relations</i>	Public accountability high. Full disclosure of information. Responsive to outside inquiries. Media has full access. Military actively manages relationship with the public.	Low public accountability. Controlled release of all information to outside inquiries. Limited media access. Doesn't actively foster relationship with society.
<i>Compatibility of Military and Societal Values</i>	Accepts legitimacy of democratic institutions. Conceptualization of democracy is similar to society's. Adapts internal operations to reflect democratic societal values.	Military and social values highly compatible. Military used as primary instrument of political socialization. Internal operations reflected corrupted Soviet bureaucratic values.

Recruitment and Retention

The Party controlled all avenues of entrance into the officer corps through its establishment of entrance requirements to the commissioning schools, the presence of military commissariats at the local level to handle applications, and the prioritization placed on a favorable party reference for admission.⁴³ Admission to the military schools was determined through the process of competitive examinations and was fierce, although some schools were more popular than others.⁴⁴ The goal of the military authorities was to attract three candidates for every vacancy at a military school.⁴⁵

Standards of selection were boosted by the Party's efforts to enhance the political, economic, and social status of the Soviet officer. Indeed, the emergence of a professional officer corps depended on its portrayal within Soviet society as a prestigious job that also came with a generous package of pay and perks, such as specialized shopping facilities and better than average apartments. The emergence of the commissioning schools as degree granting institutions also enhanced the prestige and status of the military profession, since Soviet parents placed a high value on careers requiring a degree.⁴⁶

The extensive network of 140 commissioning schools located throughout the Soviet Union and the relative desirability of the profession ensured cross-societal representation throughout the officer corps. The political authorities in the Soviet era placed a high priority on establishing the appropriate incentives of pay and prestige to

⁴³ Jones, *Red Army and Society*, pp. 87-88.

⁴⁴ J.E. Moore, "The Soviet Sailor," in *The Soviet Military: Political Education, Training and Morale*, ed. E.S. Williams (London: Macmillan, 1987), p. 168.

⁴⁵ Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 354.

⁴⁶ Jones, *Red Army and Society*, p. 82-85.

attract to the Soviet officer corps sufficient numbers of well qualified youths from all spectrums of Soviet society. Officers' pay was generally one-third more than that received by civilians with similar qualifications.⁴⁷ Throughout the Soviet era, the promise of housing, access to goods, and of a generous pension attracted quality prospects to serve in the officer corps.

In East European militaries, the "remaking" of the officer corps according to the demographic preferences of the Soviet Union resulted in the replacement of officers from aristocratic or bourgeois backgrounds with those from peasant-working class backgrounds. While these individuals were thought to be more ideologically reliable, their educational qualifications were substantially below those who had previously served. The establishment of East European military academies to educate the second generation of postwar Eastern bloc officers improved the situation. However, even through the 1980s the East European officer corps lacked the level of educational attainment that characterized the Soviet officer corps.⁴⁸

The type of student attracted to service in East European militaries was typically a cut below what the Soviet military colleges could recruit.⁴⁹ Those who became military officers came largely from the strata of society that did not place a great premium on

⁴⁷ Herbert Goldhammer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level* (New York: Crane, Russak, and Co., 1975), p. 25. For an explanation of the pay system see J.E. Moore, "The Soviet Sailor," p. 170.

⁴⁸ Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, pp. 94-97.

⁴⁹ For statistics on the academic qualifications of cadets in the Soviet Union and in Russia today see Oleg Vladykin, "A Declining 'Curve' of the Military Salary Level is Becoming Increasingly Threatening: Current Social and Financial Policy With Regard to Servicemen is Leading to a Cadre Catastrophe in the Armed Forces," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 16 February 95, p. 1,3, *JPRS-UMA-95-007*, 21 February 95, p. 23. For comparable statistics on the case of Hungary in the Soviet era see Ivan Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political Socialization: The Case of Hungary," in *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, eds. Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), p. 156.

university education, but which wanted opportunities and material benefits that would be denied them without some post-secondary education.⁵⁰ Material incentives rather than ideological motives were the prime motivations for service across the Eastern bloc.⁵¹ The maintenance of an attractive package of pay, housing, and other material perks were key elements of the recruitment and retention programs of the Soviet and East European militaries. The salaries of East European officers were generally 30-50% higher than their civilian counterparts. Additionally, generous pensions, vacations, and the promise of good civilian jobs upon retirement motivated many to choose military life.⁵²

Promotion and Advancement

The period of stability enjoyed by the military in the Brezhnev era led to the regularization of the promotion and assignment system. Promotion to higher ranks was dependent on first filling a position that required an officer of the higher rank and then being recommended for promotion to that rank while already serving in the higher position.⁵³ On the surface, the Soviet era promotion system seems to have had many of the elements of a merit-based system. Evaluations considered both professional and political characteristics and were reviewed by the officer's immediate supervisors, the political officer, the Secretary of the party and Komsomol committee, and the chief of the personnel office.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political Socialization: The Case of Hungary," pp. 156-159.

⁵¹ Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, p. 97; Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political Socialization: The Case of Hungary," pp. 157-158.

⁵² Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, pp. 106-110.

⁵³ A thorough explanation of this system can be found in Viktor Suvorov, *Inside the Soviet Army* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 277-282. This work makes no mention of ideological controls in the Soviet armed forces.

⁵⁴ Jones, *Red Army and Society*, pp. 88-89.

However, the most important quality for a commander to consider in the promotion of officers was the strength of their ideological convictions -- not their military skills. Being a champion of Party policy was regarded as the first and chief demand of commanders.⁵⁵ The emphasis on non-professional qualities and the involvement of authorities outside the cadre of professional officers meant that even in the most equitably administered version of this system, subjective, non-professional factors would come into the process.

The Soviet officer promotion system, however, had more problems than living with the mandated requirements of considering political qualities and subjecting evaluations to outside reviewers for approval. Corruption within the system, much of it perpetuated by the professional military, made the promotion process, in reality, less than a merit-based system. Supervisors would often manipulate the system to fulfill their own needs by downgrading the reports of good performers in order to retain them or inflating the report of a poor performer in order to get rid of him.⁵⁶

Means of advancement within the Soviet military were also polluted by the prevalence of a patronage system in which senior patrons could be relied upon to ensure that promotions and desirable assignments went to their mentees, regardless of their qualifications.⁵⁷ It was also well known that patrons could protect more junior officers from punishments that could be ruinous to their careers. Officers have also complained that officers with patrons or good family ties receive promotions and desirable

⁵⁵ Goldhammer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level*, pp. 286-287.

⁵⁶ Jones, *Red Army and Society*, p. 89.

⁵⁷ John P. Willerton Jr., "Patronage Networks and Coalition Building in the Brezhnev Era," *Soviet Studies* 39, no. 2, (April 1987), pp. 175-204.

assignments near their families regardless of their records.⁵⁸ Numerous accounts of such complaints were featured in the Soviet press during Gorbachev's period of glasnost indicating the corruption that had become prevalent in the promotion system through the Brezhnev years and which still continued.

Such abuses are likely in a system that gives so much authority to the immediate commander instead of evaluating officers for promotion through a centralized promotion board. Additionally, the frequency of longer assignments at one post in the Soviet system provided incentives for commanders to keep good junior officers within their unit. A system with more frequent rotations, such as the US system of moving every 3-4 years, is more resilient to such abuses.

In the East European militaries, professional credentials and reputation gradually became more important as conditions for promotion, but they never replaced political reliability as the ultimate indicator of success.⁵⁹ Additionally, promotion to advanced leadership positions within East European militaries depended on selection for attendance at Soviet military academies.⁶⁰ These graduates subsequently formed the pool of candidates for staffing the top command jobs within the WTO. The control of such opportunities essential to career advancement ensured a confluence of interests between Soviet military leaders and East European military elites. The existence of such a Soviet

⁵⁸ V. Seledkin, Colonel, "Kak ne podarit' rodnomu cheloveku! ... ," [How not to be obliged to relatives! ...], *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 12 December 86, p. 2. As cited in Brenda Vallance, "Corruption and Reform in the Soviet Military," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 7, no. 4 (December 1994), p. 704.

⁵⁹ Zoltan D. Barany, "Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: East-Central and Southeastern Europe," *Political Studies* XLI, no. 4, (December 1993) pp. 596-597.

⁶⁰ Christopher D. Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 13.

controlled patronage network also helped to balance the conflicting demands of socialist internationalism and patriotic nationalism.⁶¹

Officership and Leadership

Soviet military professionalism was characterized by its lack of rule bound behavior. While democratic models of military professionalism limit officers' actions through legal mechanisms, the system of *edinonachilie* (one-man command) essentially meant that there were no illegal orders in the Soviet military. The absolute power that commanders held over their subordinates "was exercised by their exclusive right to issue orders, and the assurance that these orders, regardless of what they might entail, would be followed unquestioningly."⁶² The system of Soviet-style officership was one which was based on the absolute control and authority of the commander and the denial of legal rights to his subordinates. Junior officers complained that "innovation, initiative, personal pride and motivation" were drained by the exploitation of their superiors and that "those with the right, have more rights" while "those who command, get what they want."⁶³

However, the presence of political officers with the authority to make recommendations to the commander regarding his behavior and to report back to party officials when it was perceived to be deficient, meant that the principle of one-man command was contingent on the commander's cooperation with the Party. Although party workers were to remain alert to deviations from party norms in the actions of the commander, a function of the political officer was also to support the principle of one-man command and to extol the commander to his subordinates. In doing so, however, the

⁶¹ Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, pp. 102-106.

⁶² Vallance, "Corruption and Reform in the Soviet Military," p. 704.

⁶³ "Pis'ma marshalu," [Letters to the Marshal], *Ogonek* no. 1, (January 1990) pp. 3-4.

political officer reminded the commander's subordinates that such authority was derived from the Party.⁶⁴

The system relied on personal power and political and personal loyalty. In this respect the military institution was not unlike any of the others within Soviet and East European society. Senior officers routinely used their positions for their own ends -- trading the benefits of the influence of their position to another individual willing to trade the benefits of influence within his. This practice was, again, a feature of Communist societies at large. Additionally, the highest ranking officers thought nothing of living in expensive dachas, often enhanced through the labor of their troops, while their subordinates endured harsh living conditions.

These patterns of officership can be attributed to the traditional Russian attitude toward discipline. Nine hundred years of living under authoritarian systems of government have conditioned the Russian people to accept and to expect force as a valid method of rule. Such attitudes were certainly evident in the Soviet military disciplinary system which was and remains draconian by Western standards.⁶⁵ In the Soviet system, disciplinary infractions were perceived as human weaknesses indicating disloyalty to the Party, the people, and national security. As such, the authorities reacted to them with excessive emotion and severity.⁶⁶ The Soviet soldier, whose daily life was already

⁶⁴ Goldhammer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level* pp. 147, 296-300, 300-305.

⁶⁵ C.N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Soldier," in *The Soviet Military: Political Education, Training and Morale*, ed. E.S. Williams (London: Macmillan, 1987). p. 113.

⁶⁶ Goldhammer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level*, p. 165-166, 168-169.

exceptionally demanding and rigorous⁶⁷, was additionally subjected to constant pressure and surveillance by political officers, Party activists, KGB agents and informers, and special inspecting officers, in addition to the normal oversight of their commanders. While the East European states did not share the same authoritarian heritage of Russia and the Soviet Union, the patterns of Soviet military professionalism extended to the militaries of the satellite states as well. As a result, behaviors attributed to Soviet military professionalism could also be found across the Soviet bloc.

Soviet military professionalism was also characterized by the toleration of *dedovshchina*, or “nonstatutory relations” among soldiers, which was essentially a systematized program of hazing new conscripts.⁶⁸ Such crimes have continually occupied second place in the Soviet military behind draft evasion with the peak in the number of cases occurring in 1985.⁶⁹ Hazing within the Soviet and East European militaries was much more than some sort of good-natured, morale building rite of passage that might be found in other militaries. Rather it was a system of controlling behavior not through motivation or leadership, but through the threat of brutal physical punishments. The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, formed during the liberalizations of the Gorbachev period reported in 1989 that 3900 Soviet recruits lost their lives as a result of hazing, and

⁶⁷ See Suvorov, *Inside the Soviet Army*, Part VII, “The Soldier’s Lot,” pp. 215-239; Goldhammer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level*, pp. 89-135; and Donnelly, “The Soviet Soldier,” pp. 110-111.

⁶⁸ For a description of such behavior see Suvorov, *Inside the Soviet Army*, pp. 222-223.

⁶⁹ Anatoliy Ivanovich Muranov, Colonel-General, Chief of the Directorate of Military Courts, interview by Ivan Ivanyuk, “A Law Against Dedovshchina,” *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 1 September 95, p. 2, *FBIS-UMI-95-187-S*, 27 September 95, pp. 7-9.

hazing related suicides, that can be attributed to the humiliating actions of senior soldiers and officers toward conscripts.⁷⁰

The toleration and reliance on *dedovshchina* for the maintenance of good order and discipline within the armed forces is evidence of a corrupt sense of military professionalism. It perpetuates a sort of slave mentality of officers and senior enlisted men toward their subordinates and a style of officership based on instilling fear within subordinates. Though prohibited in the criminal code, the disincentives against commanders admitting the existence of violations within their units induce commanders to conceal them.⁷¹

The Soviet model of military professionalism in these respects falls far short of the democratic model's emphasis on "leading by example", "taking care of the troops", and teaching officers the importance of respecting their soldiers. The Unified Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which outlines behavioral norms in the US military, obligates superiors to be models of faultless discipline and high moral standards. Any violations are widely publicized and procedures exist for subordinates to report cases that superiors refuse to forward to the appropriate authorities.

Gorbachev's reforms emphasizing the creation of a political system based on legal rights threatened the very foundation of officership within the Soviet military as its members began to examine in a new light practices of denying individual rights. Subordinates began to question the actions of their superiors and to call for reforms in the press. However, the reliance on these practices throughout the life of the institution and

⁷⁰ Gennady Zhavoronkov, "Save and Protect," *Moscow News*, no. 30, (August 1990), p. 11.

⁷¹ Muranov, Colonel-General Anatoliy Ivanovich. "A Law Against Dedovshchina," p. 2; Suvorov, *Inside the Soviet Army*, pp. 255-256.

the equating of them with military professionalism has led to deep resistance among senior officers and some junior officers wary of the prospect of incorporating democratic values into post-Soviet styles of officership and leadership.

Education and Training System

The Soviet military operated an extensive network of 140 commissioning schools involving over 500,000 people in their administration.⁷² Additionally, there were 23 military academies requiring a higher degree for entry.⁷³ In contrast to the US service academies' objectives of producing liberally and technically educated generalists, who can serve in any of the services' specialties upon graduation, the Soviet system was much more specialized and aimed at preparing new officers for service in particular branches and components of the Soviet armed forces.⁷⁴ Part of the justification of this difference is that much of a Soviet junior officer's job was related to overseeing the training of inductees in specific functional areas,⁷⁵ a position that would be handled by NCOs in the US military.

Consequently, the preparation of the Soviet officer, though extensive, was narrower than that received by officers with broader responsibilities in other systems. Beyond the particular specialization of the school attended, the core subjects common to all the commissioning schools included Marxism-Leninism, political economy, and CPSU history in the social sciences, math and physics among the general disciplines, and some military subjects such as tactics and military art and science. The inclusion of some type of

⁷² Scott and Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, p. 348.

⁷³ Donnelly, "The Soviet Soldier," p. 118.

⁷⁴ Scott and Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, p. 353.

⁷⁵ Donnelly, "The Soviet Soldier," p. 121.

common core curriculum was supposed to produce “specialists with a broad profile”.⁷⁶ In comparison with the less specialized philosophy of the US system, however, the Soviet officer’s training was less conducive to the preparation of officers who would eventually work with more broadly educated civilians in the policy making process or to interacting with educated civilians in general.

For the most part, officer education in the East European states among WTO members was part of an integrated system controlled by the Soviet Union. The exception was Romania which did not allow its officers to be educated abroad.⁷⁷ The same methods and curriculum characterized schools across the region. Additionally, the Soviets trained faculty for the East European military schools and academies and send lecturers and instructional materials to Eastern Europe.⁷⁸

Political socialization processes differed substantially between the democratic and Communist systems. In both systems, the prior socialization processes of the school systems ingrained general societal values in the new recruit that could then be refocused to emphasize the specific values of military professionalism. However, with the exception of youths raised in military families, the typical officer candidate or recruit in a democracy has had very little or perhaps no prior experience in military subjects. In the Soviet system, the prior socialization experience included heavy doses of militarism and political training. Beginning in kindergarten, Soviet children were subjected to patriotic education and military themes in their earliest readers. Such training continued through elementary

⁷⁶ Jones, *Red Army and Society*, p. 85 cited I.N. Shkadov, *Voprosy obucheniya I vospitaniya v voyenno-uchebnykh zavedeniyakh* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), pp. 117-19.

⁷⁷ Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe* p. 225.

⁷⁸ *ibid.*, p. 204.

and secondary school and was supplemented by membership in youth organizations in which military training was a featured aspect of the overall political indoctrination program.⁷⁹

Military-political indoctrination comprised 30 per cent of cadets' training time at the higher military training schools.⁸⁰ This aspect of the commissioning schools' curricula focused on Marxist-Leninist theory and scientific communism.⁸¹ Upon graduation, the new officers' political indoctrination was continued by their units' political officers, who were graduates of a specialized commissioning school for political officer specialists. The main function of the political officer in the military's political socialization program was to generate support for the Communist Party, its leadership, goals, and policies.⁸² Soviet surveys indicate that 90-100 minutes of a serviceman's working day was devoted to political work. On days off, two to four hours were devoted to political work.⁸³ Volgyes distinguished between short-term and long-range political socialization efforts. Short-term political socialization attempts were aimed at instilling minimal social values in conscripts whose terms of service ranged from twelve to thirty-two months.⁸⁴ The goal was to mold the "New Socialist Man" who would return from military service properly motivated to

⁷⁹ For a full account of the political indoctrination program that was conducted from nursery school through the beginning of military service see E.S. Williams, "Political Education and Training," in *The Soviet Military: Political Education, Training and Morale*, ed. E.S. Williams (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 11-38. See also Jones, *Red Army and Society*, pp. 151-153.

⁸⁰ Williams, "Political Education and Training," p. 39.

⁸¹ Yuri Runaev, Colonel, Department Head, Department of Social Sciences, Kachinsky Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots. This topic was discussed in a letter received by the author in December 1995.

⁸² Jones, *Red Army and Society*, p. 156.

⁸³ *ibid.* For a thorough discussion of the specific content of political socialization in the Soviet armed forces see Goldhammer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level*, pp. 203-254. See also, Williams, "Political Education and Training," pp. 38-68. A Soviet source on this topic is Alexander Khmel, Lt. General, *Education of the Soviet Soldier: Party Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972).

⁸⁴ Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political Socialization: The Case of Hungary," p. 146.

continue to build communism in civilian life.⁸⁵ Long-range political socialization was aimed at professional soldiers, non-commissioned and commissioned officers alike, with the goal of creating a more enduring bond between professional soldiers and the system.⁸⁶

The same methods of political socialization developed for use in the Soviet military were applied to the East European militaries. Parallel goals were pursued: ensuring the subordination of the military to Party and Soviet rule, transmitting Communist ideology to the nation's citizenry by exploiting the opportunities provided by mass conscription, and improving combat effectiveness by instilling in the troops the motivation to defend Communist ideals.⁸⁷ However, the ideological message varied somewhat in the East European states because it was focused on both building allegiance to Moscow, through socialist internationalism, and loyalty to the domestic Communist party through an emphasis on the martial traditions of each individual state.⁸⁸

A key element of the post-communist militaries' successful transitions to democracy would be to revamp the curriculum of the commissioning, pre-commissioning, and post-commissioning schools. Additionally, attention must be given to socializing soldiers and officers to the values of democratic states. Many of the elements of Soviet military professionalism discussed in this chapter were first learned through the process of professionalization that occurs at the commissioning schools and in the pre-military training that precedes it at the high school level. These topics were then reinforced

⁸⁵ Jones, *Red Army and Society*, p. 150; Goldhammer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level*, p. 208.

⁸⁶ Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political Socialization: The Case of Hungary," p. 146; Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, p. 92.

⁸⁷ Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, p. 91.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, p. 92.

through the political education that occurred in military units and which continued later through the work of party propagandists in civilian life.⁸⁹

Especially critical areas of instruction would be the role of the military in a democratic state and characteristics of military professionalism in a democracy such as standards of officership and leadership that emphasize respect for the individual, professional ethics, responsibility to a democratic society, and an aversion to corrupted meritorious processes that detract from professionalism and the prestige of military service. These same issues must also be discussed at the higher military academies and general staff colleges as crucial elements of the post-communist militaries' transitions to service within a democratic state. The extensive infrastructure of the military educational system and the value placed on learning professional military topics throughout the course of an officer's career are positive aspects of the Soviet legacy. These features can be redirected in the post-communist era to orient post-communist officers to the professional qualities most compatible to the service of a democratic system of government.

Norms of Political Influence

Colton defined military participation in politics as consisting of two dimensions -- scope of issues concerned and political means employed. Scope can range from the narrowest bounded issue area of internal military matters, to institutional issues to even broader intermediate issues, to the broadest issues concerning society at large. Similarly, the means employed for political influence vary from restricting involvement to official

⁸⁹ Goldhammer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level*, p. 243.

prerogatives, to the conveyance of expert advice, to engaging in political bargaining to, ultimately, using force to achieve political ends.⁹⁰

In the case of the Soviet military, Colton argued that military participation in Soviet politics was limited in both dimensions. Most of the Soviet military's participation in politics was confined to internal matters or the dispensation of expert advice to civilian authorities in order to resolve institutional issues. Only a small portion of political behavior crossed into the territory of outright political bargaining⁹¹, and there was no movement toward direct military rule until the 1991 coup.⁹²

The military had some experience with exerting political power *vis-à-vis* the Party in the Soviet era, but mostly confined this activity strictly to matters involving military affairs.⁹³ Kolkowicz adds that, at times, Party control was loosened and greater professional autonomy granted when the Party was more dependent on the military due to domestic or international crises. It was in these periods that political participation increased.⁹⁴ However, ultimate authority always remained with the Party and military influence generally did not extend beyond limits that were acceptable to the political leadership. Military officers, as agents of civilian leaders, were delegated the authority to make routine decisions on such matters as military training, living conditions, weaponry, and strategy. Additionally, institutional issues such as share of the state budget and demands on the science infrastructure and other national resources to support the military

⁹⁰ Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority*, pp. 233-241.

⁹¹ *ibid.*, pp. 248-249.

⁹² For a thorough treatment of the reasons for and implications of the August 1991 as a break point in Soviet civil-military relations see John W.R. Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup," *World Politics* 44 (July 1992), pp. 561-572.

⁹³ Colton, , "Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union," p. 35.

⁹⁴ Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, p. 33.

were often based on the advice of military officers whose monopolization of defense expertise gave them special weight in these areas.⁹⁵ In general, the interests of the military and the Party coincided⁹⁶ and the acceptance of civilian supremacy was undisputed in the Soviet officer corps.

In the East European states, however, the interests of the military and the state did not coincide as closely as in the Soviet Union. For instance, the push for reform in the military at times surpassed the state's conservatism. Additionally, the armed forces of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania have been implicated in coup attempts throughout the Communist era.⁹⁷ The civilian leadership of the East European states questioned the political reliability of their militaries due to the armed forces' reluctance to support the domestic regime against its internal foes in politically tense situations.⁹⁸ Finally, the overall influence of the military in the political system of the East European states lagged that of their Soviet counterparts because of the less extensive representation of military personnel in the highest policy making bodies of the state. While military membership in the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party varied from 7-9% since 1972, the level of such membership in Eastern Europe was only 3%.⁹⁹ These factors combined with the limited legitimacy of the East European regimes and external Soviet

⁹⁵ Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority*, pp. 242-244, 246-248.

⁹⁶ Kolkowicz, "Military Intervention in the Soviet Union: Scenario for Post-Hegemonial Synthesis." p. 129.

⁹⁷ Barany, "Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: East-Central and Southeastern Europe." pp. 598-599.

⁹⁸ *ibid.*

⁹⁹ Ivan Volgyes, "Military Politics of the Warsaw Pact Armies." in *Civil-Military Relations: Regional Perspectives*, ed. Morris Janowitz (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981), p. 198.

military interference prevented the East European militaries from becoming interest groups to the degree that the Soviet military did.¹⁰⁰

Democratization has resulted in multiple axes of civil-military interface.¹⁰¹ The evolution of democratic institutions competing for authority in the transitioning states will require the simultaneous evolution of the militaries' liaison skills in working with these transformed and newly instituted levers of civilian oversight. For instance, lobbying for military interests in parliamentary bodies constitutes a new avenue of political influence previously unavailable in the Soviet era. On the other hand, there is a loss of political influence in the overall political process due to the elimination of the Party structures in which Soviet, and to a lesser extent East European, soldiers were represented in the various decision making bodies of the state.

Prestige and Public Relations

The Soviet military officer enjoyed a great amount of status in the Soviet Union and was held in higher esteem than a great majority of occupational groups.¹⁰² Among military professionals worldwide, Raymond Garthoff argued that the status of military officers in the Soviet Union was "unsurpassed among contemporary world powers."¹⁰³ The Soviet Union's preoccupation with national security and fear of encirclement by hostile states led to the military's assumption of a preferential position in the society and

¹⁰⁰ Adelman, "Toward a Typology of Communist Civil-Military Relations." p. 4.

¹⁰¹ Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup." p. 568.

¹⁰² Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority*, p. 267.

¹⁰³ Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Military in Russia, 1861-1965," in *Armed Forces and Society*, ed. Jacques van Doorn (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 255-256.

the economy which afforded the armed forces influence, privilege, and status greater than any other group.¹⁰⁴

The Soviet military did not actively work to earn the degree of prestige that it enjoyed; rather, its position of high status within Soviet society was granted to it by the Party leadership. The symbiotic nature of the Party-military relationship has been discussed already¹⁰⁵, but it is important to emphasize it again here because it helps to explain the role that the Party leadership assigned to the military institution in Soviet society.

East European regimes also tried to insure the loyalty of the military by granting the military material benefits and prestige.¹⁰⁶ However, the prestige of the military profession in the East European states always lagged that found in the Soviet Union because of the lack of legitimacy of the national Communist regimes. The citizens of these regimes considered the members of the armed forces to be defenders of Soviet international interests and of unpopular subordinate political regimes.¹⁰⁷

The one-party states were in command of all organs of the media and the release of information to the public. Consequently, the Soviet and East European states were able to fashion a popularized image of the armed forces and the military officer. However, as mentioned earlier, these image shaping campaigns had less effect in Eastern Europe due to the populations' greater reluctance to embrace the ideological underpinnings of their

¹⁰⁴ Kolkowicz, "Military Intervention in the Soviet Union: Scenario for Post-Hegemonial Synthesis". pp. 114-115.

¹⁰⁵ Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority*, p. 259; Jacques Sapir, *The Soviet Military System* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991), p. 250.

¹⁰⁶ Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe*, p. 20.

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*, p. 173.

political regimes. Additionally, the capacity to control the economic incentives of the state also enabled it to reward the military profession materially, thus contributing to its overall status in society.

The lack of feedback mechanisms between the citizens and the state resulted in low public accountability of all of the institutions of the state -- including the military. A lack of accountability to its own members within the military institution also characterized the Soviet military and the East European militaries molded in its image. As previously discussed, Soviet styles of officership and leadership often resulted in negative outcomes for subordinates who had little recourse to report ill-treatment or neglect on the part of their superiors. The point is that, in comparison with the democratic model of military professionalism, the Soviet model was concerned with only a contrived sense of public accountability.

Disclosure of all information was controlled and the responsiveness of all institutions to outside inquiries was virtually non-existent. Certainly, many of the negative aspects of the military institution became known to society at large through first hand experience, such as the universally poor treatment of conscripts, but no efforts were made to change the source of these negative images. Instead, the dissonance between first hand or second hand accounts of military life and the images propagated by the media organs of the state continued until democratization began across the region under Gorbachev.

Compatibility of Military and Societal Values

The compatibility of military and societal values was high in the Soviet Union. The military's role in assisting with the production of the "New Socialist Man" has already

been discussed. The ideal Soviet officer was only a slight variation of the ideal Soviet civilian manager. Those who internalized and valued Party ideals flourished in both the military and civilian worlds.¹⁰⁸

Consequently, the lack of distinctiveness between military and civilian values, as perceived by the Party leadership, led to less tension between them than might be found in democratic political systems. Militarism pervaded all the Communist states and was prevalent in all phases of political socialization. Conscription, in particular, with its secondary function of socializing conscripts in the values of the Communist regime, fostered the process of transmitting a common set of values across these societies.¹⁰⁹

In the East European states the interests of the ruling party and the military were generally compatible. However, the legitimacy problem of the imposed Communist regimes led to a greater gap between the values of the societies at large and the military institutions which allegedly defended them. As a result, the quality of the recruited professional soldier was lacking because he did not represent the ideals of the citizenry in the same way that the Soviet officer did for the Soviet people.

As Gorbachev's political liberalization began to unleash new forces in society and within Soviet institutions, the military's social standing and institutional role in society was adversely affected. The most fundamental change was the de-emphasis of the military pillar of Soviet power in favor of increased reliance on economic reform. "Reasonable sufficiency" became the new defense posture and great economic constraints were placed on military spending.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Jones, *Red Army and Society*, p. 93.

¹⁰⁹ Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe*, pp. 8-9.

¹¹⁰ Parrot, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations," pp. 78-86.

The sea change in the Party leadership's perception of geopolitics necessarily affected the military's role, and ultimately, its prestige in the transitioning state. The concurrent expectation to participate in the process of perestroika which entailed enduring increasingly harsh criticism of the military bureaucracy and external public pressure to "restructure" in order to respond to societal needs proved to be an enormous strain on the military.

In contrast, in the East European states the disconnecting of the militaries with the Communist political regimes is an opportunity for the divisions between transitioning post-communist societies and their militaries to heal. The political leaders in the former WTO states are faced with the challenge of remolding the image of their military forces as defenders of democratic states. Their success will depend on the exploitation of the democratic oversight powers granted to them through their constitutions and their determination to inculcate the transitioning militaries in democratic values.

Conclusion

My objective in this chapter has been to highlight elements of Soviet military professionalism that are incompatible with military professionalism in a democracy so that internal and external efforts to overcome the Soviet legacy in the post-communist states can be appropriately focused. This survey of the processes of political control and accepted standards of military professionalism in the Soviet bloc has revealed some serious discrepancies between democratic and Soviet era perceptions of military professionalism.

Some of these deficiencies can be related to the necessities of authoritarian rule while others can be attributed to practices that were allowed to endure within it. One can

expect that characteristics of Soviet era political control that are incompatible with democratic systems of government will eventually adapt to more appropriate forms associated with democratic models of legitimate government. More troublesome will be the corrupt habits of Soviet military professionalism which have been tolerated for decades and which paralleled the pervasive bureaucratic corruption of life in the Soviet bloc.

The process of democratization has had a seismic effect on post-communist societies and especially on their military institutions. The relationship between the military and democratic institutions in post-communist states continues to evolve within a transitioning political arena that for the moment increasingly favors the rule of law and the rights of the individual within society in general. However, as chapters five and six will illustrate, norms and practices of military professionalism developed in the Soviet era continue to persist in the post-communist states. The penetration of democratic values with the conservative post-communist militaries has proven to be a slow process.

Those charged with democratic oversight in the transitioning states and external actors from the West attempting to assist with the process of democratization in the region should be familiar with the discrepancies between methods of political control and patterns of military professionalism in democratic and authoritarian states. Only with such an understanding can legacies of the Soviet era be overcome and new democratic patterns of behavior adopted.

The next chapter will focus on the efforts made by one external actor, the US, toward assisting the democratic transition of the post-communist militaries. I will argue that the military assistance programs set in motion since the end of the Cold War have

been ineffective predominantly because US policy makers have not understood or applied the theoretical underpinnings that should guide these programs' activities. These programs will only be successful when the contrasting models of political control and military professionalism in democracies and the Soviet bloc are comprehended and applied to them.

CHAPTER 4

A Survey of Overall US Democratization Programs and Military Democratization Efforts in the Post-Communist States

Introduction

This chapter will survey the military democratization programs that the US has developed to facilitate the transition to democracy of the military institutions of post-communist states. The goal is to present an overview of these programs so that their effectiveness can be fully evaluated in the case studies of the Czech Republic and Russia that will follow in chapters five and six. The overall approach of the United States to assisting the transitioning states will also be surveyed within the context of the overall Western aid effort. The aim here is to put the military programs in proper perspective with respect to efforts focused on the overall political and economic transition of the post-communist states to democracy.

The result is a survey of missed opportunities at every level to assist the transitioning states. The evidence will show that the military effort was plagued by the dual challenge of adapting cold war era programs to post-Cold War contingencies, and, creating new military democratization programs with an incomplete conceptualization of the problems associated with transitioning from authoritarian to democratic political systems. Additionally, it will be demonstrated that incomplete coordination between programs and confusion over mission areas constrain the effectiveness of US military democratization programs. Finally, the case will be made that the idea of the interoperability of existing democratic forces with the partner states of NATO has been

narrowly focused on the achievement of strategic professionalism issues. Not enough attention has been paid to ensuring that partner states develop norms of democratic accountability. Though widely stated, democratization objectives at every level of assistance: political, economic, and military are poorly conceptualized, and, consequently, ineffectively carried out.

Needs Vs. Response: The Overall US Approach to Assisting the Post-Communist States

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequent collapse of the Warsaw Pact has triggered a complete reappraisal of US national security strategy. Particularly fascinating has been the dramatic shift in policy toward the post-communist states. The previously routinized geopolitical rivalry between the US and Soviet Union, centered on the zero-sum game of containing Communism, has gradually shifted to the post-Cold War strategy of full scale engagement aimed at fostering stability and prosperity in the region by encouraging processes of democratic development and market reform.

In August 1994 the Clinton Administration released the new national security strategy of the United States in a policy document entitled, *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. In it its authors argue that

Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.¹

The strategy of engagement calls for pursuing security through “enlargement,” a policy based on the concept predominant in recent years in political science literature that

¹ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington DC: GPO, July 1994), p. 2.

“democracies don’t fight one another”.² Those who have documented the “democratic peace” have been able to establish that the relatively peaceful relations of democracies toward each other are not spuriously caused by other factors such as wealth or alliance ties.³ At the same time, the democratic peace research shows that democracies are not more peaceful in general and that they are as likely to enter war as any other polity -- but not war with another democracy.⁴

The theory of the democratic peace has guided the Clinton administration’s foreign policy.⁵ However, the most recent research in the field contends that such an approach might actually be counterproductive. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argue in a widely circulated 1995 article in *International Security* that states undergoing a transition to democracy are more war prone, not less, and were 60% more likely to go to war than states that were not democratizing.⁶ This research suggests that the US policy of promoting democratization in states attempting to make dramatic shifts from authoritarian

² See Dean Babst, “A Force for Peace,” *Industrial Research*, (April 1972); Peter Wallensteen, *Structure and War: On International Relations, 1820-1968* (Stockholm: Raben & Sjogren, 1973); Melvin Small and J. David Singer. “The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes,” *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 1, 1976; Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 80, pp. 1151-61, 1986; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali. “Regime Types and International Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33, (March 1989); Bruce Russett and William Antholis. “Do Democracies Fight Each Other?” *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 4, 1992, pp. 415-434; and, Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

³ Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 119.

⁴ Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, and Bruce Russett, “Peace Between Participatory Polities,” *World Politics* 44, no. 4, (July 1992).

⁵ Most recently, the 1995 version of *The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* argues that the promotion of democracy is a key objective of the Clinton administration and that “our efforts focus on strengthening democratic processes in key emerging democratic states including Russia, Ukraine and other new states of the former Soviet Union.” The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington DC: GPO, February 1995), p. 7.

⁶ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” *International Security* 20, no. 1, (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38. See also Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3, (May/June 1995), pp. 79-97.

rule might mean a heightened risk of war in the short run.⁷ The conclusions of the democratic peace literature, then, apply only to consolidated democracies -- not democratizing states. Policy implications of these complementary findings require placing a top priority on the conditions that lead to relatively peaceful democratization and focusing on creating these conditions through external aid.⁸ According to the democratization literature, such conditions include giving golden parachutes to elites who lose in the transition process -- especially the military -- and encouraging the development of a level playing field for political debate.⁹

US assistance to the post-communist states has been couched largely in strategic terms, with democratization itself viewed as a strategy.¹⁰ Thomas Simons, State Department Coordinator for Assistance to the New Independent States (NIS), characterized the objective of the assistance program as putting “behind us the greatest threat which our republic has faced in its whole history by working with twelve new independent states to help them shed the legacy of decades of despotic communism and to become free, equal, and reliable partners in a better international community for the next century.”¹¹ Ralph Johnson, Coordinator of US Assistance to Eastern Europe defended aid to the former Soviet Union’s satellites similarly, “It was only a few years ago that these countries were members of an alliance that threatened us and threatened our European

⁷ Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and War,” p. 80.

⁸ For a survey of the recent research in democratization and democratic consolidation see Don Chull Shin, “On the Third Wave of Democratization,” *World Politics* 47, (October 1994), pp. 135-70.

⁹ Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and War,” pp. 95-97.

¹⁰ *The Economist*, “Foreign Aid: The Kindness of Strangers,” 7 May 94. p. 20.

¹¹ Thomas Simons Jr., Coordinator, US Assistance to the New Independent States (NIS), opening statement in a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee European Affairs Subcommittee on US Assistance to Europe and the New Independent States, 28 March 95. From the *Federal News Service* transcript, p. 4.

allies as well. Now they have separated themselves from that alliance and they are rapidly building bridges to Western institutions, including the European Union and NATO.”¹²

Clearly, US policy reveals a strategic interest in promoting the successful democratic transitions of the post-communist states of the former Eastern bloc. However, the addendum to the democratic peace literature suggests that the US should stay focused on achieving the long term goal of enlarging the zone of stable democracies while also paying attention to minimizing the dangers of the process of democratic transition. What shape has this effort taken and how effective has it been?

Beginning in 1989 Congress and the Bush Administration proposed increased assistance to Central and Eastern Europe. This effort culminated in the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act, signed into law in November of 1989, which appropriated \$900 million in assistance over three years.¹³ This was followed by some limited assistance to the Soviet Union beginning in December 1990 to show support for reform efforts there. With the passage of the Freedom Support Act in October of 1992, US support increased substantially following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. This legislation authorized the expenditure of \$400 million across a range of activities to include humanitarian assistance, the promotion of democratic reform, economic privatization, and environmental protection.¹⁴ The Nunn-Lugar program was also initiated in this time frame -- becoming law in December 1991. This initiative

¹² Ralph Johnson, Coordinator, US Assistance to Eastern Europe, opening statement in a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee European Affairs Subcommittee on US Assistance to Europe and the New Independent States, 28 March 95. From the *Federal News Service* transcript, p. 7.

¹³ Jeremy D. Rosner, “Clinton, Congress, and Assistance to Russia and the NIS.” *SAIS Review* 15, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 1995), p. 19.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

supported the denuclearization of four Soviet nuclear successor states and will be discussed in greater depth in the section detailing US military assistance.

In April 1992, President George Bush pledged \$24 billion in aid to Russia¹⁵, but from FY 90 through FY 95, only \$13.45 billion in grant, donation, and credit programs have been obligated in aid to the FSU.¹⁶ A February 1995 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report identified 19 agencies involved in the disbursement of this assistance. US government programs that focus specifically on the FSU include Freedom Support Act activities and the Cooperative Threat Reduction program which together comprise only 5 percent of all authorized moneys. The rest of the assistance has come through worldwide programs with FSU components such as the US Department of Agriculture's (USDA) food programs, Economic Support Fund financed programs, programs of the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and other federal agencies.¹⁷

US assistance programs to Central and Eastern Europe have offered \$2.43 billion through the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) program from 1990-1995.¹⁸ The State Department has requested \$480 million for the SEED program for FY96.¹⁹ Originally designed for application in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, SEED programs are now operating in fourteen countries and include humanitarian assistance to

¹⁵ *The Economist*, "Russia in Need," 15 January 94, p. 16.

¹⁶ GAO Report: GAO/NSIAD-95-10, 7 February 95, p. 2. Obtained from the Federal Document Clearing House via Lexis-Nexis Information Service.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁸ Johnson, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 28 March 95; *Facts on File*, 55, no. 2828, p. 85 and 54, no. 2806, p. 636.

¹⁹ Warren Christopher, statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Overview of 1995 Foreign Policy Agenda and the Clinton Administration's Proposed Budget," *Department of State Dispatch*, 6, no. 8 (20 February 95).

the former Yugoslavia.²⁰ US priorities have been privatization and private sector development with only a limited emphasis on public administration which has been the focus of the EU's assistance.²¹ Eighteen government agencies have been cited as being players in the coordination and disbursement of US aid.²²

According to the State Department's own account, the prime areas of emphasis of US assistance have been in strengthening democracy through support for local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the development of a free and independent media, exchange programs, technical assistance to local governments, establishment of enterprise funds for the encouragement of private investment, and advice on the creation of social service systems. "For the most part, the US government provides technical assistance, not cash, to the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It is trade, not aid, which will provide the bulk of hard-currency capital that the region so badly needs."²³

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has been the primary administrator of aid across the post-communist states and has been roundly criticized for its misapplication of third world development principles to those states between the first and second worlds. The February 1995 GAO report cited above documents a litany of complaints against the USAID from other government agencies involved in the assistance process. "Agency officials [non-USAID] provided numerous examples of frequent and

²⁰ Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, "US Support for Reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS," *US Department of State Dispatch* 5, no. 21 (23 May 1994), pp. 332, 336.

²¹ Janine R. Wedel, "US Aid to Central and Eastern Europe," *Problems of Post-Communism* 42, no. 3 (May-June 1995), p. 50.

²² Robert L. Hutchings, "US Aid to Central and Eastern Europe: A Call for Imagination," *US Department of State Dispatch* 4, no. 17 (26 April 93).

²³ Talbott, "US Support for Reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS," p. 335.

lengthy disputes between USAID and other agencies over money and policy. Many of the agencies we spoke with were highly critical of USAID and expressed strong reservations and concerns about their relationship.”²⁴

Moreover, the emphasis on assistance aimed at bolstering trade and investment in the region, while governments stall on improving the business environment, has led to speculation that prime beneficiaries of US aid dollars are US corporations optimizing the financial backing of the US government to participate in business enterprises.²⁵

Grassroots indigenous reform organizations are often ignored by the organizations receiving USAID contracts which themselves have no experience in Eastern Europe or the FSU.²⁶ Additionally, there have been long delays in delivering aid. Through FY 94 only 28% of the USAID obligated funds for the Newly Independent States had been spent.²⁷

Assistance to the post-communist states has also been generally criticized for lacking focus and strategic planning. Most democracy assistance organizations tend to assume that the definition of democracy is self-evident and that therefore the goals of democracy assistance organizations do not require extensive elaboration. The management of the assistance programs to the transitioning states has featured duplication of effort, bureaucratic infighting, and weakly focused objectives. The result has been much activity of dubious merit.²⁸

²⁴ GAO Report: GAO/NSIAD-95-10, 7 February 95, p. 23.

²⁵ David Kramer, “Russian Aid II,” *The National Interest* no. 39 (Spring 1995), p. 79.

²⁶ Ariel Cohen, “Aid Russia, But Reform the US Program,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 42, no. 3 (May-June 1995), p. 34.

²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 33.

²⁸ Thomas Carothers, “Enlarging Democracy,” *Current* no. 367 (November 1994), p. 23.

Most of the aid to the post-communist states has come from a much maligned joint effort of the Western democracies. In 1993 the Group of Seven (G-7) industrial countries promised \$43 billion in economic assistance to Russia to include \$15 billion of debt relief. The West made good on only the debt relief portion of the offer plus \$5 billion. Much of the aid was tied to International Monetary Fund (IMF) objectives which could not be met.²⁹ Overall, Western aid to Russia has been criticized for being absent at times when Russian reformers were in a position to implement reforms (January 1992-December 1993) and so tied to the achievement of IMF objectives, that most of the promised aid was never delivered.³⁰ The combined effectiveness of the multilateral effort of Western democracies to assist the political and economic transition of the post-communist states is beyond the scope of this study, but it is important to describe the magnitude and general impact of the overall effort in order to understand the relative contribution of the specific US effort.

Similarly, a full accounting of US assistance programs to the post-communist states exceeds the intent of this study, but the purpose of briefly surveying them as a prelude to an in-depth analysis of US military democratization assistance programs has been several fold. First, it is important to highlight the great size of the larger effort in order to keep the relative scale of the military's program in perspective. Second, many of the administrative problems that will be documented in the military's program are also found across the inter-agency coordinative effort of the main program. Finally, it is important to note that the military's democratization initiatives, beyond Nunn-Lugar, are

²⁹ *The Economist*, "Russia in Need," pp. 16-17.

³⁰ *The Economist*, "Russia: The Road to Ruin," 29 January 94, p. 23.

largely left out of accounts of US assistance to the transitioning states. These efforts are uncoordinated with the civilian based programs and are virtually unknown, with the exception of the Nunn-Lugar program, to those who have not directly participated within them.

Needs Vs. Response: The US Military's Approach to Assisting the Post-Communist States

I have argued that post-Cold War US foreign policy has redirected the instruments of foreign policy toward achieving the goal of enlarging the community of democracies within the international system. Although the responsibility for US assistance to the emerging democracies of the former Eastern bloc clearly falls within the audit of the State Department and USAID, the military instrument of foreign policy has also assumed a significant role. US foreign policymakers have come to realize that, while military institutions in evolving democracies cannot by themselves ensure an overall democratic outcome, a dysfunctional, non-democratically motivated military institution can become a formidable obstacle to the achievement of democratic consolidation in the post-communist states.

Security Assistance

The military instrument of foreign policy, short of direct military intervention and the stationing of troops abroad, has historically been centered on the transfer or sale of arms from one nation to another when such a step was perceived to be in the national interests of the provider nation. This type of aid is called "security assistance." It is important to note, however, that the specific term "security assistance" does not

incorporate all of the US military's assistance to foreign militaries. This term applies specifically to programs approved and administered by the US State Department and carried out by the DOD and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).

Specifically, security assistance includes arms transfers, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), and International Military Education and Training (IMET).³¹ Military to military contacts do not fall under the security assistance purview.

Eventually grant aid was replaced by foreign military sales to economically capable allies with the goal of protecting vital national interests in the form of US oil imports from the Middle East and the containment of communism worldwide. The promotion of democracy in the Cold War era was achieved as an indirect and unwitting benefit of these security assistance programs rather than as the result of a program created with this explicit goal. In some cases, such as the failed Vietnam effort, democratization was not achieved at all. The tendency was to equate the containment of communism with the protection of democratic values in the West in the short term. The long term hope was for the eventual collapse of Communism in the East. The demise of communism behind the Iron Curtain from 1989 to 1991 prompted the general flow of foreign assistance to the region along with traditional security assistance and military to military cooperation programs.

The economic weakness of the post-communist states precluded the possibility of foreign military sales to the region rendering the traditional form of security assistance inappropriate for these nations. Yet, the burden of transition from communism to

³¹ George A. Joulwan, General, Commander in Chief, US European Command, statement before the House National Security Committee," 2 March 1995, *Federal News Service*.

democracy was recognized as an overwhelming aim that would require outside assistance to achieve. In FY 94, democratic development was included for the first time as a funded category in the security assistance budget.³²

Democratization through Military to Military Programs

The US military was charged with a democratization role in the aftermath of World War II when it was charged to denazify Germany and democratize Japan. In these earlier instances, the US military had the advantage of being an occupying force on conquered territory, yet these postwar reform efforts only partially fulfilled their goals. In recent years, the idea that the promotion of democracy should be an *explicit* mission of the US military has been gradually institutionalized throughout its military cooperation and security assistance programs.

However, it is interesting to note that the post-Cold War initiative did not originate in the Pentagon from some “do-gooder” policy makers far removed from the field, but from practitioners in the European theater eager to use their resources to address needs observed in their area of responsibility. This time the military’s effort to play a role in the democratization process would be necessarily less direct since the West did not have the leverage of being a victor in war and had to deal with regimes attempting to carry on with their inherited tools and resources from the Communist era.

The potential for increasing military contacts with the reforming Soviet Union became possible in the late 1980s when American and Soviet generals began to exchange visits. The need for some sort of assistance to the post-communist militaries of Central

³² Louis J. Samelson, ed. *The Management of Security Assistance*, 14th ed. (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, April 1994), p. 7.

and Eastern Europe was recognized in the early 1990s on high-level visits to these states made possible by the collapse of the Iron Curtain. General James P. McCarthy then, Vice CINC of the US European Command (EUCOM), visited Poland in April 1990 where Polish military leaders requested to buy F-16s. Though eager to modernize their inventory with American fighter jets, the Poles neglected to consider their lack of any sort of airspace management system to handle them. General McCarthy told the Poles that the request would have to be denied for this reason, but that he would immediately send in a team of experts to help them devise a modern airspace management system.³³

The next year, while attending the CSCE Conference on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), high ranking officers of the Albanian military repeatedly approached high level American officers and requested assistance on restructuring their forces. The Albanians were eager to accept preliminary ideas mapped out on napkins over meals in Geneva. After a similar experience in Czechoslovakia, and as the August 1991 coup began to unravel the Eastern bloc, it became increasingly clear to the leadership of the US military that a window of opportunity was at hand.

From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General Colin Powell, on down the leadership of the US military recognized that change was inevitable in the previously closed societies of the East, and that the US should maneuver to be an influential force. Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) had been meeting at the Pentagon to approve each individual contact made with the post-communist states, but this mechanism proved insufficient for the volume of contacts that was beginning to

³³ James P. McCarthy, General, ret, interview by author. USAFA, 22 April 94.

overwhelm the system. Realizing that a lack of coordination was sending a poor impression to the East, General John Galvin, CINC EUCOM, directed that a more centralized program be launched to coordinate at least the contacts in EUCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR) which included Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, but not the rest of the former Soviet Union.³⁴

The cornerstone of the US military's contribution to the overall US democratization strategy toward the former Eastern bloc has been the "military to military" concept. This approach seeks to exploit the common bonds of military professionalism across states in order to influence institutional processes and behavioral patterns within transitioning post-communist states. Democratization objectives have also been incorporated into the US security assistance mission through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. The US military effort has four main elements: Defense and military contacts conducted under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Each of these programs will be discussed in turn.

Defense and Military Contacts Program for the FSU

The current defense dialogue with the former Soviet Union began during the 1987 Washington Summit when Soviet General Staff Chief Sergei Akhromeyev called on Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci. Secretary Carlucci reciprocated with several meetings with Marshal Akhromeyev in 1988. Military to military contacts began with

³⁴ Frederick P.A. Hammersen, Lt. Colonel, interview by author, Marshall Center, 7 June 94.

Akhromeyev's July 1988 visit to the US. Admiral William Crowe, JCS Chairman, and his Soviet counterpart established a two year plan of contacts which was signed in Moscow in June of 1989.³⁵

The purpose of these contacts was to alleviate conditions which might have led to conflict. This goal was furthered through the signing of an agreement on dangerous military activities at this time. With the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 came the opportunity to expand the contacts begun in 1988 with the successor states, primarily Russia. This early progress is the basis of the program in place today in the FSU.³⁶

The overall foreign policy contexts that form the backdrop for each program have led to substantial differences in program activity, and especially the funding available for each program. Although pledges were made to treat each region separately, in reality, overall policy toward Central and Eastern Europe was subservient to Russian interests. Policymakers assumed that progress in Russia was inextricably linked to progress within its former satellites. Resources and general attention subsequently favored Russia over the Central and East European post-communist states. By mid-1995 policymakers realized, however, that progress is occurring in the former satellites, especially in Central Europe, despite the US's relative neglect of the region and the lack of progress in Russia. Such an observation may lead to a true separation of policies between the two regions.³⁷

³⁵ *Talking Points on Defense and Military Contacts with the FSU, 1993*. Paper obtained at the Pentagon, May 1995.

³⁶ *Mil-To-Mil Contact Programs for FSU/Central Europe*. USAF briefing obtained at the Pentagon in May 1995, p. 4.

³⁷ Bruce Messelt, OSD Point of Contact for Military to Military Programs in East and Central Europe. interview by author, the Pentagon, May 1995.

The opportunity to facilitate the denuclearization of a former adversary has been the primary goal of the defense relationship between the US and the FSU. The 1991 passage of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, better known as the Nunn-Lugar Act, initiated the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program under which the DOD was authorized to transfer up to \$400 million to facilitate “the transportation, storage, safeguarding and destruction of nuclear and other weapons in the Soviet Union ... and to assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation.”³⁸ Since 1991 \$900 million has been appropriated under Nunn-Lugar³⁹ which has led to the dismantlement of 2500 nuclear warheads targeted at the United States as well as other progress across the CTR program.⁴⁰ The authority to spend nearly \$330 million of CTR assistance expired before it could be used.⁴¹

This legislation also proved to be a relative windfall in funding for military to military initiatives with the four nuclear powers of the FSU: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. In addition to the four major purposes of the CTR program: destruction and dismantlement, safe and secure transport and storage of nuclear weapons and materials, non-proliferation, and defense conversion, the initial legislation set aside \$15 million for defense and military contacts in the eligible states.⁴²

³⁸ Dunbar Lockwood, “The Nunn-Lugar Program: No Time to Pull the Plug,” *Arms Control Today* 25, no. 5 (June 1995), p. 8.

³⁹ Susanne Schafer, “AP Military Writer,” *Associated Press Worldstream*, 6 Jan 95. Obtained through the Lexis-Nexis news service.

⁴⁰ John Diamond, “Administration Defends Russia Aid Program with AM-Foreign Policy,” *Associated Press Worldstream*, 23 May 95. Obtained through the Lexis-Nexis news service.

⁴¹ DOD Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 28 March 95.

⁴² *Mil-To-Mil Contact Programs for FSU/Central Europe*, p. 13.

The purpose of this aspect of the program is “to increase understanding and promote more stable military relations between the US and the FSU states, to encourage support for reform and the development of military forces under civilian control which are more responsive to democratically elected officials, to promote denuclearization of forces in the FSU, and to encourage cooperation in regional crises.”⁴³

The defense goals stated at the onset of the contact program with the FSU were to facilitate a military responsible to democratically elected civilian authorities, a demilitarized market economy, and a smaller military with defense-oriented forces. Additionally, it was recognized that such a program could influence the military, which is an important factor in the transitioning societies, encourage the downsizing of defense establishments, help the military to better understand Western society, and increase US understanding of defense activity in the newly independent states.⁴⁴

Though the program for Defense and Military Contacts with the FSU and the JCTP have virtually identical broad policy guidance, each program is overseen by separate inter-agency working groups (IWGs). The decision not to let the FSU, with the exception of the Baltics, fall under the purview of the USEUCOM Joint Contact Team Program was a deliberate decision rooted in differing schools of thought within the DOD political-military bureaucracy.

The military attaché corps assigned to the Soviet Union was comprised of a large group of Soviet experts which lobbied to keep the military contact mission away from the “non-experts” at EUCOM. Those involved in the process of continuing contacts with the

⁴³ *Semi-annual Report on Program Activities to Facilitate Weapons Destruction and Nonproliferation in the Former Soviet Union*, 30 April 1994, Section 5.

⁴⁴ *Talking Points on Defense and Military Contacts with the FSU*, 1993.

FSU wanted them to remain under strict Washington guidance. Although the EUCOM effort was respected for its enthusiasm, the perception also existed that it could be too eager to act and wasn't always as solicitous of the US Embassies' Chief of Missions' preferences as it could have been.⁴⁵

As a result, the military to military contacts aspect of the overall military cooperation program with the FSU has been run by the attachés in-country. While these officers have linguistic and area training superior to their EUCOM counterparts serving in the JCTP, conducting and facilitating military contacts are just a portion of their overall responsibilities and they cannot give the attention to this aspect of their duties that full-time specialists could. However, as the in-depth study of the effectiveness of military to military initiatives in the Russian case study will show, the lack of enthusiasm for these contacts among the leadership of the Russian military somewhat alleviates this problem since the lack of a supportive climate decreases the number of contacts that are possible.

The Joint Contact Team Program

General Colin Powell sent a message to General John Shalikashvili, then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, outlining his ideas to create a program akin to a military peace corps so that the transitioning states have the alternative to turn away from Russia and toward the US.⁴⁶ Later Powell approved the need for a Brigadier General and a staff of thirty to manage the process. Brigadier General Thomas Lennon, who was slated to

⁴⁵ Gordon Stirling, State Department Russian Desk Officer and Point of Contact on the Inter-agency Working Group (IWG) for Military to Military Contacts, interview by author, Washington DC, May 1995.

⁴⁵ Les Aspin, *The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 September 93) p. 2.

⁴⁶ Charles Helms, Captain, USAF, former Executive Officer to General Lennon, interview by author, 2 June 94, HQ EUCOM, Stuttgart, Germany.

become Wing Commander at Homestead AFB before Hurricane Andrew destroyed it, was sent to EUCOM to lead the office created to oversee the program.⁴⁷

The EUCOM Commander used funds set aside for his discretionary use to launch the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), and the first Military Liaison Team (MLT) was sent to Hungary in July of 1992 as a trial. One year later, a total of ten MLTs were operating in Central and Eastern Europe. Today, there are twelve MLTs working in Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.

In the first year the program operated with \$6 million from CINC (Commander-in-Chief) initiative funds.⁴⁸ In FY 1994 the JCTP operated with an allocated budget of \$10 million. The program has requested \$16.3 million in funding for FY 1995.⁴⁹ In FY 96 there will no longer be a specific line in the budget for the JCTP. Funding will come from the \$60 million allocated to the CINCs for discretionary spending. This is either a positive or negative development for the program depending on the willingness of each CINC to support it. Theoretically, much more money can be directed at the program, but on the other hand there is no guarantee that CINCs will direct funds toward the program at the same levels than in the past.⁵⁰

The JCTP was initiated in the final year of the Bush Administration, before the Clinton administration, which was eager to make the promotion of democracy a key military mission, came on board. There was some concern at the State Department that

⁴⁷ McCarthy interview.

⁴⁸ These are discretionary funds available to all of the theater CINCs (i.e. EUCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM...)

⁴⁹ JCTP briefing papers acquired June 94 at HQ EUCOM, Stuttgart.

⁵⁰ Messelt interview.

the JCTP should not proceed, because this would “put the military ahead of the political process”.⁵¹ While there was an appreciation at State that contacts between militaries could have positive results, State felt that it had to remind DOD that it was not charged with foreign policy constitutionally and that the military should be careful not to take the lead on foreign policy issues -- even those with a national security aspect to them.⁵²

As the program began, a new national strategy had not yet been written, nor had the “Bottom-Up Review” been conducted -- mechanisms that would help sustain the program past its first year when influencing “dangers to democracy and reform, in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere” would be touted by the new administration as a main pillar of its defense policy.⁵³

The fact that the program was launched in less than a perfect political climate is testimony to the firm grasp of the military institution’s role in a democracy held by the leadership of the US military. They understood the importance of the military to the processes of transition happening all around them and acted to try to positively influence their counterparts in the post-communist states. However, as evidence presented later in the study will show, there has never been sufficient understanding regarding how to specifically assist post-communist militaries transitioning to democracy. Political turf battles plagued the program at its onset and still affect it today, but the recognition that *something* must be done as soon as possible ensured that a program, even an imperfect one, be set in motion to begin to address the US military leadership’s goals of influencing the emerging democracies of the East.

⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁵² Stirling interview.

⁵³ Aspin, *The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era*, p. 2.

The stated goals of the JCTP are to promote positive long-term relationships, encourage moves to civilian controlled militaries, establish contacts at mid/lower officer level, encourage participation in NATO efforts, foster forces structured for defensive needs, promote depoliticized military institutions, instill respect for human rights and the rule of law, enhance public respect for the military in society, and encourage the development of a cadre of military leaders well-versed in democratic norms.⁵⁴ Its mission statement highlights its broad mandate: “to assist the governments of Central and Eastern European countries and the republics of the former Soviet Union in developing civilian controlled military forces which foster peace and stability in a democratic society.”⁵⁵

To complicate matters further, the Commander of the US European Command, General George Joulwan, has stated that USEUCOM engages in two types of military cooperation programs: the first consists of combined bilateral and multilateral military exercises, while the second program provides the model of an apolitical military under civilian control.⁵⁶ The first program refers to activity supporting Partnership for Peace exercises, while the second refers to the JCTP. According to this testimony, the JCTP is clearly supposed to be focused on democratization goals while other EUCOM activity accomplishes the military interoperability goal.

However, the JCTP’s goals enumerated in its mission statement above indicate a mixed mission of civic democratic and strategic professional goals. On the one hand, the JCTP accepts responsibility for encouraging further democratization within transitioning

⁵⁴ JCTP policy paper attained from Lithuanian MLT, July 94.

⁵⁵ JCTP mission statement from briefing slide in HQ USAFE Military to Military briefing obtained at the Pentagon in May 1995.

⁵⁶ Joulwan, “Statement Before the House National Security Committee,” 2 March 1995.

militaries by exposing host militaries to the civic virtues characteristic of military professionals in democracies.⁵⁷ Yet, the JCTP also lists strategic professional goals, such as encouraging participation in NATO efforts and structuring forces for defensive needs, that can only be interpreted as enhancing the military competency of the transitioning states. The JCTP mistakenly assumes that all of its activities contribute to democratization outcomes even though much of its activity is not specifically focused on this goal. The tendency to lump together these disparate democratization and strategic professional missions under the auspices of a democratization assistance program indicate that policy makers were uncertain at the outset how to distinguish between these missions.

JCTP Policy Oversight

JCTP activity is monitored by the oversight of an inter-agency working group composed of representatives from the National Security Council (NSC), Department of Defense (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of State, Joint Staff, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).⁵⁸ In theory, this group is supposed to screen proposed events to ensure that they are supportive of the stated democratization goals of the program, but, in reality, the only events screened out are ones that might “get the program in trouble”.⁵⁹ Those involved in the policy review process agree that it has become routine, that the group no longer meets in person, and that policy implementers at

⁵⁷ A more complete analysis of democratic military professionalism is the subject of chapter 6. I will argue that there is a unique brand of democratic military professionalism that military members from transitioning states should learn that adapts habits acquired under authoritarian systems to practices that reflect the democratic values of the state. I will further suggest that US military assistance programs focus on developing these practices within the military institutions of transitioning states.

⁵⁸ *Military to Military Contact Program Bottom Up Review*. Briefing prepared by the JCTP reviewing its progress through 1993. Obtained at the Pentagon, May 1995.

⁵⁹ Interviews with various representatives from the IWG verify this conclusion.

EUCOM can assume that their proposed event will be approved unless it conflicts with specified unauthorized activity.

Policymakers imposed “non-lethality” and “no training” prohibitions on the JCTP at the start which severely limit the effectiveness of the program. This constraint stems from internal bureaucratic battles and is rooted in the State Department’s monopoly on training foreign military personnel -- not in fears of the Russian reaction to a more substantive program.⁶⁰ Program managers feared that infringing into the State Department’s mission area could jeopardize congressional funding for the JCTP. However, American officers in-country think that these constraints prevent the host nations from seeing the “real” US military. The role modeling function is limited when US participants can’t really “model” to the point of training. For instance, a pilot exchange might occur, but policy constraints prohibit the pilots from the US and the host country from flying together, discussing tactics, or exchanging technical information.⁶¹ This is especially important for impact in some of the democratic military professionalism aspects of reform. Important leadership lessons could be learned from seeing US squads in action and if US units were allowed to actually teach.⁶²

Interviews with host nation military personnel from across the region indicated that the utility of information based exchanges had been exhausted as early as the summer of 1994 and that what they needed was specific follow-up training to incorporate proposed

⁶⁰ Only the State Department’s IMET program is allowed to train foreign military officers.

⁶¹ Ron Maxwell, Major, USAF Point of Contact for Military to Military Programs in Eurasia. Central and Eastern Europe, interview by author, the Pentagon, May 1995.

⁶² Andrew R. Wielkoszewski, Lt. Colonel, US Army Attaché. Czech Republic, interview by author. Prague, March 1995.

ideas into real reforms. Major Johannes Kert, Chief of Kaitseliit (Estonian National Guard) complained that the MLT should “teach us to fish -- not just give us bread.”⁶³

A greater policy flaw, though, is related to the determination of what happens in the program within the outlined policy constraints. Events are proposed according to the in-country coordination described earlier, but the menu of possible events is generated by representatives of the US military units, primarily in Europe, that will support each activity. The USAF component of this event generation function described its understanding of USEUCOM policy guidance as promoting “contact initiatives at all levels and across the entire spectrum of specializations.”⁶⁴

The supporting command’s briefing papers noted that it was understood that USEUCOM policy prohibited events in which training of foreign troops took place or events which could be categorized as combat related. Consequently, the following “focus areas” were listed as the main areas from which MLTs and host nations could expect program activity to come.

⁶³ Johannes Kert, Major, Chief of Kaitseliit, Estonian National Guard, interview by author, Tallinn, June 1994.

⁶⁴ Statement from briefing slide in HQ USAFE Military to Military briefing obtained at the Pentagon in May 1995.

Table 4.1: JCTP Supporting Units' Areas of Focus

(As stated in USAFE briefing papers obtained at the Pentagon in May 1995)

Airspace Management	Information Management	National Guard/Reserves
Air Traffic Control	Inspector General	Personnel Management
Civil Engineering	Legislative Liaison	Public Affairs
Communications	Logistics	Resource Management
Education and Training	Meteorology	Safety
Environmental	Military Chaplaincy	Search and Rescue
Fire Fighting	Military Legal System	Security Police
History	Military Medicine	Services

Several reactions should be immediately evident to policy overseers charged with ensuring that the program is focused on its mission of facilitating democratization goals. The first is that any list of “focus areas” that is 24 elements long is arguably unfocused. Second, the focus areas do not seem to pay any particular attention to democratization goals. Indeed, what the areas appear to operationalize are categories of non-lethal military activity thus ensuring that policy implementers steer clear of the prohibited areas of training and aid with combat related military assistance. The prominence of the types of events listed above in JCTP program activity is indicative of both an inability to operationalize democratization goals and the inappropriate equating of non-lethality with democratization. Without a strict process of event prioritization, how does the JCTP achieve its program goals?

The answer is that it does not nor does it seem overly concerned with achieving them. The chief policy overseer at the Joint Staff, a Navy Commander, admitted that the

policy from the start of the program has been “not to have a deliberate policy.” This was in keeping with General Powell’s initial vision that “all contacts are good” and that in the long run lots of interaction will pay off.⁶⁵ There may be some value to this approach, but it begs the question of maximizing the program’s effectiveness.

Players involved in the policy chain in Washington agree that no master plan exists at the Joint Staff for the program. Representatives at the level of the individual services complain that their only role is to sign off on the supportability of EUCOM’s proposed list of events. The services complained further that the lack of more specific guidance frustrates their attempt to responsibly carry out their role at a service specific level for policy oversight and implementation.

This approach is flawed on several counts. First, American taxpayers are not getting what they paid for. Funding was granted to the program with the assumption that it would directly support the *democratic* transition of the assisted states. Policy overseers openly admit that they have deliberately decided against focusing program activity through the operationalization of its democratization goals and assessing the program’s progress accordingly, yet they stress the worth of working to facilitate democratic civilian control when the program comes up for funding every year.

Second, a potential problem exists with the inability to distinguish between program events that make a military more democratically accountable and which encourage democratic military professionalism and those which merely make an ideologically flawed military a better military. The result could be that the US military

⁶⁵ Dirk P. Deverill, Commander, USN, Joint Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, European Division, interview by author, the Pentagon, May 1995.

assistance to the post-communist states builds up potential foes whose ideologically based behavior has not changed -- all in the name of democratization. The policy oversight as it stands now is not only less than effective in meeting its stated goals -- it is potentially dangerous.

Furthermore, observers complain that EUCOM policy makers take a "salami slice" approach that fails to distinguish between the individual and distinct needs of the twelve countries participating. Executive oversight of the program needs to weigh the varying degrees of progress across the program and tailor assistance accordingly. The most obvious manifestation of this policy is the uniform funding amounts distributed to each case.

The JCTP's budget submission for FY 96 funding documented that each MLT got between \$935,800 and \$995,800 to spend on operations costs exclusive of the fixed \$87,000 in manning costs for each team in FY 95. This means that the MLT deployed to facilitate the transition of the 235,000 strong Polish military is given roughly the same resources as the team working to assist the 2500 members of the Estonian Defense Forces.

Table 4.2: JCTP Budgeting Across MLTs (Source: JCTP budget submission for FY 95-96)

Country	FY 95 Funding	Projected FY 96 Funding
Albania	\$1,286,600	\$1,387,000
Bulgaria	\$1,286,600	\$1,387,000
Czech Republic	\$1,306,600	\$1,407,000
Estonia	\$1,266,600	\$1,347,000
Hungary	\$1,306,600	\$1,407,000
Latvia	\$1,306,600	\$1,407,000
Lithuania	\$1,306,600	\$1,407,000
Poland	\$1,306,600	\$1,407,000
Romania	\$1,316,600	\$1,427,000
Slovakia	\$1,306,600	\$1,407,000
Slovenia	\$1,326,600	\$1,427,000

The JCTP is widely recognized as having quickly filled the need to interface with the post-communist militaries and should be credited for generating good will between these states and the US. However, policymakers within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) agree that this approach has probably gone on about two years too long. One OSD official credited the JCTP with getting the relationships off the ground, but added, "They need advisors, trainers, and the capacity to be shown things. What good is a military with great MWR (Morale Welfare and Recreation), but is incompetent militarily? We can't just show them how to build a military social welfare system."⁶⁶ Such an observation points to ineffectiveness in achieving either the JCTP's designated mission of performing a democratizing role or of its secondary role of enhancing strategic professionalism. An analysis of program activity to date reveals that the democratization goals of the program have never been thought through or operationized to ensure their achievement. Instead, whatever activity is possible under the constraints of the program's

⁶⁶ Messelt interview.

policy guidance occurs and is attributed to the achievement of the program's assigned mission.

How the Joint Contact Team Program Works

The main concept involves deploying teams of US military personnel into the countries in order to perform the dual missions of providing infrastructure building information and presenting the US armed forces as a role model of a highly effective military that operates under civilian control. "The continuous contact with these former enemies demonstrates American values and ideals while encouraging increasing openness, as ideas and experiences are shared in a natural positive dialogue."⁶⁷

An inherent assumption of the program's designers is that ideals and values associated with military service in a democratic political system and the imparting of democratic civic virtues can begin to take root through a series of military contacts. However, the events which occur are largely focused on improving the strategic professionalism and military effectiveness of the transitioning states. The latter goal is the primary motivation of the host countries' participation while the former goal of imparting democratic values forms the basis of US taxpayers' support of the program. The program's ineffectiveness in achieving its democratizing mission can be traced to the fundamental conflict of goals between assisting and assisted states and the conflict between both missions within the assisting state's program.

The key program element is the Military Liaison Team (MLT) which consists of four to six US military members drawn from all services to include active duty, reserve,

⁶⁷ JCTP briefing papers acquired in June 94, HQ EUCOM, Stuttgart, p. 1.

and national guard components. These personnel are deployed in-country for six-month intervals with the mission to facilitate visits to the country by US military experts in the form of Traveling Contact Teams (TCTs), and from the country to US military installations either in Europe or the CONUS by host nation military personnel through familiarization (FAM) tours. The overall program is coordinated at USEUCOM headquarters in Stuttgart where the JCTP office oversees all command, control, and support of the interactions.

The US Ambassador approves the work plan that the MLT creates in conjunction with host nation authorities. However, the MLT works in facilities provided by the Ministry of Defense of the host nation -- not the US Embassy. The American team is typically supplemented by English speaking members of the military of the host nation. Such cooperation is essential for ensuring that the host nation's needs are made known and also to ensure that events are well-coordinated in-country.

Involvement of National Guard and Reserve Forces

In July of 1992 the United States was asked to participate in a NATO/NACC sponsored assistance visit to Latvia. Representatives from five NATO countries comprised the delegation and the US was given the specific task of addressing the topic "Military Support to Civilian Authorities." Since the National Guard is primarily responsible for performing this function, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) prepared briefing materials on the subject to be used by the US team. The Latvians were impressed with the concepts that were briefed and expressed an interest in learning more. The Office

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy subsequently asked the NGB to prepare an assistance plan.⁶⁸

At the same time, USEUCOM was working on finalizing its plan for military contacts in Central and Eastern Europe. An alliance between these two groups was formed to garner the Congressional support necessary to fund the contacts beyond the first year when CINC initiative funds would be spent. It was agreed that the NGB would take the lead in contacts with the Baltics, but their initiative would fall under the umbrella of the overall USEUCOM Military to Military Contact Program -- the JCTP.⁶⁹

The National Guard initiative was concentrated on assistance to the Baltics which looked to the US National Guard as a good model for building some military capability without relying on a large standing army which had been both a negative experience under the years of Soviet occupation and which would also be impossible within the financial constraints of transition. The Guard also performs a civil defense mission in the US which is relevant to the needs of these states. In addition, the post-communist states have large ecological cleanup requirements in which their militaries will be used. There is a great need for the assisted states to learn how to work with civil authorities in these areas.⁷⁰

The National Guard's involvement, supported by the services' reserve components, has developed into a region wide effort called the State Partnership Program.

⁶⁸ Wayne P. Gosnell, Colonel, US Army National Guard, Chief of International Initiatives, National Guard Bureau, 26 August 1993 Concept Paper, pp. 1-2.

⁶⁹ Joseph A. Giddis, Lt. Colonel, US Army National Guard, "Bridge to America: National Guard Support of the US EUCOM's Joint Military to Military Contact Program," Paper prepared for the US Army War College, May 1994, p. 12.

⁷⁰ Margaret West, Major, USAF National Guard, Point of Contact for Guard and Reserve involvement in Military to Military Programs, interview by author, Arlington, VA, National Guard Bureau HQ, May 1995.

US state National Guards have been paired with partner states participating in the JCTP on the basis of ethnic ties, climatic, geographic, and economic factors. For instance, Illinois has been linked with Poland due to the high concentration of Polish-Americans in Illinois. Additionally, Guard and Reserve members make up one third the manning of the JCTP's MLTs.⁷¹

The rationale for the state partner dimension of JCTP activity is to build a grassroots relationship between local communities in the US and post-communist partner states to facilitate the development of local governmental, academic, industrial, and people-to-people contacts that would not otherwise be possible through the support provided by the active duty components.⁷² Guard and Reserve participation in the MLTs additionally eases the active components manning requirements. The NGB is currently working to extend the State Partnership concept to the Russian Federation and other states of the FSU.⁷³

EUCOM's alliance with the National Guard and Reserve forces was a necessary concession for the securing of the support needed to ensure the continuation of its own efforts in the region. EUCOM program developers realized that the NGB's ability to lobby Congressional support exceeded their own and would be an essential element in the JCTP getting off the ground. There have also been fears throughout the life of the JCTP that its funding would not be renewed from year to year, but that some Guard dimension of the effort would likely remain in such a contingency.

⁷¹ Joulwan, "Statement Before the House National Security Committee." 2 March 1995.

⁷² Gosnell, Concept Paper, p. 5.

⁷³ *National Guard State Partnership Program: Real People, Real Success*, (NGB: Washington DC, September 1994), p. 5.

In a perfect funding environment it is likely that EUCOM would have preferred to have launched its initiative alone without the complications of merging the separate cultures and expectations of guard and active forces. There have been problems with some of the state political issues that have carried into the program regarding program activity and the quality of personnel deployed to fill the Guard MLT billets.⁷⁴ States have also been known to bypass EUCOM bureaucratic procedures in some cases acting almost as sovereign nations conducting their own foreign policy in the region.⁷⁵

However, given the inability of the active forces to fully embrace the JCTP concept with funding and top-flight personnel, the NGB's enthusiasm for and participation in the program has been a necessary, though sometimes complicating, factor for its continuation. However, the National Guard is even less prepared than the active forces to staff the policy planning aspect of its participation or to appreciate the need to think through which activities will make a greater contribution to imparting the ideals and values essential to militaries in democratic political systems. The Guard's involvement can largely be attributed to budgetary and personnel resource issues and the inclusion of a disparate military component conducting program activity in twelve separate US states has made it more difficult to control and focus the events that have occurred there.

General George Joulwan, Commander of EUCOM, has stated that:

⁷⁴ For instance, MLT members reported that some personnel had been sent back to the US as a result of criminal or inappropriate behavior in-country. These activities ranged from improper promoting of personal business interests to charges of the rape of a foreign national.

⁷⁵ MLT members in the Czech Republic reported that their state partner, Texas, had inappropriately tried to arrange a military exercise with the Czech Army without coordinating with EUCOM or DOD.

When our servicemembers arrive on the ground the fact that they are citizens of the United States gives them special capabilities. Because they come from a nation of federated states, they understand instinctively the advantages and challenges of many governments working together ... American reservists are a unique group, and as citizen soldiers they represent in their persons the concept of a military subordinate to civilian authority.⁷⁶

Unfortunately, this is the type of thinking that has underpinned the JCTP since its inception. “Special capabilities” derived from American citizenship do not make any contact with Americans a democratizing experience. Only a coherent, focused plan of action based on an understanding of the specific elements required for a military in a democracy will result in program activity that furthers the goal of ensuring the transition of post-communist militaries to democracy.

The International Military and Education Training (IMET) Program

IMET is a State Department program administered by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). IMET is a component program of the United States Security Assistance Program, and provides military education and training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly foreign nations. Other key components of US security assistance include the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NPD).⁷⁷

Since 1950 IMET and its predecessor programs have provided education and training for over 500,000 international military students.⁷⁸ “The training ranges from basic technical skills to professional military education and is designed to advance the efficiency,

⁷⁶ Joulwan, “Statement Before the House National Security Committee,” 2 March 1995.

⁷⁷ Samelson, *The Management of Security Assistance*, 14th ed., pp. 41-46.

⁷⁸ Spiro C. Manolas and Louis J. Samelson, *The United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program: A Report to Congress*, reprinted in *DISAM Journal* 12, no. 3 (Spring 1990), p. 2.

professional performance, and readiness of the recipient armed forces.”⁷⁹ In recent years the US has funded the education and training of over 5000 students annually from over 100 countries at funding levels ranging from a high of \$56 million in FY 1987 to a low of \$21.25 million for FY 1994.⁸⁰ The cut of 50% in the funding for FY 1994 was the result of Congress’ perception of duplication in military assistance programs. For FY 1996, \$40 million has been requested for the benefit of over 100 friendly and allied nations. It is thought that these funds will be forthcoming.⁸¹ The FY 1996 IMET request for the post-communist states is \$10.8 million with \$7 million of this request earmarked for Central European countries.⁸²

The philosophy behind IMET is that through participation in US military training and education courses designed for members of the US military, foreign students will be exposed to US military professionalism within the context of American life and culture.⁸³ The hope is that these individuals will eventually rise to prominence within their own militaries and will positively influence public policy and foreign relations decisions that favor US interests.⁸⁴ Program administrators admit that it is impossible to rigorously prove that such influence actually takes place and that there have been a few instances in which IMET graduates rose to prominent positions and followed policy courses that were

⁷⁹ Manolas and Samelson, *The United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program: A Report to Congress*, p. 20.

⁸⁰ Samelson, *The Management of Security Assistance*, 14th ed., p. 44.

⁸¹ Mark Cheek, Point of Contact at Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) for International Military and Education Training (IMET) programs in Russia, East and Central Europe. interview by author, Washington DC, May, 1995.

⁸² DOD Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 28 March 95.

⁸³ Manolas and Samelson, *The United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program: A Report to Congress*, p. 1.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, p. 4.

disloyal to civilian governments. Overall, though, analysts agree that IMET participation has positively predisposed many foreign officers to US values and interests.

This long-standing program was extended to include the states of the former Soviet bloc beginning in 1991.⁸⁵ Since that time IMET has been funding nationals of post-communist states to study in US military education and training programs to expose students to democratic principles prevalent in the US military. The approach of IMET had never been to directly teach foreign students about the US democratic system or US democratic military professionalism, but to expose participants to these concepts by living within the wider US culture and its military subculture.

IMET funds have made possible the training of foreign students in US military institutions and training programs, but the emphasis with this program has been on the training itself. For instance, an allied country may receive several slots at a US pilot training base with the hopes of having several pilots return to their country trained to US standards. What these officers may have picked up with regard to how the military operates in a democracy was incidental, or perhaps irrelevant, if the allied student wasn't even returning to a democratic regime. For instance many students from such countries as Saudi Arabia and Iran have participated in this program.

Beginning in FY 1991 a portion of IMET expenditures was earmarked for a new IMET focus area dubbed "Expanded IMET" (EIMET). This initiative expanded IMET to allow the participation of civilian defense officials as well as that of civilians from non-defense ministries and legislatures and individuals from relevant organizations outside of

⁸⁵ US EUCOM briefing slide prepared in 1994. Obtained by the author at the Pentagon in May 1995.

the government such as the media. These participants take part in courses aimed at enhancing the management of military establishments and budgets, the promotion of civilian control of the military, and the creation of military justice systems and codes of conduct that are in accordance with internationally recognized standards of human rights.⁸⁶ The allocation for EIMET has been 10% of the total IMET budget⁸⁷ for each state although it can be a higher portion of the IMET grant in states with greater democratization needs.⁸⁸

It is important to emphasize that IMET and the JCTP are separate programs administered by different parts of the US defense bureaucracy. The State Department funds and oversees the administration of IMET while the JCTP is funded by DOD with policy oversight from the Joint Staff. Though each program has invested in the achievement of democratization objectives in the post-communist states, the efforts have been incompletely coordinated and both programs have competed for the same limited resources.

The Marshall Center

The greatest long term role in trying to overcome the lack of education in democratic principles of officers and civilian defense personnel of the post-communist states will most likely be played by the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany. The Marshall Center is a separate initiative from the military to military contact programs and IMET and focuses on educating senior military

⁸⁶ Warren Christopher and William J. Perry, letter to the Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chairman of Senate Committee on Armed Forces, 7 April 95, p. 1.

⁸⁷ Samelson, *The Management of Security Assistance*, 14th ed., p. 44.

⁸⁸ For instance, the Security Assistance Officer (SAO) in the Czech Republic was directed to target 20% of the total Czech IMET grant for EIMET courses.

officers and defense ministry personnel through their participation in courses that stress a broad sense of national security and defense planning in democracies to include political, economic, and military aspects. Its goal dovetails with the mission of the military to military contact programs which emphasize short term assistance through the establishment of contacts at the middle ranks.⁸⁹

The inaugural group of 50 officers and 25 civilian officials from the foreign and defense ministries of 23 countries graduated in December of 1994 after the completion of a five month course of study.⁹⁰ All of the CEE/FSU cooperation partner states of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council except Azerbaijan were present whose request to participate was denied because of the restrictions of the Freedom Support Act.⁹¹

The Marshall Center hopes to put through two such classes per year along with shorter courses and conferences aimed at specific audiences and topics. It is patterned after the conceptual basis of the Marshall Plan except that intellectual capital is being offered instead of money. The center has targeted rising stars -- officers and civilians expected to hold senior leadership positions within their countries' transitioning defense infrastructure -- as its preferred students.⁹²

Initial reaction to the training has been largely positive with a few reservations.

"It's a very good initiative," said Gregori Saytsev, who oversees disarmament at the

⁸⁹ Hammersen interview.

⁹⁰ Malcolm Shearmur, "Eastern European Officers Study Peace at a NATO Base," *The Prague Post*, 25-31 January 1995, p. 4.

⁹¹ *The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies*, 6 January 95 background paper obtained at the Pentagon in May 1995, p. 2. Note: The Freedom Support Act does not permit aid to any states engaged in warfare.

⁹² Charles Squires, Major, Executive Officer to the Director, Marshall Center, interview by author, Marshall Center, June 1994.

Russian defense ministry and was the spokesman for the six Russian students in the first class. "The course is very one-sided, but it's interesting and important to hear the opinions of others, particularly from CIS countries." He noted, though, that "It's a painful experience to see that the Russians are blamed for everything." A Polish officer from the Polish general staff added that the exchange of ideas possible at the center impressed him most. "I have never experienced a situation like this before, where everybody gives their personal opinion, rather than that of their government."⁹³

Funding is provided by the German and American governments, mainly through the US Army budget, with oversight and command and control coming from the headquarters of the US European Command in Germany. Nunn-Lugar funds pay the costs of students from Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.⁹⁴ Since the program started conducting courses it has been funded at a level of \$16.1 to \$16.8 million dollars annually.⁹⁵

Because the program targets only a few individuals yearly from each participating state, success will ultimately depend on the quality of participants, their future positions within their military institutions, and the student reactions to the education received. These factors are largely dependent on decisions made within the participating states and may limit the effectiveness of the effort. The Marshall Center is tracking its students according to the above criteria and is interested in assessing its impact over the long term.

⁹³ Shearmur, "Eastern European Officers Study Peace at a NATO Base," p. 4.

⁹⁴ Hammerson interview.

⁹⁵ *George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies*. Briefing slides obtained at the Pentagon in May, 1995.

Other Military Assistance Efforts

Though not aimed specifically at the goal of democratizing post-communist militaries, it should be mentioned that substantial funds have also been allocated to further the NATO membership goals of the post-communist states participating in the Partnership for Peace program. This commitment stems from President Clinton's promise made in Warsaw in July 1994 to seek \$100 million in funds in FY 96 to assist the partners' NATO activities. Known as the Warsaw Initiative, this program is designed to improve defense force interoperability and relieve the problems of logistical and resource deficiencies, equipment obsolescence, and operational shortcomings which have hampered Partnership participation.⁹⁶

Though the political objective of insisting that the admission of partners as full members will be contingent on the progress of democratization, and, specifically, the achievement of democratic political control of the armed forces,⁹⁷ little activity at the NATO level has focused on these goals. Specific criteria for democratic civilian control of the partner states began to be developed in the fall of 1995, pushed largely by the US Mission, and some Partnership for Peace resources are beginning to be channeled to achieve this goal.⁹⁸ The need for both ideological and military interoperability is finally being recognized as a necessary condition for the enlargement of NATO.

⁹⁶ DOD Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 28 March 95.

⁹⁷ *Partnership for Peace Framework Document*, January 1994. document obtained at NATO headquarters.

⁹⁸ James Kinzer, Major, USAFA faculty member assigned to US NATO Mission, June-August 95. interview by author, Colorado Springs, September 1995. See also Brooks Tigner. "Military Clout Dilutes East European Democratic Hold," *Defense News*, 20-26 November 95, p. 35.

Conclusion: The Effectiveness of the US Military's Democratization Approach

This chapter has introduced the US military democratization programs and suggested that their construction limits the achievement of their aims. The following chapters will illustrate how these programs fall short of meeting the democratization needs of two specific cases: The Czech Republic and Russia in terms of achieving both democratic political control and democratic military professionalism.

Although it has been demonstrated that democratization is a strategic aim of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, the achievement of this goal is elusive in US military democratization programs primarily because there is widespread confusion over how to achieve democratization objectives. These programs, particularly the military to military contact programs, were flawed from the start due to an inability to conceptualize the problem of military democratization. Policymakers understood neither the imperative of democratic political control nor democratic military professionalism. As a result, inconsistent mission statements were born containing elements of furthering both the development of democratic civic virtues and strategic professionalism under the auspices of military democratization programs. Furthermore, the deliberate decision to refrain from assessing the programs led to the perpetuation of poor program designs and the continuation of the bureaucratic infighting and underfunding that has plagued the effort. From this perspective, the military democratization programs have largely failed to diagnose and prescribe appropriate solutions to the problem of the democratic transition of military institutions. In addition, these programs were poorly funded.

The programs could benefit from redirecting measures of success away from tracking the frequency of events toward tracking how well the interactions taking place address specific pre-existing obstacles to reform or move the transitioning state closer to some ideal set of criteria that characterize military institutions in democracies. The problem is that progress made toward overcoming obstacles and facilitating headway toward democratic goals is sporadic because the underlying principles and theory that should drive the program are not universally understood.

Personal contact and the opportunity to discuss democratic principles can contribute to a greater understanding of these concepts in the East and certainly much progress has been made merely by removing the barriers to isolation that once existed. However, the lack of any sort of formal training program for members of the MLTs inbound to serve in-country limits the effectiveness that they can have. In fact, field research revealed how unfamiliar many team members were with the overall democratization goals of the program. While these goals exist in briefing documents available at the program's headquarters in Stuttgart, they don't seem to loom very large in the planning scheme of MLT members in-country. The reality of their day to day life is that they are staff officers "making events happen" which means that logistical details consume their time rather than lofty goals of helping to create democratic institutions.

Personnel serving in-country should at least be familiar with the post-Soviet model that they are confronting and the precepts of the American model that they represent. This is especially important considering that the deployments are only six months long meaning that by the time a serviceman or servicewoman learns these lessons it will be time

to redeploy to the West. This is one area where the effectiveness of the program could be substantially improved.⁹⁹

Issues of incomplete coordination and internal turf battles continue to plague the overall effort of influencing the post-communist states. Parts of the US defense bureaucracy that have traditionally played a role in political-military relations are reluctant to share their role or delegate substantial powers to a new program within DOD. For example, defense attachés do not universally support the program and the attitude of some of them actually undermines the effectiveness of the program and sends the signal to the host militaries that US defense structures are not complementary or united in purpose.

Additionally, self-imposed limitations, such as providing only information that falls short of actual training also limit the effectiveness of the military to military programs. The host militaries universally expressed their concern that their continued need for information briefings is short-term or already expired, while their need for real training will persist indefinitely, but program constraints prohibit the fulfillment of more advanced needs. Bureaucratic shortcomings such as frequent rotations of MLT members and the assignment of personnel to participate either on the deployed staff or as “experts” in their particular fields without any specific training on the transition in progress that they are charged with influencing are also problems that could be easily overcome.

The success of the US military’s effort to facilitate the democratic consolidation of militaries in the post-communist states depends on many factors. Highly trained professional military personnel with language speaking ability enhance the process as does

⁹⁹ Indeed, beginning in 1996 the MLT team chiefs’ tours will be one year long, but still unaccompanied. Robert J. Borowski, Commander, USNR, Poland MLT member, interview by author, USAFA, November 1995.

coordination among all members of the US team in-country to include the embassy staff and the defense attaché. Additionally, the attitude and support of the host military is key. How motivated are they to reorient their defense structures and processes toward Western models? How severe are the limitations induced by pre-existing obstacles to reform? What image from the Soviet era must the military overcome or what advantages does it have due to its positive image earned in the Soviet period or in the peaceful transition to a post-communist government? The overall condition of the web of political, economic, social, and military transitions within each post-communist state also effects the degree of influence that external actors can have on internal processes.

If the goals of positively influencing the democratic transition of the military institutions of the post-communist states is a matter of such national import and a major thrust of the post-Cold War defense policy, then the US military should embrace this role and ensure that the most competent officers and NCOs are selected and appropriately trained to serve within the program.

Once first rate personnel are selected and adequately trained to serve in the programs, program content must be re-designed to contribute to the achievement of military democratization objectives. These objectives should concentrate on alleviating the democratization deficits inherited from the Communist era and developing professional habits characteristic of militaries in democracies. These have been enumerated in chapters two and three and will be explored through in-depth case studies in chapters five and six. They include educating military personnel about standards of democratic accountability and the role of oversight bodies in democratic political systems. Instruction in these areas

would include an appreciation of the need for transparent defense institutions, the legitimate role of civilians in defense issues, and the need to be responsive to the public and to political authority. Military to military contacts should focus, too, on the specific requirements of democratic military professionalism. US military personnel could demonstrate how democratic values permeate educational and training systems which ultimately influence how the craft of officership is implemented in democratic states. Additionally, the importance of being ideologically committed to the defense of democratic institutions and understanding the proper political role of servicemembers in democratic states could be shown. In sum, these programs should be engaged in breaking down and adapting the model of the military in a democracy presented in chapter two in light of local cultures and needs. As this chapter has begun to show and as the following chapters will bear out, the military to military programs as currently constructed do not come close to achieving these goals.

CHAPTER 5

Post-Communist Military Democratization Needs: An Assessment of Democratic Political Control in Russia and the Czech Republic

Introduction

The previous chapters have laid the theoretical foundation for the analysis of cases that will now follow. Chapter one illustrated that the promotion of democracy is an enduring characteristic of American foreign policy throughout history. The pursuit of this goal has continued in the post-Cold War era in the form of an American foreign policy focused on facilitating the enlargement of the number of democracies in the international system. But recent research argues that enlargement alone is not a sufficient goal. Democratic consolidation of transitioning states must be achieved, in order to achieve the benefits of a democratic peace. Accepting indefinite periods of transition runs the dual risk of transitioning states backsliding into autocracies and of the exhibition of war-prone behavior.¹

Concretely, this means that the democratic consolidation of the post-communist states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe should be a primary goal accompanied by the specific simultaneous goal of ensuring that military institutions also progress on the path of democratization. While most attention is focused on progress of civilian democratic institutions in the post-communist states, the compliance of military institutions with democratic norms should not be overlooked. After all, military

¹ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38.

institutions possess the expertise and force which can be directed either at the preservation of democratic gains or at their destruction.

Chapters two and three laid out the scope of the military democratization problem with the presentation of models of civilian control and military professionalism for both democratic states and for the communist states of the Eastern bloc during the Soviet era. The following three chapters analyze two cases where the democratization of post-communist military institutions is underway -- Russia and the Czech Republic -- and the American response to their democratic transitions. This chapter addresses the specific problem of democratic political control of post-communist militaries.

The model for democratic political control developed in chapter two posited that civilian control of the military depends on constitutional provisions outlining the separation of powers, executive control, parliamentary oversight, and the consensus of the society at large as exhibited through the population at large and the media. In the achievement of democratic political control some distinction between presidential and parliamentary political systems was made. Whether the executive, the legislature, or some combination of the two has primary oversight authority of the military, control depends on how well these responsibilities are exercised. In addition, evidence presented in the Czech and Russian cases will show that military institutions lag behind other societal institutions participating in the democratic transition. Consequently, progress in democratic military reform is largely dependent on the strength of the civilian democratic institutions charged with oversight of the military that can force compliance.

This chapter highlights the democratic deficits that persist within the civilian democratic institutions of the transitioning cases that limit full achievement of democratic civilian control. These democratic deficits include varying levels of commitment of political leaders to democracy, weak budgetary control, lack of expertise on defense issues, insufficient confidence concerning oversight authority, limited political will to influence the defense process, poor relationships between the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Parliament, and inadequate transparency. Additionally, democratic deficits within military institutions that exacerbate the ineffectiveness of civilian oversight bodies will be explored.

The evidence presented in this chapter and the next will support a central thesis of this work. It argues that democratic control in transitioning states is largely achieved through the presence of shared democratic values across democratizing institutions. The infusion of democratic values into a previous authoritarian society creates expectations that these values will be reflected in all democratizing institutions -- including the military. Resistance within one democratizing institution must be met with the enforcement of standards of democratic accountability in others. The expectations of formal institutions, such as parliamentary bodies and elected executives, are reinforced by other influential elements of the transitioning state such as the media and the expectations of the population at large.

An analysis of the cases will show that there are winners and losers in the democratization process. Whether or not the goal of democratic consolidation is ever achieved depends on many factors: the historic predisposition of the state toward

democracy, consensus among societal forces that democracy is a common goal, success in overcoming specific democratic deficits that face each state at the point of transition, and ultimately, the match up between winners and losers within the transitioning state.

Post-communist militaries are facing many challenges: the loss of status and prestige, the divergence of societal and military values, the structural and ideological reform of their forces, and the sorting out of old Soviet era patterns of behavior and Western democratic standards for military institutions. The aim of this chapter is to assess the democratization progress of the post-communist militaries of Russia and the Czech Republic in order to specify their democratization needs. The framework developed in the analysis of these cases can subsequently be applied to other military institutions participating in democratic transitions. Once identified, these democratic deficits can be more effectively addressed by the established democracies. The response of the US will subsequently be analyzed in-depth in chapter seven.

The Collapse of Communism and the Advent of Democracy in Russia and the Czech Republic

The introduction of *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the Soviet Union during the mid-1980s proved to be an unsuccessful experiment in the controlled democratization of a socialist state. The openness of *glasnost* revealed the fault lines of a regime tenuously held together by a corrupted communist system. Those indoctrinated within it long knew that the reality of living under communism contrasted sharply with the ideal socialist state which their society professed to be. Greater exposure to the Western world also awakened Soviet citizens to the tremendous gap in the standard of living, however defined, between the communist East and the democratic West.

Mikhail Gorbachev was persuaded some hybrid of socialism, democracy, and market economics, which was carefully managed by the leadership of the Communist Party, appeared to be a feasible path of reform for the Soviet Union to follow. Consequently, his support for the democratization process was limited and sporadic. In the end he would be the last General Secretary of a great superpower doomed to disintegration by the forces which he himself unleashed. Boris Yeltsin, the popularly elected President of the Russian Federation, emerged as the leader of the democratic factions following the August 1991 attempted coup and faced the task of continuing the process of democratic reform where his predecessor left off.

Meanwhile, the liberalization taking place in the Soviet Union spread through the Eastern bloc. In Czechoslovakia, this culminated in the November 1989 "Velvet Revolution" that swept through the country resulting in an almost bloodless change of power. The speed with which the Communist regime collapsed evidences its superficiality and lack of legitimacy among the Czech and Slovak peoples. The two main opposition groups to Communist rule -- Civic Forum and Public Against Violence, its Slovak counterpart -- remained united through the country's first democratic elections in 1990. But by the time Czechoslovakia held its second post-communist elections in 1992 preferences for different paths of economic reform and a resurgence of Czech and Slovak nationalism combined to paralyze the federal government's capacity to continue the democratic transformation process. On January 1, 1993, the Velvet Revolution culminated in the Velvet Divorce with the birth of the Czech Republic and the rebirth of Slovakia. The Czech Republic has proceeded with its plan for a rapid transition to a

market economy while Slovakia has chosen a slower rate of economic transition that takes into account the transformation of its large, outmoded heavy industrial sector and higher rate of unemployment. The economic progress achieved within six years of the fall of the repressive Communist regime has been heralded as miraculous. The Czech Republic's balanced budget, 9.1 % annual inflation, and unemployment rate of 3.4% indicate that it will lead the pack of post-communist neighbors vying for entry into Western European institutions.²

The 10.4 million people of the Czech Republic and the 150 million citizens of the Russian Federation are undergoing a transformation of all aspects of their societies -- cultural, political, economic, and military. But the Czech Republic's historical experience of liberal democracy between the world wars of the twentieth century gives it some national memory about and confidence in democratic institutions. Although the intervening period of repressive Communist rule has left its mark on the national, institutional, and individual psyches of the Czech Republic, the lack of popular acceptance of the imposed Communist political system made it easier to reject it when circumstances permitted the re-adoption of democratic values.³

In contrast, four years after the achievement of their independence, Russian citizens have yet to fully embrace democracy. Many Russians who were sympathetic to *perestroika* and who believed Western reformers who promised that "all you need is democracy and capitalism and all the problems of the Soviet era will be over" have come to the conclusion that after trying out democracy and capitalism their problems are "a hell

² Kitty McKinsey, "The Velvet Divorce Set Good Example." *The Gazette* (Montreal), 17 October 95, p. D14.

³ *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, "Eastern Europe: Approaching the West," 3 January 95.

of a lot worse.”⁴ The very formula designated to propel them forward has come into question by many and frustration with the outcome of the introduction of democratic forces into their previously ordered society has led others to reject the concept outright.⁵ The cradle of Bolshevism is finding it harder to discard its heritage of collectivism, lack of private initiative, and the expectation that the masses will be cared for by the powerful.⁶

With no significant tradition of democratic government or free market economics and an aversion to Western cultural traditions, Russians’ opinion of democracy and capitalism is formed primarily from the impact that the introduction of these institutions has had on their individual lives. There are a few prominently new rich who have benefited from the free market, but a middle class akin to what has formed in their Central European neighbors has yet to develop. Unemployment has not yet reached the high levels that most analysts agree will inevitably occur when Russian enterprises truly succumb to market demands, but many workers are underemployed and sporadically paid.⁷ Organized crime reportedly has infiltrated every aspect of Russian society and is associated by many with the evils of capitalism.⁸ Criminals act with impunity without fear of the police or judicial system.⁹ According to one US embassy observer, “the average Russian doesn’t care what kind of state he lives under. All he knows is that ten

⁴ Ervin J. Rokke, Lt. General, Commander National Defense University, former Defense Attaché in Moscow, 1986-87, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

⁵ David Hoffman, “General Arises in Russia’s Presidential Race: Alexander Lebed has commanded attention of a growing number of the disaffected,” *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 30 October-5 November 1995, p. 19.

⁶ *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, “Eastern Europe: Approaching the West,” 3 January 95.

⁷ Penny Morvant, “Unemployment: A Growing Problem,” *Transition* 1, no. 6 (28 April 95), pp. 46-50.

⁸ Lee Hockstader, “Crime Atop Chaos: In post-Communist Russia, the strong arm of the mafiya is everywhere,” *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 20-26 March 1995 pp. 6-7. See also Stephen Handelman, *Russia’s New Mafiya* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

⁹ Daniel Zwerdling, “Russian Mob Big Crime Problem in Moscow and New York,” *All Things Considered*, National Public Radio Transcript # 1818-6, 15 April 95.

years ago a loaf of bread cost a few kopecks and now it is 1000 rubles. If this is democracy, then who needs it?"¹⁰ An overwhelming majority of Russians believe that reforms have hurt them, and a plurality of 48 percent now condemns even the launching of *perestroika*.¹¹ The Russian ambassador to the United States, Yuli Voronstov, explained that, "material changes are happening faster than mental changes. We're still debating what kind of society that we're building."¹²

Western observers agree that 1989-1991 provided a unique window of opportunity for the embracing of democracy and capitalism, but the system did not deliver any benefits for the absorption of democratic values and individual lives did not improve quickly enough. When asked, what were the greatest changes observed since his arrival in Moscow in 1991, Defense Attaché Brigadier General Gary Rubus replied, "First, the initial euphoria about democracy and all things Western followed in short order by the West's failure to make good on its commitments. Second, the retreat from democracy and all things Western."¹³

No Soviet institution has been less receptive to the advent of democratization than the military. Democracy has meant only increased hardship and loss of societal and material status, and, ultimately, loss of purpose for the Soviet and post-Soviet military.¹⁴ It has led to the break-up of the Soviet empire, which the military was instrumental in

¹⁰ Ilona W. Kwiecien, Lt. Colonel, Assistant Army Attaché, US Embassy, Moscow, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

¹¹ Fred Hiatt, "A Nation Up for Grabs," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 3-9 April 95, p. 17.

¹² Yuli Voronstov, Russian Ambassador to the US, speech given at the US Air Force Academy, 19 April 1995.

¹³ Gary Rubus, Brigadier General, Defense Attaché, US Embassy Moscow 1991-1995, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

¹⁴ Brian D. Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations After the October Uprising," *Survival* 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994), p. 5.

achieving, to a state of chaos and multiple ethnic conflicts within the region and the country, and to the perceived meddling in military affairs by civilians. The Russian military attributes its reduced status and rapid decline in readiness directly to the process of democratic transition.¹⁵ Never an agent of social change, the post-Soviet Russian military has lagged behind society in all respects in terms of its adaptation to democratic values and processes. Receptivity to Western assistance in these areas has also been poor.

Similarly, the Czech military institution has been challenged by the ideological and bureaucratic legacy of the Soviet era as it attempts to transform itself into an institution serving a democratic state. But, it has turned away from the East and toward the West with the help of Western allies and its own will to establish an identity separate from its Communist legacy. Still, throughout its democratic transition, the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) has been haunted by its Soviet era past.

Role of the Military in the Transitioning Cases

Perestroika and its foreign policy counterpart, “new political thinking,” resulted in a fundamental shift in the role of the military in the Soviet state which was not immediately obvious. Gorbachev’s emphasis on economic reform as the remedy of the Soviet Union’s societal ills also meant that military power would decrease because it was no longer relevant as the main instrument of power of the state. Previously, the idea that the Socialist empire was good prevailed; therefore, the armed forces that acquired and defended the empire were good and represented the most esteemed of societal values.¹⁶ Reminiscing on this era, a current member of the Russian Security Council staff remarked,

¹⁵ Rubus interview.

¹⁶ Boris Zhelezov, Research Fellow, Center for International Security, USA-Canada Institute, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

“The whole country worked for the Army to be strong. The mission was to free the US and all other countries of capitalism. The army made up the prestigious main pillar of this ideological goal and money was given to it without a problem. Maybe the people didn’t live very well, but the Army was strong and well-supplied.”¹⁷

There is no such consensus on the role of the military in post-communist Russia. Indeed, there is a side of the debate that does not see a need for an army while the opposite view argues that the army should be strengthened, though for what purpose is not altogether clear.¹⁸ Meanwhile, of course, the entire strategic context of maintaining and deploying military forces has changed in the aftermath of the cold war. The ideological basis of the Soviet armed forces has been scrapped by the political leadership as post-communist institutions struggle to retool themselves in order to deliver the promises of democratic and capitalist societies.

The USSR ceased to exist, but the Soviet military machine remained with 80 percent of the inheritance flowing to Russia which inherited only slightly more than half of the Soviet Union’s territory and population.¹⁹ Though its role as defender of superpower interests is gone, massive border changes still leave a state which stretches from Europe to Asia with significant regional interests that will entail a wide-ranging security policy that approaches that of a superpower. Russian policy in the era of independence has been centered on the belief that Russia should fill the security vacuum in Central Asia and exert

¹⁷ Vladimir Pirumov, Chairman of Scientific Council, Security Council of the Russian Federation, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

¹⁸ Pirumov interview.

¹⁹ Sergey Rogov, “Will the Russian Armed Forces Stand Fast: The Forgotten Military Reform.” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 3 November 94, pp. 1,5. *JPRS-UMA-94-050*, 30 November 94, p. 13.

its influence over the states of the former Soviet Union.²⁰ The loss of superpower status has resulted in a psychological need to build a sense of national identity and strength, and to focus on interests in the Russian near-abroad -- the former Soviet republics which now surround the Russian Federation as independent states.

Similarly, the starting point for the creation of the armed forces of the Czech Republic is what remains from its predecessor forces -- the Czechoslovak People's Army (CSPA) and the Czechoslovak Army (CSA). But, while the personnel and equipment of the ACR are drawn primarily from these previous entities, the whole context of employing defense resources has changed dramatically. While Czechoslovakia's neighbors included Ukraine (previously the Soviet Union) and Hungary, the Czech Republic shares borders with four friendly and stable neighbors: Slovakia, Poland, Austria, and Germany. With the division of Czechoslovakia, any threats to internal stability due to the presence of itinerant minorities have also subsided. The democratization of the Czech political system and its continuing transformation to a relatively prosperous market economy mandate that the military's role be rescripted to insure that it supports the overall objectives of the Czech Republic as it cuts its ties to the East and embraces the West.

A point driven home repeatedly in interviews with members of the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) was that they were serving in the new armed forces of a brand new state. A member of the General Staff said that they were in the process of "building an army of the Czech Republic -- an entity that has never before existed." He added that both the General Staff and the government understood the importance of presenting the

²⁰ John W.R. Lepingwell, "The Russian Military and Security Policy in the 'Near Abroad'," *Survival* 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), p. 70.

armed forces of the Czech Republic in this new light.²¹ Another military briefer from the MOD while recounting the achievements of Czech military reform stressed how the process of reform was made more complex because both the military and the state had to deal with issues that neither had dealt with before to include the formulation of a military strategy specific to the singular needs of the Czech Republic.²²

Colonel General Karel Pezl, the first Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, argued that the security of the Czech Republic depends on its adoption of a comprehensive and integrated concept of defense policy of which the military plays only a part -- the defense and protection of the sovereignty and independence of the state and the safety of all its citizens.²³ The *Military Strategy of the Czech Republic*, however, highlights the Czech reliance on European security structures to ensure its ultimate survival in the face of a superior aggressor. While the goal is to build up a "capability to resist by our own military potential an even stronger enemy," the strategy also states that the Czech Republic will "at the same time seek and use all possibilities of international security structures and prospective allies."²⁴

In contrast, the most recent draft of Russian military doctrine was accepted in November 1993. It emphasizes the role of the military in the defense of regional threats and local conflicts and takes a more uni-lateralist approach to security. Special attention is

²¹ Jiri Martinek, Colonel, Chief of Operations, General Staff of the Czech Republic, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

²² Statement made in MOD briefing on Czech military reform presented to visiting American Colonels from the US Air War College, March 1995.

²³ Karl Pezl, Colonel General, "The role of the armed forces of the Czech Republic," in a special edition of *Czech Military Review* on the topic of *Military Doctrine and Military Reconstruction in Post-Confrontational Europe* (Prague: General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces, 1993), p. 36.

²⁴ *Military Strategy of the Czech Republic*, an information briefing provided by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, p. 3.

also given to the protection of the rights of Russian citizens in the near-abroad. Four basic threats are identified: attempts by any power, presumably NATO, to achieve global or regional hegemony through military means, the encirclement of Russia by hostile states, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, terrorism, and general regional instability, and, finally, political, economic or military blackmail of Russia. However, no specific single state or coalition of states is singled out as its enemy.²⁵

National priorities include regaining some semblance of great power status despite the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union effectively weakened its successor state's power capacity. Specific objectives include maintaining the Soviet nuclear arsenal and building a defensive posture perceived to be necessary because of Russian concern over NATO expansion.²⁶ However, economic and political realities rule out the possibility of sustaining the capability of fighting all the armies of the world simultaneously.²⁷ Indeed, the Russian military is in deep financial, organizational, and ideological crisis, and there is no evidence that any significant steps are being made to alleviate the situation. The litany of problems that the war in Chechnya has highlighted within the Russian military was present well before the war broke out.

These varied approaches in post-communist military doctrine and strategy indicate the differing roles that these post-Soviet era military institutions are assuming in their respective societies. Both states are still struggling to define themselves as independent post-communist states. The military, which plays a role in this redefinition, also acts as an

²⁵ Jacob W. Kipp, "Russian Military Doctrine and Military Technical Policy: An American Military Historian's Perspective," *Comparative Strategy* 13, (1994), pp. 30-31.

²⁶ Rokke interview.

²⁷ Pirumov interview.

instrument of the still to be delineated state's interests. The process of becoming aware of one's new statehood and identity, which has been painful for all has been especially tortuous for those in uniform. In the case of Russia, many of these servicemen are now serving in non-Russian, and sometimes, opposition forces, which are directed against the Russian Federation.

Though the primary role of each military remains constant -- the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state -- secondary roles remain unclear. In Russia, the post-communist role of the military has not yet been defined and the future of the military is uncertain. Many still advocate the maintenance of a force structure capable of waging world war when the main threat to Russia is from within or from border conflicts.²⁸ The decline in military power is an undisputed fact, but the absorption of this reality and the consequent societal adjustment has been difficult for the officer corps and the leadership.

Additionally, the universal values of military service and the national priority of Army socialization have come under fire in the post-communist era. The lack of societal consensus on the role of the military in Russia stems from the conflict between reformers, who seek to adapt the Russian military to democratic control and standards of conduct, and conservatives who do not recognize any need to adapt to the post-communist realities that have taken root in Russian society. For instance, while the press, the population at large, and various political groups have spoken out against the poor treatment of recruits, policymakers within the defense ministry have turned a deaf ear to these calls for reform.

²⁸ Rogov, "Will the Russian Armed Forces Stand Fast: The Forgotten Military Reform." *JPRS-UMA-94-050*, 30 November 94, p. 14.

The divisive result leads to further disharmony over the role of the military in post-Soviet Russian society.

There is greater consensus in the Czech Republic on the overall goals of the state and on the military's role in achieving them. Chief among these is integration into Western European and international institutional structures.²⁹ The pursuit of NATO membership is driven by much of the same motivation that drives the policy goals of EU membership or the active support of UN operations -- the desire to be regarded as a contributing member of all "Western clubs". This goal affects greatly the overall process of democratization taking place in the country and impacts as well the path of military reform.

While two roles -- defense of the state and support of Czech international prestige -- can be cited as the main purposes of the newly defined Army of the Czech Republic, a comprehensive analysis of the role of the military in this particular transitioning case would not be complete without some discussion of the desire of the new Czech state to restore the credibility and prestige of its armed forces.

In his outline of the chief tasks facing the armed forces of the Czech Republic, General Pezl listed immediately beneath the two roles already discussed the goal of the armed forces achieving "the position which it deserves in a democratic society, and to be further integrated into that society."³⁰ The current Minister of Defense Wilem Holan

²⁹ R.C. Longworth, "Time for NATO to Admit Trio From Europe," *Chicago Tribune*, 16 October 94, p. 1. This article also discusses the desire for EU membership.

³⁰ Pezl, p. 35.

similarly listed giving “the Army back the honor it deserves” as his tertiary goal behind building the Army into an effective force and working for integration into NATO.³¹

The yearning of the military for some measure of prestige and recognition from society has been a pervasive theme in my research on the evolution of the Czech military as an institution serving a democratic state. Convincing the Czech populace that the military even has a proper role in its transitioning state is an additional task confronting the government that most states do not have to address. It is an issue that affects every aspect of military reform and of external military assistance and which shapes as well the popular perception of what the military’s role in the state should be.

Post-Communist Military Democratization Needs: An Assessment of Democratic Political Control

Having explained the general reorientation of the states and their military institutions to the post-Cold War world, the focus now turns to the specific accomplishments of democratic reform. One main objective of this work is to spell out the specific democratization needs of the transitioning militaries. The goal is to explain the specific components involved in post-communist militaries’ transitions to democratic political systems. Doing so will enable the assessment of progress along these dimensions and also serve as a means of focusing external assistance efforts aimed at facilitating democratic outcomes among the post-communist military institutions. This assessment will begin with an analysis of military democratization needs related to the achievement of democratic political control of the armed forces.

³¹ Wilem Holan, Czech Minister of Defense, *Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network*, 22 September 94. *FBIS-EEU-94-185*, 23 September 94, p. 6.

Constitutional Provisions Required for Democratic Political Control

In both cases, civilian control of the Soviet era military existed in the form of strict control by the Communist Party, but this was neither democratic nor state control. In the post-Soviet era, respect for civilian authorities and the level of experience of civilians within each MOD is too thin. In Russia the problem is more severe because there has yet to develop a state mechanism for democratic political control over the armed forces.

Enforcement of constitutional provisions for democratic political control of the Russian armed forces is limited by the weakness of the judicial branch which has yet to institutionalize a legal system to guard against abuses of constitutionally designated authority and the general lack of widespread respect for the rule of law within the Soviet system.³² Yeltsin's dissolution of the Russian parliament in September 1993 followed in short order by the deployment of military forces to attack the White House illustrated the fragility of constitutional provisions intended to balance authority among the separate branches of government. Indeed, the December 1993 Constitution concentrated more power in the executive. The US government and most of the American mainstream media framed the October 1993 confrontation as a showdown between the lone democrat and several hundred hard-line communist villains. But Yeltsin's actions raise serious questions regarding the use of violence to prevail over a parliament (composed partially of members

³² Boris Yeltsin, "I Don't Believe People of Russia Were Meant for the Whip," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 19 August 95, pp. 1-2; Fred Hiatt, "Political Elites Vie for Power in Russian Quasi-Democracy; Transition from Communism at Stake," *The Washington Post*, 26 March 95, p. A1; *The Economist*, "Russian Law: Groping Ahead," 2 September 95, pp. 42-48.

opposed to parliamentary government) which was instituted via elections characterized by the same “fair and free” procedures used to elect him in 1991.³³

Yeltsin’s action stripped that particular parliament of any constitutional authority, but some argue that even with the election of a parliament more pleasing to Yeltsin, the separation of powers as outlined in the present constitution is unbalanced because too much strength is given to the executive.³⁴ These same critics realize, though, that reaching the consensus that would be necessary to change the Constitution is impossible in the short term. Some of the balance might be righted by exploiting the powers designated for the legislature -- especially budgetary authority. More laws governing the responsibilities of oversight, and in particular the process of managing defense policy, are necessary if a balance in democratic political control is to be eventually restored.³⁵

But, as evidenced in the 1994 Draft Law on Defense and the Draft Law on Peacekeeping, which still awaits the approval of the Parliament, the trend is for the Office of the President to propose legislation that will severely restrict the remnants of parliamentary accountability that remain. Essentially, these laws, if passed, reserve much if not all discretion to the President and his personal office and remove both the President and the Ministry of Defense from effective, democratic, parliamentary accountability and control.³⁶ Passage of these laws would compound the regression in Russian civil-military

³³ *The Nation*, “Rump Roast: Russian Parliament and Boris Yeltsin”, editorial, vol. 257, no. 12 (18 October 93), p. 12.

³⁴ Michael McFaul, “Why Russia’s Politics Matter,” *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 1 (January/February 95), p. 92.

³⁵ Zhelezov interview.

³⁶ Stephen J. Blank, *Russian Defense Legislation and Russian Democracy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, August 1995), p. v. This document contains a thorough analysis of both of the draft laws and their implications for democratic civilian control of the military if passed.

relations that began with the 12 December 1993 constitution. Critics complained that this alleged “improvement” on the 1992 constitution reserved too much authority for the President to include the authority to confirm his own appointments.

The Russian legislature also has no control over military promotions. Yeltsin established a commission under the Security Council to act as an honest broker to review the names recommended by the MOD, but the commission is ignored when it recommends against a particular promotion. One such promotion involved a returning commander from Germany accused of all sorts of corruption charges, but his friendship with Defense Minister Pavel Grachev earned him a promotion. For refusing to approve, the head of the commission was fired.³⁷ One should keep in mind, however, that the Russian system embodies a strong executive and strong presidential authority is consistent with the Russian preference for centralized rule. Deficiencies in democratic political control arise when these controls are not effectively implemented.

Symptoms of transitional growing pains are also evident in the Czech Republic. The Czech Constitution names the President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, however, he needs prime ministerial approval for directing the use of military force and to commission and promote generals.³⁸ This unclear delineation of emergency powers could lead to confusion in a crisis and still needs to be resolved constitutionally.³⁹ This problem is of particular significance for a state undergoing democratic transition which has weak confidence in any one democratic institution.

³⁷ James H. Brusstar, Senior Research Professor, National Defense University, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

³⁸ Jeffrey Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion* (Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, April 1995), p. 129-130.

³⁹ *ibid.*

The Czech parliament has budgetary control of the armed forces although only a lower house currently exists. The upper house or Senate has still not been filled because of an ongoing dispute between those who think the body should be abolished and others who cannot agree on how it should be composed if it is resumed.⁴⁰ In the meantime the Chamber of Deputies fulfills the duties of the Senate until one is elected. In general, the proper controls are in place in the constitutional sense though some imperfections remain that are being addressed in subsequent legislation.

In Russia, however, democratic political control of the armed forces has proven to be a competitive process among adversarial actors vying for influence. Thus far political crises within the nascent Russian Federation have been characterized by conflict between legislative and executive authorities, partially caused by the executive's ineffective implementation of his more powerful means of control. The action taken by the armed forces in these instances did not reflect constitutional loyalty, but preference for the perceived stronger side.⁴¹ This is a dangerous tendency since the prevalence of democratic or non-democratic processes may depend on the preferences of military forces.

The effectiveness of constitutional constraints in each case depends on how constitutional institutions implement their authority. Consequently, it is necessary to analyze the relationships between the military and the executive, the legislature, and, the populace to which it is accountable in a democratic society.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, *The Russian Military's Role in Politics* (Mc Nair Paper 34) (Washington DC: National Defense University, January 1995), p. 27.

The Quality of Executive/MOD Democratic Control

One of the hallmarks of democratic political control in full-fledged democracies is the delegation of overall executive oversight of the military institution to a civilian defense minister. Russia has not appointed a civilian either to the position of defense minister, or to any of the deputy minister positions with the exception of one. In the Czech Republic, however, the ACR and its predecessor the CSA, adjusted to a series of three civilian defense ministers. A priority of the Russian Duma is to have a civilian defense minister,⁴² but the military has rejected the idea of creating a civilian Minister of Defense. The pending 1994 Draft Law on Defense, and the military reforms proposed in April 1995, call for the statutory institutionalization of a civilian defense minister. However, this may be of no relief to democratic reformers because these proposals also limit the role of the MOD to administrative regulation while vesting the General Staff with operational control of the armed forces. In addition, the General Staff would be subordinate to the President effectively removing the armed forces from legislative accountability.⁴³

Currently, civilian control of the military exists purely through Yeltsin's control of Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev.⁴⁴ Grachev was selected on the basis of his political reliability, not his military prowess or expertise.⁴⁵ However, observers agree that there is no guarantee that Grachev can deliver the loyalty of the military institution to Yeltsin. A 1994 survey of Russian military elites indicated that less than one in five

⁴² Daniel J. Hartmann, Lt. Colonel, Assistant Army Attaché, US Embassy Moscow, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

⁴³ Blank, *Russian Defense Legislation and Russian Democracy*, pp. 16-23.

⁴⁴ John Williams, Political Military Officer, US Embassy Moscow, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

⁴⁵ Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 2 (March/April 95), p. 93.

expressed trust in Grachev with over half expressing mistrust in him.⁴⁶ Grachev's nickname among his subordinates is Pasha Mercedes, stemming from his mysterious acquisition of several Mercedes Benz automobiles as his personal possessions, purportedly made possible through endorsement of and participation in corruption schemes.⁴⁷ Grachev is universally despised and criticized by his subordinates. His staying power in office, even after the debacle of the Chechen War which he declared could be won by airborne forces in two hours, sends the message that loyalty matters most of all to President Yeltsin -- not the quality of leadership or operating efficiency of the armed forces.⁴⁸ Yeltsin is confronted with the dilemma of relying on cronies, who provide him dubious loyalty to stay in power so that he can continue his overall democratization efforts, and ridding his government of incompetents whose continued presence also threatens his government.

Observers agree that democratic reform is not possible without changing the present leadership at the MOD.⁴⁹ The premium that Yeltsin has placed on loyalty within the defense ministry means that the crises of the armed forces will continue unabated. Neither the money, political will, nor expertise exists to make further progress.⁵⁰ The Russian Ministry of Defense has striven first and foremost to keep cuts to its structure and

⁴⁶ *Military Elites in Russia 1994*, p. 4.

⁴⁷ Charles C. Justice, Lt. Commander, Assistant Naval Attaché, US Embassy Moscow, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow. See also Angela Charlton, "Under Pressure, Defense Minister Shows Up in Court for Libel Case," *AP Worldstream*, 25 October 95.

⁴⁸ Adam R. Wasserman, Policy Planning Staff, US Department of State, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

⁴⁹ Olivia Ward, "Trouble in the Ranks as its Top Officers Make a Run for Political Office: The Once Formidable Russian Army Falls in Disorder and Decay," *The Toronto Star*, 5 November 95, p. F5; James Howcroft, Major, Assistant Marine Attaché, US Embassy Moscow, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

⁵⁰ Ward, "Trouble in the Ranks as its Top Officers Make a Run for Political Office: The Once Formidable Russian Army Falls in Disorder and Decay," p. F5; Don Jensen, Political Officer, US Embassy Moscow, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

its budget to a minimum. Its emphasis on the support of troop withdrawals from the West and their accommodation in Russia is understandable, but its unbending will to sustain these forces indefinitely is not. The decision of the national political leadership to depend on the armed forces as the arbiter of conflicts between the executive and legislative branches of government, and to settle domestic disputes through the waging of war as was done in the Chechen Republic, essentially meant that the executive branch was electing to remove itself from “interfering” in the military sphere.⁵¹ As a result, the MOD has been left alone to deal with its own affairs. Additionally, the 1994 Draft Law on Defense indicates that the Office of the President is more interested in reforms that insure the President’s personal control over the military rather than reforms that will make the military more accountable to all democratic institutions and effective as a fighting force.⁵²

In Czechoslovakia, among the first adjustments that the General Staff had to make after the ushering in of democracy was to get used to being a subordinate department to an MOD led by a civilian. In the CSPA, the Chairman of the General Staff had been on an equal level with other ministries and the Defense Ministry was run by military officers. This subordination has been achieved, but as one American serving as an advisor to the MOD put it, “it doesn’t mean that everyone likes it.”⁵³

The first civilian MOD overseeing the CSA was Lubros Dobrovsky. He succeeded a series of military MODs who had been implicated in a conspiracy to use the military in counterrevolutionary activity during the critical week of 17-24 November

⁵¹ Rogov, “Will the Russian Armed Forces Stand Fast: The Forgotten Military Reform,” *JPRS-UMA-94-050*, 30 November 94, p. 14.

⁵² Blank, *Russian Defense Legislation and Russian Democracy*.

⁵³ Kenneth L. Kladiva, Faculty Member, Defense Systems Management College and PPBS advisor to the Czech MOD, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

1989.⁵⁴ Dobrovsky brought in other civilians with him, including some who had been expelled in 1968, but he was perceived as a weak “Havel-type” humanist overwhelmed by the task of dealing with a huge Army apparatus that was psychologically still in the old regime.⁵⁵ The military responded negatively to him and regarded him as a “civilian telling us what to do.”⁵⁶

During Dobrovsky’s tenure he eliminated the military counterintelligence service and replaced it with a unit subordinate to him charged with monitoring Army criminal activity. Dobrovsky also took great steps to ease the military’s secrecy laws enabling such facts as the size of the military and the budget to be made public.⁵⁷ In addition, he appointed his defense advisor, Major General Karl Pezl, an officer dismissed during the Prague Spring of 1968, as Chief of the General Staff to begin the shake-up of personnel there. For several months at the end of 1992, a change in cabinets mandated that a Slovak serve as Defense Minister and Lt. General Imrich Andrejcek presided as the break-up of Czechoslovakia was effected.⁵⁸

The first defense minister of the Czech Republic was Antonin Baudys, a civilian mechanical engineer and university professor with no military experience.⁵⁹ In his first week in office Baudys declared that “no major changes have been made in the Army since 1989.”⁶⁰ He initiated a large scale purge which was shrouded in the necessity to downsize

⁵⁴ Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion*, p. 118.

⁵⁵ Jiri Pehe, Director of the Open Media Research Institute (OMRI), interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

⁵⁶ Jan Sternod, Political Officer, US Embassy Prague, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

⁵⁷ Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion*, pp. 119-120.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p. 124.

⁵⁹ Jan Obrman, “Military Reform in the Czech Republic,” *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no. 41 (15 October 93), p. 37.

⁶⁰ Prague CTK, 7 January 93. *FBIS-EEU-93-005*, 8 January 93, p. 11.

the military due to CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty compliance. This exercise got rid of the politically unreliable officers and served as a screening process for all professional soldiers. Despite the fact that these initiatives were coming from a civilian Defense Minister, the military took them relatively well. However, there was some resentment over how political reliability distinctions were being made which was exacerbated by the belief that Baudys, himself, had been a collaborator in the Communist era.⁶¹

Deep organizational reforms took place on his watch as well as many personnel cuts which probably gained many enemies for him. He also enthusiastically embraced the goal of NATO membership and encouraged movement toward Western military structures and the reorganization of Czech military structures accordingly. However, a series of incidents in 1994 to include the discharging of a gun on his official plane while it was in flight, the alleged cover-up of a Czech general caught for shoplifting while in Sweden, and the public revelation of his own personal policy toward the conflict in Bosnia, became too much of an embarrassment for his party which elected to replace him.⁶²

The present Czech Defense Minister, Wilem Holan, took office in September of 1994. With this appointment, President Havel tried to quell once and for all any lingering discontent that a civilian could not have the necessary experience to head the MOD. He argued that it is not important that the Defense Minister be a soldier with the same military expertise of the General Staff. "In all democracies the Defense Minister is more a man to supervise the Army on behalf of the public, to make fundamental decisions concerning

⁶¹ Pehe interview.

⁶² Pehe and Sternod interviews.

army life, to care for the authority of the army and of people's confidence in it. In this sense, I think it is good when a politician heads the Defense Ministry."⁶³

Holan was a top official at the Foreign Ministry giving him a background in diplomacy and an appreciation for the importance of negotiating and of quietly making behind the scenes progress. He is also focused on not making the same mistakes that his predecessor was renowned for.⁶⁴ Holan is fully continuing the work of Baudys and lists as his main goals "the completion of the transformation of the Army, improving the efficiency of the armed forces, and taking steps toward the integration of the Czech Republic into NATO."⁶⁵ He took over the reins of the MOD when the quantitative transformation was almost complete and qualitative internal changes such as military education reform and personnel management reform were about to begin.

Democratic deficits persist across both the Czech and Russian armed forces, although the deficits are more severe in Russia and are pervasive throughout the government. In Russia, secrecy is still the norm. Decrees are signed, but not published and decision making is shrouded in rumor.⁶⁶ The post-Soviet government has proved as adept as its predecessor in hiding military expenditures in civilian portions of the budget.⁶⁷ Others complain that specific budget data were more readily available in the late 1980s than they are today.⁶⁸ The informational "iron curtain" made possible such tragedies as

⁶³ Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, interview with CTK, 25 September 94.

⁶⁴ Richard Byrne Reilly, *Prognosis Weekly*, 18 January 95, p. 5. *FBIS-EEU-95-035*, 22 February 95, p. 6.

⁶⁵ *Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network*, 23 September 94. *FBIS-EEU-94-185*, 23 September 94, p. 6.

⁶⁶ Hiatt, "Political Elites Vie for Power in Russian Quasi-Democracy: Transition from Communism at Stake," p. A1.

⁶⁷ Mark Galeotti, "Decline and Fall: The Russian Defense Budget," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 6, no. 9, p. 386.

⁶⁸ Rogov, "Will the Russian Armed Forces Stand Fast: The Forgotten Military Reform," *JPRS-UMA-94-050*, 30 November 94, p. 14.

draftees dying of emaciation on Russkiy Island and the October 1994 murder of journalist Dmitriy Kholodov, who was investigating corruption within the MOD.⁶⁹ Lack of information and misinformation was also obvious during the war in the Chechen republic. It was often impossible for families to find out information about servicemen who had been killed or injured.⁷⁰

US defense attachés in Moscow report that the transparency of military capability is still low and that readiness is still an issue internal to the MOD. Furthermore, external inspections of military forces by oversight bodies do not occur.⁷¹ US military observers also question whether either Grachev or Yeltsin were capable of knowing the true state of readiness before the Chechen campaign. Speculation prevails that under the current state of management, it is possible for local commanders to hide low levels of training from their superiors.⁷²

Poor transparency within the MOD also makes it impossible to exert control over the ministry. The greatest recent transgression was the failure of President Yeltsin to halt the bombing of Grozny when he ordered the shellings to cease on 27 December 1994.⁷³ Yeltsin's impotence as commander in chief fueled speculation that a group known as "the party of war" was dictating policy in the Chechen operation according to the preferences of the chiefs of the power ministries.⁷⁴ This incident raises serious questions about the

⁶⁹ Charlton, "Under Pressure, Defense Minister Shows up in Court for Libel Case," *AP Worldstream*, 25 October 95.

⁷⁰ Ward, "Trouble in the Ranks as Its Top Officers Make a Run for Political Office," p. F5.

⁷¹ Kwiecien interview.

⁷² Howcroft interview.

⁷³ Timothy Heritage, "Russian Armed Forces Face Inquiry Over Bombing," *Reuters World Service*, 10 January 1995.

⁷⁴ *The Economist*, "After Chechnya," 14 January 1995, p. 44.

loyalty of the military to Yeltsin -- the very objective that he has been so resolute in pursuing.

In the Czech Republic, overall transparency between oversight bodies and the MOD is good, but a transparency deficit is evident in the lack of coordination and information sharing between the General Staff and the MOD and within these bodies. Colonel Jelik, designated point man for the creation of a personnel management reform proposal within the General Staff, expressed his frustration at not even being allowed to brief his proposals in person to the appropriate people within the MOD. Instead of *presenting* his plan, he must *send* it through the mail. This indignity prompted him to say, "We're clerks, not leaders." Once his proposals are received, he added, he is not sure what *they* do with them. "Do they use them to plot against me? Do they present these materials as their own? What information is ultimately briefed to the people at the top?" He is frustrated that someone in his position does not have the answer to such questions.⁷⁵ These divisions within and between the General Staff and the MOD have been allowed to persist with the result of stalling reform efforts and generating criticism from Parliament that the ACR is not forthcoming with reform proposals.

A democratic deficit characteristic of the Russian military is the inability of the MOD and the government to control the behavior of publicly disobedient officers. Chief among these is the former 14th Army Commander, General Aleksandr Lebed, who has openly criticized both the Russian Defense Minister and President, describing the latter

⁷⁵ Josef Jehlik, Colonel, Director of Personnel, Czech General Staff, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

publicly as “useless.”⁷⁶ Lebed resisted a series of attempts by Grachev to remove him from command of the 14th Army and eventually rendered his resignation after Grachev issued an order in April 1995 disbanding the 14th Army ‘s command structure. Lebed argued that his removal and the reduction of forces in the region could result in the loss of the Army’s control of weapons in the volatile region.⁷⁷ Regardless of the truth contained in Lebed’s objections to MOD policy, his long history of public disobedience is indicative of the MOD’s inability to control its own officers. Numerous other officers refused to carry out orders or to accept commands in the Chechen conflict and went unpunished.⁷⁸

Charges of corruption also plagued both MODs, but corruption charges persist and have gone unaddressed in the Russian case. Under the Soviet system ministries controlled vast areas and their resources. Officers with access to military property have been selling it for personal gain. As much as \$65 million may have been pocketed by Russian generals in the past two years in such endeavors.⁷⁹ The transition to a market economy and the sale of military assets within a generally unregulated environment has created conditions for rampant corruption . Indeed, a major rise in Russian mafia activity is attributed to the crime rings set up by officers in Germany selling off Russian military assets and ferrying stolen German cars to Russia after the fall of the Berlin Wall.⁸⁰ US Naval attachés report corruption involving ship scrapping activities and naval officers who

⁷⁶ Michael Peyrard, “On the Chechnya Front We Realized That Our Leaders Were Mad,” *Paris Match*, 9 February 1995, pp. 58-59. *FBIS-SOV-95-024*, 6 February 1995, pp. 28-29.

⁷⁷ Mikhail Leontyev, “Will the President Sign Off On Lebed’s Resignation?” *Sevodnya*, 7 June 95, p. 1. Found in the *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* XLVII, no. 23, p. 22.

⁷⁸ Jensen interview. See also Frederick C. Cuny, “The War Nobody Can Win,” *The New York Review of Books*, reprinted in *The Sacramento Bee*, 9 April 95, p. F1.

⁷⁹ Lambeth, p. 93.

⁸⁰ Gregory Katz, “Russian Mafia Sets Off Growing Wave of Crime,” *The Dallas Morning News*, 10 September 95, p. 1A.

benefit from such sales. Few of the MOD assets sold off in recent years have found their way back to the national treasury.⁸¹ A lot of personal business is being conducted by regional commanders that is not centrally managed by the MOD. For instance, Strategic Rocket Forces warehouses have been rented to local industries with local commanders profiting from such arrangements and it is common knowledge that the commander of frontal aviation sells issue military watches for a personal profit.⁸² General Lebed incurred the wrath of the MOD when he publicly stated that Deputy Defense Minister, General Matvei Burlakov, should not visit his command, because there was “nothing [for him] to steal.”⁸³

However, the abuse of power within the power structure of post-communist Russia permeates every aspect of the new nomenklatura so that corruption within a specific ministry, such as the defense ministry, doesn’t particularly stand out and has come to be expected by the population.⁸⁴ “The old warriors have reappeared with their old customs and traditions. They have their own views of how power should work.”⁸⁵

Another underutilized tool for defense oversight in the Russian Office of the Presidency is the Security Council. This body first appeared in the waning years of the Soviet Union, was carried over into the Russian Government, and is now enshrined in the

⁸¹ Justice interview.

⁸² William H. Thurston III, Colonel, Air Attaché, US Embassy Moscow, interview by author. April 1995. Moscow.

⁸³ Christopher Bellamy, “Disgruntled Military Poses Constant Threat,” *The Independent*, 28 October 95, p. 11.

⁸⁴ Martin Malia, “The Nomenklatura Capitalists: Who’s Running Russia Now?” *The New Republic*, 22 May 95, p. 17.

⁸⁵ Alla Y. Gerber, Member of Russian Parliament, as quoted by Alessandra Stanley, “Russia’s New Rulers Govern and Live, in Neo-Soviet Style,” *New York Times*, 23 May 95, p. A4.

new constitution.⁸⁶ The main problem with the Security Council is that it defines security so broadly that its responsibilities range from management of the economy to environmental and health issues to military affairs. A member of the Security Council staff explained that “before Chechnya the military problem was number ten of ten.” The economy was the number one priority and “the military task was our basement of priorities.”⁸⁷

Given the broad agenda of the Security Council, one can conclude that it in no way can serve as a specialized body of national security expertise akin to the US National Security Council. In fact, some have accused the Security Council of being sort of a post-communist Politburo with the only democratic difference being that the Security Council is authorized under the Constitution.⁸⁸ Members of the Security Council, however, do not seem particularly concerned that their sphere of responsibilities is too large. Even in the midst of the Chechen War one of the Council’s staff remarked, “Our number one priority is still economics. If we decide this question we decide everything.” He went on to add that ecology and health are also prime concerns due to the declining birth rate. “Russia is slowly dying.”⁸⁹ These may certainly be Russia’s most pressing problems, but to solve them through the offices of the Security Council means that more narrowly defined security issues such as the conduct of war and the reorganization of the armed forces continue to receive scant attention.

⁸⁶ H.H. Gaffney, H.H., Center for Naval Analyses, *National Security Decision-Making in Russian and in the United States*. Paper obtained from the Atlantic Council, Washington DC.

⁸⁷ Pirumov interview.

⁸⁸ Brusstar interview.

⁸⁹ Pirumov interview.

Lack of civilian expertise is a deficit characteristic of both cases, however, the Czech Republic is giving civilians responsibility for oversight functions within the MOD while Russia, for the most part is not. Civilians working within the Czech defense ministry, however, are not sufficiently trained in military subjects to perform adequate oversight. The US Defense attaché in Prague MOD observed that, “there are lots of people in positions who don’t know what they’re doing.”⁹⁰ As of yet, the perceived and real lack of civilian expertise is not being sufficiently addressed with appropriate education and training programs. The social stigma of being associated with the military -- even as a civilian -- also affects the ability of the MOD to recruit young professionals to join its ranks.⁹¹

There is also a lack of consensus among civilian and military defense ministry personnel about how duties should be divided between them. A military officer complained while briefing a group of visiting American air force colonels on the development of Czech military strategy that much of the political wording of the document was done by the military because the civilian “politicians” did not understand that this was their role.⁹² While such a statement gives a less than favorable insight into the state of civilian oversight, it also indicates a certain lack of sophistication on the part of the military through its open criticism of these abilities in a public gathering of American and Czech officers.

⁹⁰ George D. Dunkelberg, US Defense Attaché to the Czech Republic, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

⁹¹ *ibid.*

⁹² Statement made in MOD briefing on Czech military reform presented to visiting American Colonels from the US Air War College, March 1995.

Overall, in the Czech case, although some democratic deficits remain, much progress has been made in gaining democratic political control through the Defense Minister, who is accountable to the Prime Minister. During the period of democratic transition, MOD and General Staff responsibilities have begun to be clearly spelled out and accepted and the skills of civilian oversight developed and respected. On-site Western military observers contend that civilian oversight is a fact, but an overall pervasive lack of civilian expertise in the MOD limits its effectiveness.

In Russia, however, the goal of achieving democratic political control directed by civilian leadership has been overwhelmingly negative and appears to be worsening. Sergey Rogov observed that “the MOD and other ‘muscle’ agencies are practically no longer subordinated to the government.”⁹³ This is a serious deficiency of democratic political control since the only real authority for oversight falls to the executive and those accountable to him. As argued earlier, control exists in the personal relationship between Defense Minister Grachev and President Yeltsin, but it may not extend to Grachev’s control of officers subordinate to him. Secrecy still reigns and corruption continues unabated. Meanwhile, the issue of democratic military reform seems to have taken a back seat to Yeltsin’s ensuring that he gains personal control of the armed forces.⁹⁴ The lack of an advisory council focused on addressing military affairs and security issues compounds the problem. Additionally, the weakness of the legislative input to the process of democratic political control of the armed forces fails to counterbalance the situation in a positive way.

⁹³ Rogov, “Will the Russian Armed Forces Stand Fast: The Forgotten Military Reform,” *JPRS-UMA-94-050*, 30 November 94, p. 14.

⁹⁴ Blank, *Russian Defense Legislation and Russian Democracy*, p. 17.

The Quality of Parliamentary Control

In both cases parliamentary control is still developing and exists primarily in some form of budgetary control. Again, effective parliamentary control is more critical in the Czech case, since its parliamentary system vests most of the authority for democratic control of the military in the parliament. In the Russian case, the small authority vested in the parliament relative to the executive will be examined to see how effective this dimension of oversight is.

In comparison to the Communist era, there is a significant increase in parliamentary authority because the Soviet era legislatures routinely approved budgets without even reading the budgetary document.⁹⁵ Additionally, in both cases oversight quality is poor due the lack of expertise on defense issues. Each post-communist military has also been slow in adjusting to the new political environment in which it is just one of many elements participating in the democratic process and lobbying for resources.

In the Czech Republic, the MOD prepares and presents the defense budget to the Defense and Security Committee in Parliament which can either modify the proposed budget or reject it. However, a rejection would be considered as an expression of no confidence in the Defense Minister and would consequently be a rare occurrence. The first detailed budget appeared in 1993-94 giving a significant boost to defense oversight. The subsequent introduction of the Czech version of the Planned Programmed and Budgeting System (PPBS) also contributed substantially to increased transparency although not all parts of the budget are yet covered under this system.

⁹⁵ Igor Brett, Secretary of the Defense and Security Committee of the Czech Republic, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

In contrast, budgetary control of the Russian Duma is much weaker. Executive control over writing the budget, the lack of transparency regarding budget items, and executive control over all off-budget expenditures has shifted control of financial policy from the parliament to the executive.⁹⁶ Specifically, the Ministry of Finance plays a key role in the disbursement of appropriations to the military. Much of the defense budget is kept classified with only a few line items made known to the lawmakers. “Any talk of reform is meaningless as long as the MOD’s budget request fits onto one page.”⁹⁷ For example, the proposal for the 1996 defense budget included only nine vaguely described line items or articles. These were broken down into categories such as: Maintenance and Operations, Procurement, Research and Development, Liquidation of Weapons, and Conversion. However, there is no separate line item for personnel costs. This is remarkable since the material state of personnel is the most dire condition of the Russian military. These costs must account for a large portion of the budget, but as the budget is presented it is impossible for a Duma deputy to know very much about how the appropriations will actually be allocated. There is no way of knowing if more money is being spent on gas and electricity or on military salaries; therefore, there is little control over actual policy. Additionally, the deputies are not introduced to the goals that expenditures are meant to address because the MOD does not defend why it needs to spend more money in one area than in another. Proposed spending also is not justified against specific threats.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ McFaul, “Why Russia’s Politics Matter,” p. 93.

⁹⁷ Rogov, “Will the Russian Armed Forces Stand Fast: The Forgotten Military Reform,” *JPRS-UMA-94-050*, 30 November 94, p. 20.

⁹⁸ Zhelezov interview.

Overall oversight ability is limited in both cases by lack of civilian expertise in defense issues. In the Czech Republic, Western military observers agree that Parliament has succeeded in achieving a basic level of control, but that it still lacks the sophistication necessary for comprehensive oversight. The US Defense Attaché remarked that, according to his own subjective judgment, “Parliament gets a “B” for trying with oversight, but a “C/C-” for knowing what to do.”⁹⁹ Of the twenty parliamentarians assigned to the Defense and Security Committee only three are considered knowledgeable in their duties by outside observers -- the Chairman, deputy chairman, and the committee member responsible for military education.¹⁰⁰ One observer at the US Embassy remarked that the members of the committee started out as “absolute amateurs,” but they have also grown in the job.¹⁰¹

There are several explanations for the deficient civilian skill level in the Czech Republic. One is that the split of Czechoslovakia affected the overall skill level of all parliamentarians since the best politicians at the time were in the upper house which has not yet been reinstated in the Czech Republic. Many of the new deputies entered the lower house practically “from the streets” with little education.¹⁰² Another explanation, provided by the Secretary of the Defense and Security Committee, is that no committee members have expertise in defense matters because “it was undesirable that such persons should be elected or work in Parliament” since any such individuals would be associated with the old Communist regime.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Dunkelberg interview.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Sternod interview.

¹⁰² *ibid.*

¹⁰³ Brett interview.

Because of the military's monopolization of defense matters in the Soviet era, Russian Duma deputies charged with parliamentary oversight are also limited by a lack of expertise. Lack of adequately trained staff available to support the parliamentary defense committees exacerbates the problem. In the Czech Republic, the only staff assigned specifically to the Defense and Security Committee is the Secretary who performs mostly organizational and administrative work for the Committee. The Secretary said that he tries to be an informed advisor for Committee members as well, but this is difficult since sometimes Committee members withhold information from him. Upon further probing he admitted that there were no legal obstacles blocking disclosure of information to him, but that this practice had developed in reality.¹⁰⁴

The lack of staff and other methods of analyzing complex budget data means that decisions are often made on political grounds because the Parliament lacks the sophistication to be more objective. For example, in the debate in early 1995 over whether or not to buy new Czech L-159 fighter jets or to modernize the MiG-21s already in the inventory, it was difficult for Parliament to do an accurate cost comparison to see if one solution was more affordable than another. Without the resources to crunch these numbers, budgetary oversight in this matter was driven purely by political factors.¹⁰⁵

In Russia, deputies have staffers, but they receive no formal training on how to work in either their regional or Moscow offices. The size of a deputy's staff also varies because the government will allow each deputy to have either five staffers who are each paid a small salary, one staffer who is paid five salaries, or any variation in-between. It is

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Dunkelberg interview.

also not uncommon for one staffer to work for more than one member of Parliament. A former staff member of the Duma Defense Committee, now studying in the United States, remarked that teamwork among the staff of different deputies is not an understandable concept. She added that committees have little communications with each other, making it difficult to know what is happening in other committees.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, deputies are limited in their ability to forge common strategies on legislation or to form alliances between parties with similar interests.

Additionally, the combination of a lack of confidence in defense committees' oversight authority and a sort of timidity toward the MOD and the government affects the degree of oversight that is rightfully in parliamentary purview. For instance, in the Czech case, when asked whether or not the Committee has a role in military personnel matters such as the size of the armed forces, pay and conditions, housing, and education, or in the organization of the MOD, or in the deployment of troops abroad, the Secretary responded that members of parliament (MPs) and the Committee voice their opinions on all these issues but these problems are exclusively under the authority of the Defense Secretary. He added, however, that the approval of Parliament is required to dispatch armed forces abroad.¹⁰⁷

In Russia, "Some in the Duma say the military doesn't want to be controlled, but the Duma doesn't use the power it has to control the budget. They talk blindly about various amounts -- forty trillion rubles or sixty trillion rubles. But no one speaks in terms

¹⁰⁶ Olga Kashina, Humphrey Fellow, University of Maryland, former staff member of the Duma Defense Committee, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

¹⁰⁷ Brett interview.

of concrete problems or priorities. To have control means having the responsibility to solve problems. Nobody really wants that control.”¹⁰⁸

The same is true of the power to influence the course of military reform. “They can do it if they choose to fund one program over another. But the deputies escape from this. There won’t be any reforms. No one wants to touch military reform in an election year. So they’ll let it go. The Army will live and have a thin level of financing all over the Army.” In contrast, the ACR has been reasonable about asking for money and has accepted and implemented vast reductions in troop levels, the General Staff, and the MOD.¹⁰⁹

A former staff member of the Duma Defense Committee remarked about the post-December 1993 parliament, “This Duma was more about agreement with them [the military].”¹¹⁰ She added that even the most obvious of reforms were avoided. “My deputy tried to pass a Law on Realization and Utilization of Military Production which would have regulated the sales of excess military equipment. The impetus of this law was the sale of tanks and scrap metal from Germany by the military with no controls over where the money went. The bill passed on the first reading but the military stopped the law on the second reading. So the situation remains that what is bought new comes out of the federal budget and what is old is kept by the military.”¹¹¹ Sergey Rogov added, “Moreover, it looks as if they remember well how the previous conflict between the

¹⁰⁸ Alexander Golz, reporter for *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star--the main military newspaper), interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

¹⁰⁹ Brett interview.

¹¹⁰ Kashina interview.

¹¹¹ *ibid.*

executive and legislative branches ended, and so they do not want to ‘turn a deaf ear’ to the military’s requests.”¹¹²

Parliamentary oversight is made more difficult by the inability to forge a comfortable working relationship between it and the military. The American attaché in Prague explained that the Czech military does not have much of a direct relationship with the Parliament which is compounded by communication problems within the military. “In general, the General Staff and the Parliament could both use a course on diplomacy.”¹¹³

He elaborated further with an anecdote. General Jiri Nekvasil, Chief of the General Staff, insists on briefing before Parliament himself, but Vladimir Suman, the Chair of the Defense and Security Committee has to accept the general’s briefings. At times, the personality conflict between the two eliminates the possibility of such testimony. But Parliament would rather make up its mind with limited information than have personal interaction with people they do not like. Indeed the first time that General Nekvasil even met the Chair of the Parliament was when he escorted the American Vice Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Owens, on the occasion of the US Admiral’s speech before the body.¹¹⁴

In the Czech case all contacts between the military and the Parliament are controlled through the MOD. An officer on the General Staff responsible for reforming the personnel department complained that the only time he has been able to talk with a member of the Committee has been at a course arranged by the US which was jointly attended by people from the General Staff, the MOD, and Parliament. At one of these

¹¹² Rogov, “Will the Russian Armed Forces Stand Fast: The Forgotten Military Reform,” *JPRS-UMA-94-050*, 30 November 94, p. 14.

¹¹³ Dunkelberg interview.

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*

meetings some MPs offered to come to him directly, but such interaction is not allowed without approval from the MOD.¹¹⁵

In Russia the inability of the MOD to control the activities of all of its officers and the direct participation in politics by some officers makes it impossible to regulate the interaction of all officers and Parliament. But, the relationship between the MOD and Parliament has been generally conflictual and the military is more motivated to answer to the President than to answer to Parliament.¹¹⁶ Grachev's attitude is that the legislature can pass all the laws it wants, but if they conflict with any of Yeltsin's decrees, he won't follow them. Additionally, Grachev has repeatedly waffled on whether or not he would support the Constitution or the President if the two should come into conflict again.¹¹⁷

There are some signs, however, that the legislative role may be rising somewhat. In the Fall 1994 session the Duma showed some willingness to ask questions and called in generals to testify at hearings. At the same time, the military is becoming more attuned to the fact that the legislature approves its funds and that it is in the military's best interests to defend its requests. Cooperative behavior on the part of the generals has led to some spending increases on their own behalf. Generals from the MOD, however, still insist on testifying before closed committees.¹¹⁸

Meanwhile, other interest groups are also seeking allies in the Duma to achieve their specific defense related goals. The most significant of these is the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers formed in 1988 in response to the increased number of deaths from

¹¹⁵ Jehlik interview.

¹¹⁶ Howcroft interview.

¹¹⁷ Brusstar interview.

¹¹⁸ Williams interview.

hazing and other forms of mistreatment in military service. In early 1995 the Duma Committee on Health held hearings and required MOD officials to respond to the allegations of the Mothers' Committee. However, no significant change in policy seems to have arisen from this process.¹¹⁹

A significant difference between the cases indicative of varying levels of democratic accountability is transparency. The Czech Parliament has much more access to defense information than the Russian Duma. In the Czech Republic, MPs can ask for information from any Ministry and it must be provided even if it is classified.¹²⁰ Additionally, the defense acquisitions process is more strictly regulated in the Czech Republic as a result of a law passed in 1995 which makes the bidding process more transparent by limiting the inappropriate influence of political parties and government officials. Observers say the Czech Republic still falls short of practices that ensure that it gets the best product for the best price for the national interest, but these changes have left less room for corruption.¹²¹ Such transparency has yet to develop between the Duma and the Russian MOD.

In the Czech Republic the situation is much improved from the starting point when the first civilian committees formed after the Velvet Revolution were accused of overzealously purging officers and meddling in the Army.¹²² There is some concern that the military does not really have a "friend in the court" because of the Parliament's general

¹¹⁹ Kwiecien interview.

¹²⁰ Brett interview.

¹²⁰ Andrew R. Wielkoszewski, Lt. Colonel, US Army Attaché, Czech Republic, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

¹²¹ Dunkelberg interview.

¹²² Pehe interview.

obsession with economic issues, but the military is not rejecting the concept of civilian control.¹²³

Parliamentary control in Russia is at the stage of development where it is possible to lodge complaints and conduct inquiries, but the body being investigated does not really have to respond in a substantive way. Many observers regard the Parliament as largely irrelevant to the political process as a whole, and in a country which is largely being run by presidential decree, many allege that the Parliament is little more than a national debating club. Parliament was not consulted about the decision to use force in Chechnya¹²⁴ and does not have the designated authority to confirm the Minister of Defense.

An analysis of the Czech and Russian cases indicates that weak budgetary control, lack of expertise on defense issues, insufficient confidence concerning oversight authority, limited political will to influence the defense process, poor relationships between the MOD and Parliament, and inadequate transparency characterize transitioning states' struggle to achieve democratic accountability over their military institutions. Much learning has occurred on all sides, but much remains to be done in order to "standardize" the relevant relationships which are characteristic of military institutions in democracies and their oversight bodies. Another strained relationship, crucial to the legitimacy and support of a military institution in a democratic state, is the bond between the society at large and the armed forces which protect it.

¹²³ Paul B. East, Colonel, US MLT Team Chief, Czech Republic, interview by author, July 1994, Prague.

¹²⁴ Otto Latsis, "The Real Winners in a Losing War," *Izvestia*, 5 January 1995, reprinted in *World Press Review* 42, no. 3 (March 1995), p. 16.

Relationship of the Military to Society at Large

In democratic states it is essential that tensions between society and the military remain low and that the military is perceived as the protector of the state's democratic values and ultimately as the territorial defender of the cradle of those values -- the sovereign state itself. The attitude of the society at large is shaped by such factors as the congruence of military and societal values, the historical role of the military in the state, and the prevalence of outside threats. These factors strain the relationship of the Russian and Czech militaries to their societies at large. In the Russian case, the relationship has become characterized by an increasingly poor perception of the military institution while the Czechs face the challenge of improving an historically poor relationship.

Russia

In the Soviet era "the Army and the people were one. The military filled all victories and the disappointments of society."¹²⁵ But *glasnost* coincided with military failure in Afghanistan followed in short order by the domestic use of military forces in Tblisi, Baku, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Vilnius in the waning days of the Soviet Union. Increasingly objective press scrutiny, which began in the Afghan War, combined with a series of unpopular military missions to spur the downward spiral of respect which culminated in the war in Chechnya. A brief look at present day Russian civil-military relations through the lens of the Chechen War will reveal some valuable insights into the Russian military's potential to defend democratic values within the transitioning state.

¹²⁵ Golz interview.

The impact of the events in Chechnya on relations between the military and the population at large in Russia are varied and differ depending on the point of view of observers. On-site American personnel analyzing the conflict from the US embassy regard the war as a huge mistake that reveals the superficiality of the progress of democracy in Russia. As one US army attaché put it, “What civilized country would do this to its own people and then declare that it’s a humane country because it rebuilt the destroyed cities and villages?”¹²⁶ Observers from this school of thought argue that the war in Chechnya has set back democracy in Russia significantly.¹²⁷ The events in Chechnya bode poorly for the government’s commitment to democratic principles such as the protection of civil liberties and individual human rights and consultation among democratic institutions before committing armed forces.

The lack of such democratic processes resulted in critical public discourse in the press. Questions were also raised about the potential of the government to deal with the real problems of the country given that so much of its limited financial resources were expended in the war. Some Russian citizens are asking, “If we had the money to spend in Chechnya, then why didn’t we have it to address some of our pressing social needs?”¹²⁸ Among these social needs is improving the living standards of the officer corps. With half of the year’s military budget having been spent on the war, it is unlikely that any strides will be made in improving the salaries and living conditions of the officer corps.

¹²⁶ Kwiecien interview.

¹²⁷ *The Economist*, “The Wrong Man for Russia,” 7 January 95, pp. 13-14; *The Nation*, “Botched Operation: Russian Troops in Chechnya,” 30 January 1995, p. 116.

¹²⁸ Kwiecien interview.

The Russian people, overall, though, did not initially protest the need to intervene in Chechnya. There is evidence of some disappointment over the decision making process leading up to the commitment of forces, but, by and large, the Russian people accepted the initial rationalization of the intervention presented by the government. This is interesting because the case for intervention was presented so poorly.

Indeed, in an interview with a Security Council staff member, it was explained to me how Russia in the post cold war era was dedicated to relying more on its instruments of political and economic power with the use of force being a last resort. But when I asked him to apply this logic to Chechnya he said that this was a unique case and went on to lecture me how Russians living there had been oppressed for the past three and a half years, but the government was reluctant to intervene for fear of making the oppression worse.¹²⁹ Somehow, then, it was logical to start a war in which many of these Russian citizens that the government was trying to protect would be killed along with many Chechen civilians, who were also citizens of the Russian Federation, along with the death of thousands of servicemen, many of them teenage conscripts. Generally, though, the Russian population bought the government's argument about the need for some military action. No doubt their natural predisposition to scapegoat minorities for internal problems and their specific regard for Chechens as a criminal race figured into their calculations.¹³⁰

However, as the war progressed and the Russian military's disastrous performance became evident, popular unrest grew. Democrats and human rights activists opposed the

¹²⁹ Pirumov interview.

¹³⁰ Natasha Singer, "As Ethnic Wars Haunt Yeltsin, Others Wonder, 'Who's Next?'" *The Ethnic Newswatch* 98, no. 31 (13 January 1995), p. 1; Vanora Bennett, "Scared Chechens in Moscow Feel Russian Noose Tighten," *Reuters*, 2 March 95.

war on legal and moral grounds. Nationalists spoke out against the killing of Russian civilians. The Army resisted the war due to the extraordinary toll it has taken on men and equipment, morale, and its public image.¹³¹ A primary cause of the rift between the population and the government in the war was the decision to use virtually untrained conscripts in combat. When the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers organized a march in Red Square in March 1995, their main complaint was not that the war was unjust or that the intervention should not have taken place, but that the military was sending untrained conscripts into combat.¹³² The women escalated their protest of military policy with an attempted march on Grozny in early April to demonstrate for an end to the war and to plead for the release of their sons held as prisoners.¹³³ Some mothers have even pulled their sons, to include officers, from the ranks and taken them home.¹³⁴

Management of the crisis indicated a mentality at the top of the decision-making apparatus that "people should accept what we say without question. Moscow should decide all problems because there are wise people there." Even democrats take the view that once they come to power they can decide what is best for the country with little or no further consultation from those who elected them.¹³⁵ The decision to launch the Chechen War revealed a return to Soviet era pre-democratic practices evidenced by the complete ignorance of public opinion and democratic structures.¹³⁶

¹³¹ Cuny, "The War Nobody Can Win," p. F1.

¹³² Kwiecien interview.

¹³³ Sergei Shargorodsky, "Soldiers' Mothers Take Their Ant-War Protest to Chechnya," *AP Worldstream*, 20 Mar 1995; *Ekho Moskovy Radio, Moscow*, 25 March 95. translated in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, SU/2263/B, "Chechen Peace March Proceeds Despite Ban," 28 March 95.

¹³⁴ Cuny, "The War Nobody Can Win," p. F1.

¹³⁵ Zhelezov interview.

¹³⁶ Peter Ford, "Yeltsin's War in Chechnya Reveals Old Soviet Ways Can Persist," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 30 December 94, p. 1; Latsis, "The Real Winners in a Losing War," p. 16.

However, the unflappable grit of the press in its coverage of the war ensured that Chechnya would go down in history as the first publicly reported and open to the press military operation. Television coverage enabled people to see the negative impact of government policy for the first time and to draw their own conclusions about the wisdom of their leaders who promulgated such an ill-founded policy.¹³⁷ The influence of the press as an instrument of accountability to the people is increasing as its efforts to expose corruption and report objectively from Chechnya continue unabated. With Chechnya, the greatest level of criticism ever was found in the press. Media coverage which splashed uncensored scenes of gore and suffering helped to shape public opinion against the war.¹³⁸ This occurred despite the fact, according to the Russian human rights commissioner, Sergei Kovalyov, that the Russian government made its best effort to generate lies through its propaganda machine in order to control the news from Chechnya.¹³⁹ But the accurate accounts reported in many newspapers and in news broadcasts “shredded the official fabrications”¹⁴⁰ and by the midpoint of the war reporters agreed that the military was becoming more accepting of the press’s role and had lifted the policy of harassment that characterized the relationship of the press and the military at the onset of the conflict.¹⁴¹

The war in Chechnya also marked the first time that the population refused to accept passively the implementation of forces in a conflict. In the previous use of force in a questionable theater, such as in Ingushetia, the population remained silent. This earlier

¹³⁷ Tom Birchenough, “TV Has Role in Chechnya War,” *Variety*, 27 February-5 March 95, p. 59; Thurston interview.

¹³⁸ Valentina Starova, “Russian Press, Government Discuss Chechen Coverage,” *UPI*, 28 February 95.

¹³⁹ *The Nation*, “Botched Operation: Russian Troops in Chechnya,” 30 January 95, p. 116.

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁴¹ Starova, “Russian Press, Government Discuss Chechen Coverage,” *UPI*, 28 February 95.

silence may be at least partially attributed to the smaller scale of earlier operations. But, in Chechnya, many for the first time began to ask, "Why?" In a joint press conference with the Chair of the State Duma Committee for Defense in September 1995 the Press Secretary of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers declared that if the will of the people is not heard an active campaign to frustrate all subsequent call-ups for military service will begin.¹⁴² One Russian analyst predicted that the social conflict between the Army and civilians may have entered a dangerous stage paralleling the USA student movement in the 1960s. "In Russia, though, these tensions may be more dangerous."¹⁴³

The general effect of the war in Chechnya on the relationship of the post-communist Russian military with society at large has been to expose the inadequacies of the Army and to illustrate the expectations for accountability and the protection of civil liberties and human rights that the infusion of democratic values into Russian society has prompted. The result has been public outrage.¹⁴⁴ The poor performance of the military has highlighted the need for radical reform. The problem is that military reform will not be effective unless it is driven from the top, but the necessary personnel cuts and industrial closures have not been embraced by either Parliament or the military.

The people have also been able to separate their negative feelings about the military leadership, which has come off as extremely incompetent in the execution of the war, from their feelings of sympathy toward the soldiers fighting themselves. As a reporter from the military newspaper, *Red Star (Krasnaya Zvezda)*, put it, "The soldiers

¹⁴² Valentina Melinkova, Press Secretary of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia, press conference with Sergei Yushenkov, Chair of the State Duma Committee for Defense, 18 September 95. *Official Kremlin International News Broadcast*.

¹⁴³ Zhelezov interview.

¹⁴⁴ Jensen interview.

and officers fighting are like some kind of super-heroes. Many of them have fought in earlier hot spots such as Ingushetia and Tajikistan and they continue to follow orders despite the lack of virtually any material incentives. All this hard work and for what?"¹⁴⁵ The respect for the post-Soviet fighting man endures among the population, but so does the realization that the military leadership is incompetent and incapable of reforming itself.

So where does all this leave the state of civil-military relations and, in particular, the state of democratic political control in Russia as a result of Chechnya? First, the moral authority of the government has been severely damaged if not lost.¹⁴⁶ This chapter has presented evidence that democratic control seems to have weakened with the lack of parliamentary consultation, poor preparation of the population for the intervention, and the somewhat widespread disobedience of orders by military personnel and local officials who refused to send troops to Chechnya. Some elements of the civil society, though, seem to have been emboldened including the press in the forefront and the increased politicization and effectiveness of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers which helped to shape public opinion against the war. More significant, though, is the sustained political apathy of most of the population over the matter and the reluctance of the Parliament to use its authority *vis-à-vis* the military, and, of course, the reluctance of the military itself to face its own reform and requisite reorganization.

The Czech Republic

Both external and internal observers agree that the last time Czechs believed in their armed forces was during the Thirty Years War of 1618-1648. Many also associate

¹⁴⁵ Golz interview.

¹⁴⁶ *The Economist*, "The Wrong Man for Russia." pp. 13-14.

this date with the last time the Czech Army put up a fight.¹⁴⁷ The aversion of Czech society to anyone in uniform dates to their participation in the Austrian Empire from 1620-1918. In this era of the militarized empire all important Austrians wore uniforms, but since the Czechs were not regarded as one of the leading groups in society they did not hold important positions and came to regard those who did with hostility.¹⁴⁸

A brief respite in the negative attitude toward people in uniform occurred from 1918-1938 in appreciation for those Czechs who fought for independence, but ill feeling toward the Czechoslovak military recurred with the 1938 occupation of the Germans when the politicians ordered the military to remain in its barracks without a fight. Faced with the abandonment of its democratic allies, Czechoslovak political leaders succumbed to the terms of the Munich Agreement and fled to Britain. The population rejected the German occupation, but could not muster an armed resistance against it.¹⁴⁹ Most officers either fled and fought for the allies or stayed behind and retired from military duty.¹⁵⁰ Despite the political decisions ruling out armed resistance to the Germans, the people blamed the military for their fate and renewed their hatred for uniforms while living under Nazi rule. Some respect was regained, however, due to the successes of Czechs who fought in the Red Army and helped to liberate the homeland at the end of the war. Particularly noteworthy, was the Czechs' performance in the 18 October 1944 Battle for Dukla Pass in which 6500 Czechs were killed in the defeat of German forces there.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Czech Major, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

¹⁴⁸ Blanka Prokesova, Department of Culture, Czech MOD, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

¹⁴⁹ Petr Cornej, *Fundamentals of Czech History* (Prague: Prah, 1992), p. 42.

¹⁵⁰ Condoleeza Rice, *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-1983: Uncertain Allegiance* (Princeton: Princeton U Press, 1984), p. 38.

¹⁵¹ *ibid.*, pp. 34-37.

Official histories of the development of the CSPA call the period from 1945 to 1948 the era of “the struggle for the democratization of the armed forces.”¹⁵² The goals of officers who had served with the democratic allies, primarily with Britain, conflicted with those who had come under Communist influence while serving with the Red Army. The inter-war officer corps was drawn mainly from the Czechoslovak Legion formed in 1918 which gained world renown for its five thousand mile march across Siberia fighting the Bolsheviks.¹⁵³ These officers held the highest positions in the inter-war period and upon their return from Britain expected high post-war positions.¹⁵⁴

But these ambitions collided with those of Czechs who served during WWII with the Red Army. The war service of these forces and their association with the Soviet “liberators” of Czechoslovakia along with the political clout of Communists immediately following the war resulted in the dominance of the Communist faction of the Czechoslovak armed forces after WWII. The Czechoslovak air forces, which meanwhile had served with distinction with the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the war, returned home to heroes’ welcomes. But once the Communists came to power many of these officers were stripped of their wings, sent to forced labor camps, and harassed throughout the rest of their careers because of suspicions that they were pro-Western.¹⁵⁵

The postwar Czechoslovak army drew its ranks from workers who received military educations and became faithful to Marxist-Leninist ideals. However, the Soviet Union did not consistently hold the CSPA in high esteem. The 1950s were the “golden

¹⁵² *ibid.*, p. 38.

¹⁵³ *ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

¹⁵⁴ *ibid.*, p. 39.

¹⁵⁵ Richard Byrne Reilly, “One Hawk Scatters Many Crows,” *Prognosis Weekly*, 1-7 December 94, p. 6.

years” for the CSPA. During this decade it developed into both a “red and expert” force and became the Soviet Union’s junior ally in the Third World.¹⁵⁶ But tensions increased in the 1960s as CSPA leaders began to question whether or not they were being offered as sacrificial lambs to the Soviet cause. As the Prague Spring developed, Czechoslovak officers became more outspoken and threatened to protect the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.¹⁵⁷ When the Soviets invaded in 1968, presidential orders confined the military to the barracks, but the Soviet Union view of the CSPA’s reliability was severely damaged. As a result, the CSPA came to lag behind other Warsaw Pact states in terms of modernization of weapons and lost its role in the Third World. Additionally, Soviet troops remained stationed in Czechoslovakia.¹⁵⁸

The Czechoslovak people, however, again blamed the military for not resisting the Soviet invasion and since 1968 have held the military institution in low esteem. The military in the Soviet era, consequently, became associated with oppressive Communism and it is this image that persisted through the Velvet Revolution and which still persists today.¹⁵⁹ The negative image has been reinforced in the Soviet era by the military’s neutrality in the 1948 Communist coup, its passivity in the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion, and its apparent supporting role in counter-revolutionary activities in 1989.¹⁶⁰ On 23 November 1989 the Defense Minister, Milan Vaclavik, gave orders for the possible use of

¹⁵⁶ Condoleeza Rice, “Warsaw Pact Reliability: The Czechoslovak People’s Army,” in *Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability*, ed. Daniel N. Nelson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 127.

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p. 129.

¹⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p. 140.

¹⁵⁹ Prokesova interview.

¹⁶⁰ Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion*, p. 113.

force and the CSPA issued a statement asserting that it would “defend Communism [and the] achievements of socialism.”¹⁶¹ Fortunately, the order was never issued.

The Czechoslovak, and now the Czech military, also suffered and still suffers from a dismal competency image. Czechs generally portray the military in caricature form and most would have a difficult time putting the words *military* and *professionalism* together in the same sentence. The people who actually like the military come predominantly from military family backgrounds.¹⁶² The bumbling image of the Czech soldier portrayed in *The Good Soldier Schwejk* of Czech literary fame prevails. The common perception is that officers can’t hold real jobs and that the mandatory conscription service is a waste of time.¹⁶³

At the birth of the Czech Republic in January 1993, 51 percent of the population expressed confidence in the army’s capacity to defend the republic against an assault from another country. As dismal as those numbers may sound, by December of 1994 the number subsequently fell to 30 percent three years later.¹⁶⁴ Similarly, a United States Information Agency (USIA) poll conducted in September of 1994 placed the Czech Republic twelfth of twelve European states surveyed with a 41 percent confidence rating in its military overall.¹⁶⁵ The USIA report went on to say that “this erosion in confidence

¹⁶¹ *The London Times*, 24 November 1989.

¹⁶² Wielkoszewski interview.

¹⁶³ Robert L. Leininger, Lt. Colonel, Security Assistance Officer, US Embassy Prague, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

¹⁶⁴ Jan Stojaspal, “Latest Poll Finds the Good Soldier Schwejk Still Typifies the Czechs and Their Army.” *The Prague Post*, 8 February 95. Poll was conducted by the Center for Empirical Research (STEM).

¹⁶⁵ USIA, Office of Research and Media Reaction, “Majorities in the Czech Republic Favor PFP, NATO Membership,” *USIA Opinion Analysis*, 27 December 1994, pp. 2-3. The other eleven states in order of descending military confidence levels were: Croatia, Britain, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, France, Germany, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Albania, and Estonia.

likely results partially from widespread allegations of theft and misconduct among the ranks, as well as throughout the Ministry of Defense.”

Indeed a series of incidents marred the image of the ACR from its conception. One of the most embarrassing for the MOD was a burglary committed in the MOD building by off duty conscripts while conscripts on duty slept. This incident, on the heels of several others, prompted a Czech daily to editorialize, “the fact that weapons are being stolen from the Czech Army arsenals and are being traded is known even to babies. Citizens concerned ask whether the Army whose headquarters are easily burglered is capable of action or not and they want to hear a clear answer. Minor scandals indicate what is going on in the armed forces.”¹⁶⁶

An American military attaché compared the ACR’s image problem to US service members “trying to wear a uniform in the Vietnam era. The difference, though, is that the US officer corps knew that it had to earn its respect back. Czechs think that they should just get respect.”¹⁶⁷ This attitude is slowly changing, though, as the MOD seeks for ways to send the signal to the ranks that disciplinary infractions and violations of internal laws and regulations will be punished.

Community relations have also progressed somewhat as local leaders begin to understand the economic benefits of being supportive of local military garrisons. A Czech Major related how a mayor shortly after the revolution came to a meeting about closing the local military base and said, “I hate the military.” The mayor then proceeded to decide to close the base not on logical grounds, but on his negative personal feelings. Later when

¹⁶⁶ CTK, 6 December 94, *Survey of Czech Press. Rude Pravo.*

¹⁶⁷ Wielkoszewski interview.

he realized how many local jobs would be affected he went back to the base and said that he wanted it to stay, but it was too late because the base had already been slated to close.¹⁶⁸

An expert on Czech politics at the US embassy confirmed that in the early days after the revolution municipal governments had the authority to eliminate local bases if they wanted. This practice continued until federal authorities realized that such unbridled authority could affect national security. For instance, of the dozens of military airports in operation before the revolution, only four or five remain. Some of the airports hastily closed may have to reopen to meet the needs of the air force. But now the MOD has become strong enough to outweigh the desires of local authorities, who themselves have become more pragmatic, and security factors carry more weight than personal animosity and public opinion.¹⁶⁹

President Havel, Prime Minister Klaus, and other popular democrats have been leading an effort for the public to support the idea that the Czech Republic needs a competent military supported by its people. “At present, nobody is directly threatening our state, our freedom, and the democratic values adopted by our society. This is why many people tend to consider the army to be an unnecessary luxury, to consider the money to be spent on it to be wasted, national service to be a waste of time, and military training to be folly.” He added that real dangers do exist and that such an attitude can be suicidal.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Miroslav Krcmar, Major, Member Czech liaison team to the US MLT, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

¹⁶⁹ Sternod interview.

¹⁷⁰ Vaclav Havel, *Prague Radiozurnal*, 18 September 94.

While national leaders can lend their support and make resources available, as they have in the Czech Republic, there is much that only the military institution can improve by focusing on issues of internal reform. Closing the gap between Soviet style military professionalism and the type of military professionalism characteristic of democracies would do much to enhance the public image and the competency of both the Czech and Russian militaries. This issue will be the focus of the following chapter.

Conclusion

An analysis of the Russian and Czech post-communist cases has illustrated two variant levels of progress in the task of democratization. A steady and unimpeded advance toward democratic consolidation has characterized the Czech case. The result has been the development of normalized election procedures, the continued maturation of democratic institutions that effectively balance political power, and a clear shift toward democratic ideological goals and Western institutions. Although the task of democratic consolidation is not yet complete, such progress has earned the Czech Republic a place among the market democracies of the international system.¹⁷¹

The specific task of democratic political control of the military has consequently fared better as well. Some deficits remain in each of the dimensions of democratic political control presented in the chapter, but overall mechanisms exist by which the democratic government can control national security policy and ensure compliance with oversight bodies.¹⁷² However, established democracies should continue to encourage the

¹⁷¹ Hans Binnendijk, and Patrick Clawson, "Rethinking Grand Strategy," *The Washington Quarterly* 18, no. 2, p. 109.

¹⁷² Christopher Donnelly, "Armies and Society in the New Democracies," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 7, no. 1, p.3. Donnelly outlines in this article the specific structural elements needed to establish effective civil-military relations according to Western democratic standards.

further democratic consolidation of this new democracy to ensure that it does not backslide toward autocratization and the propensity toward aggressive behavior and war.¹⁷³

The Russian case, in contrast, has sequentially moved forward and backward in its democratic transition. “In Russia today almost none of the major institutions of representative government work in a reliable way: constitutional rules change to fit the needs of the moment; constitutional courts take sides on transparently political grounds; elections are postponed or announced on short notice; and political parties are transitory elite cliques, not stable organizations for mobilizing a mass coalition.”¹⁷⁴ Russia remains indefinitely stuck as a transitional state which runs the risk of further democratic backsliding into political chaos and economic decline.¹⁷⁵

In both cases, the prevalence of democratic values and expectations as evidenced in the oversight capability of developing democratic institutions, the media, and the society at large have determined the extent of democratic political control of the armed forces. In the Czech case, there is greater consensus on the centrality of democratic values and the achievement of Western democratic standards of behavior within all democratizing institutions -- including the military. In Russia, the pervasiveness of democratic values and expectations within its democratizing institutions and society at large has not been as great. But, the clash between elements of Russian society that hold democratic expectations and those who resist meeting them is growing more evident.

¹⁷³ Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy for the Long Haul.” *The Straits Times (Singapore)*, 10 September 95, p. 1; Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War.” pp. 5-38.

¹⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁷⁵ Binnendijk and Clawson. “Rethinking Grand Strategy.” p. 109.

My main impression after the conclusion of my field research in Moscow was one of pessimism for the very continuation of democratization in Russia. The coalition of political forces is mired in their own self-interest and the pursuit of the greatest allocation of resources to their lobby to the detriment of the possibility of the reprioritization of resources that could result in the increased democratic and economic health of the Russian Federation as a whole. The case has borne out Mansfield's and Snyder's hypothesis that losers in the process of full-fledged democratization will fight to resist it. Such actors continue to thwart the development of democratic institutions that threaten their power and ultimately contributed to reckless policymaking that led to the war in Chechnya and the further weakening of democratic accountability.¹⁷⁶

Among the big losers in the Russian democratization venture have been the military and its associated industrial allies. The weakness of democratic institutions charged with ensuring democratic political control of the armed forces has allowed the post-Soviet military establishment to resist attempts to subordinate itself to the oversight of legitimate democratic bodies. Democratic deficits across every dimension of democratic political control analyzed are severe and are persistent with the singular exception of the press. In this case, established democracies should be wary of assuming that a permanent state of transition poses no threat for the stability of the international system. Any external action or lever that can facilitate the strengthening of democratic institutions and encourage the adoption of international democratic norms should be taken.

¹⁷⁶ Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," pp. 19-25.

This chapter has focused on presenting the democratic deficits that exist in the Russian and Czech cases in terms of democratic political control of the armed forces. The dimensions of constitutional, executive, parliamentary, and societal control of post-communist militaries were analyzed in-depth and problem areas highlighted. The hope is that such an analysis will serve to target assistance efforts so that specific democratization needs are met and the task of democratic consolidation is advanced. The past history of transitional states has shown that anything less than the achievement of democratic consolidation may result in belligerent behavior and the disruption of the stability of the international system. Much work remains to be done, but an awareness of which efforts will bear more fruit will enhance the potential for success.

CHAPTER 6

An Assessment of Post-Communist Military Professionalism: the Russian and Czech Militaries' Democratic Deficits

Introduction

A primary theme of this work is that there are significant differences between military professionalism in democratic and non-democratic states. The civil-military relations literature on civilian supremacy, however, does not distinguish among the types of political systems to which regimes owe their loyalty. The assumption is that professional militaries will remain loyal to whichever government comes to power through legitimate means.¹ The problem with such an assumption is that it ignores *how* the officer corps comes to accept the principle of civilian supremacy² and how this professionalism is manifested. I contend that the ideological underpinnings of the state must play some role in the inculcation of the value of civilian supremacy in the officer corps. Consequently, military professionalism must be reoriented through new methods of inculcating the concept of civilian supremacy in states that experience a shift in the ideological underpinnings of the state from authoritarian to democratic rule. Most troubling are cases which do not make a clear shift in the ideological basis of their state. Transitioning states, which still lack societal consensus on whether or not democratic norms of accountability should displace the norms of state and institutional behavior that characterized the authoritarian regime, remain perilously perched between ideologies. As a result, military professionalism also remains caught between two systems.

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962); Claude E. Welch Jr., *Civilian Control of the Military* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976).

² Brian D. Taylor, *Professionalism and Politicization in the Soviet and Russian Armed Forces*, Paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 31 August-3 September 1995, p. 8.

When states make the political transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, the infusion of democratic values in the transitioning society begins to permeate all of its institutions -- including the military institution -- affecting the expectations of those within the institution and those to whom the institution is accountable. The model of democratic military professionalism developed in chapter two balanced the dual goals of developing professional competence as a means of protecting the democratic state and the importance of reflecting in institutional practices the societal values of the democracy which the military defends. Democratic states have long recognized the quality and competency benefits of building military institutions reflective of their societies.

Transitioning states are still learning the interrelatedness of these issues and tend to address competency and value related issues sequentially rather than simultaneously, with the latter often classified as a luxury to be concentrated on at some later date. Furthermore, transitioning militaries may remain caught between two models of military professionalism resulting in only a partial adoption of democratic norms in their institution. An analysis of the Czech Republic's and Russia's adaptations to the infusion of democratic values into their governing bodies and societies illustrates the tensions which persist when Soviet style military professionalism meets a Western style of military professionalism with a marked emphasis on the inclusion of democratic norms.

This chapter highlights the ongoing struggle facing post-communist militaries as they attempt to adapt to the presence of democratic values in their societies and to the subsequent expectations of developing democratic institutions and the society at large as represented by public opinion and the media. In the process, I analyze military professionalism in the post-communist era by highlighting the overall adjustments that the Russian and Czech militaries have made, and, most importantly, examine the democratic deficits in military professionalism that exist across the dimensions of the model of democratic military professionalism presented in chapter two. As in the previous chapter, the purpose of this analysis is twofold: first, to specify the democratic deficits that persist

in the realm of post-communist military professionalism; and, second, to lay out specific problem areas that can serve to focus the assistance efforts of established democracies engaged in the task of facilitating the democratic transition of post-communist militaries. An examination of the cases will show the challenges that democratic political transitions pose for military institutions in post-communist states.

Redefining military professionalism in the post-communist era

Professionalism is a difficult subject to address with officers in transitioning states formed under the Soviet model. Indeed, to question the quality of that professionalism as a Western officer or its appropriateness to the post-communist military in which the officers of a transitioning state serve is to question the very nature of the military to military relationship -- the common bond which all officers share as military professionals.

In most respects Soviet style military professionalism featured the characteristics of Huntington's definition: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.³ The Soviet model put great emphasis on developing specializations across all workers and infused in each citizen his/her responsibility to perform that specialty for the good of the state. The military was set apart as a separate caste with its own cultural features and practices. However, these similarities between the Western and Soviet systems do not explain the fundamental differences inherent in the military professionalism of each resulting from the differences in values that underpinned the respective state systems.

In democratic models civilian control is executed across multiple axes of democratic accountability; and, it is rooted in democratic values. Consequently, a unique set of societal expectations results concerning habits and patterns of behavior within democratic military institutions.⁴ These societal expectations include democratic accountability, transparency, respect for civil liberties and human rights, and dedication to

³ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*.

⁴ This is the argument laid out in chapter two.

democratic values. These criteria assume an importance at least equal to the military values of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness in defining the operational code of a professional military officer in a democracy.

In the Soviet model civilian control was executed through a single axis, the Communist Party.⁵ The state was founded on the value of authority which served as the basis of military professionalism and civilian supremacy. Democratic values and patterns of behavior within the Soviet bloc were either a generation removed from the citizens' experience or had never been experienced. While both models can and did develop brands of military professionalism which preclude military intervention, patterns of behavior below this common denominator will be distinct, depending on whether democratic or authoritarian values characterize the state.

The relevant question in the transitioning states, then, is not whether the officer corps is professional, but whether it possesses a brand of professionalism appropriate to the type of state that it serves. The evidence presented in this chapter supports the argument that a hybrid form of military professionalism characterizes transitioning states which features characteristics of both authoritarian and democratic models.

Since the advent of *perestroika* in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, transitioning states have had to grapple with the infusion of democratic values into their societies. The process of democratization has created democratic expectations within both society at large and among the members of post-communist military institutions. One result has been the development of a fundamental conflict between the maintenance of good order and discipline in the ranks and the belief common among many that since the arrival of democracy, military discipline was no longer required.⁶

⁵ Roman Kolkowicz, "Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist (Hegemonial) Systems," in *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats*, eds. Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982.), p. 233; Ellen Jones, *Red Army and Society* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 23. This is the argument laid out in chapter three.

⁶ Jiri Giesl, Major General, Defense, Military, and Air Attaché, Embassy of the Czech Republic, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

Finding a balance between the competing forces of authoritarian and democratic principles is the common theme found in each of the dimensions of democratic military professionalism presented below. The ACR is just now starting to take a hard look at what brand of post-communist professionalism they need. They are beginning to ask some key questions like, “What is officer competence? How should we evaluate this? How can we instill these qualities?” And, “How can we attract good young people to the ranks?”⁷ But, in Russia, the resistance to change along the professional dimensions outlined in chapter two is much greater, and even the most basic questions regarding the military's adaptation to democratization have not yet been seriously considered by the military institution.

According to the reports of US military attachés in Moscow, senior Russian officers credit Marxist-Leninist principles for the buildup of the Soviet armed forces to superpower status and are consequently hesitant to turn away from these principles. US Lt. Commander Charles Justice on a visit to the office of Admiral Ivanov, the head of the Kuznetsov Academy, the Russian equivalent of the US Naval War College, noted that a huge statue of Lenin remained on Academy grounds and that a large painting of Lenin still hung over the admiral's desk. When the US attaché asked why these things still remained, the admiral replied that his generation was responsible for building up the Soviet Navy and their success was possible because of Marxist-Leninist principles. He added that, as long as he remained in his post, Lenin would remain. But once he left the academy he would approve Lenin's departure as well.⁸

The admiral's remarks indicated that he realized that times had changed, but that he did not want to change himself. This anecdote sums up the attitude of many older officers who have spent their whole professional lives under one system and one

⁷ Robert L. Leininger, Lt. Colonel, Security Assistance Officer, US Embassy Prague, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

⁸ Charles C. Justice, Lt. Commander, Assistant Naval Attaché, US Embassy Moscow, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

philosophy. Although the present political leadership purports to lead a democratic state, the military institution has been slow to acknowledge that it must adapt to whatever consequences the change in the political system has on its institutional practices.

Indeed, many Russian military personnel and military observers blame the advent of democratization as the cause of the Soviet and now Russian military's decline. "It's interesting. Democracy in the Army is not possible. We have suffered through democracy with the Army and saw the results in Chechnya. It has been difficult to call it an Army since democratization came."⁹

An analysis of the Czech case will illustrate that even in the best transitioning cases, where society as a whole has embraced the idea of adopting democratic values and where the military has adopted wide-ranging reforms, the impact of democratic values on military professionalism has lagged other aspects of reform. The Czech case shows a certain inability to address structural and ideological reform simultaneously. But, the issue of reforming the military, so that its practices reflect the values of the transitioning democratic society, has been addressed more as structural reform nears completion. Analysis of the Russian case, however, will reveal a military and a society that are more reluctant to embrace democratic values and to discard Soviet era practices.

The following section will lay the foundation for an analysis of the specific democratization deficits in military professionalism noted across the cases by highlighting which overall structural and ideological adjustments have been made by the Russian and Czech militaries. Clearly, structural reform is the easier transitional task, but in neither case is even this non-ideological task complete.

⁹ Vladimir Pirumov, Chairman of Scientific Council, Security Council of the Russian Federation, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

Achievements of Post-Communist Military Reform in Russia and the Czech Republic
Russia

The greatest potential for substantial military reform in Russia was in the *perestroika* era when the restructuring of the Soviet Union was driven from the top and political forces were capable of demanding change. There was much discussion in the press, Parliament, and among officers about various courses of reform. This peaked in the period prior to the August 1991 coup and the subsequent dissolution of Parliament later in the year.¹⁰ The military as an institution, though, was never excited about reform, continued to argue for more advanced technology for the armed forces, and interpreted all attempts at reform as thinly veiled attempts to downsize the military.¹¹

In the late Soviet era there was conflict between pragmatic high ranking officers, who understood the impossibility of Marxist economics sustaining military capability, and party ideologues resistant to change.¹² There was hope that with the creation of the Russian Federation on January 1, 1992; there was also the possibility of creating a new military for the new state. Intense lobbying for the institution of a reform agenda by some of Yeltsin's more reform minded advisors tried to sway the new Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD), but at the end of the day the Russian military inherited the old Soviet General Staff and MOD framework.¹³ The CIS military chief, Marshal Evgenii Shaposhnikov, endorsed the creation of a civilian defense ministry and called for greater professionalization of the officer corps,¹⁴ but Grachev's arrival as Russian defense minister slowed markedly the pace of reform.¹⁵

¹⁰ Vitali N. Tsygichko, Professor Doctor, Head of Center of National Security Studies, Academy of Sciences and advisor to the Federation Council on military reform, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow. See also Aleksey Makarin, "Vladimir Smirnov: The Army Must Be Assigned Realistic Missions," *Segodnya*, 26 May 95, p. 5. *JPRS-UMI-95-025*, 20 June 95, p. 14, 16. Smirnov argues that hopes for military reform that were great in 1990-1991 have disappeared.

¹¹ Gregory Govan, Brigadier General, Commander, On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) and former Defense Attaché in Moscow, 1987-1991, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

¹² Ervin J. Rokke, Lt. General, Commander National Defense University, former Defense Attaché in Moscow, 1986-87, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

¹³ Govan interview.

¹⁴ John W.R. Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup," *World*

The consensus of Western and Russian analysts alike is that no substantive reform has yet to occur in the post-communist Russian military. These observers agree, too, that the most fundamental reform agenda item is the need to reduce the force structure of the Russian armed forces to live within the means of the present day infrastructure of the transitioning state. The armed forces have not been restructured in response to redefined political goals of the state and an assessment of threats to its security.¹⁶ “The problem now is making an Army that used to be 5.5 million strong into a force of 1.5 million. We have to make a small force from a large one with quality.”¹⁷

The negative consequences of delaying cuts in force structure are evident throughout the military. Sergey Rogov, an analyst at the USA-Canada Institute and a strong advocate of military reform, has argued that, “Russia today is over-saturated with a huge number of undermanned and poorly supplied units and formations, as well as hastily organized armaments and equipment warehouses. These conditions have overstrained the support infrastructure of the Armed Forces and made it impossible to ensure normal combat training for the troops.”¹⁸ He argued, further, that the war in Chechnya demonstrated that an underpaid, undermanned, untrained Army can hardly achieve military goals even in a low intensity military conflict. “The failure to implement military reform creates a very dangerous threat to national security in Russia.”¹⁹

An American naval attaché stationed in Moscow has witnessed first-hand officers and families living in derelict hulls and barracks in Kaliningrad. He has heard the pleas of the Baltic Fleet’s commander for the construction of housing units for 19,000 officers and their families. Fulfillment of this need will require a major commitment on the part of the

Politics 44 (July 1992), p. 565.

¹⁵ Tsygichko interview.

¹⁶ Ivan Malevich, Colonel, “Military Reform in Russia: Military Reform is More Than Reform of the Army Alone,” *Kommersant-Daily*, 15 July 95, p. 5. *FBIS-UMA-95-159-S*, 17 August 95, pp. 17-20.

¹⁷ Pirumov interview.

¹⁸ Sergey Rogov, “Will the Russian Armed Forces Stand Fast: The Forgotten Military Reform,” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 3 November 94, pp. 1,5. *JPRS-UMA-94-050*, 30 November 94, p. 14.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, p.

government. However, the US Lt. Commander added, "the government has never decided if it really needs those 19,000 troops stationed in Kaliningrad."²⁰ Although a poorly organized drawdown has occurred, a bloated force remains that the military wants to preserve even it cannot afford to equip or train it. As a result, the forces that remain become more and more degraded.²¹

The Russian MOD continues to demand unsustainable levels of defense spending, devoted disproportionately to salary and social needs; and even this commitment is woefully inadequate. Approximately, 85 percent of the military budget goes to salary and social needs, with salary absorbing more than 60 percent of the total. As a result, there is almost no money for training and operations.²² In 1995 the overall official expenditure on defense was 40.6 trillion rubles out of a total federal budget of 194.5 trillion rubles which accounted for 20.8 percent of the whole. Inclusion of paramilitary and defense related agencies raised the defense allocation to 23 percent of the federal budget.²³ Grachev, however, complains that this allocation falls well short of the 83 trillion annual outlay for defense that he says is necessary. The planned allocation for 1996 of 70 trillion rubles will also comprise approximately 20 percent of the government's budget.²⁴ Inclusion of non-defense ministry forces and expenditures on the arms industry bring the total to figure to 40 percent.²⁵ While the MOD may wish it had more money to sustain its unreformed force structure, these statistics make it hard to see defense as a loser in the budget battle.²⁶

²⁰ Justice interview.

²¹ Tsygichko interview.

²² *ibid.* See also Georgiy Lukava, *Armeyskiy Sbornik* no. 4 (April 95), pp. 11-13. *FBIS-UMA-95-139-S*, 20 July 95, pp. 6-7.

²³ Mark Galeotti, "Decline and Fall -- The Russian Defense Budget," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 6, no. 9 (1 September 94) p. 386.

²⁴ *The Economist*, "A Real General Election," 23 September 95, p. 44. Another source projects the 1996 defense allocation to be 78.9 trillion rubles and cites the MOD's request at 111 trillion rubles. See Anatoliy Yurkin, "Military Budget Plan Will Put Army 'On Brink of Survival,'" *ITAR-TASS*, 4 October 95. *FBIS-UMA-95-206-S*, pp. 4-5.

²⁵ *The Economist*, "A Real General Election," p. 44.

²⁶ Galeotti, "Decline and Fall -- The Russian Defense Budget," p. 386.

The Russian military leadership is determined to fight any cuts that will draw down the forces below two million. But such a level of manning is too great to adequately sustain, train, and equip.²⁷ There is also a need to close and convert bases, to cut back on expensive weapon systems, and to increase the amount of investment spending for research and development in the budget. Given that there is no possibility of funding the military at any levels greater than the present level of 23 percent for the 1995 budget, the only prospect for addressing the pressing quality needs of the force is to make deep cuts, by as much as one-third to one-half, and to professionalize the forces who remain within the constraints of realistic funding levels.

A half-hearted attempt at professionalizing a small segment of the enlisted force was undertaken by offering some conscripts "contract service" in which soldiers would be given higher pay, better housing, and increased responsibility in exchange for a longer term of service in a non-conscript, "professional" status. The problem is that contract and draft service did not turn out to be appreciably different since the government could not deliver the benefits agreed upon in the contract.²⁸ Additionally, contract troops were primarily used in auxiliary duties instead of in main combat units, so no significant gains in the control of troops through this system was possible.²⁹ Military leaders complain that prohibitive costs make the transition to a professional army impossible, but many see this as an excuse to perpetuate the familiar Soviet system despite overwhelming evidence from the war in Chechnya that this system is inappropriate for the current needs of the Russian state.³⁰ The truth is somewhere in between. In this respect, some former Warsaw Pact allies, who have moved as far along the professional army scale as their budgets will allow and who maintain complete professionalization as a long term goal, could serve as models.

²⁷ William Odom, Lt. General, "The Senate Foreign Relation Committee's European Affairs Subcommittee Hearing," 22 August 95, *Federal News Service*. Obtained from the Lexis-Nexis Information Service.

²⁸ Justice interview.

²⁹ Makarin, "Vladimir Smirnov: The Army Must Be Assigned Realistic Missions," p. 5.

³⁰ Adam R. Wasserman, Policy Planning Staff, US Department of State, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

A 1994 survey of Russian army officers indicated that to the extent military reform has been implemented it is very negatively assessed. Of those polled, 60 percent viewed any such reform as having changed the army for the worse, while 30 percent said that no noticeable reform had taken place. However, a majority of those surveyed favored the abolition of compulsory military service and the introduction of a professional army.³¹

Observers agree, however, that there is no will on the part of the senior military leadership to seriously deal with the critical needs of the armed forces through reform. Military reform will not come from within.³² With regard to the adaptation of the military to the distinct demands of a democratic political system, “practically no state policy [has been] directed toward a sensible transition from an army of a totalitarian government to the army of a legal one.”³³ The present power relationships and trade-offs of loyalty for quality have also ensured that it is unlikely that reform will be spurred by the government, either. The national political leadership interferes little in military affairs, preferring to stay out of such internal matters while it simultaneously calls on the military to play the role of arbiter between the executive and legislative branches of government. Pandering to military leaders by all sides in the December 1996 parliamentary elections indicates that placating them in return for votes is the top priority of political parties.³⁴ Such dependence on the military institution in domestic political battles reduces the likelihood that the government will insist on a path of reform unsupported by the military elite.

The Czech Republic

In the wake of the Velvet Revolution, the Czechoslovak military was caught up in the changes sweeping the country and wanted to be a part of them. The first post-

³¹ *Military Elites in Russia 1994: A survey amongst 615 officers of the Russian armed forces in the military regions Moscow/St. Petersburg, Volga-Ural, North-Caucasus, The North/North Sea Fleet, Siberia, Kaliningrad* (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Munich and Moscow, August 1994), p. 6, 45.

³² Gromov, Boris, Colonel-General, “Commander: Colonel-General Boris Gromov: ‘I Cried the Entire First Year in the Army’,” interview by Yuriy Zaynashev, *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 18 May 95, p. 2. *JPRS-UMA-95-025*, 20 June 95, p. 4.

³³ Makarin, “Vladimir Smirnov: The Army Must Be Assigned Realistic Missions,” p. 5. .

³⁴ *The Economist*. “A Real General Election”, p. 44.

communist politicians, most of whom had anti-regime backgrounds and little expertise in military issues, were ambivalent about the military in general, but interested in ensuring that certain reforms were implemented there. This led to a series of steps being taken immediately after the revolution.

The first substantive measure was to purge the officer corps of Communist sympathizers. This was accomplished mainly by transferring the political officers and officers of the military defense intelligence service.³⁵ Officers' records were examined and anyone who had ever served in these positions, even those officers currently serving in other positions, was reassigned or fired. The defect of this approach was that it allowed many good officers to be swept away in the pursuit of "Communists" while some political hacks who served in non-political specialties were allowed to stay. Additionally, 150 of the 156 general officers serving at the time of the revolution were immediately dismissed.³⁶ However, critics complain that many of the officers who were removed from their positions through the attestation and lustration process remain "hidden" on the payroll in less-exposed jobs or received newly created civilian positions within the defense establishment.³⁷

The next major steps in the reform process were to downsize, reorganize, and redeploy the Czechoslovak military substantially in response to the new strategic environment. But, even before 1989, the CSPA was in the process of drawing down from a force of 200,000 to meet the limits imposed in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty which put a cap on Czechoslovak forces of 93,300.³⁸

³⁵ These actions affected approximately 1650 officers of the Military Counterintelligence Service and 3800 political workers. Jan Gadzik, "On the Deplorable State of the Czech Army," *Cesky Tydenik*, 6 July 95. *FBIS-EEU-95-189*, 29 September 95, p. 6.

³⁶ Bruce Messelt, OSD Point of Contact for Military to Military Programs in East and Central Europe, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC; Kenneth L. Kladiva, Faculty Member, Defense Systems Management College and PPBS advisor to the Czech MOD, interview by author, March 1995, Prague: Leininger interview.

³⁷ Vaclav Zaspal, "On the Deplorable State of the Czech Army," *Cesky Tydenik*, 6 July 95. *FBIS-EEU-95-189*, 29 September 95, p. 6.

³⁸ General Staff of the Czech Republic, *The Army of the Czech Republic*, p. 1.

The split of the country in January 1993 into the Czech Republic and Slovakia compounded a reorganization process that was already underway and called for yet another revision of the strategic concept. By all accounts the division of military personnel and assets went smoothly according to a ratio of 2:1 with the Czech Republic getting the larger share of resources.³⁹ The separation of Czech and Slovak politicians, in turn, facilitated a clear consensus on how to proceed with further reform of the ACR.⁴⁰

The new ACR came into existence with a force structure of 106,447.⁴¹ In June of 1993 the government approved a draft of the new Czech Army structure which called for the ACR to be drawn down to a force of 65,000 by the end of 1995.⁴² Most of the physical realignment of the ACR was completed in 1994 and it is expected that the 65,000 limit will be reached on schedule by the end of 1995.⁴³

In general, organizational reform in terms of the restructuring and redeployment of units to meet a post-Cold War Czech national security strategy has been completed with the exception of making personnel cuts necessary to correct the inverted pyramid of the officer corps. Reform has been slower in terms of *how* the military functions as an institution. Many remnants of the Soviet model remain although the Czechs are enthusiastically reviewing Western models of military professionalism.

The dual dissolutions of the Warsaw Pact and Czechoslovakia forced the military leadership to focus on structural issues of adaptation to new strategic realities to the exclusion of other aspects of military reform -- particularly those related to the democratic transformation of the Czech military institution. Although some progress was made in this area while the structural reforms were being carried out, democratic reforms did not become the focus of attention until mid-1995. As one member of the Czech General Staff

³⁹ Jan Obrman, "Military Reform in the Czech Republic," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no. 41 (15 October 93), p. 37.

⁴⁰ Messelt interview.

⁴¹ *Prague Report*, 3 January 1993, p. 3.

⁴² Giesl interview.

⁴³ Statement made in MOD briefing on Czech military reform presented to visiting American Colonels from the US Air War College, March 1995.

put it, "It's easy to disband a unit in one to two months, but not so easy to rebuild one."⁴⁴ The leadership of the ACR is beginning to make the connection between building a quality force and reassessing many of the modes of operating inherited from the Soviet era that are incompatible with the norms of military professionalism found in democratic military institutions.

Democratic Military Professionalism

The remainder of this chapter will address the progress which has been made along the dimensions of democratic military professionalism developed in the framework presented in chapter two: recruitment and retention, promotion and advancement, education and training, officership and leadership, prestige and public relations, the compatibility of military and social values, and norms of political influence. The contrasting progress made in the Czech and Russian cases will illustrate how enthusiasm for the success of democratization across all institutions of the transitioning society and the transferring of these societal expectations for democratic values to military members results in varying rates of progress in the achievement of democratic military professionalism.

Recruitment and Retention

Chapter two emphasized that the type of candidate attracted to the military institution is an important factor in maintaining democratic civilian control, competency, and the prestige of the military. As post-communist militaries transition to democracy, the type of person that they have set out to recruit and retain is also changing. In the Soviet era, both countries attracted officer candidates in search of stability and of a quality of life superior to what these individuals could have otherwise achieved in society at large. The prestige of military service was an added incentive in the Soviet Union, but in Czechoslovakia, lack of prestige was a disincentive to serve. The common perception in

⁴⁴ Jiri Martinek, Colonel, Chief of Operations, General Staff of the Czech Republic, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

the CSPA was that only “second class people with no other opportunities” chose the military as their profession.⁴⁵

In the post-communist era, the primary recruitment and retention factors of pay, prestige, opportunity for advancement, and overall quality of life are all currently working against both Russia’s and the Czech Republic’s struggles to build a quality officer corps.

In Russia, the general economic decline and failure to downsize the force has resulted in a precipitous decline in living standards. Paychecks often arrive months late. In the first half of 1995 the average pay owed to servicemen was one million to two million rubles. The wives of officers of an aviation squadron threatened to block the airfield’s landing strip unless back pay was forthcoming.⁴⁶ When it does arrive, real pay when indexed for inflation has declined and is meager. For instance, the salary of a captain in January of 1994 was \$186 per month, but by February of 1995 had declined to \$89 per month.⁴⁷ Additionally, twenty five percent of the officer corps does not have housing. Attempts by the President to increase the loyalty of the border guards, federal intelligence service, and internal ministry troops has led to a relative decline in pay of defense ministry troops of 1.5 to 2 times. In a 1994 survey fewer than one quarter of defense ministry officers described their overall living conditions as good or very good. One in three described their living conditions as poor or very poor.⁴⁸

The quality of life has also declined appreciably for Czech officers continuing to serve in the democratic era. At the time of the Velvet Revolution 90 percent of the CSPA was deployed on the Western border. When forces started to relocate from this area,

⁴⁵ Jan Sternod, Political Officer, US Embassy Prague, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

⁴⁶ Vitaliy Denisov, Captain, “‘Do Not Disturb’: Servicemen in the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus Have Seen This Sign at the Cashier’s Office Window for Several Months Now,” *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 18 July 95, p. 3. *FBIS-UMA-95-153-S*, 9 August 95, p.1.

⁴⁷ Oleg Vladykin, “A Declining ‘Curve’ of the Military Salary Level is Becoming Increasingly Threatening: Current Social and Financial Policy With Regard to Servicemen Is Leading to a Cadre Catastrophe in the Armed Forces,” *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 16 February 95, p. 1,3. *JPRS-UMA-95-007*, 21 February 95, p. 21-23.

⁴⁸ James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, “Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps,” *INSS Strategic Forum* no. 15 (January 1994), p. 2.

many fully equipped garrisons were abandoned that had provided family housing, quality schools for children, and job opportunities for officers' wives. Now there are new garrisons, but they are not fully equipped and wives have trouble finding jobs in less developed areas of the country which consequently exacerbates the overall decline in family income. Additionally, since there are fewer garrisons overall, the ones that remain are overcrowded often making it impossible for officers to live with their families at their new posts. The officers assigned to Prague related that the housing situation is so acute there that most of them live in a small apartment during the work week and commute to visit their families on the weekend.⁴⁹

It is clear that the overall declining situation for the military family is a negative factor in the retention of officers -- particularly the younger ones with the potential for more opportunity outside the military. In the Czech Republic, economic prosperity has made it difficult to retain officers because the military cannot keep up with the improved standard of living within the private sector. The Czech Republic's relatively booming economy has led to a general labor shortage in the country which has translated into substantial job opportunities for young Czechs. From 1993 to 1995, the ACR lost 1705 career officers, one-third of whom were under thirty years old. These officers cited low prestige of the military profession, poor housing, and a shortage of prospective opportunities in the armed forces as their reasons for leaving.⁵⁰

As the market economy develops, a rich/poor division is becoming more prevalent in Czech society which will negatively affect the military's ability to recruit from among the university bound and college educated youth.⁵¹ At the present time, wages in the ACR are on par with the pay of professionals not employed by foreign companies and joint

⁴⁹ Giesl interview; Miroslav Krcmar, Major, Member Czech liaison team to the US MLT, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

⁵⁰ Zaspal, "On the Deplorable State of the Czech Army," p. 7.

⁵¹ Christopher Lord, Professor, Institute of International Politics, Charles University, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

ventures.⁵² However, the government is also keeping wages artificially low with wage controls which cannot remain in effect indefinitely.⁵³

In Russia, the hardships are more acute. It is important to point out, though, that it is difficult to generalize about conditions of service across all components of the Russian military forces. The hardships experienced are not spread across the five services evenly. To illustrate this point, the US Defense Attaché in Moscow, General Gary Rubus, contrasted the differences between a typical Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) unit and a tank unit that has redeployed from East Germany. Officers in the SRF unit probably still have their old apartments, are suffering from real salary decreases due to the effect of inflation, probably have access to some off budget goods in the locale of the base, and are not deployed to a “hot spot.” The officer in the tank unit, on the other hand, is probably living in a tent city separated from his family due to the lack of new housing and may have been sent to fight in Chechnya.⁵⁴ Conditions are certainly not great in any unit, but disparities such as these have led to severe divisions in the military.⁵⁵

One major factor in the solution to the officer recruitment and retention problem is obvious: creating favorable social conditions that will better satisfy those already in service and lead to increased competition among officer candidates. Reducing force levels to a point where these conditions can be provided is also a critical step. There is a feeling particularly within the Russian military that the state has abandoned its soldiers. From the Russian servicemen’s point of view, they are doing the same important job that they had done before, but the material reward is not in congruence with their responsibility to the state.⁵⁶

⁵² Krcmar interview.

⁵³ *The Economist*, “Czech Republic: Special -- The New Bohemians,” 22 October 94, pp 23-27.

⁵⁴ Gary Rubus, Brigadier General, Defense Attaché, US Embassy Moscow 1991-1995, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

⁵⁶ A US Marine attaché related a meeting he had with an officer in March 1995 who was working at a nuclear sub repair facility and had not been paid since the previous November. The Russian officer remarked, “We’re not making macaroni here. We’re doing serious work.” James Howcroft, Major, Assistant Marine Attaché, US Embassy Moscow, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

A general officer serving in Chechnya earns \$150 per month, a lieutenant \$50, and a conscript \$30. Meanwhile the proposal for the 1996 military budget does not call for any increase in salaries or increased allocations for building military housing although other government workers received a pay raise of 30 percent in the past year. Junior officers are particularly hard to recruit and retain in both cases. In Russia, the problem is worsened by the dramatic decline in material status and prestige that has beset the Russian officer corps. Since 1992, officers leaving the service before reaching retirement age have annually become twice as numerous as in the previous year. In 1994, 30 percent more officers left the service early than retired.⁵⁷

The declining interest in the countries' military academies reflects the common lack of interest in the military profession. In the Czech Republic, enrollment at the military academies is currently running at only 50 percent of the production that is needed to maintain a 10,000 strong officer corps.⁵⁸ This is a telling statistic considering that, with the force reductions still in progress, the requirement for officer recruits has declined 280 percent. Recruitment of candidates may improve, though, as the general higher educational climate of the Czech Republic changes. The government is moving gradually toward a system in which students will begin to pay for their education -- perhaps as much as 25 percent. Such a change in policy could enhance the recruiting potential of military schools which will continue to provide university educations at government expense.⁵⁹

Similarly, in Russia competition for entrance to military schools has virtually disappeared.⁶⁰ The Commandant of the Russian Kachinsky air force academy related to his counterpart visiting from the US Air Force Academy in April 1995 that in the 1980s

⁵⁷ Vladykin, "A Declining 'Curve' of the Military Salary Level is Becoming Increasingly Threatening: Current Social and Financial Policy With Regard to Servicemen Is Leading to a Cadre Catastrophe in the Armed Forces," p. 1,3. *JPRS-UMA-95-007*, 21 February 95, p. 21.

⁵⁸ Statement made in MOD briefing on Czech military reform presented to visiting American Colonels from the US Air War College, March 1995.

⁵⁹ Leininger interview.

⁶⁰ Vladykin, "A Declining 'Curve' of the Military Salary Level is Becoming Increasingly Threatening: Current Social and Financial Policy With Regard to Servicemen Is Leading to a Cadre Catastrophe in the Armed Forces," p. 1,3. *JPRS-UMA-95-007*, 21 February 95, p. 23.

the academy had ten applicants for each position. In the early 1990s this number declined to two applicants per position and has recently increased to three to four applicants per position. But still, one half of all qualified applicants get in -- a much less competitive figure. Nationwide, the competition for each slot has declined to 1.5 persons per position.⁶¹ Schools are forced to accept candidates who have failed their entrance examinations, while the number of gold medal candidates has declined by 300 percent.⁶²

In Russia many of the new military academy graduates are not going to serve in the armed forces.⁶³ Because the education received at these institutions is still respected, these graduates are favored for civilian jobs and shun their military option because of the lack of social guarantees there.⁶⁴ Additionally, the Kachinsky commandant said that he determines which cadets are selected himself based on personal interviews. This means that there is no official mechanism for ensuring that the cadet corps at his institution is representative of the society at large. The absence of demographic controls falls short of optimal recruiting practices in advanced democratic states.

The slow progress of personnel management reform which will be addressed fully in the following section also contributes to the retention problem. Reform of this type is non-existent in Russia and proceeding with great difficulty in the Czech Republic. In both cases many young officers with ambition and marketable skills have already left to seek their fortune in the private sector. Those who remain tend to want the security that goes with the job such as medical care and apartments (for those lucky enough to have housing), and who do not think that there are better opportunities for them elsewhere.

⁶¹ Oleg Falichev, "The Military Cap Becomes the Lads," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 31 August 95, p. 1. *FBIS-UMA-95-177-S*, 13 September 95, p. 26.

⁶² Vladykin, "A Declining 'Curve' of the Military Salary Level is Becoming Increasingly Threatening: Current Social and Financial Policy With Regard to Servicemen Is Leading to a Cadre Catastrophe in the Armed Forces," p. 1.3. *JPRS-UMA-95-007*, 21 February 95, p. 23.

⁶³ In 1994, 1630 officers between the ages of 21-22 left the Army's ranks. Vladykin, "A Declining 'Curve' of the Military Salary Level is Becoming Increasingly Threatening: Current Social and Financial Policy With Regard to Servicemen Is Leading to a Cadre Catastrophe in the Armed Forces." p. 1.3. *JPRS-UMA-95-007*, 21 February 95, p. 21.

⁶⁴ Boris Zhelezov, Research Fellow, Center for International Security. USA-Canada Institute, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

Additionally, the immobile character of both societies due to the difficulty of obtaining housing makes the practicality of relocating low.⁶⁵ Many young officers look to the swollen senior officer ranks and decide that advancement opportunities are limited and apparently not improving. Additionally, some Czechs are using some of the "good deals" available to junior officers such as English language training, courses in the West, and service with UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) to either enhance their resumes or save enough money to ease the transition of leaving the service.⁶⁶

Great recruitment and retention problems also exist on the conscript side in both cases. In the Czech case, the problem is attracting young people to serve in an enlisted force that will gradually become professionalized. In Russia, the problem is much more severe and centers around getting enough conscripts to show up for duty. Seventy five out of every one hundred young men manage to get a draft deferment⁶⁷ leading to a situation where officers outnumber conscripts.⁶⁸ In order to field eight divisions in Chechnya, the resources of twenty four divisions were combined.⁶⁹ Conscript service is almost universally avoided by resourceful young Russians. Reportedly, \$1000 can buy a document to present to the local military commissariat proving that a person has already served in the military while \$500 can purchase a health certificate certifying that a young

⁶⁵ Howcroft interview.

⁶⁶ One Czech Major who has attended a year long course in the US through IMET, served on the Czech liaison team to the US MLT enabling him to make many trips abroad, and served in UN peacekeeping units explain his departure plan. He related that one more tour with the Czech peacekeepers in Yugoslavia would give him enough of a nest egg to leave the service and move his family to a small Czech city where he has been offered the job of director of marketing for a small firm. Peacekeepers receive a per diem paid by the UN which far exceeds the basic pay of troops serving within the Czech Republic. Despite his excellent service record and selection for many opportunities in the West, he sees no future in the ACR officer corps or at least not an opportunity comparable to what he can arrange for himself in the Czech economy. Krcmar interview.

⁶⁷ Viktor Litovkin, "Deputies Told to Send 211,000 Soldiers Home, but They Are Unlikely to Succeed," *Izvestiya*, 11 October 95, p. 1,2. *FBIS-UMA-95-206-S*, 25 October 95, p. 7.

⁶⁸ *The Economist*. "A Real General Election," p. 44.

⁶⁹ Paul H. Nelson, Colonel, Chief of Staff, On-Site Inspection Agency, US Army Russian Foreign Area Specialist, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

recruit is medically unfit to serve.⁷⁰ In 1989, 3000 people avoided the draft. By 1995, the number rose nearly ten fold to 28,000.⁷¹

The greatest potential recruitment problem, meanwhile, has scarcely been addressed -- increased professionalization of the Russian enlisted force. The war in Chechnya painfully demonstrated the low level of military competence that has been achieved four years after independence with a force of demoralized officers and low quality conscripts. Analysts agree that the solution is to professionalize at least some percentage of the conscript force. Limited attempts to do this have thus far failed.

As noted earlier, a campaign to sign up 15 percent of the conscript force as conscript servicemen sputtered due to lack of financial and psychological commitment to the program on the part of the MOD. Such commitment requires a fundamental change in thinking regarding the acceptance of more highly trained enlisted personnel in tasks which previously would have been filled by officers. Some soldiers might still be persuaded to sign up for contract service, but their conditions will most likely not improve over the next five years.⁷² Recruitment of individuals to meet broader professionalization goals would require the extension of great incentives beyond the means of the military budget as long as personnel are not cut. Meanwhile, the Russian military continues to deal with its "manpower problem" through such solutions as the extension of conscription service from eighteen months to two years and cracking down on educational deferments and exemptions.⁷³ Such actions indicate that reliance on a conscript system that produces low quality soldiers will continue.

Recruitment and retention issues plague both militaries. While some strides have been made in the Czech Republic, all indications from Russia are that these problems are

⁷⁰ Ilona W. Kwiecien, Lt. Colonel, Assistant Army Attaché, US Embassy, Moscow. Main embassy liaison with the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

⁷¹ Yurkin, *FBIS-UMA-95-192-S*, p. 1.

⁷² Tsygichko interview.

⁷³ Pyotr Zhuravlyov and Aleksey Kirpichnikov, "Innovation: Hawks Win Hands Down," *Segodnya*, 8 April 95, p. 1. *JPRS-UMA-95-020*, 2 May 95, p. 9.

only becoming worse. In the Czech Republic, the government and the military are more committed to the goal of a professional military over time. Continued economic growth makes this a reasonable aim. But, the military must continue to work hard on its agenda of reform items aimed at making the reality of the ACR more competent and attractive to serve in than the prevailing current image. Failure to address these issues bodes poorly for the likelihood that officers and conscripts alike will remain loyal to a democratic state indefinitely that is not coming close to meeting their most basic needs. Political and military leaders must determine an appropriate military force structure for their state and search for the means to adequately support it. Such leadership is evident in the Czech Republic and woefully lacking in Russia. Only such a step will lead to the fostering of a military institution willing to support and defend a democratic political system and way of life to which it will one day, hopefully, feel a debt.

Promotion and Advancement

Many of the elements of the Soviet model of personnel management described in chapter three remain in the Russian and Czech cases. The prime defects of the inherited system of the Communist era are that it promoted officers automatically based on time in service, often made promotions without giving the officer of the higher rank increased responsibility, and, ultimately, created an officer corps that allowed for a disproportionate amount of officers to serve in the higher ranks with no expected standards of competency driving their daily performance or their next promotion.⁷⁴ Cronyism characterized the advancement of officers throughout the system.⁷⁵

Many from provincial regions became officers as a means of acquiring a college education and leaving their towns. Others preferred service as an officer to serving any time as a conscript. Additionally, in Russia, the practice of counting time served in outpost regions as double that served elsewhere for officers' pensions made it possible for

⁷⁴ Paul B. East, Colonel, US MLT Team Chief, Czech Republic, interview by author, July 1994, Prague.

⁷⁵ See chapter three for a summary of this argument.

an officer to serve ten years in an area such as the Far North and earn a pension for twenty years of service. Such officers are not concerned about earning promotions when their first significant promotion to Major could occur after they are eligible for retirement.⁷⁶

The promotion of officers on time instead of on merit led to the development of a disconnect between rank and position. Officer competency would be recognized by the assignment of greater authority to an officer often resulting in more senior officers working for officers junior to them in terms of rank.⁷⁷ The development of this practice over time contributed to the blurring of traditional lines of authority within the military hierarchy. But even position advancement often depended more on political reliability than professional competence since the evaluation of officers weighed ideological factors disproportionately over individual ability. This dilution of a merit based system, where an officer's evaluation is based on an objective and standardized assessment of his or her contribution to the unit's mission, led to a distorted view of "merit" that is difficult to reform today.

In the Czech Republic these problems have been recognized and much attention has been focused on how to correct them. In Russia there is little evidence that any reform of the promotion and advancement system is in the offing.⁷⁸ Indeed, evidence concerning how cuts were made following the withdrawal from the West points to a continuation of past practices. Many of the officers who redeployed to Russia were simply retired early without competition among all officers. Those in the middle ranks not yet eligible for retirement have been kept on the rolls as "extra" officers. These officers

⁷⁶ Zhelezov interview.

⁷⁷ George D. Dunkelberg, Colonel, US Defense Attaché to the Czech Republic, interview by author, July 1994, Prague.

⁷⁸ According to an April 1995 interview with the author, Colonel William Thurston, US Air Attaché to Moscow said that there is evidence that some among the Russian military leadership may be exploring ways to increase the importance of merit in the system. When General Colonel Sergeev, Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, and Admiral Chiles, Vice Chief of the Joints Chief of Staff, met in a high level visit in 1994 the US provided the Russians information on how the US officer evaluation system works at the request of the Russians. The specific request for information concerned how the US assesses the degree to which an officer's performance contributes to the mission of the unit.

who number approximately 200,000 are staying on because the state does not have the means to discharge them with the proper social guarantees.⁷⁹

In the Czech case the main problem in the area of promotion and advancement is that the career expectations of older officers who remain in the ACR are clashing with the young people that the ACR needs to retain and attract. For those officers formed under the Communist era system, "growing old with the Army and reaching higher rank based on years of service was completely normal and there could be no shortage of higher-ranking officers. Central organs were inflated and within these units the men with gold shoulder boards frequently performed work worthy of incompetent auxiliary personnel."⁸⁰ On the other hand, junior officers lack a vision for promotion to Colonel, perceive that reform of the system will never take place, and that politics will always matter more than merit.⁸¹

The ACR is working toward the development of a pyramidal force structure with a defined up or out philosophy managed by an evaluation system built on merit with a professional development program for officers and NCOs focused on improving both technical and leadership skills. The "inverted pyramid" which now characterizes the ACR is dysfunctional at several levels. First, there is an excessive total number of officers in the ranks -- 20,000 officers and 10,000 warrant officers.⁸² An army with more officers than soldiers is "a situation unheard of in Western armies."⁸³ Second, although the ACR is approaching its goal of drawing down to 65,000 personnel by the end of 1995, the

⁷⁹ Sergey Rogov, "Will the Russian Armed Forces Stand Fast: The Forgotten Military Reform," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 3 November 94, pp. 1,5. *JPRS-UMA-94-050*, 30 November 94, p. 18.

⁸⁰ Vaclav Smejkal, "Where Are the Four Wheels of the Army Vehicle Headed?" *Ekonom*, January 95, pp. 27-32. *FBIS-EEU-95-065*, 5 April 95, p. 13.

⁸¹ Peter R. O'Connor, US MLT Team Chief, Czech Republic December 94-May 95, interview by author. March 1995, Prague. In this interview, Colonel O'Connor related his own interview with an especially promising Czech junior officer who had attended the US Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, KS and who had worked closely with the US MLT.


⁸² Wilem Holan, "The Older Officers Must Make Room for the Younger Ones," briefing reported in *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 4 September 95, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-173*, 7 September 95, p. 14.

⁸³ Richard Byrne Reilly, "With Its Chief Out, Where is the Czech Army Headed?" *Prognosis*, 8 October 94, p. 8, *FBIS-EEU-94-222*, p. 9.

principal problem of the rank and age imbalance of its personnel structure remains. The following table indicates the inverted pyramid of the ACR.

Table 6.1 : Inverted Pyramid of ACR Personnel

Source: ACR General Staff document made available to US MLT, March 1995



NCOs: 7610 (5500 of them are senior conscripts)


Other conscripts: 23,390⁸⁴

The next table indicates the redistribution of the officer ranks that has been proposed by officers assigned to the ACR General Staff as a target upon which to focus the continued personnel transformation of the ACR.

⁸⁴ Chart provided by officers of the ACR General Staff, Prague, March 1995.

Table 6.2: Proposed Pyramidal ACR Force Structure

Source: ACR General Staff document made available to US MLT, March 1995



Defense Minister, Wilem Holan, addressed the disparity between the current inverted pyramid and the desired ideal pyramid in a May 1995 interview, "The ideal pyramid of ranks is clear to us. The current appearance of the rank hierarchy pyramid is also known. Inverting to its proper shape depends, first, and foremost, on the interest shown by young people in serving in the Czech Army."⁸⁵ While Holan's statement certainly highlights the key obstacle to filling the lower ranks, the inversion also depends on the willingness of the Ministry of Defense to direct the reductions in the upper ranks.

⁸⁵ Wilem Holan. interview by Ferdinand Peroutka, *Denni Telegraf*, 31 May 95, p. 5. *FBIS-EEU-95-107*, 5 June 95, p.12.

Critics maintain that precise rules for completing the downsizing of the ACR have been successfully resisted by high ranking Army officials throughout the transition era.⁸⁶

The Director of Personnel for the ACR General Staff, Colonel Jelik, attributed resistance to change at the MOD and within the General Staff as the primary obstacle blocking the implementation of personnel management reform. The main problem, he explained, is that “competing interests are operating. Activity that is in the best interests of the organization is threatening to other people of a certain age.”⁸⁷ The junior and senior officers have a fundamentally different personal stake in the reform agenda. Officers older than forty want to stay in the system as long as possible because each additional year served increases their military pension benefits which they must live on until they can receive a government pension at age sixty.⁸⁸ Sixty to seventy per cent of these officers are against making any changes that will force voluntary separations.⁸⁹

Colonel Jelik added that while some reform-minded officers are using their influence to move the effort along, they work side by side with “resisters.” Compounding the situation further is the presence of “rehabilitated” officers, the “1968ers” brought back to advise within the MOD. Though politically reliable, these officers, who served in their youth in a completely different era, tend not to appreciate the current problems confronting the ACR. Although good officers have worked on his staff in the development of a personnel management reform plan, their effectiveness depends on an array of factors: support through the chain of command, the amount of independence granted to those working at the top for reform, and the freedom to direct subordinates to implement the plan.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Zaspal, "On the Deplorable State of the Czech Army," *FBIS-EEU-95-189*, 29 September 95, p. 11.

⁸⁷ Josef Jelik, Colonel, Director of Personnel, Czech General Staff, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

⁸⁸ O'Connor interview.

⁸⁹ Jelik interview.

⁹⁰ *ibid.*

In addition to the downsizing of the higher ranks -- righting the inverted pyramid -- the main elements of reform in the promotion and advancement of officers being considered include the development of an officer career pattern, the creation of a professional military education system to support the new career pattern, and the implementation of a new promotion system based on merit based evaluations and centralized promotion boards. The development of a career pattern would establish for the first time concrete requirements for progression through the ranks and eliminate officers who do not progress, thus ensuring a pyramidal officer corps. But it is crucial that a career pattern and the implementation of a merit based promotion system take place simultaneously so that officers who meet the new criteria are evaluated favorably and advance.

Observers agree that time is running out in the implementation of a new career pattern and promotion system. A message must be sent to the younger officers that change is on the way and that their potential for advancement within the ACR is limited only by their ambition and merit. But as MOD bureaucrats and resisters to change continue to stall the process, the clock ticks and the inverted pyramid becomes more distorted by the day as junior officers continue to leave the service. Czech units are staffed at levels of 10 to 60 percent because of the shortage of junior ranking officers.⁹¹ Only 30 percent of the 100 platoon commander posts are filled and company commanders cannot move forward because no replacements are available to back-fill their positions.⁹²

The ACR must present a unified front on an issue that has, at least superficially, the full support of Defense Minister Holan and the government. A critical window of opportunity is at hand. "This moment is a key moment and history will note how difficult it was to fulfill it. If we hesitate, the whole process could be slowed down by several

⁹¹ Zaspal, "On the Deplorable State of the Czech Army," *FBIS-EEU-95-189*, 29 September 95, p. 8.

⁹² Andrew R. Wielkoszewski, Lt. Colonel, US Army Attaché, Czech Republic, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

years. Next year [1996] is an election year and Parliament will be more interested in other things besides the Army.”⁹³

In the Czech case, there is no certainty that the proposed reforms will actually be implemented, but the importance of ensuring continued progress is recognized by many within the government and MOD. Meanwhile, in Russia, recognition that adapting the promotion and advancement system to the norms of democratic states has not yet occurred. Equality of opportunity is a basic value of democratic societies and those who serve democratic states expect that the institutions in which they serve will reflect the democratic values of the state. More importantly, standards of democratic accountability demand that expenditures spent on military personnel result in the most competent force possible to defend the values of the state. Finally, corrupted cronyism, lack of a widely recognized career path, and a priority on job security instead of job performance combine to create a package of disincentives for motivated service to the state.

Officership and Leadership

The aspect of military professionalism most in need of reform due to the infusion of democratic values into post-communist societies is the legacy of authoritarian styles of officership and leadership. In the tsarist system, and later across the Soviet bloc, the role of subjects and citizens of the state was to serve the state. In a democracy, the state exists to make possible the interests of the people whose primary concern is preserving their civil liberties and human rights. Indeed, democratic control of the military is partially dependent on the shared socialization of all citizens, including those in military service, about the principles of democratic values and accountability.⁹⁴ Soldiers in democratic states are conditioned to believe that standards of treatment central to life within their democracy are expected within all societal institutions. These opposite priorities within

⁹³ Jehlik interview.

⁹⁴ *The Chicago Tribune*, “Editorial,” 27 November 95, section 1, p. 14. This editorial in endorsing the firing of an American Navy admiral dismissed for making inappropriate comments regarding the behavior of sailors in Okinawa argued that “Democracies can and should demand principled behavior from those who fight ... America’s flag and star officers must represent American values.”

authoritarian and democratic states result in fundamental differences in relationships between the state and its citizens and among citizens of the different types of states.⁹⁵

Consequently, the core issues of professional officership: *who*, *why*, and *how* an officer serves differ markedly in authoritarian and democratic states. These issues are difficult to address because modification involves changing long practiced behavioral patterns that have come to be associated with “professionalism” as officers in the Soviet bloc knew it. The answers to the *who*, *why*, and *how* questions vary according to the historical position of the military in each case. In the CSPA, the case could be made that an officer’s answer to the question *who* do I serve was, ultimately, himself. Since he could not protect the people of his state from the Soviet Union which essentially controlled the CSPA, the standard motivation of defense of the state was denied the Czechoslovak officer. Serving in the coercive pillar of an illegitimate and less than beloved local Communist regime also denied him the satisfaction of protecting a system of government valued by the population. The answer to the *who* question in the Russian case is more positive because Soviet officers had the satisfaction of serving a state which was the cradle of the world communist movement. The Soviet military was instrumental in the spread of communist ideology which had greater legitimacy among the Soviet people than among the citizens of the allied states in the Warsaw Pact.

The answer to the *why* question was similar to the *who* and *what* questions but also featured an incentive based dimension. Soviet society rewarded its officer corps beyond material levels that most Soviet workers could expect and undoubtedly lured some citizens to serve for this reason as well. Similarly, the CSPA attracted officers who liked the fact that the military was essentially a socialist state within a socialist state. *Why* serve? The response for many was, “because I don’t have to work and I’ll still get paid.”

“Schwejkism” prevailed in the CSPA with the corresponding opportunity to exist by doing

⁹⁵ For a review of the differences in officership and leadership in democratic and Soviet era military institutions, see chapters two and three.

nothing.⁹⁶ In Czechoslovakia, the prime motivation for service in a social institution loathed by the civilians of the state was to have a means of existence within it.

These different motivations for service in an authoritarian state led ultimately to distinct differences in *how* Soviet era officers served which persist today. The abuse of one's position power was prevalent throughout the Soviet system and also characterized the behavior of officers toward their subordinates. "The order of the commander is law" was the phrase stated in armed forces manuals.⁹⁷ Unlimited one-man command continues in the Russian army and has actually become more severe with the removal of the political officers who used to restrict some actions of the commander. Consequently, practices that respect the dignity of each soldier and that are not directed toward suppressing the individual are still absent.⁹⁸ In democratic states laws come from those elected to create them and all citizens are subject to them. No individual's order, even that of a military commander, could override the law of the land.

These contextual factors led to a different concept of leadership among Soviet era officers which persists today and which is negatively affecting the competency of the post-communist armed forces. "The conscript-officer relationship has always been unhealthy and even Soviet era people have acknowledged this as a crucible of corruption."⁹⁹ This was noted especially in the Afghan War when the poor quality of the NCO corps and the poor socialization of troops were identified as key reasons why Soviet troops were performing poorly in a modern battlefield situation.¹⁰⁰ The atrocities committed in Chechnya by Russian troops are evidence that problems of leadership negligence and poor discipline persist today.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ Wielkoszewski interview. The "good soldier" Schwejk is a character from Czech literary fame who embodies the Czech perception of the bungling soldier.

⁹⁷ Anna Bukharova, Major, Scientific Associate (faculty member), Higher Military Humanities College on Scientific and Research Work, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

⁹⁸ Makarin, "The Older Officers Must Make Room for the Younger Ones," *JPRS-UMA-95-025*, 20 June 95, p. 13, 15.

⁹⁹ Bukharova interview.

¹⁰⁰ Wasserman interview.

¹⁰¹ *The Economist*, "Still Bleeding," 10 June 95, p. 44.

The concept of *leadership* as it is understood in the West did not exist within the CSPA or the Soviet Army. Leadership as understood by and taught to US officers has never been and is not currently part of officer development. The concept that “leaders are made and not born” is fundamental to the US system of officer and leader development.¹⁰² The assumption of the American military education and training system is that leadership qualities can and should be taught and that the permeation of these traits across the military institution is essential to its professional competency. Furthermore, the system assumes that democratic values, when appropriate, should be present within military institutions that serve democratic states. With regard to officership and leadership, the proper appropriation of democratic values includes respect for the rule of law and law bound behavior, respect for the individual and non-toleration of the violation of civil liberties and individual human rights, equal opportunity for advancement based on merit, and the positive use of democratic ideology as a motivator for service.

The course of instruction at Russian and Czech military academies in this respect remains unchanged. US Air Force Academy officers who were hosted by the Kachinsky Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots (a Russian military college that trains future fighter pilots) noted the lack of systematic training in leadership as a glaring difference in the approaches between US and Russian military colleges.¹⁰³ The US Army attaché in Prague went so far as to argue that, “there are no traditions of leadership in the Czech military.” Throughout the course of his three year tour he has never come across a single block of training on leadership anywhere.¹⁰⁴ He added that the whole concept of motivation is foreign to them. “Everything is always someone else’s problem. The 2

¹⁰² Chapter two fully develops this point in the presentation of the model of democratic military professionalism.

¹⁰³ David A. Wagie, Colonel, Professor, USAFA, James H. Head, Colonel, Vice Dean, USAFA, and Gerrold G. Heikkinen, Captain, USAFA faculty member, interviews by author, May 1995, USAFA.

¹⁰⁴ Wielkoszewski interview.

percent of ACR officers who have the attitude that their mission is to serve the state have some international experience and are probably natural born leaders.”¹⁰⁵

The primary difference between the Russian and Czech cases on the issue of officership and leadership is that the Czechs recognize that their inherited system is defective and are taking steps to correct it. Senior Czech officers admit that in the past the military’s disregard for individuals serving within it was extreme. One member of the ACR General Staff related that before 1989, when there was a requirement to store all military equipment under roof, at times the equipment lived better than the soldiers whose barracks might go unheated because the fuel was needed to keep the equipment depots warm.¹⁰⁶

Another Czech officer related that besides the top priority of improved living conditions, what officers want most is better leadership. “If they get these two things they might stay in.”¹⁰⁷ A Czech officer who attended the USAF professional military education (PME) course for captains told the US Army attaché upon his return that, “I’ve seen your military and don’t want to go back [to his own].”¹⁰⁸

An incident which occurred within the Czech UNPROFOR forces in March 1995 is indicative of the state of leadership at the unit level in the ACR. An NCO “fragged” or murdered an unpopular officer who held a leadership position within the unit. This incident within the highly touted volunteer United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) unit highlighted the persisting enmity between officers and soldiers. The US trained Czech major who related the story seemed disgraced by the incident involving his countrymen and fellow officer and explained how such a thing could occur, “Most officers don’t know what leadership means.”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Martinek interview.

¹⁰⁷ Krcmar interview.

¹⁰⁸ Czech Lt. Hosa as told to Lt. Colonel Andrew Wielkoszewski and relayed in an interview by author.

¹⁰⁹ Krcmar interview.

An American attaché thought that the incident was also indicative of weaknesses in the officer evaluation system. Officers are judged suitable for advancement and continued service based on the record of psychological examinations which has led to a mentality that effectively equates psychological stability with good officership. Apparently, the “fragged” officer had satisfactory psychological exams and was deemed fit to lead.¹¹⁰ This example demonstrates how a method of evaluating officers devoid of expectations of traits indicative of good leadership can produce stable officers, but not officer leaders.

ACR leadership style could be influenced through a new evaluation system that records development across specific leadership traits and awards ratings accordingly. Such a change is being considered and the leading proposal for a new ACR officer evaluation form features 18 attributes such as “ability to lead subordinates,” “setting the example,” “will to be the best,” and “independence in fulfilling tasks” which can be considered pure officership qualities which are apolitical and intrinsic to merit.¹¹¹ The new proposal differs from the old evaluation form which was a purely narrative form not focused on measuring any specific attributes and which emphasized psycho-cultural aspects of an officer’s personality.

However, not much progress will be made in changing Communist era officer behavior patterns unless those who evaluate and those being evaluated understand the leadership traits being measured. Such a change also requires broad compliance to effect an institution wide impact. Observers worry that compliance at all levels will be difficult to achieve because many officers in the field are resistant to implementing the reform.¹¹²

A meeting with a group of four senior Czech officers from the ACR General Staff, who were graduates of the first Marshall Center class, indicated that Western style leadership traits are becoming more widely known. Before the meeting, I had been warned that one of these officers was a great fan of General Norman Schwarzkopf and

¹¹⁰ Wielkoszewski interview.

¹¹¹ O’Connor interview.

¹¹² *ibid.*

that he had read his book numerous times. This tip alerted me to the possibility of turning the discussion to US style generalship and leadership and the willingness of the Czechs to adapt their ways.

When the opportunity presented itself I asked the alleged Schwartzkopf fan, General Jiri Martinek, what about General Schwartzkopf's leadership style impressed him the most. The Czech general responded that the main lesson he learned from reading the book was that General Schwartzkopf was an officer who perfectly understood the problems of a commander and who never forgot that every subordinate had a family and that one day that soldier might have to leave the family behind. General Martinek added that General Schwartzkopf "understood how to train soldiers and how to live with them, how to live with his own family, and how to actively rest." When asked if such a style of leadership was possible in the ACR, he responded that he did not think that it was so far-fetched for them to achieve, that he understands it and that other reformers also understand it, and that, ultimately, when their transformation is complete, they will achieve it.¹¹³

Though most of the ACR senior leadership, through the benefit of extensive and repeated exposure to Western officers, are beginning to understand the US "leadership concept," beyond this exposure and the individual experiences of the limited number of officers who have participated in IMET courses, most officers "don't know it, haven't been taught it, and don't see it."¹¹⁴ Most officers are used to being told what to do and they understand that either they do it or get chewed out. The MLT Team Chief added that the old leadership style is still prevalent and that, in general, positive motivation is absent and authoritarian styles prevail.¹¹⁵ Although commanders educated in the West are serving in important command and leadership positions, such as the commander of the ACR's elite Western style Rapid Deployment Brigade, the leadership style has

¹¹³ Martinek interview.

¹¹⁴ Dunkelberg interview.

¹¹⁵ O'Connor interview.

fundamentally remained unchanged from the dictatorial top-down leadership style of the past.¹¹⁶ However, a willingness at the top to change from Soviet era leadership practices to norms of leadership expected in advanced democratic states indicates that a greater potential for reform exists in the Czech case.

In Russia, however, many Russians, even some who advocate the need for military reform in other respects, do not recognize the leadership deficit of the Russian officer corps. This argument contends that officer-subordinate relationships are constant across all military institutions and do not change as a result of time or because of a change in the political system.¹¹⁷ But those with experience serving within the military institutions of democracies disagree. Brigadier General Gregory Govan, former US Defense Attaché in Moscow, and a Russian military expert with experience serving as a draftee in the US Army and in observing the treatment of conscripts in Russia made the reverse argument that democracy does make a difference in the treatment of troops.¹¹⁸

In free societies, military institutions created to protect a certain quality of life, tend to reflect these values in the life of the institution. This is a result of their lifelong socialization within a society built on democratic values. US officers involved in planning joint exercises with Russian forces have recognized this blind spot among their Russian counterparts and consciously try to model the positive motivation that characterizes US officership and the attention that is given to quality of life issues for troops participating in such exercises. “We try to show that our commanders actually think about these things -- that it is part of their computations in military planning.”¹¹⁹ The American officer’s observation highlights the disparity in expectations between democratically socialized soldiers and those socialized to expect little from their leaders. But, as democratic values

¹¹⁶ Wielkoszewski interview.

¹¹⁷ Tsygichko interview.

¹¹⁸ Govan interview.

¹¹⁹ Howcroft interview.

take root and become more pervasive, expectations of soldiers in transitional states will also change accordingly. The Czech case is beginning to bear out this hypothesis.

But in the Russian case, Soviet era leadership practices continue virtually unaffected by the change in political system. One indication of poor leadership among Russian officers is the high death rate among conscripts in military service.¹²⁰ A particularly atrocious incident occurred among conscripts serving on Russkiy Island who were allowed to die of starvation. The commander in this case was eventually relieved of his command, but was never brought up on criminal charges. It is unclear, though, whether the commander in question was reprimanded over the incident of emaciation or because he opposed a commission set up to investigate his corrupt behavior involving the sale of MOD property.¹²¹

Perhaps the greatest evidence of leadership practices devoid of any appreciation of human rights is the persistence of *dedovschina*, or hazing, in the Russian military.¹²² The number of reported incidents increased markedly in 1994, but official statistics do not accurately portray the problem since commanders are still more likely to conceal than to report incidents in their units.¹²³ The system of disciplining through corporal punishment and allowing unsupervised harassment in the conscript ranks is related to both the detached leadership styles of commanders who permit the practice to continue and to the warped sense of interpersonal relations brought to military service by the conscripts themselves who perpetuate the behavior against each other. This pattern of mistreating conscripts, sometimes to the point of death, is evidently another blind spot of many in

¹²⁰ According to Ministry of Defense statistics, in the first 8 months of 1993, 1222 servicemen died. Twenty five percent of these deaths were attributed to suicide. Ministry of Defense officials reported that 518 deaths, including 74 officers, occurred in the first 6 months of 1994. See *US Department of State Dispatch*, February 1994, which reported on Russian human rights practices in 1993. See also *US Department of State Dispatch*, March 1995, which reported on Russian human rights practices in 1994.

¹²¹ Justice interview.

¹²² *US Department of State Dispatch*, March 1995.

¹²³ Anatoliy Muranov, Colonel-General of Justice, . "A Current Theme: A Law Against Dedovshchina." interview by Ivan Ivanyuk, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 1 September 95, p. 2. *FBIS-IMA-95-187-S*, 27 September 95, p. 7-9.

Russian society. “Kids and mothers are against it, but not really the people at large. We in the West play it up a lot more than it matters in Russia.”¹²⁴ Another Western expert noted, “They’ve tried to stop it, but it’s too cultural.”¹²⁵

The main group advocating reform in this area is the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers although other human rights groups have also been active in trying to eliminate the practice.¹²⁶ Before the war in Chechnya, the top goal of the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers was to eliminate hazing. The group’s goal is to force commanders to take responsibility for incidents in their units, to prevent the malnourishment of soldiers, to pressure the MOD not to accept soldiers unfit for service, and for the MOD to be generally more responsive to the inquiries of the Committee.¹²⁷

The mothers try to work directly with commanders and with the MOD. But the mothers have found that many commanders are indifferent to the problem and that the MOD refuses to address the problem systematically. “If a commander happens to be a good one, then the mothers can have a good relationship with him, but many allow the hazing to continue. Commanders think that hazing is convenient for them -- it maintains discipline. It’s much easier to let it go than to try to fix the problem.”¹²⁸ Meanwhile the MOD has failed to lay out any negative consequences for commanders who allow the practice to persist.

The mothers have tried to pressure the MOD by lobbying their allies in the Duma to hold hearings on the topic which only highlighted the MOD’s unwillingness to respond to the problem. The lead general sent to the hearing was very antagonistic and did not even try to address the problem. Others presented false statistics and made inane comments like, “See, a lot of officers are getting killed too.” Or, “We’re not the only ministry with problems.” But even the involvement of parliamentary committees has done

¹²⁴ Nelson interview.

¹²⁵ Rokke interview.

¹²⁶ *US Department of State Dispatch*, March 1995.

¹²⁷ Kwiecien interview.

¹²⁸ *ibid.* See also *US Department of State Dispatch*, March 1995.

little to alleviate the problem. The hearings are not televised and nothing ever seems to come of them. The committee can make a report, but has no executive authority to take any greater steps.¹²⁹

Possible solutions to the *dedovschina* problem include stationing conscripts closer to home where it is more likely that parents can monitor their son's status, stationing soldiers in units of similar ethnic, geographic, and social origins to reduce the possibility of tensions between troops and increase accountability among troops returning to the same cities after their service. Those who support this solution contend that the problem was able to persist so long because Marxist-Leninism taught that interpersonal conflicts within the military were impossible. When they happened, military leaders denied that a problem existed.¹³⁰

However, the best solution is to demand higher standards of leadership and to reform the system of leader development so that conscripts understand what behavior is acceptable and so that commanders learn how to enforce and model increased standards of interpersonal relations.¹³¹ The institution of an NCO corps charged with leadership responsibilities would also be a major step toward solving the *dedovschina* problem and raising the competency level of the Russian military in general.¹³² "The problem is that all officers are professionals and all conscripts are not professional. Officers, by definition, cannot perform an NCO's function because they have no enlisted experience."¹³³ Russian conscripts have no NCO role models, empathizers, or teachers and no means of leadership between themselves and their officers. Western observers agree that the lack of

¹²⁹ Kwiecien interview.

¹³⁰ Zhelezov interview.

¹³¹ Some Russian military leaders who do not think that foreign models are relevant to reform in any other respect make an exception for the idea of creating an NCO corps to raise the combat capability of troops through the infusion of technical expertise and leadership. See Igor Rodionov, Colonel-General. "An Alternative: After Chechnya: A New Turning Point in the Reform of the Armed Forces or a Repeat of Past Mistakes?" *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 9 February 95, p. 3. *JPRS-UMA-95-007*, 21 February 95, p. 15.

¹³² *US Department of State Dispatch*, March 1995.

¹³³ John C. Reppert, Brigadier General, former US assistant army attaché US Embassy Moscow and US Defense Attaché to Moscow designate, July 1995-. interview by author, May 1995, the Pentagon.

NCOs is a tremendous disadvantage with regard to the leadership quotient of the Russian armed forces and stems from a culture that neither appreciates the needs of individuals or able to self-identify this particular democratic deficit. “Exploiters of troops would not have a future in an NCO system.”¹³⁴

The mistreatment of conscripts in the Czech case has not yet been eradicated and according to the chairman of the Union of Military Youth, Corporal Miroslav Mejdr, half the young men who go to serve in the ACR are afraid of hazing.¹³⁵ Defense Minister Holan referenced the negative feeling that common knowledge of the practice conjures up in the public’s mind when he promised to “ease the fears of mothers whose sons currently serve” as one of his goals upon taking office.¹³⁶

As in Russia, Czech observers attribute the persistence of the practice to the absence of an NCO corps and to the combined effect of the officer drawdown and the misinterpretation of democracy in the ranks. Officers about to be cut had little concern about the disciplinary state of their command while those serving under them assumed that the new democratic CSA and, later, the ACR would not require the strict discipline of the past.¹³⁷

The ACR leadership has realized the importance of building an NCO corps to fill the leadership vacuum between the officers and the conscripts, but faces an uphill battle in convincing enough conscripts to stay on for another three to five years to serve as platoon commanders. The US MLT Team Chief related an anecdote about how one ACR general came to value the idea of having NCOs in the unit. He said that the general realized that such a person with individual responsibility over the troops might be able to reduce the destruction of equipment and facilities that routinely takes place when the troops go

¹³⁴ *ibid.*

¹³⁵ Tomas Kellner, “Army Targets Hazing Ritual,” *Prague Post*, 7 March 1995, p. 1.

¹³⁶ Richard Byrne Reilly, “With Its Chief Out, Where Is the Czech Army Headed?” *Prognosis*, 8 October 94, p. 8. *FBIS-EEU-94-222*, 17 November 94, p. 9.

¹³⁷ Sternod interview.

unsupervised.¹³⁸ While this newfound motivation may not spring from hearts of commanders who have suddenly been converted to the cause of taking an interest in and caring for their troops, any movement toward inserting a professional NCO to serve as a junior leader between the officers and the conscripts would be a step toward achieving the goal of improved leadership.

Unfortunately, in Russia no discussions of potential military reforms address this issue. Motivation for professionalization of the force is to increase its technical competency -- not to improve the broken leadership system. Russian military leaders in their contacts with Western militaries have been impressed by the great amount of responsibility given to Western NCOs and would like to have professionals in their force with such levels of expertise, but all such plans that have been tried in the past, the *proposhik* and warrant officer systems and the contract servicemen systems, have not involved giving these more highly trained enlisted men responsibility for controlling troops that even comes close to the power still reserved for officers. Indeed, the contract servicemen fighting in Chechnya have been implicated in the worst brutalities there and are considered to be little more than mercenary ex-convicts incapable of instilling leadership in troops.¹³⁹

Soviet standards of ethical behavior also contribute to the democratic deficit of military professionalism among Russian officers. In the Soviet system, where direct salary compensation was low, a premium was placed on protecting such assets as information and friends. Contacts, were and continue to be, in the post-communist era of near hyperinflation, Russians' lifeline for all valuable commodities in life. The habit of circumventing established procedures, many of which are now codified in the rule of law, to procure one's wants also characterizes the behavior of many Russian officers who put a

¹³⁸ O'Connor interview.

¹³⁹ *The Economist*. "Chechnya: Still Bleeding". p. 44.

higher priority on taking advantage of every lucrative opportunity than following the standards of democratic accountability.¹⁴⁰

US military observers report that training in professional ethics is neither formalized at military colleges nor emphasized as an expected character trait of officers. US Air Force Academy officials noted that cadets at the Kachinsky Higher Military Aviation College were shocked that US academies had honor codes.¹⁴¹ A separate group of American cadets reported, in their discussions with Czech cadets, that a premium is not placed on the instruction of honor or ethics nor is there an honor code.¹⁴² “They’re not taught anything about this at all. Whatever it takes to accomplish the mission is OK at the top. It’s better for an officer out in the field not to whine about inadequate resources [that is to get the resources needed through any possible means].”¹⁴³ Corruption is widespread and widely known to exist within the Russian military. “It is known that Dudayev got weapons from Russian military sources and that high military circles use their influence to gain riches. Much of the money put in the budget to improve officers’ salaries was never seen by them.”¹⁴⁴

This section has highlighted the need for leadership and officership in both the Czech Republic and Russia that is characterized by accountability to democratic values, respect for human rights, stewardship of the public trust, and ethical behavior. Such reforms will not only make the transitioning militaries better reflectors of their transitioning democratic societies, but lead to increased competence as a military institution due to the adaptation of more effective leadership styles. These reforms, however, must be accompanied by a simultaneous change in the education and training

¹⁴⁰ The issue of corruption in post-communist military institutions and in society at large is dealt with more thoroughly in chapter five.

¹⁴¹ US officers reported that the Russian cadets were interested in what the consequences of violations were and were amazed that disenrollment may be the designated punishment. The Commandant at the Russian academy asked the student body if they would like such a system implemented at Kachinsky and the cadets laughed as if such a concept was an impossibility. Head interview.

¹⁴² Brittany Stuart, Cadet, US Air Force Academy, Interview by author, May 1995, USAFA.

¹⁴³ Howcroft interview.

¹⁴⁴ Tsygichko interview.

system to teach these desired qualities. Like so many other aspects of reform, success depends on supportive measures being carried out concurrently in other areas.

Education and Training

A key component in the democratic professionalization of post-communist militaries is the reform of their education and training systems. It is in this aspect of an officer's career that professional socialization occurs and when an awareness of professional expectations develops. Military professionals in training acquire the technical expertise they will need to perform their craft as well as the cultural norms of their caste in society. It is through a series of these formative educational experiences that officers are taught the answers to the key questions of military service: *who why*, and *how* they serve. As the discussion of the democratization of officership and leadership styles illustrated, even the answer to the question *how* an officer serves changes as the ideological character of the state changes.

A key question in the post-Soviet era regarding the education and training system of the post-communist militaries is how this system is adapting to the vast ideological changes which have taken place within the state. A brief examination in changes taking place in the curriculum of military colleges and of the ongoing struggle to reach a consensus on what should comprise the content of ideological training will help illuminate the evolution of this particular aspect of the cases' democratic deficit.

Fundamental change in the approach to developing future officers through the military education system has not yet occurred in either case. The plan for reform of the military education system in Russia assumes that the historical experience and traditions of training officers cadres are rich and unchangeable.¹⁴⁵ Those directing the reform profess

¹⁴⁵ Gennadiy Radionov, Lt. General, "Military Education Today and Tomorrow," *Orientir* no. 9 (September 1994), pp. 3-8. *JPRS-UMA-94-043*, 26 October 94, pp. 9-10. Lt. General Radionov is the Russian Federation MOD Military Education Directorate Chief.

that any changes will rely on this model which needs only to be qualitatively improved.¹⁴⁶ There has not been a shift away from the technical specialization approach to officer education which contrasts with the US's method of training generalists who specialize later on in their careers. However, in Russia, a major component of the MOD education reform plan adopted in 1993 is to extend the period of training at military schools from four to five years in order to allow time to acquire a civilian specialty. This change will raise the social protection of officers by providing them with qualifications recognized in the military and which meet the state standards for civilian professionals.¹⁴⁷ But, curriculums remains very rigid with no electives and an emphasis on memorization.¹⁴⁸ In the Czech Republic, a military education and training reform plan released by the MOD in August 1995 merges the three remaining military academies into a single institution and shows a willingness to forge new ties with civilian institutions, but the plan does not indicate any substantive changes in the general content or approach to military education.¹⁴⁹

While the overall approach to undergraduate military education has not changed, there is some evidence that there have been some positive changes in the teaching of courses in the social sciences which shape cadets' attitudes toward the role of the military in society and in which cadets learn about their transitioning political system. An exchange of letters with the head of the Social Sciences department at the Kachinsky

¹⁴⁶ Yuriy Goncharov, "In the Channel of Renewal: Concept of Development of a System of Military Education of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation," *Orientir* no. 9 (September 94), pp. 58-62. *JPRS-UMA-94-043*, 26 October 94, p. 12.

¹⁴⁷ Gennadiy Radionov, Lt. General, "Two Educations -- For One Higher Educational Institution Course of Study," interview by Oleg Vladykin *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 15 December 94, p. 2. *JPRS-UMA-95-001*, 11 January 95, p. 17.

¹⁴⁸ Members of a US Air Force Academy delegation who visited a Russian military college in April 1995 reported that their hosts showed them yellowed lesson plans indicating that change had not occurred in those particular courses for some time. The overall message received by the American officers was that the administration of the college was overwhelmed by budgetary problems that had left the institution in disrepair and that the lack of available funds was the institutional excuse for lack of change. Wagie, Head, and Heikkinen interviews.

¹⁴⁹ *Denni Telegraf*, "The Army Will Prepare a 'Defense University'." 24 August 95, p. 2. *FBIS-EEU-95-166*, 28 August 95, p. 12.

Higher Military Aviation School revealed some telling insights into the problem of giving cadets the ideological grounding needed to serve as military officers.

Lt. Colonel Yuri Runaev commented upon reviewing the curriculum which I sent him outlining how the US Air Force Academy trains cadets in political science that the American academy defends too strongly the American political system and “propagandizes” American cadets on the correctness of democracy. “All of us have our own definite opinions and political positions, but we don’t impose on the cadets a particular system of ideas.”¹⁵⁰ At Kachinsky, Marxist-Leninism is taught side by side with democratic capitalism and cadets are not taught that they have a particular obligation to defend one political system over the other. Still absent is instruction that can help the future officer understand *who*, *why*, or *how* he/she serves as a military professional in service to a democratic state.

Of course the danger in this is that military officers in democratic states do not have the choice of defending the political system of their choice. They are the protectors of one type of political system -- as imperfect as it may be -- democracy. While American cadets certainly are free to learn about anything they want, an institutional responsibility of all commissioning sources is to ensure that graduating cadets understand, respect, and are motivated to defend the American political system.¹⁵¹ Additionally, cadets must understand the principle of democratic civilian control of the armed forces and the proper role of the military in politics and society at large.

Observers argue that instruction in the social sciences will be limited by the dogmatic training of the professors in this area, most of whom have been carried over from the Soviet era. The great majority of those in charge of incorporating new ideas into the social science curriculum of Russian military colleges are former professors of

¹⁵⁰ Yuri Runaev, Lt. Colonel, Head, Social Science Department, Kachinsky Higher Military Aviation College, Volgograd, Russia. Correspondence received by the author in August 1995.

¹⁵¹ By the way, I explained all this in my reply to Lt. Col. Runaev. Perhaps the contacts made in the writing of this dissertation will actually help change for the better the course of democratic military professionalization in Russia.

Marxist-Leninism.¹⁵² In the Czech Republic the former "politruks," whose careers were based on boundless loyalty to the KSC (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), still rule the military schools and control the teaching of political science.¹⁵³ A Russian journalist related that after he used the term "paternal state" in one of his articles referring to the former Soviet Union and Russia that he received twenty to thirty letters from political scientists at military academies complaining that "paternal state" is a feature of the relationship between capitalism and society. "Even if they are not so devoted to Communist ideas any longer, they are too dogmatic in their thinking to really change much."¹⁵⁴

In neither case do commissioning sources actively embrace the promotion of democratic values or allegiance to a democratic constitution. In the Czech Republic, Marxist-Leninism has disappeared, but its replacement has been some study of comparative political systems and Czech history with a nationalist emphasis.¹⁵⁵ This may be attributed to a delayed understanding of how to practically implement curriculum changes to reflect the democratic values that have been adopted by society as a whole. The Czechs must learn that the abandonment of Marxist-Leninist ideology does not necessarily mean that democratic ideology will fill the vacuum.

In the Russian case, the continued prevalence of Marxist-Leninism as a legitimate choice suggests that there is no accord on the permanence of democratic institutions. While the Russian military professor advocated his institution's support of multiple political systems as the more libertine approach to military education, such behavior indicates his uncertainty about what institutions will ultimately prevail in Russia and perhaps his personal hedge against an uncertain future. This new reserve in giving cadets

¹⁵² Alexander Golz, reporter for *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star-- the main military newspaper), interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

¹⁵³ Zaspal, "On the Deplorable State of the Czech Army," *FBIS-EEU-95-189*, 29 September 95, pp. 8-9.

¹⁵⁴ Golz interview.

¹⁵⁵ Lord interview.

answers to the *for whom* and *for what* questions may be explained by a lack of consensus on what the best response to these questions might be. It is also indicative of the fluidity of power in Russia and an unwillingness by those beholden to multiple sources of power to advocate the supremacy of any single political ideology. In advanced democratic states, such as the US, military cadets may hold varying political views, but they are taught that challenging the Constitution, except through accepted procedures, is not acceptable. This tripwire against legitimate military involvement in politics is completely absent in the Russian case and perilously left unstated in the Czech case.

Beyond the system of military colleges, much of the ideological shaping and socializing was done by the political officers. The position of political officer has been completely eliminated in the Czech case. However, in Russia the continuing need for officers specializing in the ideological training and socialization of Russian troops has been recognized. "When we made the inclination toward the de-ideologization of the armed forces we committed a mistake. We spoke about the liquidation of party influence and therefore were convinced that this idea was correct absolutely. The smashing of the communist ideology, though, left a big vacuum which is very dangerous and which was started to be filled by Zhirinovskiy and others."¹⁵⁶ As a result, the former Lenin Military Political Academy which used to specialize in the training of political officers for the Soviet military has been renamed and redesigned to train the political officer's counterpart in the post-communist era -- the "educational" officer.¹⁵⁷

The observation by many that the Russian military lost its orientation when political officers stopped working has led to the development of a general consensus that some political training in the military should continue. "A man with no tsar in the head doesn't know what to do," remarked one Russian military observer.¹⁵⁸ Additionally,

¹⁵⁶ Nikita Chaldimov, General, Chief Deputy of the Commandant of the Higher Military Humanities College, the former Lenin Military Political Academy, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

¹⁵⁷ The current name is The Military University.

¹⁵⁸ Pirumov interview.

when political officers were eliminated many of their non-ideological duties such as looking after the morale and welfare of the troops have gone unfulfilled by others. The new educational officers are intended to fill these gaps with their primary task being the “orientation” of the troops or the so-called “upbringing” of the soldiers.¹⁵⁹ Other tasks will include information-psychological support, military-social and cultural-leisure activities, and serving as liaisons to religious groups.¹⁶⁰

The problem is, however, that there is still not a consensus on what this new orientation should be. Faculty at the reshaped educational officer academy in Moscow agree that military personnel who take up arms should be convinced of *for whom* and *for what* he or she is serving, but those responsible for answering these questions are falling back on “the Motherland” as the motivation for post-communist servicemen and servicewomen in Russia. “A specific characteristic of Russian history is to be devoted to the Motherland. In the very difficult Russian history a constant was the Motherland.”¹⁶¹ Lt. General Sergey Zdorikov, Chief of the MOD Main Educational Work Directorate, stated that the position of his department and the Army is clear, “We serve not leaders, but the state. We are responsible to the people.”¹⁶²

Those who settle on the Motherland for the object of one’s loyalties must answer the question “which Motherland?” Should Russian soldiers dedicate themselves to defending the boundaries of the present day Russian Federation or the territory of the former Soviet Union where many Russians live in the near-abroad? This approach to service is flawed if defense of the state does not include the defense of democratic institutions. Indeed, such an approach can lead to defending the dismantling of democratic

¹⁵⁹ Bukharova interview.

¹⁶⁰ Sergey Zdorikov, Lt. General, Chief of Russian Federation MOD Main Educational Work Directorate, “Just What Ideology Does the Russian Army Need Today?” interview by Vasiliy Semenov, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 8 September 95, pp. 1-2. *FBIS-UMA-95-192-S*, 4 October 95, p. 2.

¹⁶¹ Bukharova interview.

¹⁶² Zdorikov, “Just What Ideology Does the Russian Army Need Today?” *FBIS-UMA-95-192-S*, 4 October 95, p. 3.

institutions if the perception of the military leadership is that such institutions run counter to the people's interest.

There is not as much enthusiasm for focusing on serving a democratic state because the "democratic Motherland hasn't given its children anything that would inspire them to give something back to it. Americans may say that they serve to defend the Constitution, democracy and rights that they have, but Russians don't feel any such obligation to the democratic state yet."¹⁶³ So, in the short term at least, the ideological training of Russian troops as guided by newly minted educational officers will feature a heavy dose of Russian history and traditions with a smattering of training on democratic principles. The foundation of the "new ideology," General Zdorikov professed, must be "Statehood, Patriotism, and Professionalism."¹⁶⁴ However, Zdorikov, the general responsible for coordinating the new educational work, had no objections to officers running for and serving in the State Duma.¹⁶⁵

Meanwhile, in the Czech Republic, the question of ideological reorientation is being virtually ignored and is related to confusion over what role, if any, democratic values should play in the transition of Czech military forces. Czechs have placed a high priority on the "professionalization" of their military and credit the time recouped from the performance of ideological tasks to making this "new professionalism" possible. As a result, ideology has been thrown out completely and no ideological reorientation is occurring.¹⁶⁶ Marxist-Leninism has not been replaced by democracy -- political ideology has simply disappeared. "There's no time to worry about *who* or *why* they serve."¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Bukharova interview.

¹⁶⁴ Zdorikov, "Just What Ideology Does the Russian Army Need Today?" *FBIS-UMA-95-192-S*, 4 October 95, p. 3.

¹⁶⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ USAFA cadets visiting the Czech military academy at Brno noted that the cadets they came in contact with did not cite service to country as a primary motivator for enrollment at the military academy. No prime ideological reasons were cited. Stuart interview.

¹⁶⁷ Sternod interview.

Professionalism and ideological orientation are considered two unrelated concepts that can be addressed sequentially -- time permitting.

The misinterpretation and subsequent misappropriation of democratic values to military life is also evident through behavior observed at the remaining Czech military academies. US Air Force Academy cadets who visited the ACR military academy at Brno on a week long cadet exchange visit in March of 1995 reported that discipline was lax and practically non-existent there. The explanation they received was that the behavior was a reaction to the strictness of the days under Communism and stemmed from the equating of discipline with authoritarianism. The US cadets also reported that, in the spirit of democracy, Czech cadets elect the Superintendent and the Commandant and can even approve teachers which puts these authorities in a difficult position to enforce standards.¹⁶⁸

The Czech Defense attaché to the United States agreed that the compatibility of democracy and discipline is a lesson which has been lost on many associated with the ACR. Through the course of his assignment in the US he has visited both the US Military Academy at West Point and the US Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs. "We need many more people to go and see what discipline looks like there." He added, that he thought his colleagues would be surprised at what they see and that, "If we want to be in NATO, we will need this discipline."¹⁶⁹ However, others fear that stricter disciplinary standards will reduce interest in the military academies further which are currently only filled to 50 percent capacity.¹⁷⁰

The final topic addressed in this discussion of democratic deficits as they relate to patterns of education and training will focus on Professional Military Education (PME). PME is defined as education that recurs throughout a professional soldier's career and is

¹⁶⁸ Robert B. Russell, David Nilles, and Brittany Stuart, Cadets, US Air Force Academy, interviews by author, USAFA, May 1995.

¹⁶⁹ Giesl interview.

¹⁷⁰ Statement made in MOD briefing by Deputy Director of Education and Head of University Level Education on Czech military reform presented to visiting American Colonels from the US Air War College, March 1995.

normally focused on preparation for a specific rank or technical specialty. The IMET program has afforded the Russians and Czechs, as well as their post-communist neighbors, the opportunity to attend various PME courses in the US and in some NATO countries. But of the cases presented in this study, only the Czech Republic has taken full advantage of exposing its officers to the West's broad based approach to officership through this program.

However, the PME system predominant in the ACR is the technical-based system inherited from the Communist era. No significant adjustments to this system have been made.¹⁷¹ While attendance at Western, and especially US, PME programs has become an important discriminator in a Czech officer's record, a comparable program has not yet developed internally for the vast majority of officers who will never be selected to study in the West.¹⁷² More importantly, the lessons learned abroad effectively do little to change the face of the ACR unless a similar PME lessons are systematized in the Czechs' own system.

The development of some semblance of an NCO corps also depends on the creation of an education and training system that prepares servicemen for these ranks and their corresponding responsibilities. The only system that the ACR has in place along these lines is the military high school system that the CSPA and CSA used to train its few warrant officers. However, it is now thought that it is better to delay this training which usually took place between the ages of fifteen and eighteen.¹⁷³

Some Czech reformers are debating in favor of revamping the whole system in order to achieve their goal of developing a semi-professional ACR. There is no talk of abandoning the conscript based system, but there is the hope that some young Czechs can

¹⁷¹ Zaspal, "On the Deplorable State of the Czech Army," *FBIS-EEU-95-189*, 29 September 95, pp. 7-8.

¹⁷² Dunkelberg interview.

¹⁷³ Statement made in MOD briefing by Deputy Director of Education and Head of University Level Education on Czech military reform presented to visiting American Colonels from the US Air War College, March 1995.

be attracted to serving as “professionals” within the semi-professional ACR. This proposal would have all potential officers and NCOs beginning their military service as conscripts, subsequently serve as NCOs, and then those willing and able could progress on to university level officer commissioning programs. The theory is that attrition at the commissioning schools could be reduced if the cadets had prior military experience.¹⁷⁴ However, it also assumes that service in the lower ranks will make a positive impression on the future officer candidates and that the training provided there will be considered an attractive alternative to other vocational type training available in the civilian sector.

Reformed education and training programs are a crucial element in the democratization and professionalization of both the ACR and the Russian military. Without such a system in place, it is unlikely that any reform agenda will be successful. The hallmarks of professionalism are learned in the formative experience of a military academy or in the hands-on military training of an NCO. A broad education in which democratic values are taught and internalized so that officers and NCOs, and conscripts for that matter, know *who*, *why*, and *how* to serve is an essential prerequisite for both democratic military professionalism and competency. Reform is also necessary for the boosting of the institution’s prestige as a whole and of the educational institutions that serve it.

Norms of Political Influence

There are some similarities between the Czech and Russian cases with respect to understanding what the norms of acceptable political behavior and influence are for a military in a democratic state. The lack of experience of being a player in democratic

¹⁷⁴ *ibid.*

processes affects both cases; however, the Russian military lags markedly behind the Czechs because it has not yet fully accepted its role in the new political order.

Russia has made only limited progress toward creating an apolitical military and setting up institutional safeguards to prevent the use of coercive force by political leaders intent on gaining or maintaining power. The Russian Armed Forces remain, in essence, the old Soviet Armed Forces -- an institution traumatized by the breakup of the USSR and coexisting uneasily with the new political order.¹⁷⁵

The Russian military's trauma is increasingly being played out by its inappropriate participation in the election process. While many officers still adhere to the idea that apolitical behavior is a hallmark of military professionalism,¹⁷⁶ others are endorsing a more direct political role.¹⁷⁷ The All-Russian Officers' Assembly created in the first half of 1995 is led by some of the top plotters of the 1991 coup. The movement's aim is to seek the support of active duty officers, reservists, and sympathetic civilians to support candidates of Communist, agrarian, and nationalist blocs.¹⁷⁸ Additionally, every major political party or bloc has recruited a senior officer to serve in its leadership¹⁷⁹ to help sway the military vote which is estimated to account for one-third of the nation's registered voters.¹⁸⁰

Even more disturbing is the endorsement by the MOD of a slate of 123 officers, many of them still on active duty, to run for office in the December 1996 parliamentary

¹⁷⁵ James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, *The Russian Military's Role in Politics* (Mc Nair Paper 34) (Washington DC: National Defense University, January 1995), pp. 3-4.

¹⁷⁶ A Russian journalist who accompanied a group of visitors from London to a Russian military college reported that the British delegation was shocked when the chief of the college told them that no version of political science was taught there. The chief justified this curriculum decision by saying, "The Army is not involved in politics." Golz interview.

¹⁷⁷ The Chairman of the All-Russian Officers' Assembly defended his movement by saying, "The army is an instrument of politics, so it should take part in the fate of our country." Deborah Seward, "Former Soviet Generals Vow to Oppose Yeltsin in Parliamentary Vote," *AP Worldstream*, 17 August 1995.

¹⁷⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Anatoliy Verbin, "Russian Generals March in Parliamentary Campaign," *Reuters*, 3 October 95.

¹⁸⁰ This estimate includes the military-industrial complex, pensioners, and relatives of active duty forces. Carey Scott, "Russian Army Drafted for Vote Rigging Duty," *Sunday Times*, 1 October 95.

elections.¹⁸¹ Even Grachev, himself, indicated a desire to run and authorized the collection of signatures on his behalf to qualify.¹⁸² In some cases, officers from the official MOD slate were ordered to run against retired officers, such as General Boris Gromov, who have fallen out of favor with Grachev and the Ministry.¹⁸³ Officers' participation in elections dates to the first Russian elections, when civilian candidates allied with officer candidates in an effort to woo the military vote.¹⁸⁴ The December 1993 Constitution does not allow serving officers to sit in the Duma, but there is no prohibition against becoming candidates.¹⁸⁵ Observers worry that the MOD intends to circumvent the ban by allowing active duty officers to assume an inactive status while in Parliament with the understanding that they may return to active duty when their terms are up. These officers would consequently continue to have institutional incentives to heed the MOD's policies and interests in order to spare punishment when they returned to their military posts.¹⁸⁶

Observers worry further that the MOD will attempt to deliver some of the military vote to assist Chernomyrdin's bloc. According to one ministry source, "Grachev knows only too well that if he doesn't get the votes in, he's finished...Commanders will simply be told to deliver, say, 48 percent to Chernomyrdin. If they don't, they'll be out."¹⁸⁷ Experts agree that soldiers would never vote for Chernomyrdin on their own since the government

¹⁸¹ Verbin, "Russian Generals March in Parliamentary Campaign", *Reuters*, 3 October 95.

¹⁸² Yulia Kalinina, "Khaki-Colored Duma," *Moskovsky Komsomolets*, pp. 1-4, 11 October 95. Obtained through the *Russian Press Digest*.

¹⁸³ A Russian newspaper reported that in the district where Gromov is running the commander of the local military school was ordered to nominate himself to run against Gromov. The commander complied.

Kalinina, "Khaki-Colored Duma," Obtained through the *Russian Press Digest*.

¹⁸⁴ Natalie Gross-Hassman, "A Military Coup in Russia?: Prospects and Constraints," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 7, no. 11, (1 November 95), p. 493.

¹⁸⁵ Verbin, "Russian Generals March in Parliamentary Campaign," *Reuters*, 3 October 95.

¹⁸⁶ Kalinina, "Khaki-Colored Duma," Obtained through the *Russian Press Digest*.

¹⁸⁷ Scott, "Russian Army Drafted for Vote Rigging Duty," *Sunday Times*, 1 October 95.

is blamed for the continuation of the military's dire problems.¹⁸⁸ In 1993, deputies who had good contacts with local generals were well supported because "soldiers will vote how officers tell them."¹⁸⁹ In addition, commanders can control which political blocs have access to garrisons to promote their platforms and candidates.¹⁹⁰ The isolation of many military bases will also make it possible for the military to control closed areas and deliver the vote.¹⁹¹

The alliance building between the military and its civilian leadership that used to be based on accommodating the army's demands in exchange for subjugation to Party rule seems increasingly to have shifted to the political arena in the democratization era. However, the military candidates and blocs do not profess a unified agenda. Some, like the All-Russian Officers' Assembly are opposed to the democratic and economic reforms that have taken place and seek to roll them back. Others, such as General Lev Rokhlin, are centrists who support the current government.¹⁹² Still others are tied to the singular interests of the MOD which has the aim of increasing the defense budget and improving the living conditions of soldiers without significantly reforming the MOD itself. Some justify the increased direct political involvement as fulfilling their duty to ensure that the problems of the armed forces are adequately addressed in order to protect the state.¹⁹³ Such rationalizing is the result of the evolution of post-communist military professionalism within a context of ambiguous ideological allegiance. Loyalty to the Motherland has been

¹⁸⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ *The Financial Times*, "Military Vote Uncertain," 12 May 95.

¹⁹⁰ Anatoliy Stasovskiy, "The Army and the Elections," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 2 September 95, p. 1. *FBIS-UMA-95-187-S*, 27 September 95, p. 5.

¹⁹¹ Scott, "Russian Army Drafted for Vote Rigging Duty", *Sunday Times*, 1 October 95

¹⁹² *The Economist*, "A Real General Election," p. 44.

¹⁹³ Kalinina, "Khaki-Colored Duma," Obtained through the *Russian Press Digest*.

preserved as the ideological point of consensus from the communist era. Clearly, allegiance to democratic norms of political participation for soldiers has not yet taken root -- especially when adherence to such norms may be perceived as contrary to the interests of the Motherland as understood by the military. Though some officers still profess that an apolitical, professional military should be the norm, their views are being overshadowed by activists who have decided that this goal should be subordinate to restoring the honor of the armed forces and the state.

The Czech Republic, in contrast, has not been plagued by any rumblings from the ACR for direct participation in politics. The Czech deficit in democratic norms of political influence is characterized more by an unwillingness to participate in politics even by legitimate means and stems from a lack of experience in the political process. There are several levels on which progress needs to be made. First, the ACR must become more astute at putting its own political house in order by developing processes through which ideas can compete openly and freely between the ranks, the General Staff, and the MOD. Second, members of the military institution in authoritative and expert positions need to more assertively develop positive working relationships with the direct oversight bodies in Parliament and with the population at large which has indirect oversight authority through its elected representatives.

Additionally, the attitude that equates professional officers with completely apolitical beings does not recognize the proper amount of political savvy and awareness that is not only appropriate, but essential, to a military institution in a democracy. Although Huntington extols apolitical military officers as the purest professionals, such a

view does not take into account the degree of lobbying and the political transmission of expert advice that is needed from time to time to ensure that civilian national security policymakers make well-informed judgments.

The evidence presented in the section on education and training showed that military academicians at military colleges in both the Czech Republic and Russia are struggling with this issue. Indeed, the first question put to me in my correspondence with a faculty member from a Russian military college on the subject of teaching political science at military schools was, “It seems that the American Armed Forces have a political role in your country, but why do we hear that the Army of the USA is outside of politics? How is it possible to explain this?”¹⁹⁴

The Russian military’s confusion stems, at least partially, from its reluctant involvement by political actors in political feuds. The Russian military was averse to taking sides in Yeltsin’s fight with Parliament in October 1993, but ultimately participated in order to preserve order in the capital. The use of the military for such roles is dangerous for states in transition, because a certain amount of indebtedness to the military is created which may distort the military’s perception of what norms of political influence it must adhere to in a democracy. The military may expect rewards for its behavior which go beyond what military institutions whose coercive powers had not been called upon would expect.

There is evidently still a lot of confusion about the proper role of the military institution in the democratic political process. One observer explained, “The problem up to now has been that in general neither the military nor society at large understands the

¹⁹⁴ Runaev correspondence.

political process. On the institutional level, few people understand political decision making or legislative procedures.”¹⁹⁵ If the military leadership wants to ensure that its institution does not become involved in political conflicts, then it must provide the means for those serving in the armed forces to attain an understanding of the political process and what the proper role of soldiers is *vis-à-vis* the democratic state. It is not good enough for the military to get comfortable with being an apolitical institution if behaviors associated with this status are not also understood. Transitioning militaries must also understand the political processes happening around them and develop institutional practices that are compatible with the norms of political participation and influence in a democracy.

While the Russian case shows an inconsistent pattern of political behavior ranging from direct participation in politics to ignoring training on an officer’s proper role in the political arena, the Czech case shows an extreme aversion to ideology and politics in any form. Both cases need to become comfortable with the norms of political influence of militaries in democratic states. An officer in service to a democratic state should learn the precepts of democratic ideology and his/her proper role as a defender of its democratic institutions. Officers should also be aware of the established norms for influencing the political process of a democratic state while remaining focused on respecting the constraints of democratic accountability.

Prestige and Public Relations

Chapter five discussed extensively the relationship between society and the military as an essential element of democratic political control. The importance of transparency as a means of democratic oversight and the expectation that democratic values will be evident within all transitioning institutions were highlighted. This section and the final

¹⁹⁵ Golz interview.

section of the chapter will briefly revisit this issue in the specific context of military professionalism. The aim is to present the issue from the internal perspective of the military institutions in transition and to show the progress made in the Czech Republic and Russia on actively managing the military relationship with the public.

In both the Czech Republic and Russia there is an insufficient understanding within the military that it must earn the respect of society and that it is largely responsible for the perpetuation of its own negative image. In the Czech Republic, Western observers note that although the ACR tends to dwell on its negative image, it misses some simple ways to work on it. The US Army attaché noted that the Czech bases are by and large very “dumpy” and that little things like painting the front gate and flying the Czech flag go undone. There is a tendency, he argued further, for the Czechs to attribute their image problems to outside forces and not to take responsibility to improve some things on their own.¹⁹⁶

In Russia the picture is one of a demoralized military that is often at odds with the public. Results from a 1994 survey of military elites in Russia report that “regrets about Russia’s loss of status as a military and political world power run like a central theme throughout the survey. Seventy per cent of the officers questioned describe the decline of the Soviet Union as a ‘disaster for our country’. And more than 40 percent of those questioned are of the opinion that this should have been prevented by military means.”¹⁹⁷ Negative self-images of perceived prestige within society also characterized the survey results. Only 11 percent of mid-level and senior officers thought that officers enjoyed popular respect while only 4 percent said that General Officers are respected by the populace.¹⁹⁸

A US attaché who spoke at a forum of Afghan and Vietnam vets in Volgograd questioned those in attendance about their feelings for the plight of the conscripts in

¹⁹⁶ Wielkoszewski interview.

¹⁹⁷ *Military Elites in Russia 1994*, p. 4.

¹⁹⁸ *ibid.*

Chechnya. He discovered that the citizens there had little sympathy for their countrymen. “They thought that these guys were stupid not to find some way to get out of conscription. They were either too lazy or stupid to find a way out of their service.”¹⁹⁹ Commenting on the tactics which the Russian military is using to try to limit the shortfall of conscripts, other Russian observers report that “draft campaigns resemble military operations with future soldiers being escorted to the military draft offices at gun point.”²⁰⁰

Impoverishment of the Russian officer corps is one prime reason for its demoralization, but freedom of the press has also contributed to the widespread propagation of a negative image for the military. The press has been an important player in pressuring the military into being more responsive to the public. In this sense, the free press has made the military more accountable than it would have been on its own and has led to the military leadership’s greater acceptance of the idea that it cannot just do whatever it wants and ignore the public reaction to its behavior.²⁰¹ At the same time, the era of *glasnost* began a period of increased negative scrutiny of the military beginning with the tarnishing of the military’s image through objective reporting of the Afghan War, followed by the revelation of widespread corruption scandals and practices, and continuing to the largely negative reporting on the war in Chechnya today.

Some attempt has been made to address the issue of working actively to repair the damaged image of the Russian military through the creation of a Public Affairs department at the MOD. “In this way Grachev was actually some improvement over Yazov at first with regard to public relations. He had some appreciation of politics in a democracy.”²⁰² This office, though, has no doubt been kept very busy fielding the corruption charges continually waged against Grachev and his contemporaries. There are also some ACR officers serving in the public affairs specialty -- seven at the MOD and

¹⁹⁹ Howcroft interview.

²⁰⁰ Rogov, “Will the Russian Armed Forces Stand Fast: The Forgotten Military Reform.” *JPRS-UMA-94-050*, 30 November 94, p. 13.

²⁰¹ Govan interview.

²⁰² *ibid.*

three at the Corps level (the ACR is divided into three corps). One of the MOD officers, Captain Oldrich Holecek, has also received public affairs training in the US with American officers through a three month IMET course.”²⁰³

While some public relations infrastructure exists that was previously lacking, most observers concur that tremendous needs remain with regard to the Russian MOD’s willingness to be a transparent institution. Lack of truthful information is such that “society does not even know the colossal efforts required to resolve the problems inherited from the military sphere.”²⁰⁴ Western observers think that the ACR has been more forthcoming in providing information to the public than other post-communist militaries in the region, but that its responsiveness depends on whether or not the media has independently discovered a particular issue.²⁰⁵ Captain Holecek confirmed that there are still some lingering problems of obsessiveness with secrecy within the MOD and that often information that he thinks he should have is not routinely passed to him unless he finds out about its existence and asks for it. No routine for passing on information commensurate with his responsibilities of communicating ACR activity to the public has yet developed.²⁰⁶

Both cases have shown that there is an important link between the tasks of improving the military’s prestige and its responsiveness to the people. Reforms that are clearly communicated to the population will lead to improved coverage in the press and greater public support for the professionalization and transformation of the military. Both military institutions must convince all who serve in their ranks at all levels that democratic populations expect and deserve full accountability from all institutions of government

²⁰³ Oldrich Holecek, Captain, Czech MOD spokesman and public affairs officer, interview by author, March 1995, Prague. Captain Holecek, an older officer with a grandfatherly demeanor, said that the biggest obstacle to his job is convincing commanders that relations with the media and the press are important. “They don’t appreciate this and if they do have to do some type of press event, they don’t want any coaching so they may come off looking bad or not looking at the camera right.”

²⁰⁴ Rogov, “Will the Russian Armed Forces Stand Fast: The Forgotten Military Reform,” *JPRS-UMA-94-050*, 30 November 94, p. 15.

²⁰⁵ Dunkelberg interview.

²⁰⁶ Holecek interview.

including the military. This is especially true in the Czech case where the prospects for professionalization and reform are greater. The ACR is dependent on cultivating good will among the Czech population to support the higher spending levels that will be required to support a professional force. Both cases must also assure recruits that they can serve without fear and willingly commit to careers as NCOs and officers. Continued lack of reform, reliance on secrecy, and acceptance of corrupt behavior, on the other hand, will result in a continued downward spiral of prestige and lack of support among the public.

Compatibility of Military and Social Values

A central theme of this entire work is that societal institutions should reflect overall societal values. When societal values change, then the values of its subordinate institutions should adapt to these changes. A characteristic of the US military is that it reflects the democratic values of US society. "Our people are jealous of their military and will hold the government accountable for its misuse. This goes well beyond people not wanting their treasure wasted. Militaries are inevitably a reflection of the society that they serve."²⁰⁷ The necessity of adapting to democratic civilian oversight is teaching transitioning militaries that no institutions in democracies exist in a political vacuum. While military institutions are not and should never be democracies, the values inherent in militaries should reflect the democratic values of such states.

In the Czech case, there is cross-institutional consensus on what constitutes the legitimate authority of the state. There is no question that the leadership of the ACR respects the principle of democratic civilian control although it has shown its inexperience in being subject to it. All societal institutions, though equally inexperienced, are working toward the common goal of consolidating democracy. President Havel expressed his confidence in the ACR leadership when he commented in an interview in early 1995, "I realize that, after all those complicated personnel changes, the Army is led by a relatively

²⁰⁷ Govan interview.

good team of younger generals who are willing to build the democratic army of a democratic state.”²⁰⁸

In the Russian case, however, the advent of democratization has led to an increasing level of disparity between democratic values and the values of the post-Soviet military institution. For the first time, the military was put under scrutiny and subject to negative criticism; and, for the first time Russian society began to reject some of the military’s values. The military particularly laments the across the board demilitarization of society that is taking place.²⁰⁹ The situation is compounded by an overall lack of consensus within society as a whole concerning the acceptance of democratic values.

One fundamental value that Russian society is rejecting is the conscript system. A survey of draft age youth revealed that 70 percent of draftees are convinced of the needlessness of military service, 35 percent said that under certain circumstances they could forsake the Motherland, and 50 percent thought that such virtues as military duty, patriotism, and honor are from the past.²¹⁰ “The highly urbanized and educated mass culture is no longer going along with a conscript system based on beating youth into compliance. These elements make the continuation of such a conscript system untenable. Only the dregs too slow to get away are serving. So military leaders have an insoluble dilemma if they dream of maintaining the old model.”²¹¹ At present, the military is providing a negative socialization function giving conscripts the worst possible

²⁰⁸ Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, *Prague Radiozurnal*, 29 January 95. *FBIS-EEU-95-019*, 30 January 95, p. 6.

²⁰⁹ For instance, Defense Minister Grachev has protested the decline of military-patriotic education in schools and the demilitarization of such texts as alphabet primers. Such practices, he argued will lead to the demise of the military ideals of the state. Aleksandr Kovalev, “Educating a Patriot, Serviceman, and Citizen is Today the Main Task for a School,” *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 20 October 94, p. 1, 3. *JPRS-UMA-94-044*, 2 November 94, p. 7-10. See also Igor Rodionov, Colonel-General, “We Do Not Want to Militarize Society Again: On Military Reform and Reform of the Armed Forces,” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 23 December 94, pp. 1,3. *JPRS-UMA-95-003*, 31 January 95, p. 22. The author argues, “Let them not reproach us for attempts to militarize society again, for a systemic approach to safeguarding the country’s military security is characteristic of any democratic ‘civilized’ state of the West.”

²¹⁰ Lukava, *Armeyskiy Sbornik*, *FBIS-UMA-95-139-S*, 20 July 95, p. 8.

²¹¹ Wasserman interview.

introduction to what the state is capable of doing through service within a tough and brutal system.

But abandoning the historical socialization function of the Russian military by forfeiting the military's claim on the great majority of Russian male youths would be a tremendous concession to changing priorities of Russian society. Even those who advocate abolishing the draft caution against some possible negative side effects that may lead to the widening of the gap between civilian society and the professional military. "If the consolidation of the military caste and its further politicization are not prevented, the democratic process in Russia can be greatly jeopardized."²¹²

The Czech military, on the other hand, never felt the oneness with the state and its people that the Soviet military did and is consequently not clinging to its previous socialization function. Indeed, the ACR welcomes the day when the treasury will be able to finance the goal of converting the ACR to a professional all-volunteer force. However, as the ideology driving the Czech political system has dramatically shifted away from Communism to democracy different institutions within society have adapted to these changes at different rates. It is important to carefully monitor the potential divergence of military and societal values as the post-communist era continues. The democratic leaders of the Czech Republic must continue to use their influence to craft for the ACR a respected and valued niche in the transitioning state. The continued perception of military service as a profession for societal misfits cannot be allowed to persist.

Eventually the oversight capabilities of nascent democratic institutions will gain in strength and experience and force reforms that will bring the values of the transitioning state and the military institution that serves it into line. In the Czech case, these values will be democratic and the ACR will be compelled to root out remaining institutional

²¹² Sergey Rogov, "The Future of Military Reform," an unpublished paper, January 1995, p. 23. See also Ivan Malevich, "Five Reforms: How This Was in the Past," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* no. 2 (22 April 95), p. 3. *JPRS-UMA-95-022*, 16 May 95, p. 21. The author argues that the most democratic means of fielding an army is through conscription assuming that all citizens are equally likely to serve.

habits that linger from the Soviet era that conflict with the expectations of its democratic citizens -- both in and out of uniform. In the Russian case, the permanence of democratic values is less certain, however, the rejection of some Soviet era practices such as conscript service seems clear. Authority is a value that is still important in varying degrees in transitioning societies. But unrestricted use of authority, as evidenced in authoritarian leadership practices, has come into conflict with the expectations of post-communist citizens. Those responsible for military oversight have already and will continue to reject such practices.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to highlight the differences in military professionalism between democratic and transitioning states. Military professionalism in all states is measured by the degree to which civilian supremacy of the armed forces has been achieved. However, military professionalism in democratic states is differentiated further by loyalty to democratic political systems and their inherent democratic values. States undergoing transitions from authoritarian to democratic political systems face the unique challenge of adapting inherited forms of military professionalism so that norms of democratic accountability are evident in the transitioning military institution. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that often transitioning militaries find themselves caught between two incompatible systems of military professionalism. Additionally, progress in the military sphere of democratization seems to lag progress achieved in other transitioning democratic institutions.

Specific democratization deficits have been outlined across the seven dimensions of democratic military professionalism first presented in chapter two. First, in the area of recruitment and retention, there is a need to address the basic needs of the armed forces in order to attract and retain quality personnel. Developing appropriate and sustainable force structures that can support soldiers at a higher level will facilitate achievement of this goal. Second, deficits were noted in both cases regarding the need for merit based promotion

systems unscarred by corrupt procedures. Further development of competency based advancement practices will result in a more skilled officer corps on which the people's treasure is spent more efficiently. Third, improvements in standards of officership and leadership depend on the effective democratic socialization of all citizens to include those who serve in the armed forces and those who oversee them. The infusion of democratic values into a transitioning political system results in the development of higher expectations of treatment compatible with democratic principles. There is also the need to institutionalize democratic values through a societal wide emphasis on the rule of law which does not tolerate violations of ethical standards or corruption. Fourth, education and training programs must include clear instruction on *who*, *why*, and *how* military personnel serve in democratic states. The motivation for service must not be ambiguous and must be characterized by allegiance to a democratic political system as embodied in the state's constitution. Fifth, there is a need for further education on the norms of political influence in democratic states. Both cases suffer from a lack of experience in being players in democratic political systems. The Russian military has shown an inconsistent pattern of preferring apolitical behavior in some cases, but the recent trend is for direct political participation. The Czech military, on the other hand, revealed an extreme aversion to politics that falls short of an appropriate role in the political system. Sixth, in the area of prestige and public relations, both cases must work harder to earn the respect of their populations. Greater transparency and abandonment of old habits of secrecy and the control of information will enhance this process. Additionally, military institutions must respond to societal demands to instill democratic values clearly communicate the accomplishment of democratic reforms in order to boost the prestige of the armed forces. Finally, transitioning military institutions need to work on improving the compatibility of military and societal values. The implementation of democratic reforms can reduce the gap that has developed since the advent of democratization. Democratic

expectations in society at large have outstripped the ability of military institutions to respond to them.

In the Czech Republic democratic values have begun to take root and the combined focus of the population and its newly created democratic institutions is to complete the transition to democracy. While the transition for the military has been difficult, there is no question regarding their loyalty to the democratic state. Indeed, a general motivation to eventually achieve the dimensions of Western styled democratic military professionalism was noted although many democratization deficits still exist. In Russia, however, democracy has not been a positive experience for the military or for many other elements of post-Soviet society. It has meant only a loss in material status, increased disorder, and discontinuity with the familiar past. "It may be understandable for us what the American dream is, but we cannot say, 'What is the Russian Dream?'"²¹³ The Russian officer corps, like much of the Russian citizenry, is a adrift in a sea of confusion -- searching for values to guide their everyday lives. One result is a military institution that has made virtually no progress in responding to the shift from an authoritarian to a democratic political system. Severe democratization deficits persist across all dimensions of democratic military professionalism presented in the chapter.

The following chapter will look at the US response to the democratization deficits described in the Czech and Russian militaries. Specific measures taken to aid each case will be analyzed to determine the extent to which US military assistance programs effectively meet the democratization needs of each military in terms of both democratic political control and democratic military professionalism.

²¹³ Golz interview.

CHAPTER 7

The Effectiveness of US Military to Military Democratization Initiatives in Russia and the Czech Republic

Introduction

Chapters five and six illustrated that the democratization needs of the Russian and Czech militaries are great. Chapter four laid out the general US response to the needs of post-communist militaries across the former Soviet bloc and began to make the case that although some effort has been made to take advantage of military assistance opportunities in the region, failure to operationalize the concepts of “democratic political control” and “democratic military professionalism” severely limited the effectiveness of the outreach programs created. This chapter will highlight the disparities between the democratization needs of the Russian and Czech militaries and the specific steps taken through US assistance programs to facilitate their transitions to democracy.

US Military Presence in the Soviet Era

US military presence in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in the Soviet era was primarily in the form of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) attaché personnel charged with collecting as much intelligence information as possible as they conducted their military diplomatic duties in the US Embassy. The need for expert intelligence collectors merits an extensive period of preparation to include language training before these officers deploy in-country. These officers also usually have some regional or country specific expertise. These positions have remained a constant presence from the Soviet era to today and have influenced subsequent efforts to influence the militaries of the region.

In the Soviet era, the military relationship between the USSR and the US was centered around planning to wage war against each other and searching for ways to gain the upper hand in this endeavor. The intelligence work of attachés in Czechoslovakia also centered around collecting intelligence on the Soviet Union. Military diplomacy focused on dangerous activities or the prevention of them such as monitoring incidents at sea, air intercepts, and monitoring arms control compliance. In this respect, the relationship was adversarial with a focus on negative activities.¹

The openness created by *perestroika* and *glasnost* led to the possibility of initiating positive defense and military contacts between the superpowers. As was noted earlier, the first exchange of this kind was in 1988 when General Akhromeev came to the US to visit his counterpart, Chairman of the JCS, Admiral William Crowe. At this meeting a two year plan for defense and military contacts between the Soviet Union and the US was developed jointly by representatives of the JCS and the Soviet General Staff. Ten events were approved by both sides focusing mostly on high level visits that were centered on reciprocity and protocol. By the second year of the program Generals Powell and Moiseev were the chiefs of their respective militaries and the program was broadened at the request of Powell to include more exchanges with less formality overall.² The military to military relationship that has developed with Russia in the post-communist era has its origins in these early attempts to establish a series of friendly defense and military contacts during the Bush administration.

¹ Gregory Govan, Brigadier General, Commander, On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) and former Defense Attaché in Moscow, 1987-1991, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

² William K. Harris, Policy Assistant, DOD Office of Soviet and East European Affairs. interview by author, May 1995, the Pentagon.

US Military Presence in the Post-Communist Era

The overall relationship between the Soviet Union's main successor, Russia, and the US can be characterized by two main dimensions -- a strategic relationship rooted in the enforcement and negotiation of arms control treaties and an assistance dimension aimed at promoting democracy, economic reforms, and the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. The military to military programs explored throughout the rest of this chapter are just one small part of this overall bilateral relationship. These initiatives are a natural outgrowth of friendly relations and reflect the historic tendency in American foreign policy to foster democracy when such opportunities arise.

The first attempts at outreach toward the transitioning Czechoslovak state beyond the traditional exchange of information between attachés came in 1990 with initial military contacts between American and Czechoslovak general officers. Some key visits occurred early on during which some assistance was given with respect to the organization of a new military doctrine and strategy and processes of acquisition management. These early meetings also paved the way for Czechoslovak participation in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program through which the US sent the first Czechoslovak officer to the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas in 1991.³ The US European Command (USEUCOM) deployed its seventh MLT to the Czech Republic in July of 1993 and four Czech senior officers were among the first class to graduate from the Marshall Center in December of 1994.

³ Robert L. Leininger, Lt. Colonel, Security Assistance Officer, US Embassy Prague, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

US Military to Military Programs in Russia and the Czech Republic

The survey of regional military to military programs in chapter four noted that the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) and the program for Defense and Military Contacts with the former Soviet Union (FSU) have virtually the same broad policy guidance. The stated goals of the program of contacts with the FSU is “to facilitate a military responsible to democratically elected civilian authorities, a demilitarized market economy, and a smaller military with defense-oriented forces.”⁴ Similarly, the mission of EUCOM’s Joint Contact Team Program is to “assist the governments of Central and Eastern European countries and the republics of the former Soviet Union in developing civilian controlled military forces which foster peace and stability in a democratic society.”⁵

The following analysis of events that have occurred under the auspices of these programs indicates that there is a significant gap between events that can be categorized as directly or even indirectly addressing the task of democratization facing the Czech and Russian militaries and those which cannot be classified as democratization events. Indeed, a substantial portion of events can be categorized only as supporting post-communist militaries’ quests to be better militaries -- a goal that does not coincide with the stated missions of the JCTP or the program of Defense and Military Contacts with the FSU which are ideologically driven and justified. The tables in Appendix A and Appendix B detail the events which have occurred under the auspices of these programs and illustrate the gap between mission statement and mission implementation.

⁴ See chapter 4, page 55.

⁵ Quote taken from HQ USAFE (United States Air Forces in Europe) briefing slide obtained at the Pentagon in May 1995.

It is difficult to detect any particular focus areas of emphasis through an analysis of program activity. It is especially difficult to come to the conclusion that any sort of operationalization of the programs' mission statements was ever done and that some effort was made throughout the implementation of the program to facilitate the occurrence of events that would contribute to the democratic transitions of the militaries.

In Russia, between January 1991 and December 1995, 212 completed or anticipated defense and military contacts have occurred under the official auspices of the Program of Contacts Between the Department of Defense of the United States and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Of the events recorded in the tables, I categorized 80.6 percent as not directly contributing to the democratization focus areas outlined in the models. Only 19.4 percent of the defense and military contacts recorded could be classified as contributing to one of the focus areas of a military in transition to a democracy according to the framework developed in the theoretical chapters. The inclusion of visits of top US civilian defense officials due to the potential to have some indirect impact on democratization through exposure to high ranking US civilians reduces to 75 percent the percentage of events not directly contributing to democratization areas.

In the Czech Republic of the 126 events recorded I categorized 79.4 percent of them as not contributing to the stated goals of the program. I classified 20.6 percent of the events as contributing to one of the focus areas of a military in transition to a democracy. These remarkably similar statistics across the cases speak to the amount of attention that is likely to be paid to democratization issues within programs that do not specifically attempt to ensure that program activity achieves this goal. The degree of

success, however, must be considered to be an accidental occurrence since there is no evidence that either the policymakers or policy implementers had any knowledge of such a framework as they directed and carried out the programs' activities. Any such classifications are the result of applying the framework after the events have been carried out.

In the Russian case many of the events recorded in tables B.1 and B.2 (see Appendix B) were exchanges of high level delegations of various defense officials and personnel whose trips in-country did not necessarily focus on democratization needs. I categorized many of these events as contributing to democratization needs simply because civilian defense officials were involved or because the exchange occurred between educational institutions with the assumption that at least exposure to representatives from these components of the US defense community might have some impact on perceptions of civilian control and issues involving education and training. In contrast, events that fell into the democratization category in the Czech case tended to be more clearly focused on achieving specific democratization needs of post-communist militaries in transition. It should also be kept in mind that the Russian contacts recorded include only the list of official contacts agreed to by the two governments under the auspices of the defense and military contacts program. The tables do not include contacts associated with arms control implementation, cooperative threat reduction, or other less formal contacts that may have occurred. Experts estimate that contacts related to arms control inspections and scientific and technical military contacts comprise 75 percent of the overall defense and

military contacts between the US and Russia.⁶ But these types of technical assistance contacts make no claims to be facilitating democratization outcomes.

The use of frequency criteria is quite limited since it does not consider the qualitative impact of particular events. It may be that one particular event was many times more successful than another and that great program impact could have occurred within just a few events. However, I began with this assessment tool, since, at least in the Czech case, it is the only tool which the program has applied to itself. There has been a management mentality present through the life of the JCTP that equates degree of program activity with success. An excerpt from USAF Pentagon briefing papers offers a self-congratulatory appraisal, "Probably the best measure of our success is they like what they see and keep asking for more. Here are some numbers on how many air force contacts we've had."⁷ These comments accompanied a chart which illustrated through the use of bar graphs the increase in event activity across two fiscal years.

Additionally, in the JCTP, teams are compared to each other on the basis of the number of Traveling Contact Teams (TCTs) and Familiarization Tours (FAMs) accomplished. Charts tracking such comparative program activity are distributed and briefed periodically at the quarterly scheduling conferences sending the message to the MLT Chiefs that greater recognition comes from having a taller bar graph indicating an increase in the number of events accomplished than on concentrating on abstract focus areas which are probably unknown to the MLT members in any case.

⁶ John C. Reppert, Brigadier General, former US assistant army attaché US Embassy Moscow and US Defense Attaché to Moscow designate, interview by author, May 1995, the Pentagon.

⁷ Excerpt from USAF briefing papers obtained at the Pentagon, May 1995.

This creates a dilemma for the team chiefs in-country who have become accustomed in their military careers to fulfilling specific mission objectives in their daily duties. The team chief in the Czech Republic was frustrated that no clear definition of victory had been laid out for his team by the program's policymakers. "When can we declare success?"⁸ He added that it was interesting to be in this position since current US military thinking puts such a premium on laying out objectives and criteria for success.

Additionally, he noted that no one at USEUCOM has ever asked him about specific aspects of progress in the Czech Republic. When he did offer information indicating that progress has been made in a particular area, no one asked him *how* this progress was achieved. Indeed, his desk officer back at the program's headquarters requested that such information be deleted from future reports. In his opinion, the recipients of the reports generated each week and dispatched back to Germany are interested primarily in how much money was spent and which particular events took place in the previous week.

The MLT in place in the Czech Republic during the period of my research there was an example of a team motivated to achieve program success, but limited by its directives and policy guidance. Their in-country experience resulted in the frustrating realization that those charged with overseeing the program had low expectations of what could substantively be accomplished by their team and had set up a bureaucratic mode of operations that practically ensured that only limited progress was possible.

⁸ Peter R. O'Connor, US MLT Team Chief, Czech Republic December 94-May 95, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

A partial explanation of this phenomenon is that the JCTP is a political-military program in which operators have been allowed to both develop the flawed policy guidance and implement the program on the ground. A National Defense University scholar observed that those running the program have to learn as they go, but that this was unlikely since operators cannot be expected to understand the theoretical issues that should underpin and subsequently drive program activity.⁹

Instead, what has developed is an overall approach which is generally passive and with a focus on offering a menu of services versus the development of a particular product -- democratic military institutions. This has led to a situation where the definition of success has not changed appreciably as the relationships between the host country and the US military have grown and the potential for greater sophistication developed. The management of the program to date makes it almost impossible for a conscientious, and perhaps uniquely enlightened, operator to improve the quality of the activity that has preceded him or her.

In Russia there were similar complaints from the US attachés about policy guidance in their military to military contacts program. Policy planners at the Pentagon described the process of choosing which events should be proposed from the US side as “unsophisticated.” The US defense attaché charged with the duty of presenting the list of proposed US events to his counterpart in the Russian General Staff Foreign Liaison Office said that he starts with a list of 150 unprioritized proposed events from the US side that is comprised of inputs from all of the services. Then the Russian and US officers review the

⁹ Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Faculty Member, interview by author, May 1995. Washington DC.

list and winnow it down based often on reciprocity issues -- that is offering to host a type of delegation that the other state had hosted previously. He said that there is no specific guidance other than this in determining many of the contacts and that "in general the process of choosing events will not grow in sophistication until we push it." He added that the US has never figured out what it wants the military to military contact program with Russia to be. Do we want it to show how successful our system is, break down barriers from the Cold War, achieve interoperability, or influence senior decision makers?¹⁰

The Army officer at the Pentagon with the responsibility for determining the Army's inputs to the annual list of proposed events also complained about the lack of prioritization on the part of the US about what its goals for military contacts with Russia should be. He said that in the "honeymoon" period right after Yeltsin took over, the DOD threw too much too fast at the Russians without focusing on objectives. "Powell's guidance to engage at all levels as often and anywhere was well-intentioned, but not practical."¹¹ He went on to say that this lack of prioritization was regrettable because the scarcity of Russian economic resources severely constrained their level of participation in exchanges and other contacts.

Personnel involved with the program agree that there really is no broad plan guiding the contacts or supervision over what happens. "The idea is to let 1000 flowers

¹⁰ James Howcroft, Major, Assistant Marine Attaché, US Embassy Moscow, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

¹¹ Stephen Freeman, Lt. Colonel, US Army Point of Contact for Military to Military Programs in Russia/Eurasia, interview by author, May 1995, the Pentagon.

bloom.”¹² Brigadier General Reppert, a former army attaché to Moscow and US Defense Attaché to Russia as of July 1995, said that the Russian General Staff assumes that there is a master plan to the US approach and has repeatedly asked to see it. But, the general admits, “There hasn’t been one. We’ve taken the Johnny Appleseed approach -- throwing seeds everywhere and hoping that some trees grow. This is why when we look back over the program we can see that we’ve tended to pursue paths of least resistance.”¹³

The primacy which the US placed on its relationship with Russia relative to the other post-communist states in the region also affected program activity. Many more high level exchanges of civilian defense officials and generals have occurred in Russia than in her post-communist neighbors. “Everyone wants to do stuff with the Russians -- not just the components that should rightfully be involved.”¹⁴ Additionally, the military relationship has been viewed more in strategic terms with the overall focus being on denuclearization. Role-modeling the military in a democracy was perceived as important, but relative to the strategic issues of the relationship this goal, in reality, was far down on the list.¹⁵ Exercises have also been more numerous between Russian and US forces than between the US and other post-communist states.

¹² Andrew S. Weiss, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

¹³ Reppert interview.

¹⁴ Charles C. Justice, Assistant Naval Attaché, US Embassy Moscow, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

¹⁵ Harris interview.

Bureaucratic Limitations of the Programs' Effectiveness

The Czech Republic and the JCTP

The greatest bureaucratic limitation of the Joint Contact Team's effectiveness is in the policy driving the manning of the MLTs and the Joint Contact Team at EUCOM.

While the assignment of highly trained professional military personnel with some fluency in the host nation's language and some area expertise would enhance the effectiveness of the in-country teams, in reality, the quality of each MLT varies substantially and there are no specific criteria for filling the available positions.

A team chief who had served in the Czech Republic said that from his vantage point manning of the teams is done by the "Hey you!" method.¹⁶ That is, anyone who wants to come and live in Central or Eastern Europe for six months unaccompanied by their family has a good shot at the job. No special expertise is required, nor is any such training provided in preparation for the deployment. The week orientation course at EUCOM headquarters does not include any country orientation, nor is it possible to attend a Defense Language Institute (DLI) course before deployment in-country.

A US Army officer involved with program oversight at the Pentagon explained that the language ability to man the teams is not in the data base nor have efforts been taken to improve it substantially through the three years that the program has been operating. Another contributing factor is that the greatest source of area specialists in the US officer corps, the US Army's Foreign Area Officers (FAO), has dwindled due to the disincentives of the US Army's personnel management system. The promotion rate of

¹⁶ O'Connor interview.

these officers lags so substantially behind line officers that interest in becoming a FAO has been significantly curtailed. This problem has been noted and is currently being addressed, but it has existed throughout the life of the JCTP and also affects the quality of attaché staffing at embassies.¹⁷

In the case of the Czech Republic there are additional cultural obstacles that have affected the scarcity of US military officers with Czech heritage. Again, these are related to the negative image which Czechs have traditionally had of military service. Since Czechs have not historically placed a cultural premium on military service, those who emigrated to America did not encourage their sons to make the military their profession. Consequently, the search for a team chief with a Czech background has been difficult.¹⁸

The Defense Attaché staffs remain the only military entities in which linguistic and area expertise training dollars are invested. These officers have the skills to influence military reform, and are interested in doing so, but the strict separation of MLT and DAO duties relegates the DAO staff to its traditional intelligence collecting and representational functions. The MLT, although its members lack the specific training investment of the DAO staff, typically has much greater access to their counterparts in the host military. The result is a situation where the US military entity in-country with the most potential for influence is not prepared to take advantage of its unique opportunity.

The team chief in place during the course of my research in the spring of 1995, Colonel Peter R. O'Connor, was an active duty US Army Colonel whose previous

¹⁷ Hank Richmond, Lt. Colonel, US Army Point of Contact for Military to Military Programs in Central and Eastern Europe, interview by author, May 1995, the Pentagon.

¹⁸ Andrew R. Wielkoszewski, Lt. Colonel, US Army Attaché, Czech Republic, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

assignment was Chief of Personnel for the US Army in Europe. He was aware of the opportunity to serve in the Czech Republic because his college classmate and US Army colleague, Colonel Paul B. East, served in the position of Team Chief for the second half of 1994. His previous experience as a member of the Military Assistance Group (MAG) in Korea as a young officer and his friendship with a Czech officer who was his classmate at the Army War College also contributed to his interest in the assignment and caused him to actively seek the six month position.

His personal interest in personnel management reform resulted in some significant progress being made in this aspect of democratizing the Czech military, even though he had no specific area expertise or language ability. However, his success is an example of an individual proactively promoting a personal agenda which, it turns out, positively influenced the course of the Czech military's development as a democratic institution. It is important to note that neither this particular focus area or the brief assignment of Colonel O'Connor to serve as team chief were a result of deliberate JCTP policies. Indeed, these events occurred despite the obstacles inherent in the JCTP bureaucracy. In the end, the positive influence he was able to have was limited to the length of his short tour in Prague.

Another staffing issue is related to the involvement of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) in the program. As chapter four illustrated, the involvement of the NGB is closely associated with its ability to garner congressional support and funding for its programs. This involvement also translates into the guard and reserve forces being allocated a portion of the MLT billets. However, guard and reserve personnel are not uniformly recognized for their superior professionalism nor for their knowledge of the active duty

“big picture.” To be fair, there are certainly exceptions to this negative stereotype, but there is a substantial difference between a career active duty colonel who has risen through the ranks in the “up or out” active duty service and a reservist of similar rank in terms of both being a professional role model and having professional expertise -- a difference that host countries are surely capable of detecting.

As one of the key Pentagon civilians charged with the oversight of the JCTP put it, “The idea of using reserve and guard personnel would make more sense if they were the only source of talent.”¹⁹ However, manning the teams with reserve and guard personnel is more a function of bureaucratic politics and the reluctance of active components to offer their “best and brightest” for these positions than any particular expertise or talent that only these forces possess.

There are also numerous disincentives for the participation of active duty officers to serve in the program. First, the assignment is not a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) that is considered a re-assignment to new duties, but a Temporary Tour of Duty (TDY) that requires a leave of absence from one’s current assignment. This presents several hurdles for these officers. First, the officer’s commander must release him for the length of the six month TDY. Many jobs simply cannot be left for six months at a time without some negative impact on mission accomplishment -- this is especially the case with outstanding officers, particularly those of higher rank, who may be serving in critical positions. Second, since that officer is not replaced in his primary duties, colleagues may not be enthusiastic about assuming the officer’s duties in his/her absence. Third, the TDY

¹⁹ Harris interview.

status of the assignment does not allow the shipment of household goods or for the officer to be accompanied by his/her family. There are, then, several deterrents on both the career enhancement and the family support front that adversely affect the manning of the program.

The policy of rotating the teams every six months also negatively impacts the effectiveness of the program. Despite its obvious drawbacks, the rotation policy has endured because it is less expensive to support a service member in a TDY billet than to pay for a PCS. Indeed, 180 days is the maximum length of a TDY before regulations mandate that a PCS be executed. Program managers exploit this provision to the greatest extent possible. However, the greatest complaint of the host countries involved this particular policy. Generally, when directly asked about what aspects of the program could be improved, personnel from the host country are reluctant to make any negative comments for fear that the US side might be offended, but the rotation issue is the one exception to this otherwise strict protocol.²⁰ The MLT Team Chief admitted that the frequent turnover of US personnel interrupts continuity and that the Czechs are frustrated by it. "They build a team with us. The US side of it leaves and then they have to build another team."²¹

The short duration of the assignment also limits the application of the learning curve which each new team member must endure. By the time cultural and professional acclimation is accomplished, the team member only has a few months left in the position

²⁰ When I asked the Czech Defense Attaché to the US this question he was careful to preface his remark with, "This is not meant to be a negative comment, but rotating the teams every six months is too much. The deployments should be at least one year long." Jiri Giesl, Major General, Military and Air Attaché, Embassy of the Czech Republic, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

²¹ O'Connor interview.

before a replacement comes on board and must relearn many lessons. Such circumstances do not foster the feeling that there is enough time in-country for any great commitment to linguistic, cultural, or academic study related to the mission to pay off.

The lack of a requirement for keeping accurate records of the substantive content or impact of accomplished events compounds the difficulty of maintaining continuity in the program. There are no standardized procedures for the completion of after action reports from either the host country or from the TCT deployed to assist it in some way.

Remarkably, the officer with the chief day to day oversight of the program at the Joint Staff explained that, “a conscious decision was made not to get involved with assessment. Our approach has been to give them the information and let them act on it.”²²

All of this is related to the “exposure mentality” of the program, which was present at the start and still remains and also to the policy of not having specific goals. The theory is that all exposure is good and that it is not necessary to track specific types of exposure makes it impossible to exploit the lessons learned or to provide the appropriate follow-up events as the program matures in each host country.

The MLT files are in such a shambles in some locations that it is difficult for follow-on teams to even know which particular events have taken place. One policy overseer also admitted that this policy becomes a “complication” when the JCTP defends its budget requests every year. At these times advances in democratic civilian control are talked up, because program managers do not want to say that they are intentionally not pursuing specific goals in the program.²³

²² Dirk P. Deverill, Commander, Joint Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, European Division, interview by author, May 1995, the Pentagon.

²³ *ibid.*

Russia and the Defense and Military Contacts Program

In contrast to the Czech case, significantly greater bureaucratic constraints are present within the Russian defense bureaucracy that limit the effectiveness of the US program. Defense attachés implementing the program of contacts report that numerous obstacles are put up by the Russian Ministry of Defense to impede the process. The Russian military hierarchy in general is very cautious about links between the two militaries and strictly controls all contacts at the highest levels of the MOD.²⁴ The perception among the US attachés in-country is that the whole MOD organization exists to thwart US cooperation efforts and that a “gatekeeper mentality” prevails among their Russian counterparts.²⁵

An additional obstacle on the Russian side is that Russia still has a predominantly military run Ministry of Defense while the US Department of Defense is led primarily by civilians. It is difficult for the Russians to comprehend that a high-ranking civilian defense official has the same or higher status of a multi-star general officer. “The Russians understand general officers -- not high ranking civilian equivalents. They don’t really deal with civilians in their military culture and in fact detest them.”²⁶ Overall, this network of defense ministry counterparts has been difficult to develop on both sides and the Russian military seems set on perpetuating the myth of civilian non-expertise.

On the US side officers carrying out the program at the Pentagon complain that staffing is grossly inefficient to handle the program effectively. “Just a few action officers

²⁴ Ilona W. Kwiecien, Lt. Colonel, Assistant Army Attaché, US Embassy, Moscow, interview by author, April 1995, Moscow.

²⁵ Justice interview.

²⁶ Harris interview.

are working on it. Senior officers at the Joint Staff need to be actively engaged in order to develop a long range strategy.”²⁷ This officer went on to say that the JCS should either upgrade the rank structure overseeing the program or turn it over to other administrators. Additionally, continued funding of military contacts with Russia is likely to become a problem. The Nunn-Lugar money which has funded the contacts thus far will have run out at the end of FY 1994 and tight service budgets will not likely replace this shortfall. Congressional republicans swept into office in 1994 are also less eager than the preceding democratic congress was to give aid to Russia. One US army officer working the program in Washington said that he is personally frustrated that so much of the balance of aid is going to nuclear dismantlement to the exclusion of the human element. “Russians like the human element if it meets their needs.”²⁸

Overall Impact of Military to Military Contacts in Russia and the Czech Republic

Russia

The reviews are mixed from the field on the overall impact that the US effort to conduct defense and military contacts has had on the Russian military. One school of thought argues that the more contacts there are, then the greater the external influence will be. Such interactions help to encourage an awareness of global military standards and may be an impetus to reform.²⁹ Another school posits that the contacts as they have proceeded are useful to a point, but not as much as we might think. “We have the attitude, ‘If only you were like us ’ We show them things that don’t have a lot of

²⁷ Freeman interview.

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ Adam R. Wasserman, Policy Planning Staff, US Department of State, former CIA military analyst, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

relevance to them like recruiting stations and \$10 million child care centers. They have a concept of what's 'Russian' and what will work for them."³⁰ A third school thinks that the cultural differences between the two societies are so great and the Russians so fundamentally resistant to change that change will take no less than a generation -- if it even happens then. One observer thought that, in general, Russians and Americans could not even agree on what specific problems existed.³¹

Anecdotal evidence exists supporting the argument that the various exchanges have left lasting impressions. A former US Defense Attaché to Moscow who served a term during the *perestroika* era, Brigadier General Gregory Govan, remembers Russian officers' first impressions on their first visits to the US. "They commented on the real patriotism that they saw, the respect of officers and the military that was earned instead of bestowed, and the importance of NCOs."³² He added that he hoped that the Russians learned the lesson that the people in the US military were more valued because the US military is a reflection of a society which values all people. Govan's predecessor, then Brigadier General Ervin Rokke, concurred that the "higher ups who have gone to the US on trips appreciated the quality they saw and were curious about how it was achieved."³³

Others complained that the endless exchange of delegations accomplishes little. Many of the US military attachés in Moscow mentioned a phenomenon which they have dubbed "delegation euphoria" -- when one time participants in exchanges get charged up

³⁰ Howcroft interview.

³¹ Paul H. Nelson, Colonel, Chief of Staff, On-Site Inspection Agency, US Army Russian Foreign Area Specialist, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

³² Govan interview.

³³ Ervin J. Rokke, Lt. General, Commander National Defense University, former Defense Attaché in Moscow, 1986-87, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

over visiting the other country for the first time and discovering that their counterparts are human beings who superficially appear to be very much like themselves. These critics argue that too much “military tourism” takes place and that more emphasis should be put on exercises where military personnel from both states get to work together as professionals on a common problem. Proponents of this approach put a high premium on the achievement of interoperability above all other goals.

While there is some disagreement on how much positive impact the interactions that have taken place between the Russian and US militaries has had on Russia, all observers agree that the receptivity of the Russians to the US outreach effort has been disappointing. “As the program was originally conceived, we thought that the Russian military would be a key player in a lot of issues and could use its channels to push certain agenda items. But it turned out that the military was unwilling to talk about substantive issues. [In the end] they proved to be poor interlocutors.”³⁴ In this vein an Army planner at the Pentagon added, “We’re a lot more interested in engaging them than they are in being engaged. We have a sort of messianic ‘military in a democracy’ approach while they don’t even perceive the need for such reform. They will only participate in activities of value to them like exercises and high level visits.”³⁵ In addition, the Russians have been concerned about spying, cultivation, and recruitment of their officers who have participated in various exchanges and opportunities for education in the US.³⁶

It seems, then, that the potential to influence the course of democratic reform in the Russian military through defense and military contacts with the US has been limited by

³⁴ Weiss interview.

³⁵ Freeman interview.

³⁶ Weiss interview.

the Russians' unwillingness to be objects of such efforts. In this respect, had the continuation of contacts depended on Russian enthusiasm, then many agree that the relationship would have died. US personnel driving the program should be credited with prodding the relationship and keeping it alive. However, even the presence of formidable obstacles on the Russian side does not excuse the lack of prioritization and poor policy management that has characterized the US effort. The program can still benefit from the laying out of clear goals, the recognition of the democratization needs of the Russian military, and the prioritization of program activity to further whatever ends are deemed worthy of pursuing.

The Czech Republic

Despite the legion of problems outlined above, some progress has been made toward the democratization of the ACR because of the presence of the American MLT. First and foremost, the day to day contact that the US team members have with members of the ACR exposes the Czechs to the US military's approach to leadership and its mode of operations in general. Regardless of the subject of the interaction, there is some role modeling benefit to be gained just by working with each other.

The US has distinguished itself among the other Western allies by investing more resources into its military outreach effort than any other player. The Germans, British, French, and Dutch have all offered various assistance opportunities, but none of these are as large as the US effort. The Czechs have rewarded the US commitment with the granting of enviable access to its top military policymakers through the assignment of prime office space in the corridor of the Chief of the General Staff. This allows frequent

contact with Czech officers at the highest levels and puts the MLT. and, particularly, the Colonel who heads the team, in a prime position to influence these individuals and the path of reform. It is a position of access much envied by the US defense attachés. However, the limitations placed on the program, its focus on “soft” issues, and the lack of preparation of the US personnel serving within it results in much of this access being wasted.

Specific strides were made in the area of personnel management reform because of the efforts of Colonel Peter R. O’Connor who served as team chief in the first half of 1995. Several TCTs related to these reforms took place during his tour and he used his personal influence and access to politics among senior Czech officers for progress in this area. He was regularly briefed on the Czech proposals for reform and his feedback on these measures was solicited and often incorporated into the next revisions that appeared.³⁷ However, none of these reforms was implemented before his tour ended in May of 1995 and his replacement reported that the more progressive plan has died in his absence. A different plan has surfaced that may allow the current structure to exist indefinitely.³⁸

On the leadership front, the prevalence of US NCO participation on many of the TCTs has had a positive impact on ACR reform. Again, regardless of the specific purpose of the visit or exchange, the opportunity to see US NCOs in positions of responsibility and expertise has illustrated to the Czechs the void within their own chain of command. All descriptions of further ACR reform feature prominently the goal of building such a system

³⁷ O’Connor interview.

³⁸ Maritta Loo, Lt. Colonel, US MLT Acting Team Chief, Czech Republic, comments in fax sent to author, June 1995.

and can be directly attributed to the exposure to Western militaries that has been possible in the post-communist era.

Beyond these general observations it is difficult to point to other specific accomplishments related to the democratization goals of the program. Given the degree of program activity, it is credible to assume that many other ideas may have been adopted due to the exchanges of ideas that have occurred on multiple occasions. It is not unrealistic to assume that a discussion on the differences between the US and Czech militaries' approaches to officership could take place during a TCT set up with the purpose of exchanging information on air traffic control systems. But, all that policymakers can be sure of is that air traffic control topics were discussed. If one wanted to ensure that progress was made on the issues specifically related to the program's democratization goals, then TCTs and exchanges aimed at making gains in these particular areas should have been planned.

Similarly, the Czechs have probably received many intangible benefits from participating in the numerous familiarization tours to the US and Germany which have exposed them first hand to the way of life of democratic, free market societies. While general exposure is necessary, following initial visits up with visits focused on making particular strides in the ACR's democratization needs would result in more tangible progress.

An objective analysis of the MLT's alleged mission and the resulting program activity in one case, the Czech Republic, reveals an enormous gap between the program's stated goals and the outcomes which resulted from the events generated under the

program. This deficit can be directly attributed to the unwillingness and inability of program overseers to evaluate the progress of their program's activity. The decision not to assess has resulted in the acceptance of random activity as satisfactory, the failure to operationalize the stated goals of the program by its fourth year of existence, and, ultimately, the expenditure of millions of dollars without a clear plan to maximize their effectiveness.

Assessment of IMET Effectiveness

A separate effort to influence the process of military reform has been made through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Clearly, the Russian MOD has not embraced this US initiative and consequently what little participation takes place has little or no influence on the military reform process. Whereas many of the Eastern European armed forces look to the US as their role model and actively seek US training, the Russian armed forces do not. The Czech military, in contrast, has embraced the program and has been an influential tool in the overall military assistance effort in the Czech Republic.

Russian participation in IMET began in 1992 with the attendance of a few officers at US senior service schools. US attachés on the ground in Moscow reported that getting the program off the ground was difficult due to the lack of English language training among Russian line officers, suspicions on the part of the Russians that the program was a US attempt to recruit spies, and general obstructionism within the MOD.³⁹ Additionally,

³⁹ Justice interview.

the program suffered a major setback when the second Russian student sent to the US defected.

The officially stated US objectives for the Russian IMET program are “to actively engage officers of the Russian military (from junior to senior grades) and civilians who may influence government policy formulation via military education and training courses in an effort to promote the concepts of civilian authority and respect for human rights during the conduct of military operations.” The Russian MOD has not yet articulated its objectives for participation in the program.⁴⁰

Only a handful of Russian officers have participated in IMET since 1992. Of the three officers who attended courses in the US in the first year, one defected, one was discharged upon his return to Russia as a security risk, and US attachés were informed by MOD officials to “stay away” from the third. However, six officers were allowed to participate in the program in FY 1994.⁴¹ Only five Russian officers attended professional military education courses (PME) in the US in FY 1995 while the remaining nineteen Russian participants went to defense management courses, but most of these attendees were civilians.

In fiscal years 1996 and 1997 US quotas for Russian participants will be raised to thirty students per year with attendance at defense management courses largely by Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel outstripping PME attendance by 2:1.⁴² While the US has designated the lion’s share of the FSU IMET budget for Russian participation,

⁴⁰ Christopher D. Bott, Lt. Commander, Assistant Naval Attaché, *IMET Two Year Training Plan for Russia 1996-97*. Document obtained from Lt. Commander Bott by the author in Moscow, April 1995.

⁴¹ Report prepared in December 1993 by officers in the defense attaché office in Moscow for inputs to a report to Congress on the effectiveness of the US military to military contact program in Russia.

⁴² Bott, *IMET Two Year Training Plan for Russia 1996-97*.

Russia turned back \$200,000 of the \$700,000 offered by the US to fund Russian students in FY 1995. In contrast, Ukraine spent all of its \$600,000 IMET budget for FY 1995 and asked for more funding.⁴³ In fiscal years 1996 and 1997 \$779,000 is budgeted for Russian participation in IMET.⁴⁴

A major problem affecting the IMET program in Russia is that

The Russian MOD neither requested US security assistance nor desires it. Although some element within the MOD apparently agreed to the US IMET initiative, or else was forced to accept it, other factions have been waging a war to negate it. Elements with the Russian military leadership mistrust US intentions and consider American trained officers as tainted/corrupted.⁴⁵

As a result, all of the criteria on which IMET effectiveness is measured in other cases indicate that the impact of IMET in Russia has been negligible. American officers complain that the MOD does not send officers who could benefit from participation in the program professionally. Most of the officers sent have either been close to retirement or GRU officers interested in the opportunity to gather military intelligence in the US.

“Some of the guys they send over to the US are on a boondoggle -- it’s some kind of payback vacation in the US. When some get back, the Russians don’t seem to know what to do with them because they’ve been ‘infected.’”⁴⁶

Most of the Russians who have studied in the US are reluctant to maintain contact with the US military attachés when they return home citing the possibility of future “difficulties” if they do so. Those who have communicated with the US attachés report that they are frustrated that they are not using what they have learned and are losing their

⁴³ Richmond interview.

⁴⁴ Bott, *IMET Two Year Training Plan for Russia 1996-97*.

⁴⁵ Report prepared in December 1993 by officers in the defense attaché office in Moscow for inputs to a report to Congress on the effectiveness of the US military to military contact program in Russia.

⁴⁶ Howcroft interview.

ability to speak English.⁴⁷ Only the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is taking full advantage of slots allocated to it under the Expanded IMET (EIMET) program which funds educational opportunities for civilians involved in defense. Most of the MFA participants have attended defense resource management courses in the US.⁴⁸

An additional problem affecting Russian participation is the systemic difference between US and Russian military education systems. Attendance at IMET does not fit in with the career patterns of Russian officers which would affect participation even if the MOD was more enthusiastic about the program. US officers attend PME throughout their careers while Russian officers attend at fewer points in their careers. A US attaché used a two ladder analogy to explain this difference:

The American ladder is six feet tall with rungs equally spaced; the Russian ladder is two meters tall with fewer rungs unequally spaced. In terms of this example, the American educational rung does not fit into the Russian ladder of professional military development. Unfortunately, this gulf between the two systems is widest at the junior officer level, where the bulk of traditional IMET opportunities are centered.⁴⁹

In sum, the combination of xenophobia, systemic differences, and unwillingness to engage in military reform have severely constrained the potential impact that IMET can have on the Russian military. The only bright spot in the program has been the participation of civilians in EIMET and US program administrators will continue push for progress in this area. However, the impact on the Russian military has been negligible and the program's only value in this respect has been through its symbolism as a US gesture of military cooperation.

⁴⁷ Bott, *IMET Two Year Training Plan for Russia 1996-97*.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁹ Report prepared in December 1993 by officers in the defense attaché office in Moscow for inputs to a report to Congress on the effectiveness of the US military to military contact program in Russia.

Czechoslovak participation in the IMET program began in 1989 with the enrollment of a CSA officer at the US Army's Command and General Staff College. Participation expanded in the following years to reach the level of twenty to thirty officers taking part in courses in the US per year at a total cost of approximately \$900,000.⁵⁰

While the overall impact of the IMET program is limited due to the small numbers of officers participating, a few of these graduates have made a substantial impact on the progress of democratic reforms in the ACR. One name that was repeatedly mentioned in-country and in Washington DC was ACR Colonel Peter Luzny who graduated from the US Army War College under the auspices of the IMET program.

Upon his return to the Czech Republic he became the Chief of Strategic Planning at the General Staff. His ability to apply his knowledge of the defense budget rationalization process taught at the US Army War College enabled the ACR to receive a 20 percent increase in its budget over Parliament's initial allocation.⁵¹ Colonel Luzny had been marked as a bright young star within the General Staff, however, he eventually came into conflict with other more senior officers who were resistant to other changes that he recommended and he resigned from the ACR in May of 1995. Many speculate, though, that he will continue to influence the problem of ACR reform through the political arena.⁵²

Officers who have studied in the US and in programs of other Western allies have been placed in important command positions in the UNPROFOR unit and the Rapid Deployment Brigade -- the elite units of the ACR.⁵³ Defense Minister Wilem Holan has

⁵⁰ Leininger interview.

⁵¹ Simon interview.

⁵² Loo fax.

⁵³ Jan Gadzik, "Czech Army Looking for a Form Press," *Lidove Noviny*, 9 February 95, and carried over CTK national news wire, 9 February 95.

stated that the intellectual potential of the ACR rests in the officers who have studied at US military schools. "They are men who are not only very well prepared in their field of expertise, but also newly motivated for service in the transforming Army of the Czech Republic."⁵⁴ Additionally, General Nekvasil, ACR Chief of Staff, has stated his preference that all commanders have studied in the West as a criterion for promotion.⁵⁵

The Czechs lean on their IMET participation to lend credibility and prestige to their officer corps. Some fear that these officers will be given undue preference in promotions if the merit based promotion system goes into effect, but such enthusiasm does not necessarily mean that IMET graduates are successfully making great inroads into the democratization and general transformation of the ACR or that their specific training is being applied.

Because IMET participation is such an individual experience, it is difficult for lone officers to change their unit upon their return. A Czech major who had participated in a US course said that when he related the stories of his experience in the US to his colleagues, they reacted as if he had been to the moon. They were convinced that such things could not be possible.⁵⁶ Not until many officers of a single unit have had the experience of studying in the West will the lessons learned there be more likely to be applied at home.

US officers who observe the implementation of IMET in the Czech Republic to include the selection process of those who attend US courses and their utilization upon

⁵⁴ Wilem Holan, Defense Minister, "For Joining NATO, We Have the Support of the United States and Canada," *Lidove Noviny*, 5 December 94, p. 5. *FBIS-EEU-94-236*, 8 December 94, p. 13.

⁵⁵ O'Connor interview.

⁵⁶ Miroslav Krcmar, Major, Member Czech liaison team to the US MLT, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

their return report serious deficiencies on both fronts. First, the requirement that all participants speak English fluently limits the pool of officers who can participate.

Selection, then, is not dependent on an officer's leadership skills or performance record, but on his language ability. Additionally, most of the officers with English language capability have already been selected to participate in one of the courses.

The preferences which officers who studied in the US receive when they get home breeds resentment among those officers who are not English speakers.⁵⁷ Additionally, although the US assumes that its dollars are being spent on the very best and brightest that the ACR has to offer, in reality, the deficient selection process means that "the US has been getting twos on a scale of one to ten."⁵⁸ The Czechs still lack the strategic planning skills to maximize the opportunities inherent in the IMET program. The personnel system isn't presently set up to look for the most qualified people or to decide how best to utilize the program. Personal contacts rather than merit often drive participation in IMET.⁵⁹

Specifically, the ACR personnel system lacks a requirement for officers who have returned from US IMET courses to be put in a job that uses their newly acquired skills. Additionally, regulations that require officers who have received valuable training in the US and polished their language skills to stay in the ACR for a specified period of time are not enforced.⁶⁰ Consequently, it is possible for an officer to receive the training and apply it to a job search in the civilian sector.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*

⁵⁸ George D. Dunkelberg, Colonel, US Defense Attaché to the Czech Republic, interview by author. July 1994, Prague.

⁵⁹ Leininger interview.

⁶⁰ O'Connor interview.

To their credit, US personnel charged with implementing the program have tried to make it clear that it is important for the integrity of the program and even continued participation that its administration be perceived as legitimate and fair. Program guidelines, however, reserve the rights of selection and career commitment to the host countries. In cases of extreme abuse US officials have approached the parliaments of host countries to invite them to use their oversight authority to influence the process, but such a step has not yet occurred in the case of the Czech Republic.⁶¹

The most significant IMET contributions to the democratization process of the ACR has been in the participation of civilians in courses designed to enhance civilian oversight. One particular course taught in Prague by faculty from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California was widely praised by the Czech civilians and military officers who participated. The five day seminar which focused on the problems of civil-military relations in a democracy was attended by civilian officials, military officers, and parliamentary representatives. "Perhaps the seminar's most important aspect was its establishment of an open forum for frank dialogue among military professionals and their civilian counterparts who, by their own account, had experienced few such opportunities in the past."⁶² Some Czech civilians have also participated in defense resource management courses in the US through the Expanded IMET program. Program managers

⁶¹ Mark Cheek, Point of Contact at the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) for International Military and Education Training (IMET) programs in Russia, East and Central Europe, interview by author, May 1995, Washington DC.

⁶² Message sent from the US Embassy in Prague by the Security Assistance Officer to Washington DC, 6 April 94.

are targeting 20 percent of the IMET grant for the Czech Republic in the coming year to focus on the training of civilians in defense oversight programs.⁶³

IMET has offered valuable opportunities for military personnel and civilians to benefit from participation in US military education programs. Many individuals have personally benefited from their experiences, but without the systemization of lessons learned within the internal organs of the MOD and within military units, widespread impact is not possible. The real aim of IMET, some maintain, is to cultivate relationships between US and officers abroad so that former IMET participants who later reach positions of influence will be friendly to US interests. The cost per participant is great, but the gamble is that the investment is well worth it if even just a few of the “bets” payoff.

While an influential tool in the overall US military assistance effort in the region, and in the Czech Republic in particular, program implementation limitations and the limited number of participants restrict the transforming effect that this specific lever of influence can wield. Improved standards of student selection and utilization that are more actively monitored by the US and appreciated by the participating militaries could make the effort more effective. Continuing to target more of the spending on English language training and on civilians motivated to apply their course work will also yield greater results. Or the resources could be focused on designing new programs aimed at influencing transitioning states’ education and training needs.

⁶³ Security assistance memo attained in Prague, March, 1995.

The Marshall Center

Six Russians and four Czechs have participated in each of the three classes that have gone through the Marshall Center since its inaugural class graduated in December 1994.⁶⁴ It is difficult to assess the impact of this particular military democratization tool, because only a few officers and civilians have had the opportunity to attend since the program was launched. However, the comments of some of the school's first students indicate that they are benefiting from the opportunity to attend the Garmisch retreat.

The spokesman for the Russian students, Grigory Zaitsev of the Russian Foreign Ministry, said "It's important for us to keep sending people here -- a lot of our military don't have enough knowledge of questions of planning and civilian control of the army."⁶⁵ Another Russian graduate of the five month course on the relationship between democratic governments and their militaries, Lt. Colonel Sergei Soldatenkov, said that, "They are trying to do good things [here]. I will tell other officers that the experience was worth it. But I'm not sure that I'll be able to continue. Back in Moscow, it will be easy to lose touch."⁶⁶

The Czech senior officers who attended as members of the first class universally found the experience to be worthwhile. The four officers, all members of the General Staff, related their experiences in a March 1995 interview. Led by General Pavel Jandacek, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, these officers agreed that the course was an

⁶⁴ E. Douglas Menarchik, Marshall Center faculty member, telephone interview by author, 25 September 95.

⁶⁵ Malcolm Shearmur, "Defense Planning Courses Learning Not to Spy," *The Warsaw Voice*, 15 January 95. Obtained from the Lexis-Nexis News Service.

⁶⁶ Justin Burke, "Red to White: Ex-Communists Taught Democracy 101," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 19 December 94. Obtained from the Lexis-Nexis News Service.

opportunity to meet with democracy on a wider scope and to get familiar with the situation of security in Europe. General Jandacek added that his previous understanding of democracy was that it meant that everyone was entitled to their own opinion. He realized, though, by participating in the Marshall Center program with his colleagues from across the region that it was also important to get others to agree with his opinion if change was to be possible.⁶⁷ His colleague added that he learned that in democratic thinking all conclusions on a particular issue may be different, but none of them is necessarily wrong.⁶⁸

The group of Czech graduates agreed that the success of the Marshall Center in the long run will depend on several factors. First, countries must responsibly select the students who attended. The ACR sent four of its most influential officers, but they were certain that other countries had sent their “second strings” who could not have the same relative impact when they returned home. They warned that countries currently sending top officers will refrain from doing so in the future if they perceive that a universal standard of student selection is not taking place.

Zaitsev said that it was difficult to find Russians to come to the course because the Russian mass media had labeled the school as an instrument of American propaganda. “Bosses were afraid of sending personnel.” An American faculty member confirmed that the typical Russian student was average to above average compared to the others, but they were more hard line than most. He added that in a few instances attendance at the school

⁶⁷ Pavel Jandacek, General, Deputy Chief of the ACR General Staff, December 1994 Marshall Center graduate, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

⁶⁸ Jiri Martinek, Colonel, Chief of Operations, General Staff of the Czech Republic, interview by author, March 1995, Prague.

seemed to be some sort of reward unrelated to any motivation to apply the lessons learned at Garmisch at home.⁶⁹

Zaitsev added, "The course is very one-sided, but it's interesting for me to hear the opinions of others, particularly from the CIS countries."⁷⁰ The Russians' classmates from the former Eastern bloc complained, though, that the Russians brought with them an adversarial conception of NATO and this affected their attitude toward classmates from former Warsaw Pact states eager to gain NATO admittance. A Polish officer described this mentality as the biggest obstacle between them. "For them, it is all NATO, the US and the West on one side, and Russia and the East on the other. It is still the old way of thinking."⁷¹

General Jandacek said that he thought his Russian classmates did learn a lot in the course and that, "The discussions with them at the end of the course were quite different than the ones in the beginning. But they'll revert back to the norms of the home environment when they return. No one at home will believe what they learned."⁷² The Czechs complained, too, that the students were from states with such different levels of understanding about democratic principles that the pace of the program was too quick for those with very limited experience and too slow for those with more. However, the Marshall Center is reluctant to track students according to their states' levels of democratization due to political sensitivities.⁷³ The absence of officers from the West in

⁶⁹ Menarchik interview.

⁷⁰ Shearmur, "Defense Planning Courses Learning Not to Spy,".

⁷¹ *Moscow Times*, "Training the Military in the Art of Democracy," 31 December 94. Obtained from the Lexis-Nexis News Service.

⁷² Jandacek interview.

⁷³ Menarchik interview.

significant numbers also took away from the program leading the officers from the East to feel that they were inferior and that the West did not think that any lessons could be learned from them.⁷⁴

In response to a question about whether or not he thought a program that reached so few officers could ever make a significant impact, General Jandacek shared his “sand particle theory.” He said that the Marshall Center graduates will each go back as individual sand particles in their militaries that are a minute speck on the giant sand hill which comprises the whole military. But eventually there will be more and more sand particles who have had the experience and some may eventually attain the very top positions on the hill. Then these particles will be in a position to dominate the entire hill and communicate with others at the top of other hills. He added, that already in the few months since graduation, he has had the opportunity to deal with the Defense Minister in Latvia who was his classmate at Garmisch.⁷⁵

The effectiveness of the course within each post-communist state is dependent on the willingness of each participating country to send quality students and to draw on their expertise when they return home. Though the individuals affected thus far in the ACR have been few, it seems that the Marshall Center’s classroom and mountainous environment has had a positive impact on those Czech officers who were the first to enter its doors. But, the staff of the Marshall Center has its sights set on Russia as the most important target of this initiative due to its military primacy in the region. The current overall state of the Russian military which is plagued by corruption, declining morale

⁷⁴ Jandacek interview.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*

exacerbated by the war in Chechnya, widespread public disobedience of orders, ties with organized crime, and inappropriate participation in politics indicates that civilian control of the military is tenuous. Hopefully, the experience of Russia's Marshall Center graduates will not be individual encounters with the nature of liberal democracy and the role of the military within it -- but opportunities to bring these lessons to the Russian defense establishment at large which is in dire need of learning them. The potential exists for the Marshall Center to be a meeting place and democratic training ground of import for senior defense officials and officers across the post-communist region.

The Future of US Military Assistance Programs in Russia and the Czech Republic

The Russian MOD's strict control of defense and military contacts with the US means that the future of the program depends on the attitudes of the senior military leadership in the MOD. While Defense Minister Grachev has been somewhat positive about military to military contacts, General Kolesnikov, Chief of the General Staff, has been described as "a cold war Neanderthal dinosaur not interested in contacts."⁷⁶ US officers contend that most of the senior Russian generals give lip service to the effort in an attempt to be politically correct, but do not really support it.

Chechnya has driven home the limited degree that the Russian military has internalized reforms. The military leadership has also been able to successfully resist post-Chechnya efforts at military reform. Some US officers think that this reality should make the US reevaluate its approach of reaching out to the Russians. "A shotgun approach is not good enough. Any contact may not be good. We should be concerned if we are

⁷⁶ Freeman interview.

dealing with the right individual who is serious about absorbing what we have to offer.”⁷⁷

Meanwhile, the Russians have come to the conclusion that the political value of “hobnobbing” with us is declining. Both sides, then, are withdrawing in the relationship.

The part of the relationship that is considered most secure is the continuation of practical programs like Nunn-Lugar that are perceived as serving mutual interests. Additionally, program managers think the US should be persistent in its efforts of including younger officers in contacts in order to get them direct exposure to many of these ideas. Such an engagement may pay off in the long-run when the Soviet era military leadership finally fades into retirement.

In the Czech Republic no deadline has been set for the end of the Joint Contact Team Program. Originally envisioned as a short-term program, the JCTP has already survived beyond its initial projected life of two years and there are no immediate plans to shut down operations in any of the participating states. Policymakers have said, though, that when the program is slated to end, it will be phased out according to the progress made within each country. This chapter has documented how untenable that objective will be since, criteria for victory have never been announced or assessed throughout the program’s life. IMET and the Marshall Center are envisioned as long term programs that will continue indefinitely with the goal of achieving gradual impact in all of the post-communist states.

The infusion of Partnership for Peace funds into the region may gradually overshadow the JCTP and lead to its de facto demise. In fact, in March of 1995 EUCOM

⁷⁷ Wasserman interview.

headquarters issued a memo to its MLTs directing those operating within Partnership for Peace states to earmark 75 percent of all contacts to support the host nation's Partnership for Peace Individual Partnership Plan objective.⁷⁸ This would be a substantial shift from democratization objectives to goals centered on making post-communist militaries better fighting forces prepared to contribute to NATO. Focusing on the latter objectives without ensuring that the former have been accomplished is a dangerous prospect in the long term.

It seems, then, that in order to survive, the JCTP is internally shifting its focus from its original abstract, "never able to operationalize" goals of facilitating democratization to an emphasis on NATO interoperability issues. Maybe now, the JCTP will get into the assessment game with its new self-assigned more easily quantifiable mission. While such a switch may be a shrewd adaptation to the winds of congressional funding, it can also be seen as an abandonment of the JCTP's original mission. The question is, will anybody notice?

Conclusion

Perestroika and *glasnost* afforded the US an opportunity to engage the Soviet Union in democratization issues and the effort has continued in the post-Soviet era. Meanwhile, November 1989 marked the opening of the window of opportunity for the US to influence the process of democratic transition in Czechoslovakia, and, later, the Czech Republic. Within these overall efforts, the US military accepted its delegated role to influence the transition of the post-communist militaries. The goal was to facilitate the

⁷⁸ HQ USEUCOM memo dated 25 March 95 entitled "JCTP Goals".

development of military institutions which are democratically accountable and which act as positive factors in the overall progress of the democratic transitions.

Chapters five and six illustrated that democratization deficits still exist in both militaries studied in the areas of democratic political control and democratic military professionalism. The US should continue to monitor these deficits and exploit opportunities to positively influence them. However, an objective analysis of the US effort to assist in the democratization needs of Russia and the Czech Republic concludes that the US's attempt has fallen short of its potential. The ACR continues its struggle to become more proficient as a democratically accountable military institution and to achieve the standards of democratic military professionalism prevalent in the West. The Russian military, meanwhile, seems to be disinterested in making any progress in alleviating its democratic deficits.

The US's inability to overcome its own Cold War legacy as evidenced in the persistence of Cold War bureaucratic inertia accounts for much of the lack of success. The US was unable to release adequate resources from its defense arsenal still poised to counter the massive Soviet threat to fund and staff sufficiently efforts to ensure that post-communist militaries make the ideological and organizational shifts necessary to consolidate democracy in the region. Additionally, the lack of sufficient aid to the states at-large at the beginning of the transitions contributed to the dire economic conditions of many post-communist states and to the development of negative views about democracy. This is particularly true in the case of the Russian military.

Both the Russian and Czech cases illustrated the deficiencies of the uncoordinated and poorly conceptualized democratic military assistance programs that resulted. Particular attention was given, in the Czech case, to the US European Command's Joint Contact Team Program because it was the centerpiece of the effort to have a mass impact in Central and Eastern Europe. Research throughout the JCTP's area of responsibility in June and July 1994, revealed similar deficiencies across the American effort in the region. The JCTP's shortcomings, and those described in the program of Defense and Military Contacts with the FSU, indicate a lack of learning from previous military assistance efforts in the US military's history and the inability of the US military to exploit its political-military expertise to provide the theoretical underpinnings necessary for the programs' success. A first step toward making these programs more effective should be operationalizing the military democratization objectives to focus activity.

This chapter has presented two contrasting examples of recipients of US assistance and of the variations in assistance that exist in programs aimed at Central and Eastern Europe and the FSU. The Czech Republic was presented as a post-communist state enthusiastically accepting Western, and, in particular, US attempts to assist it. The main characteristic of the Russian case was its unwillingness to be assisted in a similar way. The inability and increasing unwillingness of the Russian military leadership to discard cold war thinking and practices has certainly impeded the development of the Russian military as a democratic institution. However, opportunities have been lost in both cases due to a failure to maximize all tools available to positively influence post-communist regimes at this critical transitional moment in history. The US should remain steadfast in its effort to

influence the process of democratization across the region and within military institutions in particular. The prize of a stable democracies as the successor states of the former Soviet bloc is too great a windfall for the international community not to pursue at every opportunity.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusions and Prescriptions for Improving Democratization Outcomes in the Post-Communist States

Chapter one illustrated that the promotion of democracy has been an enduring theme of American foreign policy throughout history, and increasingly in this century an important -- sometimes salient priority. A survey of US foreign policy behavior throughout the life of the republic reviewed the evolution of the struggle between the promotion of national interests and democratic values in the diplomacy of the United States. The US's assumption of the leading role in international politics among the democratic states after World War II paralleled the simultaneous acceptance among US policymakers that the protection of democratic values throughout the world was the responsibility of the United States.

The pursuit of this aim continued in the post-Cold War era as the goal of democratization was propelled to the forefront of US foreign policy. As a result, US foreign policy goals and grand strategy have increasingly become tied to the idea of pursuing the "democratic peace." Specifically, US policy has focused on facilitating the enlargement of the number of democracies in the international system¹ despite the dangers inherent in the transitional period of democratization.²

¹ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington DC: GPO, July 1994), p. i.

² Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, (Summer 1995): p. 5-38; Alexander V. Kozhemiakian, *Expanding the "Pacific Union": The Impact of the Process of Democratization on International Security*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1995.

The task of creating programs to carry out the US's democratization mission was undertaken in the heady days following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the collapse of communism in the region. US and allied policymakers from the democratic West congratulated themselves that their steadfast commitment to the promotion of democracy through the strategy of containment had finally worked. Actors on both sides of the former Iron Curtain had high expectations that democratic institutions and market economies would bloom as democratic political and economic principles were embraced by the long repressed citizens of the former Soviet bloc.

A specific outgrowth of the priority placed on the overall process of democratization in the post-communist states has been the ascendance of the promotion of democracy as a post-Cold War mission of the US military. Although analysts have focused most of their attention on the progress of civilian institutions in the transitioning states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, this study has shown that it is imperative that the compliance of post-communist military institutions with democratic norms not be overlooked. After all, military institutions possess the expertise and instruments of force which can be directed either at the preservation of democratic gains or at their destruction.

However, the combined effects of the lack of sufficient funding from Western coffers and an insufficient understanding of how best to foster democratic transitions in the post-communist states led to uneven results in the effectiveness of Western and US assistance efforts to the region. This was especially true of the US military's attempt to influence the democratization of post-communist military institutions.

The US military programs were flawed from the start because they did not address the scope of the military democratization problem across two critical dimensions -- democratic political control and democratic military professionalism. The military democratization initiatives also failed to adequately account for the institutional and systemic obstacles which are present when military institutions must transition from authoritarian to democratic political systems. In addition, the historical legacy of Soviet patterns of civilian control and military professionalism was not addressed. Finally, these efforts were woefully underfunded and poorly staffed.

Chapter two's presentation of a model for military institutions in democratic states emphasized how militaries can be democratically accountable and reflect democratic principles while also functioning as effective instruments of national security. The criteria of democratic political control and military professionalism developed in the chapter were offered as guideposts for success for militaries undergoing the process of democratization. Policymakers from the developed democracies working to support democratic transitions and internal actors within the post-communist states must all understand the dimensions of the military democratization problem. Success can never be declared if there are no benchmarks by which progress can be measured.

The task of democratizing the post-communist militaries is complicated by widely held, putatively classical assumptions of civil-military relations, promoted by such theorists as Samuel Huntington. These traditional views do not take into account the specific problems of states transitioning from authoritarian to democratic rule. Traditional interpretations of military professionalism ignore both *how* the officer corps comes to

accept the principle of civilian supremacy and *how* this professionalism is manifested in particular behaviors and practice. I argue that the ideological underpinnings of the state must play some role in the inculcation of the value of civilian supremacy in the officer corps. Ideological shifts, in turn, result in different forms of military professionalism, defined by norms and behavior patterns in the conduct of their social functions as “managers of violence.”

The development of separate models of democratic and Soviet style military professionalism in chapters two and three showed that military professionalism is not a static phenomenon immune to changes in political systems. Indeed, the analysis of military professionalism developed in chapter three demonstrated that there are many elements of the form of military professionalism practiced in the Soviet bloc that are incompatible with military professionalism in a democracy. Additionally, great adjustments must also be made to democratic methods of political control where multiple actors have legitimate roles in the process of democratic oversight. These differences cannot be addressed, however, unless military professionals from both systems are aware that they exist.

Chapter four began the process of assessing the match of theory and policy in the implementation of democratization assistance programs. The survey of the overall US democratization assistance effort showed missed opportunities at every level. Political, economic, and military programs were poorly conceptualized and consequently ineffectively carried out. The US military democratization programs, in particular, clearly lacked an understanding of the challenges confronting the post-communist militaries

confronted with the task of transitioning from authoritarian to democratic political systems.

An analysis of specific military democratization initiatives, which have been applied across the Soviet bloc, revealed low levels of funding, poor coordination among similar efforts, inconsistent mission statements, and an appalling lack of strategic vision for the achievement of military democratization objectives in the region. The inability of US military policymakers to diagnose the democratization needs of the transitioning militaries inevitably led to the prescription of inappropriate solutions for their problems. Consequently, the US military's contribution to the overall strategic aim of assisting in the process of democratic consolidation across the former Soviet bloc has been negligible.

Chapters five and six applied the criteria developed in chapter two for military institutions in democracies to two specific cases -- Russia and the Czech Republic. The military democratization needs of Russia and the Czech Republic were identified across the two critical dimensions of the military democratization problem -- the achievement of democratic political control and democratic military professionalism.

The evidence presented in chapter five illustrated that democratic deficits persist within both the civilian and military institutions of the transitioning cases that limit the full achievement of democratic political control. The specific democratic deficits explored included the existence of weak budgetary control, lack of expertise on defense issues, insufficient confidence within civilian oversight bodies to exercise control, limited political will to influence the defense process, poor relationships between ministries of defense and

parliaments, inadequate transparency throughout democratic institutions, and the strength of civilian and military leaders' commitment to democracy.

Chapter six examined the second critical dimension of the military democratization problem in the two cases -- democratic military professionalism. Once again the criteria for democratic military professionalism developed in chapter two were applied to the specific post-communist experiences of Russia and the Czech Republic. The evidence presented highlighted the difficulty of adapting inherited forms of military professionalism to the norms of democratic accountability found in the military institutions of developed democracies.

An examination of the democratic deficits explored across the cases in specific issue areas: recruitment and retention, promotion and advancement, officership and leadership, education and training, norms of political influence, and compatibility of military and societal values suggested that militaries transitioning from authoritarian to democratic political systems find themselves caught between two incompatible systems of military professionalism. Additionally, the evidence supported the contention that progress in the military sphere of democratization lags behind progress achieved in other transitioning democratic institutions.

The contrast between the experiences of Russia and the Czech Republic were clear and can be attributed to the varying degree of consensus on democratic norms and practices across democratizing post-communist institutions. Overall, a steady and unimpeded advance toward democratic consolidation characterized the Czech case, while Russia was shown to be sporadically moving forward and backward in its democratic

transition. The overall progress of democratization in each transitioning state subsequently affected the path of democratic transition for their militaries.

In both cases, the prevalence of democratic values and expectations as evidenced in the oversight capability of the developing democratic institutions, the media, and the society at large determined the extent of democratic political control of the armed forces. Adapting inherited forms of military professionalism from the Soviet era to the norms expected of militaries in service to democratic states also depended on societal attitudes toward democratic values and the ability of democratic institutions to enforce standards of democratic accountability.

In the Czech case there was greater consensus on the importance of consolidating democratic values and meeting Western democratic standards within all democratizing institutions -- including the military. In Russia democratic values have made some inroads in the authoritarian culture and expectations that they will continue to be protected to at least some degree have taken root. However, the actual implementation of norms of democratic accountability across all post-communist institutions has been met with stiff resistance from military and civilian authorities in the government who are reluctant to subordinate themselves to legitimate democratic oversight bodies.

The evidence showed that the needs for external assistance are great even in the most advanced of the cases. However, US military democratization programs have been plagued by their inability to develop a concrete framework to focus their assistance efforts. An analysis of the Czech and Russian cases across both dimensions of the military democratization problem laid out the specific democratization needs of these militaries

across a variety of issue areas. The hope is that the identification of specific democratization deficits will lead to deliberate efforts to address them and result in an end to the randomness that currently characterizes program activity.

Finally, chapter seven analyzed the effectiveness of the US military programs in the cases. An in-depth analysis of program activity in Russia and the Czech Republic was conducted in order to measure the degree to which the military democratization needs presented in chapters five and six were being addressed. An objective study of the implementation of the military assistance programs in Russia and the Czech Republic showed that the US's attempt has fallen far short of meeting the needs of these transitioning militaries. Although the attitude toward the West and Western assistance was markedly different between the two cases, with the Czech Republic's enthusiasm contrasting with Russia's reluctance, opportunities for influence have been lost in both cases, and, presumably, throughout the region.

The military to military outreach efforts between the US and the cases were found to be particularly deficient because they lacked adequate policy guidance and evaluation, sufficient funding, and appropriate staffing to carry out their vaguely conceptualized objectives. The shortcomings of the military democratization programs indicated a lack of learning from previous military assistance endeavors and a fundamental inability to exploit US political-military expertise in order to design effective programs.

Through the identification of specific shortcomings in the civil-military relations literature and an analysis of post-Cold War military democratization programs, this dissertation has attempted to develop the theoretical underpinnings needed to guide the

democratic transition of post-communist militaries that are lacking in both theory and practice. The hope is that the development of civil-military relations theory that is appropriate to the needs of the transitioning states in the former Soviet bloc will influence the work of US policymakers and domestic actors in the transitioning states engaged in the struggle to facilitate the democratic transitions of post-communist militaries.

Unfortunately, the role of the military institution in the democratization process of the post-communist states has been neglected at every level. Civil-military relations theorists have failed to offer appropriate solutions and recommendations for the specific problem of militaries transitioning from advanced authoritarian states to democratic states. The assumption that military professionalism is constant across political systems was subsequently reflected in assistance programs that did not address the distinctiveness of professional norms and practices between militaries in service to democratic political systems and those loyal to totalitarian regimes. The resultant emphasis on strategic interoperability instead of ideological issues related to the shift in the political system has led to the proliferation of programs whose implementers and overseers mistakenly believe are effectively addressing the problem of military democratization. In reality, however, these programs have done little to focus resources on the specific democratization needs of the post-communist militaries. Ironically, the efforts undertaken to date could actually be counterproductive because they have fostered military and strategic competence over ideological compatibility. There is a danger in providing such one-sided assistance to militaries serving states that have not yet become consolidated democracies and which consequently pose a greater threat to the stability of the international system.

The promotion of democracy in the post-Cold War world has emerged as a pillar of US foreign policy, but the pursuit of this aim, especially at the military level, has been ineffective. There are many reasons for this: the US's inability to overcome its own Cold War legacy, the scarcity of economic resources across the developed democracies, universal unfamiliarity with the unique problem of simultaneous political and economic transitions, and lack of public support for overseas assistance. While the current international context prohibits the influx of aid that even begins to approach Marshall Plan proportions, the limited appropriations released for democratization ends could be utilized much more efficiently if policymakers had a better understanding of which steps would lead more directly to democratization outcomes.

US military democratization efforts have a particularly acute need for such policy guidance rooted in sound analysis of the task at hand. Policymakers have shown a virtual ignorance of the dimensions of the military democratization problem and have been content to squander precious resources on the perpetuation of unfocused, random activities. An almost complete breakdown between theory and practice has characterized the effort due to the reliance on line officers without military-political expertise to design and implement program objectives.

Meanwhile, the task of democratic transition continues in the post-communist states within their societies at large and within their military institutions in particular. Whether or not these states ever join the family of consolidated democracies depends on their steady progress along a range of transitional issues. Their militaries are just one of many post-communist institutions in transition. However, the support of the military for

the overall process of transition, along with the realization that it, too, must adapt its patterns of political accountability and professionalism to democratic norms, is an essential condition for the achievement of democratic consolidation.

The advanced democracies have a tremendous stake in the outcome of these transitions. The outstanding question is whether or not history will condemn the substance of the assistance efforts aimed at achieving democratization in the post-communist states. So far the record on the military democratization front is long on criticism and short on commendations. Hopefully, the illumination of the defects of the current approach and the suggestions for refocusing program activity offered in this study will contribute to a change in the direction of military assistance to the post-communist states and bring the whole region one step closer to membership in the community of consolidated democracies.

APPENDIX A

Military to Military Contacts Conducted in the Czech Republic Through the Joint Contact Team Program

Table A.1: Events That Could Not Be Classified as Supporting Either the Enhancement of Democratic Civilian Control of the ACR or the Professionalization of the ACR as a Military Institution in a Democracy (Asterisked items indicate familiarization tours.)

Event Number	Description of Contact	Date of Contact
CZ-159	US Forces Organization	31 Aug - 2 Sep 93
CZ-162	US Army Parachute Team (show)	2 Sep -9 Sep 93
CZ-163	15th International Minuteman Competition (Germany)	10-12 Sep 93
CZ-169	Desert Storm Briefing	20-24 Sep 93
CZ-168	Force Structure Methodology	20-24 Sep 93
CZ-171	Tops in Blue Show (Entertainment Troupe)	21 Sep 93
CZ-198	Aviation Logistics FAM (Germany)	2-4 Oct 93
CZ-172	Cheb Shooting Competition	28-30 Oct 93
CZ-192	USAFE Ambassador Band (Concert)	3-7 Nov 93
CZ-195	Flight Safety	15-19 Nov 93
CZ-196	Follow Up Desert Storm Brief	22-24 Nov 93
CZ-30	Air Traffic Control Training	29 Nov-3 Dec 93
CZ-31	Chemical Defense Unit	6-10 Dec 93
CZ-22	C4 Assessment	12-18 Dec 93
CZ-37	Medical Services	13-17 Dec 93
CZ-38	Security Forces	13-17 Dec 93
CZ-43	Logistics Management	3-7 Jan 94
CZ-26 *	Czech Chemical Unit to US Chemical Unit FAM (Germany)	18-21 Jan 94
CZ-35	Logistics System Structure/Organization	24-28 Jan 94
CZ- 138 *	NATO Communications and Information Systems FAM (Germany)	24-28 Jan 94
CZ-114	Physical Fitness Programs	29 Jan - 4 Feb 94
CZ-21	Airspace Management	7-8 Feb 94
CZ-83	US General Officer Visit, Brig Gen Garret to CR	14-16 Feb 94
CZ-75 *	Security Police Information FAM (Germany)	14-18 Feb 94
CZ-36 *	Logistics Information System FAM (Germany)	21-26 Feb 94
CZ-42 *	Command and Control Reliability and Security FAM (Germany)	21-25 Feb 94
CZ-49 *	Command and Control Systems FAM (Germany)	21-25 Feb 94
CZ-72 *	Air Traffic Control FAM (Germany)	7-11 Mar 94
CZ-174	TX National Guard Visits to brief state partnership program	16-17 Mar 94
CZ-139	Brig Gen Lennon, Commander of JCTP, Visits	16-17 Mar 94
CZ-85	Air Defense at Corp and Division Level	21-25 Mar 94

Table A.1 (Continued):

CZ-173	US General Officer Visits to discuss C4	5 Apr 94
CZ-59	US Air Traffic Control Commander Visits CR	11-13 Apr 94
CZ-77	Environmental Security	11-15 Apr 94
CZ-142 *	Medical Conference FAM (Germany)	17-21 Apr 94
CZ-177	Brig Gen Lennon, CC of JCTP visits again	20-21 Apr 94
CZ-106	Peacetime Use of Engineering Troops	18-22 Apr 94
CZ-153	Cheb Shooting Competition	23-25 Apr 94
CZ-67	Ground Force Operations	25-29 Apr 94
CZ-50	Housing and Construction Services	25-29 Apr 94
CZ-184	Cheb International Shooting Contest	28-30 Apr 94
CZ-183	National War College Visit	2-5 May 94
CZ-97	Pilot Training Program	2-6 May 94
CZ-134 *	Military Engineering Conference (Germany)	2-6 May 94
CZ-115 *	Artillery Training FAM (Germany)	2-6 May 94
CZ-113	Field Construction	9-13 May 94
CZ-188	Peacekeeping School Briefing	17 May 94
CZ-147	Festival of Brass Bands	20-23 May 94
CZ-63 *	HQ to Brigade Command and System Reorganization FAM (Germany)	7-18 Jun 94
CZ-199 *	Civil Protection FAM (Slovakia)	13-17 Jun 94
CZ-44	Engineering Operations Planning	13-17 Jun 94
CZ-130 *	Real Property Management FAM (Germany)	27 Jun - 1 Jul 94
CZ-129 *	Fire and Hazardous Materials FAM (Germany)	27 Jun - 1 Jul 94
CZ-56 *	Deployment of Mechanized Operations FAM (Germany)	18-22 Jul 94
CZ-46	HQ to Brigade Command System Reorganization	7-11 Nov 94
CZ-218	Engineering Officer Exchange FAM (Germany)	17 Nov-5 Dec 94
CZ-52 *	Strategic Defenses Planning FAM (Germany)	30 Nov 94
CZ-121	Military Administration and Archives Preparation	30 Nov 94
CZ-88 *	Air Sovereignty Information FAM (US)	11-17 Dec 94
CZ-236	JAG Officer Exchange	31 Dec 94
CZ-244	Organization of Mechanized Forces Brigade	31 Dec 94
CZ-201 *	CZ 1st Corps Installation Bus Tour FAM (Germany)	31 Dec 94
CZ-267	Medical Information Systems FAM (US)	1-14 Jan 95
CZ-84	History of Air Force Operations in Conflicts	16-20 Jan 95
CZ-279*	Infantry Officer Exchange FAM (Germany)	30 Jan 95
CZ-281	Engineer Officer Exchange	30 Jan 95
CZ-278*	Air Defense Officer FAM (Germany)	30 Jan 95
CZ-256*	Tactical Communications FAM (US)	30 Jan 95
CZ-284*	Field Artillery Exchange FAM (Germany)	31 Jan 95
CZ-251	Beddown of Airbase Facilities	6-10 Feb 95
CZ-290	Lt Gen Keller Visit (US General and EUCOM Senior Officer)	9-11 Feb 95
CZ-275*	Rotary Wing Unit FAM (Germany)	13-16 Feb 95
CZ-258	Communications Forces Training	18-25 Feb 95
CZ-268	Information Officer Observer Exchange	4-17 Mar 95
CZ-280	Engineer Officer Exchange	5-11 Mar 95
CZ-273	Geodetic Security	13-16 Mar 95
CZ-270	Logistics Training in the US Army	18-25 Mar 95

Table A.1 (Continued):

CZ-269	Health care Logistics/Military Pharmacy FAM (Germany)	19-23 Mar 95
CZ-283	Armor Officer Exchange	30 Mar 95
CZ-263	Air Traffic Control Operations	1-5 Apr 95
CZ-292	Tactical Flying Training Programs	1-7 Apr 95
CZ-255	Military Health Care Logistics	3-7 Apr 95
CZ-265*	Health Care Personnel FAM (US)	9-15 Apr 95
CZ-317	Operations Planning Interoperability	20-27 Apr 95
CZ-299	Air Defense Observer Exchange	5-10 Apr 95
CZ-316*	Corps Level Plans and Operations FAM (Germany)	11-15 May 95
CZ-305	Disaster Relief Planning	20-26 May 95
CZ-318	Command Post Tactical Communications	23-30 May 95
CZ-319*	Computerized Simulators FAM (Germany)	25-29 May 95
CZ-331	Field Tactical Communications and Control	10-15 Jun 95
CZ-315	Legal Jurisdiction of Troops	15-20 Jun 95
CZ-330*	Conduct of Training in Mechanized Units FAM (US)	19-25 Jun 95

Table A.2: Events That Could Be Categorized as Supporting the Enhancement of Democratic Civilian Control

Event Number	Description of Contact	Date of Contact	Specific Democratization Area Addressed
CZ-197	Resource Management	4-7 Oct 93	US experts discussed resource management issues with members of the General Staff and military finance personnel.
CZ-141	Legal Conference FAM (US)	2-9 Mar 94	Czech military legal experts went to Washington DC to receive legal briefings from US experts.
CZ-143	Resource Management	10-12 Mar 94	Expert from National Defense University presented briefing on defense resource management.
CZ-189	Legal Support I	21 Jun - 5 Aug 94	Col Janega, USMCR, consulted with Czech military legal experts about the draft law for military service.
CZ-205	Legal Support II	30 Nov 94	Team of US military lawyers discussed the UCMJ and other aspects of the US military legal structure.
CZ-73	Resource Management FAM (Germany)	30 Dec 94	Czech planning officers received a 1 hour briefing on financial management procedures.
CZ-325	Corps Level PPBS FAM (Germany)	1-5 April 95	

Tables A.3-A.7: Events that could be categorized as supporting an aspect of professionalization of the ACR as a military institution in a democracy

Table A.3: Recruitment and Retention

Event Number	Description of Contact	Date of Contact	Specific Democratization Area Addressed
CZ-167	Officer Accession and NCO Development	19-24 Sep 93	Group of US officers from Maxwell AFB presented a briefing
CZ-326	Personnel Management/Recruiting FAM	3-14 Apr 95	
CZ-329	Personnel Management/Recruiting TCT	5-12 Jun 95	-

Table A.4: Promotion and Advancement

Event Number	Description of Contact	Date of Contact	Specific Democratization Area Addressed
CZ-87/47	Rank/Duty Position Compatibility and Career Development.	24-28 Jan 94	Czech personnel directorate received briefings on various personnel management topics.
CZ-76	Veteran/Retiree Benefits	13-16 Nov 94	NA
CZ-112	Civil-Military Personnel System FAM (Germany)	29 Jan-4 Feb 94	NA
CZ-191	Personnel Management	1-3 Jun 94	US military personnel experts presented information to Czech personnel officers

Table A.5: Education and Training

Event Number	Description of Contact	Date of Contact	Specific Democratization Area Addressed
CZ-160	English Language Instructor Conference (Germany)	31 Aug - 8 Sep 93	Czech English language instructors attended a conference in Germany
CZ-164	USAFA Cadet Exchange	11-24 Sep 94	5 Czech cadets and 1 officer visited the USAFA

Table A.6: Officership and Leadership

Event Number	Description of Contact	Date of Contact	Specific Democratization Area Addressed
CZ-167	Officer Accession and NCO Development	19-24 Sep 93	Group of officers from Maxwell AFB presented a series of briefings.
CZ-14	Mathies NCO Academy FAM (UK)	18-22 Jan 94	3 CZ Air Defense Colonels went to a US NCO Academy in the UK. Goal was to provide visitors with information on how the US educates and trains NCOs and to show how service members live, work, and play. Also showed how the US provides for the health and welfare of its airmen.
CZ-33	Maj Gen Kuba Visit to US Base FAM (Germany)	15-16 Feb 94	Major General Kuba, Chief of CZ Ground Forces, and 5 CZ officers toured US tactical units and training facilities.
CZ-60	General Major Matejka Visit to US Base FAM (Germany)	10-12 Mar 94	Gen Matejka and 4 colonels tour US tank training and facilities in Germany.
CZ-135	CZ Senior Leadership/General Officer FAM (Germany)	12-14 Apr 94	Senior CZ officers including Chief of Gen Staff hosted by Lt Gen Keller HQ USEUCOM. Saw US base and support structures.
CZ-200	NCO Orientation	15 Apr 94	MLT members visited a CZ Air Defense Unit to hold informal discussions with junior officers and NCOs of the brigade.
CZ-133	Professional NCO Corps FAM (Germany)	25-29 Apr 94	Lt. and Capt Commanders went to US NCO Academy in Germany and HQ EUCOM. Met with students and learned about the duties and responsibilities of NCOs
CZ-180	Role of the NCO	9-16 May 94	4 US Senior NCOs briefed the role of NCOs and toured CZ training facilities.
CZ-252	General Officer Visit to US	11-12 Oct 94	NA
CZ-320	Commander/Human Care Officer Program	12-18 Mar 95	US Navy Flag Officer from Joint Staff toured facilities and talked about the importance of human care of the troops as a responsibility of a commander.

Table A.7: Prestige and Public Relations

Event Number	Description of Contact	Date of Contact
CZ-48	Community Relations	30 Jan - 3 Feb 94

Additionally, a series of events occurred sponsored by the Chaplains assigned to the Joint Contact Team in Stuttgart. These events were justified as facilitating the democratization process of the ACR because they encouraged the development of chaplaincy programs. They were also meant to foster the development of "quality of life" issues aimed at supporting the individual soldier and his/her family considering the whole context of their life situation. These events also indirectly support officership goals in that they encourage commanders to look out for the spiritual needs of those under their command and to protect their rights. All of these events were conducted by a single American USAF chaplain acting independently of the MLT who did not provide records of his contacts or progress to the MLT.

Table A.8: Chaplain Related Events

Event Number	Description of Contact	Date of Contact	Specific Democratization Area Addressed
CZ-128	Chaplaincy Conference (Stockholm)	31 Jan - 4 Feb 94	2 Czechs attended NATO chaplaincy conference.
CZ-125	Chaplaincy	20-23 Feb 94	EUCOM Chaplain Visited CR
CZ-245*	Chaplaincy FAM	22 Aug-3 Sep 94	NA
CZ-246	Chaplaincy TCT	31 Oct 94	NA
CZ-248	Chaplaincy TCT	7-11 Nov 94	Chaplain Supa discussed the establishment of human/spiritual care services.
CZ-249	Chaplaincy TCT	5-9 Dec 94	NA
CZ-287	Human Care Services TCT	28 Feb-10 Mar 95	NA

APPENDIX B

Military to Military Contacts Conducted in Russia
Through the Defense and Military Contacts Program

Table B.1: Defense and Military Contacts with Russia That Could Not Be Classified as Specifically Supporting Either the Enhancement of Democratic Civilian Control or the Professionalization of the Russian Military as a Military Institution in a Democracy (Exchanges of delegations and high ranking officers that could not be attributed to a specific functional area of the democratization framework developed in chapter 2 were included in this table.)

Description of Contact	Date of Contact
Rifle and Pistol Competition at Fort Benning, GA	10-17 January 91
Soviet Incidents at Sea Delegation Visits US for Annual Review	7-14 May 91
US Coast Guard Cutter Visits Vladivostok	26-30 May 91
Military Staff Talks on Research in the USSR	3-8 Jun 91
Soviet Ships Visit Mayport, FL	16-20 Jul 91
CJCS Colin Powell Visits USSR	22-28 Jul 91
USAF LTG Jaquish (Acquisitions) Visits USSR	14-21 Aug 91
Far East Commander Kovtunov Visits US (Alaska, California, and Hawaii)	8-15 Sep 91
Air Force Chief of Staff McPeak Visits Russia	1-8 Oct 91
CINC of CIS Navy Chernavin Visits US	4-10 Nov 91
Soviet Rear Services Delegation (Logistics) Visits US	3-7 Dec 91
Visit to Washington by CIS CINC Shaposhnikov (with President Yeltsin)	1 Feb 92
USAF Strategic bombers and a Tanker Visit Russia	4-8 Mar 92
Sec Def meets with Russian Deputy MOD Grachev in Brussels	31 Mar 92
Visit by the Commander of CIS Air Forces Deynekin	7-12 May 92
US Military Band participates in Moscow for commemoration of end of WWII	9 May 92
Visit by Russian Officers to US military chaplains	17-21 May 92
Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Annual Review and Navy Staff Talks in Russia	20-27 May 92
US Coast Guard-Russian Arctic Search and Rescue Exercise in Bering Sea	9-13 Jun 92
Chief of Naval Ops (CNO) Admiral Kelso Visits Russia	14-19 Jun 92
DepSecDef Atwood Meets with Russian FM Kozyrev to sign agreements on nuclear weapons SSD	17 Jun 92
US Ship Visit to Severomorsk and PASSEX	1-5 Jul 92
23rd Army Band Visits St. Petersburg	7-18 Jul 92
DepSecDef Atwood Meets with Acad. Kuntsevich to Sign CW Agreement	10 Jul 92
Visit by Russian Air Force Fighter Aircraft	13-17 Jul 92
DIA Director LTG Clapper Visits Moscow	18-21 Jul 92
USSPACECOM Visit to Baykonur Cosmodrome	27 Jul - 1 Aug 92
US Army Participation in Kayak Competition in Russian Far East	1-12 Aug 92
USAF Delegation Visit to Moscow Airshow	10-18 Aug 92

Table B.1 (Continued):

Dep SecDef Atwood Meets with Russian UN Ambassador Voronstov	18 Aug 92
CINCPAC Visit to Russia	24-28 Aug 92
US Navy Blue Angels Visit Russia	4-5 Sep 92
US Army Foreign Military Studies Office Visit to Russia	6-11 Sep 92
USAF Fighter Aircraft Visit Russia	14-18 Sep 92
CMC General Mundy Visits Russia	13-19 Sep 92
Ship Visit to Vladivostok for Consulate Opening	20-22 Sep 92
Russian Ships Arrive in Gulf to Participate in MIF	2-3 Oct 92
DepSecDef Atwood Meets with Amb Lukin to Sign Agreement on Nuclear Storage Facility	6 Oct 92
CIS Gen Stolyarov Visits Chaplains Board	13 Oct 92
Visit by GRU Chief Ladygin	7-14 Nov 92
Bilateral Working Group in Russia	15-16 Dec 92
Visit by EUCOM J-5 to Russia	1-3 Feb 93
CINC Russian Ground Forces Semenov Visit to US	13-20 Feb 93
Russian Participation in Military Ski Event	1-6 Mar 93
Russian Military Historians Visit US	14-28 Mar 93
US-Russia Search and Rescue Exercise Planning Conference	17-22 Mar 93
Russian Air Traffic Control Delegation Visits US	21-24 Mar 93
SecDef Meets with Russian Foreign Minister	25 Mar 93
US Military Chaplains/General Officers Visit Russia	29 Mar 93
Search and Rescue Exercise in Russian Far East (Tiksi)	19-24 April 93
Russian Participation in US Military Medical Seminar	19-24 Apr 93
PACOM-Russian FEMD Working Group Meeting	22-29 Apr 93
CJCS Meeting With CIS CINC in Brussels	28 Apr 93
US-Russian Joint Staff Talks in US	3-7 May 93
US-UK-Russian Naval Conference in the UK	3-7 May 93
Russian Rear Services Delegation Visits US	22-27 May 93
Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Review and Navy Staff Talks	22-29 May 93
Russian Ship Visit to New York City	26 May-1 Apr 93
Russian Air Force Regiment Visits Charleston AFB	4-9 Jun 93
Sec Def Meeting with MOD Grachev in Europe	5-6 Jun 93
DIA Visit to Moscow	7-11 Jun 93
Russian Navy Participation in BALTOPS Exercise	16-17 Jun 93
Russian Air Force Engineering Academy Visit to Edward AFB	21-26 Jun 93
USAF Test Pilots Visit Russia	30 Jun - 4 Jul 93
Russian Ship Visit to Boston	7-10 Jul 93
Russian General Koltunov visits OSD	20 Jul 93
Russian participation in PACOM RC Conference	1-7 Aug 93
Russian visit to TRANSCOM	14-18 Aug 93
US Coast Guard-Russian Search and Rescue Exercise Planning Meeting	18 Aug 93
CSA Visit to Russia	18-24 Sep 93
USN Ship Visit to Vladivostok	18-20 Sep 93
Russian visit to DEOMI at Patrick AFB	27-30 Oct 93
Asst SecDef Horton Visits Moscow on Hotline	1-6 Nov 93

Table B.1 (Continued):

DepSecDef visit to Russia on Conversion	7-11 Nov 93
Russian General Lobov participates in US Army conference on geopolitics and security	18-23 Nov 93
CINC Russian SRF Visits the US	28 Nov - 3 Dec 93
Vice Admiral Smith Visits Moscow on Submarine Talks	13-16 Dec 93
Russian Visit to Ft. Leavenworth on Peacekeeping	13-17 Dec 93
Visit by Russian General Manilov on Doctrine and Security Policy	3-6 Jan 94
UnderSecDef Wisner and Asst to CJCS LtGen Ryan Meet with Russian MOD - General Staff During Moscow Summit	4 Jan 94
US-Russian Search and Rescue Exercise Planning Conference in Alaska	19-21 Jan 94
PACOM O-6 Working Group Meeting in Russian FEMD	24-30 Jan 94
Visit to OSD by Russian MOD Environmental Chief Grigorov	14-15 Feb 94
CG 3ID and Staff Visit Russian 27th GMRD on Peacekeeping Exercise	14-18 Feb 94
USN P-3 PASSEX with Russian Ship in South China Sea	16 Mar 94
US-Russian-Canadian Search and Rescue Exercise II in Alaska	21-25 Mar 94
DOD Sponsored Historical Conference in Washington	21-25 Mar 94
Peacekeeping Seminar at Ft. Leavenworth	21-27 Mar 94
EUCOM J-5 Maj Gen Link Visits Moscow and Meets with Border Guard Commander Nikolayev	28 Mar 94
Visit of CINC Russian Space Forces Ivanov to SPACECOM	11-15 Apr 94
Planning Conference for US-Russian June Amphibious Exercise	20-25 Apr 94
US-Russian Bilateral Working Group Meeting (and SSWG Meeting)	4-6 May 94
Visit by Gen-Col Kulikov, Russian DepMin for Internal Affairs	7-8 May 94
DEOMI Participation in Russian Humanitarian Academy Conference	22-25 May 94
CINTRANSKOM Visit to Russia	23-27 May 94
Dep CINC USAREUR Visit to Russia on Peacekeeping Exercise	26-28 May 94
Visit by Russian Border Guard Commander Gen-Col Nikolayev	1-5 Jun 94
USN Ship Visit to Baltiysk Russia	17-19 Jun 94
Ship Visit with 3D Marine Division Commander to Vladivostok and a US-Russian Maritime Disaster Relief Exercise	18-23 Jun 94
Visit to Naval War College for US-Russian-Ukrainian Cooperative Game	20-25 Jun 94
USN Test Pilot School Visit to Russia	22-25 Jun 94
USN Ship and Navy Oceanographer Visit to St. Petersburg	28 Jun - 2 Jul 94
US-Russian O-6 Working Group Meeting at PACOM	4-11 Jul 94
DIA Director LtGen Clapper Visit to Russia	8-15 Jul 94
Visit by Russian MOD Communications Chief Gen-Lt Gichkin	18-22 Jul 94
CG 3ID and Staff Visit to Totskoye Russia on Peacekeeping Exercise	26-30 Jul 94
Naval War College Students Participate in Academy of Science Conference	31 Jul - 10 Aug 94
US Coast Guard-Russian Maritime Border Guards Search and Rescue Exercise	2-5 Aug 94
Russian Flight Test Center Visit to NAS Paxtuxent	15-20 Aug 94
Sister base visit to Barksdale AFB by Russian aircraft	21-26 Aug 94
US Delegation Visits Russia for Joint Staff Talks	22-28 Aug 94
CINC STRATCOM Admiral Chiles Visit to Russian Strategic Rocket Forces	28 Aug - 3 Sep 94
Peacekeeping Field Training Exercise in Totskoye Russia	2-10 Sep 94
OSD and EUCOM Observers Visit Russian Disaster Relief Exercise	4-10 Sep 94
US Coast Guard-Russian Maritime Border Guards Search and Rescue Exercise Off Alaska	4-10 Sep 94

Table B.1 (Continued):

Defense Mapping Agency Visit to Russia	21-28 Sep 94
USS Belknap Visit to Novorossiysk, Russia	4-6 Oct 94
Russian SRF Delegation Visit to STRATCOM	17-21 Oct 94
SSWG Meeting in Moscow	17-18 Oct 94
Russian Participation in the USN Sponsored Black Sea Invitational Naval Exercise	20-26 Oct 94
Russian Sister Base Visit to Edwards AFB	21-26 Oct 94
Russian Participation in PACOM MILOPS Conference	30 Oct - 4 Nov 94
Navy Test Pilot School Delegation to Russia	2-12 Nov 94
Commandant US Coast Guard Visit to Russia	8-11 Nov 94
Gen-Lt Bogdanov from the Russian General Staff Visit to DJ-5 and Installations	14-22 Nov 94
DOD Delegation Observation of a Russian Disaster Relief Exercise	16-23 Nov 94
Russian Participation in the EUCOM Law of War Conference at the Marshall Center	5-9 Dec 94
Airborne Troops Delegation to Ft. Bragg	Feb 1995
General Staff Delegation to Attend USPACOM Peacekeeping Seminar	Mar 1995
US Joint Staff Talks Steering Group Delegation	April 1995
USAF Delegation from Langley AFB to the Frontal Aviation Center at Lipetsk	April 1995
US Navy Delegation to trilateral US-Ukraine-Russia talks	April-May 1995
USAF Delegation on Airspace Control Visit to Russia	April-May 1995
US Naval Ship Visit to St. Petersburg	May 1995
Coordination Visit for Aircraft from Barksdale to Visit the Bomber Aviation Base at Ryazan in June	May 1995
Delegation of US Veterans to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of WWII	May 1995
US STRATCOM Delegation to Strategic Rocket Forces for Technical Seminar	May-June 1995
Delegation Headed by the Chief of the Main Staff of Ground Forces to US Army Facilities	June 1995
Delegation headed by DepAsstSecDef for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence to Russia	June 1995
CINC Space Command Visit to Russia	June 1995
US Pacific Command O-6 Working Group delegation Visit to Russia	June 1995
Coastal Forces of the Fleet Delegation to US Marine Corps Facilities	June 1995
Air Defense Force Units Visit Elmendorf AFB, Alaska	June-July 1995
Fourth Frontal Aviation Delegation to Langley AFB	June-July 1995
General Staff Delegation for Joint Staff Talks	August 1995
Delegation headed by Commander US Pacific Air Forces to Khabarovsk	August-September 1995
Chief of Naval Ops Visit to Russia	Fall 1995
Russian Navy CINC Visit to US	TBA 1995
USAF Delegation from Edwards AFB to the Schelkovo Research Center	September-October 1995
Strategic Rocket Forces Delegation to Attend US STRATCOM Space and Missile Competition at Vandenberg AFB	September-October 1995
Delegation from the Rocket Forces and Artillery of Ground Forces to Ft. Sill	September-October 1995
US Army Delegation from 6ID to an exercise in the Far East Military District	TBA 1995
US Navy Delegation for Navy Staff Talks and Incidents at Sea Review	TBA 1995

Table B.1 (Continued):

Bilateral Working Group Delegation to Russia	Fall 1995
Russian Delegation Headed by the Commanders of the Far East Military District and the 1st Air Army to USPACOM	TBA 1995
Main Intelligence Directorate of General Staff Delegation to US	TBA 1995
Ships from the Russian Pacific Fleet with Naval Infantry On-board Visit US and Conduct a Combined "Cooperation from the Sea" Exercise	TBA 1995

Table B.2: Contacts That Could Be Categorized as Supporting the Enhancement of Democratic Civilian Control

Description of Contact	Date of Contact	Area of Democratic Civilian Control Addressed
DepSec Def Atwood Visits Russia on Defense Conversion	29 Oct-5 Nov 91	Exposure to top civilian defense official
US Military Journalists Visit Russia	8-11 Oct 91	Democratic accountability, relationship with society, prestige and public relations
Under Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and four Service Operations Deputies Russia	19-22 Feb 92	Exposure to top civilian defense official
Visit by Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Kokoshin	8 Jun 92	Kokoshin is the only high ranking civilian with the MOD
Visit by Russian President Yeltsin accompanied by MOD Grachev	16-17 Jun 92	Both had opportunities to meet with US counterparts responsible for democratic civilian control of US armed forces
DepUnderSecDef for Policy Libby Visits Moscow	15-18 Jul 92	Exposure to Top Civilian OSD Official
Secretary of the Army Stone Visits Moscow	2-3 Oct 92	Democratic accountability, Exposure to Top Army Civilian
UnderSec Wolfowitz, Asst Sec Jehn, and UnderSec Libby Visit Russia	10-15 Oct 92	Exposure to Top Civilian OSD Officials
Russian Dep MOD Kokoshin Visits US	17-18 May 93	More exposure to US Civilian Control by only top ranking civilian in Russian MOD
Russian Dep MOD Gromov Visits US	20 May 93	Military MOD official gets exposure to US system of Civilian Control
Russian MOD Grachev Visits US	8-10 Sep 93	Top MOD official gets exposure to top US DOD civilian officials
Asst Sec Def Allison visits Moscow	4-5 Nov 93	Exposure to Top Civilian Defense Official
SecDef Visit to Russia	17-18 Mar 94	Top US Civilian Defense Official Meets with Russian Counterpart
Visit by Russian Dep MOD Kokoshin with PM Chernomyrdin	21-23 Jun 94	Opportunity for Russian Civilian Defense Official to Meet with US Counterparts

Table B.2 (Continued):

UnderSecDef - Policy and Rep Dorn Visit Russia	20-21 Jul 94	Exposure to Top Civilian Defense Official
SecDef Meeting with Russian MOD Grachev in New York	26 Sep 94	Meeting Between Top Defense Officials
SecDef Meeting with Russian MOD Grachev during Washington Summit	27 Sep 94	Meeting Between Top Defense Officials
AsstSecDef Carter holds first SSWG in Moscow	21 Oct 93	Exposure to Top Civilian Defense Official
AsstSec Def Allison visits Moscow	21-24 Oct 93	Exposure to Top Civilian Defense Official
AsstSecDef Allison Visits Moscow	28-31 Dec 93	Exposure to Top Civilian Defense Official
AsstSecDef Carter Visit to Russia	7-9 Sep 94	Exposure to Top Civilian Defense Official
Visit of Russian Duma Delegation to Norfolk and the Pentagon	30 Sep - 4 Oct 94	Parliamentary Control
DepSecDef Visit to Russia	Jan 1995	Exposure to Top Civilian Defense Official
SecDef Visit to Russia	April 1995	Exposure to Top Civilian Defense Official

Table B.3: Contacts That Could Be Categorized as Supporting an Aspect of Professionalization of the Russian Military as a Military Institution in a Democracy

Contact Description	Date of Contact	Area of Professionalism Addressed
Medical Service Delegation (Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation)	22-27 April 91	Retention, Education and Training, Leadership, and Prestige
Military Academy of the General Staff Visits US	28 May-4 June 91	Education and Training
IMET Team Visit to Moscow	22-26 Jul 92	Leadership and Officership, Education and Training: Presented opportunity for Russians to attend US military schools
Visit by Russian Military Medical Experts in Substance Abuse Treatment	1-11 Jul 92	Retention, Education and Training, Leadership, and Prestige
Russian Cadets Visit West Point	6-10 Jul 92	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
Air War College Visit to Russia	16-27 Sep 92	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
Gagarin Air Academy Visits US	2-6 Nov 92	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
Russian IMET Orientation Visit to US	1-15 Dec 92	Leadership and Officership, Education and Training

Table B.3 (Continued):

LTG Shoffner and Delegation from Command and General Staff College Visit Russia	6-12 Dec 92	Leadership and Officership, Education and Training
Russian Visit to the US Air Force Academy	6-14 Mar 93	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
USMA Cadets Visit Russia	12-21 Mar 93	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
Frunze Commandant Visit to Ft. Leavenworth (US Army Command and General Staff College)	27-28 May 93	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
US-Russian Midshipmen Exchange	28 May-15 Jun	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
Russian Cadets Visit USMA	15-21 Jul 93	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
Russian Army Staff visit to TRADOC (Training Command)	26-31 Jul 93	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
Russian visit to Air University	26-31 Aug 93	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
US Army Foreign Military Studies Office Visit to Frunze Academy	6-10 Sep 93	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
HQ DA Visit to Frunze on FAO Training	7-9 Sep 93	Explore possibility of US Army officers studying at Frunze
US Army Combined Arms Center Visit to Russian Vystrel Training Center	23-27 May 94	Education and Training
Visit by Russian IMET Orientation Team	16-30 Jun 94	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
USAF Air Education and Training Command Visit to Russia	16-30 Jun 94	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
USAF Institute of Technology Visit to Zhukovsky Engineering Academy	18-24 Jul 94	Education and Training
Visit by Russian Army Squad to Alaska	2-19 Sep 94	Officership and Leadership
Kachinsky Academy Staff Visit USAF Academy on Sister Base Visit	12-18 Sep 94	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
Visit of Russian General Officer Delegation to Naval War College at Newport and Washington	25-28 Sep 94	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
Frunze Staff Visit to Marshall Center	22-28 Sep 94	Education and Training
Delegation of the High-Level Officers Course at Vystrel to Ft. Leavenworth	Feb 1995	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training

Table B.3 (Continued):

US Army Command and General Staff College Instructor Delegation to Frunze Academy	March 1995	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
USAF Delegation to Kachinsky Air Force Academy	April 1995	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training
Frunze Academy Delegation to US Army Command and General Staff College	TBA 1995	Officership and Leadership, Education and Training

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Feb 96-present: Assistant Professor, US Air Force Academy.

Aug 94-Jan 96: Doctoral Student, University of Illinois (Champaign-Urbana). On leave of absence from USAFA to write dissertation. Defended dissertation 29 January 96.

Jan 1993-Aug 94: Instructor, Department of Political Science, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO. *Courses*: "Introduction to International Relations," "Research Methods in Political Science," "Transitions to Democracies and Market Economies in the Former Socialist States."

1990-1993: Graduate Student, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. Fall 1990: Teaching Assistant for "Introduction to American Government."

1985-1990: Navigator, Instructor Navigator, Evaluator Navigator, 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, 349th Air Refueling Squadron, Beale AFB, CA, Strategic Air Command (SAC).

1984-1985: Student Navigator, 50th Flying Training Squadron, Mather AFB, CA.

RESEARCH, PRESENTATIONS, AND PUBLICATIONS

October 1995: Presented paper entitled, "Democracy and the Russian Military," at the Central Slavic Conference, Colorado Springs, CO.

- May 1995: Published article entitled, "When East Meets West: Fostering Democracy in Postcommunist States," in *Airpower Journal*. The article was the lead article of the special issue which featured the Air-Staff sponsored research projects funded through the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in the previous year.
- May 1995: Presented paper entitled, "When East Meets West: The Attempt of the US Military to Foster Democracy in the Postcommunist States," at the Society for Military History's annual conference in Gettysburg, PA.
- May 1995: Conducted two weeks of field research in Washington DC.
- April 1995: Presented paper entitled, "Civil Military Relations in Russia and the Impact of the War in Chechnya," at the National Defense Colloquium, US Air Force Academy.
- March and April 1995: Conducted field research in the Czech Republic and Russia on the impact of democratization on these militaries.
- November 1994: Presented paper entitled, "When East Meets West: The US Military's Efforts to Assist the Post-Communist States of the Former Eastern Bloc," at the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) annual conference at the US Air Force Academy. Received \$5000 grant from INSS for field research in the Czech Republic and Russia.
- April, June, and July 1994: Conducted research on the transitioning post-communist militaries in Eastern and Central Europe in Washington DC, HQ European Command, NATO HQ, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Romania, Russia, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic on an INSS research grant.
- December 1993: Received \$9000 grant from the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) to travel to the former Soviet Union and through Eastern Europe in the summer of 1994 to study and prepare a paper on the process and progress of military democratization efforts in the region.
- June 1993: Selected to participate in Women in International Security's (WIIS) summer symposium for young women scholars at St. Mary's College, MD and in Washington DC.
- May 1993: Presented paper entitled "From Yugoslavia to Russia: The Evolving Nature of the Post-Cold War International Security Regime," at the European Community Studies Association (ECSA) conference.

February 1993: Completed chapter, "International Security and the National Security Policy Maker," for 1994 edition of *The Encyclopedia of Policy Studies*, Marcel Dekker Press.

September 1992: Published essay on summer travel to former Soviet Union, "Inside the Enigma," *Swords and Ploughshares: The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security* 7, no.1 (Fall 1992), University of Illinois.

1991-1992: Published several book reviews in the German journal *Oesturoopa*.

EDUCATION

January 1996: Defended dissertation entitled, "Democratization and the Post-Communist Militaries: US Support for Democratization in the Czech and Russian Militaries." Dissertation deposited February 1996.

January 1993-January 1996: Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, ABD, January 1993. Major fields: International Relations and Comparative Politics. Minor Field: Former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc.

Summer 1992: Selected to participate in summer Russian language program sponsored by Indiana University in St. Petersburg, Russia followed by a two week cultural/study tour of Georgia and Moscow.

May 1992: M.A. Political Science, University of Illinois.

Summer 1991: Selected to attend the Russian language summer workshop at Indiana University.

May 1984: B.S. International Affairs, United States Air Force Academy.

HONORS AND AWARDS

July 1995: Named the runner-up in the competition for best Graduate Student Paper sponsored by the American-Soviet Successor States Relations section of the International Studies Association.

September 1994: Received the *Aaron Wildavsky Book Award* from the Policy Studies Organization as an outstanding chapter author for the best policy studies book published in 1993-94.

June 1994: Elected to a 5 Year Term Membership of the Council on Foreign Relations